Keep Space for Peace

Tom Unterrainer, END Info 50, November 2026 download pdf

Ken Coates warned in 2001 that plans surrounding the Bush Administration’s proposed ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ were:

a drop from the ocean of intended future military investment, in which the American space planners seek to unleash an arsenal from science fiction.

He also warned of the “crashing through of Cold War Treaties” designed to prevent the full militarisation of space. Until 14 September 2026, no state had confirmed what seemed possible: that they had put offensive weaponry in orbit for the purpose of destroying other objects in space. Rather, the focus was on using the ‘space domain’ for ‘terrestrial’ operations: mainly ‘missile defence’. This has now changed with the Secretary of the US Air Force, Troy Meink’s, admission that the US “has space weapons in orbit.”

In his 1958 argument for not going to the moon (‘Let’s not go to the moon’), Bertrand Russell wrote:

I should wish to see a little more wisdom in the conduct of affairs on earth before we extend our strident and deadly disputes to other parts.

Russell would no doubt be disappointed with current developments on at least two counts: first, that our affairs on earth have not been conducted with more wisdom - quite the reverse, in fact - and second, that we now have confirmation that our “deadly disputes” have reached into orbit and will no doubt reach, before too long, the moon and beyond.

Of course, the ‘Space Race’ has been consistently entangled with military concerns and not only in the imaginations of science fiction writers. Was not Werner von Braun, the ‘father’ of the US space programme, also the Nazi responsible for the design of Hitler’s V-2 rockets that rained terror down on London, Antwerp and Liège at the end of WWII? Was it not the case that whilst the schoolboys of Kettering Grammar School were tracking Sputnik’s signals with the awe and wonder of creative minds, other minds were focussed on the possibilities of delivering nuclear warheads by rocket rather than satellites?

For all the awe, wonder and hope, the first ‘Space Race’ was shaped by the reality of superpower rivalry and by 1967 - two years before the first moon landing - the world concluded that measures should be taken to prevent the presence of weapons of mass destruction in space. As this dossier outlines, efforts to extend the Outer Space Treaty to exclude any and all weapons from space have made little progress, despite the consistent efforts of Russia and China in a succession of draft treaties. As the previous 49 issues END Info have documented, treaties on weapons of mass destruction, their regulation and non-proliferation have been serially undermined and sabotaged. Will the Outer Space Treaty survive the second ‘Space Race’?

The peace movement must insist that it should and support efforts to extend it by proscribing all space-based weaponry.

The view from the moon

The Outer Space Treaty involves rather more than banning WMDs. Its provisions include a clause that exempts ‘space and celestial bodies ... from national claims of ownership.’ This clause is rather problematic for those like the Adam Smith Institute, who in 2022 proposed that the moon be parcelled up by individual states and rented out to private companies. For their part, the Institute reckons the Outer Space Treaty to be a model of “outdated thinking” that we must move beyond. Similar lines of thinking no doubt lurk behind President Trump’s social media post of 6 September 2026, which declared “The moon is ours” alongside a Stars and Stripes flag. To date, there has been no confirmation as to whether Trump’s characteristically unsubtle claim constitutes official policy or not. A month later, on 8 October 2026, Trump re-announced plans (already contained in a 2025 executive order) to establish a permanent US base on the moon at a science and technology summit. The fact that in 2020 NASA announced support for the private extraction of resources from the moon is another highly relevant data point.

Why is it that some of the richest individuals on earth have invested so heavily in space technologies? Could there be something in it for them other than the ‘thrill’ of low-orbit travel or an unleashing of creative impulses in the name of scientific endeavour? Surely there is.

Fred Hoyle, the astronomer and science fiction writer, wrote in 1948 that “once a photograph of the Earth, taken from the outside, is available, a new idea as powerful as any in history will be let loose.” ‘Earthrise’, the famous view of earth from the moon, is credited with inspiring awe - a cognitive shift, even - in astronauts, named  the ‘overview effect’.

The view from the moon continues to inspire and to be profound. It inspired a generation to take the fragility of our planet seriously and to work towards its preservation. For others, it no doubt inspired the present scramble for the moon - all the better to escape the confines of earth and to extract resources where no human has extracted before.

In his posthumously published work, Der Blick vom Mond (The view from the moon), Günther Anders asks, “What use is the moon?” and answers: raw material. The ever-increasing presence of private companies - often entangled with government initiatives and often beneficiaries of government funding and ‘assistance’ - seems to substantiate Anders’s claim.

A view from the earth

Take the view from Goonhilly, on the Lizard peninsula in Cornwall, as an example. Goonhilly is home to an ‘earth communications station’ and was first populated with dishes and antennae in the early 1960s. The first, Antenna One (nicknamed “Arthur”), was erected to receive signals from the Telstar satellite. Through “Arthur” and subsequent additions, British television viewers were able to receive video transmissions and could watch Muhammed Ali fight and the moon landings. The site is especially valued as it stands on thousands of feet of metamorphic rock, which provides great stability and helps reduce signal interference.

By 2014 the site, previously owned and operated by British Telecom, was being operated by Goonhilly Earth Station Ltd. This company secured contracts with the European Space Agency and went into partnership with an ill-fated plan to turn nearby Newquay airport into a commercial space port. In 2018, Goonhilly began a collaboration with other organisations aimed at commercial moon landing operations. In 2024, the earth station involved with the first commercial moon landing - and the first moon landing since Apollo 17 in 1972. This moon landing was a project of the Texas-based Intuitive Machines company. This company now plans to purchase the Goonhilly facility.

Intuitive Machines is one of fourteen companies awarded $1.843 billion of contracts by ‘Space Systems Command’, the US Space Force’s (the ‘space wing’ of the US military) development, acquisition, launch and logistics command. The purpose of the contract is to develop ‘Space Domain Awareness’ capabilities under the Andromeda program.

Dave Webb of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, describes Andromeda’s aims as enabling “predictive battlespace awareness that enables offensive and defensive space operations.” Goonhilly is now the world’s only fully commercial deep space station and will likely play a role in Andromeda.

Keep Space for Peace

It might be too late to ‘keep space for peace’ in all practical terms but we should aim to return peace to space. Why? Because the alternative is to permit the rampant militarisation and exploitation of not only earth orbit but of the moon and further reaches of the solar system. One driver of establishing a permanent presence on the moon is to more easily achieve travel to Mars, our nearest planetary neighbour. To achieve that, the moon will be raw material, just as earth is now raw material for those seeking to extract profit.

‘Let’s not go to the moon’, wrote Bertrand Russell with his still-pressing concerns about society on earth. The journey to the moon “was not the destination, but the starting point”, argued Anders: a “self-encounter with the Earth.” The most recent plans for lunar landings, the commercialisation and militarisation of the Heavens must be a further “self-encounter with the Earth” if we have any hope of long-term survival.

Flashpoint Briefing: Kaliningrad

Tom Unterrainer, END Info 50, November 2026 download pdf

In a diplomatic memo sent on 30 September 2026, Russia warned  that it had “information that NATO is preparing an air and naval blockade” of Kaliningrad, the Russian semi-exclave sandwiched between the Baltic Sea, Poland and Lithuania. Russia warned further that it “will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in order to defend its territory should NATO countries undertake any attempt aimed at isolating the Kaliningrad Region from the rest of the country.” This is not the first time that Russia has issued direct threats of nuclear use in the last few years. END Info 30 (March 2022) carried a series of statements released by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation following similar threats in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We asked Putin and other leaders of nuclear-armed states to “remember your humanity”, echoing the signal call of Russell-Einstein Manifesto. We further asked: “Who will provide a ladder for Putin to climb down?” (28/02/2022) and: Putin’s “‘deterrence’ flips to ‘escalate to de-escalate’. Where does that end?” (03/03/2022). The call remains unheeded and the questions remain unanswered by those with the power to soften increasingly sharp nuclear risks. In fact, rather than work towards any resolution or de-escalation, offers of negotiation and diplomacy have been ignored. Worse still, European rearmament has accelerated and talk of war is never far from the lips of European NATO leaders.

Kaliningrad

The territory of what is now the Kaliningrad Oblast has, like much of Europe, a long and convoluted history. The city of Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) was famously home to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. He was born in the city, died in the city and reportedly never left it. Yet in old age he had seen enough of the world pass before him to be moved to write a treatise on Perpetual Peace (1795), which Bertrand Russell described as follows:

In this work he advocates a federation of free States, bound together by a covenant forbidding war. Reason, he says, utterly condemns war, which only an international government can prevent ... Since 1933, this treatise has caused Kant to fall into disfavour in his own country. (History of Western Philosophy, 1946)

Kant’s “own country” was, of course, what is now Germany and he wrote in German. These facts indicate some of the tumultuous history involved.

The present status of the territory has its origins in the Potsdam Agreement (1945) between the victorious powers following World War II. The Agreement stated:

CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldep, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

U.S. president Harry Truman and British prime minister Clement Attlee supported the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

It was not until the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (1990), commonly known as the ‘Two Plus Four Agreement’ [see page ##], that the matter of borders and territorial control was resolved.

Between 1945 and 1990, Kaliningrad’s status as a semi-exclave of the USSR presented few problems given the border with the Lithuanian Soviet Republic and Poland, a Warsaw Pact member. The collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact complicated Kaliningrad’s status. Further complications came with NATO expansion eastwards, in contravention of assurances otherwise. Both Poland and Lithuania eventually joined NATO, the former in 1999 and the latter in 2004. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the consequent sanctions have had a significant impact on Kaliningrad, with Lithuania now blocking road and rail transit of key supplies including fuel, construction materials and some technologies. As such, there has been a 50% reduction of land transit of goods and Kaliningrad has become more dependent on shipping for basic supplies, which has put strain on ports and docks.

Military presence

As Kaliningrad is internationally recognised Russian territory, it is hardly surprising that the Russian military is present in the semi-exclave. Its unique geography, clear vulnerabilities and potential strategic location makes a significant military presence even less of a surprise.

Between 1997 and 2010 Kaliningrad was designated as a ‘Special Region’ and ‘Defensive Area’ by the Russian military. This meant that a distinct and dedicated structure and operational posture, where different sections of the military operated under a single command, functioned. In 1999, the forces of the ‘Special Region’ consisted of 850 tanks, more than 500 rocket systems, 93 ships and 6 submarines, 180 aircraft and 25,000 troops. By 2008, two years before the forces were integrated into other parts of the Russian military, it consisted of 30 ships, 3 submarines, multiple missile systems - including ‘defensive’ systems - and two aircraft divisions. By 2010, when Kaliningrad forces were finally integrated, there were 10,500 ground troops stationed across the territory.

Throughout the Cold War, the 1990’s and 2000’s and up to today, the Kaliningrad Oblast has been highly militarised. However, through the 2000’s up to 2014 there was a steady reduction in the deployment of troops and material. The basing of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad has been a constant. Events in Ukraine, including Russia’s annexation of Crimea, along with the interconnected reality of NATO expansion and increased tensions reversed this trend. Now, up to 18,000 troops and nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems are stationed, along with the Russian air forces and the Baltic Fleet.

NATO

NATO’s ‘legacy’ expansion is well-established and well-studied. The more recent expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden has again shifted the balance in the Baltic region. Ulrike Franke of the European Council on Foreign Relations welcomed the expansion with the claim that the “Baltic Sea becomes a NATO lake”. Dr Ian Davis of NATO Watch notes that in “May 2026, Lithuania’s foreign minister [Kęstutis Budrys] said that NATO had to show Moscow it was capable of ‘penetrating the small fortress they’ve built in Kaliningrad’ and of razing Russian air defences and missile bases there”.

In June 2026 France, Poland and Lithuania staged a joint-NATO exercise named ‘Gallant Boar’, along the Suwałki Gap along which Poland, Lithuania, Kaliningrad and Belarus share a border. Lithuania’s military described the “key objective” of ‘Gallant Boar’ as improving “capabilities required for the rapid and effective defense of the Suwałki Gap”. Russia interpreted the exercise as a practice run for further isolating Kaliningrad.

On August 18 2026, 25 aircraft from NATO member states undertook an unannounced exercise near Kaliningrad. The ‘DefenceMatters.eu’ website describes the events as a “US-led NATO air exercise close to Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave [which] brought together stealth fighters, surveillance aircraft, tankers and one of the US Air Force’s newest electronic-attack platforms.”

Russia’s 30 September diplomatic memo claimed that “NATO is preparing an air and naval blockade” of Kaliningrad. It certainly looks to be the case that NATO has been practising land and air blockades of Russia’s semi-exclave and with the Baltic Sea re-christened the “NATO lake”, ever escalating tensions - including Lithuania’s steps to remove anti-nuclear clauses from its constitution (see END Info 49) - and little evidence of de-escalatory measures, might Russia have a real cause for concern?

What else has Russia said?

Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, was asked about the memo on the evening of 30 September in the following terms:

Is the statement issued by the Russian Embassy in Ireland, which mentioned the possibility of a nuclear strike on NATO countries if they attempt to blockage Kaliningrad, the official position of the Foreign Ministry of Russia? What exactly has provoked this statement in September 2026?

She replied:

The Russophobic hysteria of Western revenge-seeking quarters has come to a head. Several hot heads are consistently pushing Europe towards a potential conflict and preparing it for an escalation of tensions. Ordinary Europeans are being scared with apocalyptic scenarios and “hybrid threats” allegedly coming from Russia.

They have embarked on a path of total militarisation. They are building up their armed forces, and defence spending in the NATO countries that border on Russia have reached an unprecedented level. The bloc is expanding its military infrastructure, rapidly building military enterprises and integrating civil innovations and dual technologies into their defences. Europe has quickly launched drone production facilities. Alliance members hold aggressive military exercises in direct proximity of our borders ...

As President Vladimir Putin has said, our country does not threaten and doesn’t intend to threaten European countries. However, there should be no doubt whatsoever that Russia has the necessary capabilities for preventing any aggression and inflicting defeat on any aggressor. If Europe attacks Russia, it will be a completely different sort of war – a very short war.

A further question was put to Maria Zakharova on 16 October, following the Warsaw Security Forum:

In a recent interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone said that the North Atlantic Alliance had no plans to blockade Kaliningrad. “I want to be absolutely clear: NATO is not preparing any blockade of Kaliningrad. This is a threat built around a scenario that does not exist,” he emphasised. How would you comment on this?

The reply:

Yes, such a statement was indeed made. Let us assume, difficult as it may be to believe, that the Admiral is being sincere this time. If so, what plans are actually being drawn up? For example, on October 12, at the annual Warsaw Security Forum, one of the central events was a keynote address by NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich, entitled Theory of Victory: How Do We Achieve Military Success Against Russia in Deterrence and Defence?

A senior NATO general chose Warsaw, the capital of a country currently pursuing militarisation at a breakneck pace, to present his proposals, the analytical merits of which we shall leave you to judge. It is worth noting that Poland harbours ambitions to turn its Wojsko Polskie into perhaps the most powerful military in Europe, and specific scenarios for its deployment are already being drawn up.

For instance, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has developed operational plans for launching pre-emptive precision strikes against the Kaliningrad Region, should a “war with Russia become inevitable”. Just consider this: nothing has happened yet, but the Polish hussars are already charging ahead in formation.

Specifically, the plan envisages the destruction of all military infrastructure, primarily Iskander and S-400 missile systems, as well as ammunition depots, fuel terminals and command posts. The operation would involve US-made HIMARS and Polish Homar-K missile systems with a range of up to 300 kilometres, F-16 fighter jets armed with precision-guided missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometres, loitering munitions and combat UAVs.

At the same time, Polish coastal anti-ship missile systems and NATO aircraft would be used to impose a naval blockade on the Kaliningrad Region. The aim would be to prevent Baltic Fleet vessels from leaving their bases and to cut off the region’s supply routes. In parallel, a ground offensive in the Suwałki Gap is envisaged, involving the 16th and 18th Mechanised Divisions and the 1st Infantry Division of the Polish Armed Forces.

Is this not essentially Operation Barbarossa 2.0? However, the “strategists” in Warsaw and elsewhere would do well to remember what President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have repeatedly stated: any treacherous armed attack against the Kaliningrad Region will be met with a literally incinerating response, using every means at Russia’s disposal. The war will be very short.

Neither statement contains a withdrawal of nuclear threats. Each ends with warnings of a “very short” war, should that point ever be reached. Both statements contain factual accounts of European rearmament, NATO exercises and the public airing of plans for an attack on Russian territory.

Flashpoint

NATO asserts that it does not plan to blockade Kaliningrad, yet over the summer months it staged two exercises with a focus on Kaliningrad. Further, NATO acknowledges that Kaliningrad is a key strategic territory and that:

If Russia were to attack a Baltic member state ... NATO plans would naturally involve cutting off and neutralising the Russian assets stationed in Kaliningrad to protect alliance territory

NATO Watch

Further still, open rhetoric and planning from senior NATO figures seems designed to put Russia on notice.

In response to Russian nuclear threats, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Putin knows that he can never win against NATO, so I don’t take this that seriously.”

Nuclear threats, provocative activity around Russian territory, reckless rhetoric and full-scale rearmament are very serious matters indeed. If NATO insists on carrying on regardless and with complete disregard for what actually constitutes European security, then the already-acute nuclear risks will continue to sharpen. As we asked in 2023, “where does that end?”

Even without further deliberate escalation, there exists a tremendous risk of precipitous escalation by accident or miscalculation. Any such accident or miscalculation could all-too-easily result in a “very short”, very deadly and most certainly catastrophic war. Where is the “ladder” for NATO and Russia to “climb down”? How can the potential Kaliningrad flashpoint - along with the myriad flashpoints that litter Europe and beyond - be settled?

A serious approach to questions of European security - a new European security architecture - is an essential step. Such arrangements have been outlined in successive appeals for ‘common security’, nuclear-free zones, renewed and sincere diplomatic efforts over decades. More recently, the Russian government has itself made proposals. China has done the same, with an eye to a global settlement.

For this essential step to be realised, a first step must be taken. The leaders of nuclear-armed states must remember their humanity “and forget the rest”. We need serious efforts to make this first step a reality.

Review: 85 Seconds to Midnight

Tom Unterrainer | Tom Unterrainer | From ENDInfo 49, August 2026 | DOWNLOAD PDF

Carlo Rovelli, 85 Seconds to Midnight – A physicist’s argument against rearmament, 2026

Carlo Rovelli’s latest book, 85 Seconds to Midnight, is an urgent, compelling and authoritative warning to humanity in the context of rearmament and sharpening nuclear risks. Echoing the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and their ‘Doomsday Clock’, he warns that the “destination point of current policy” is “nuclear war.” This is not a small claim and for those indifferent to or ignorant of nuclear risks, it is controversial. For nuclear disarmers, Rovelli’s intervention is wholly welcome and continues an important tradition: that of scientists taking responsibility and using their platform to warn the world of real dangers ahead.

In a series of short, chronologically ordered, chapters Rovelli charts a history of the nuclear age characterised by “misunderstanding and errors”. This history is punctuated by unexpected and exceptional moments where more “rational” choices point towards alternative policies. Some of the points Rovelli emphasises in his history warrant further exploration and scrutiny but his argument that humanity “has only one real enemy: our own irrationality”, carries great force.

That a good dose of this “irrationality” emerged from eminent representatives of that most rational of disciplines, physics, is important for Rovelli given his status as one of the most eminent practitioners and greatest popularisers of theoretical physics today. 85 Seconds to Midnight stands proudly in the tradition of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1955), the work of the Pugwash Movement which grew out of it and a host of other such efforts.

In a letter to Einstein in February 1955, Bertrand Russell – who played a key role in the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and served as its first, and only, President – wrote:

In common with every other thinking person, I am profoundly disquieted by the armaments race in nuclear weapons. You have on various occasions given expression to feelings and opinions with which I am in close agreement. I think that eminent men of science ought to do something dramatic to bring home to the public and Governments the disasters that may occur.

Einstein wrote back five days later:

I agree with every word of you letter … Something must be done in this matter, something that will make an impression on the general public as well as on political leaders.

These two Nobel Laureates – Russell for Literature, Einstein for Physics – corresponded over the following months and agreed the text of the manifesto that bore their name. Einstein’s final letter to Russell, dated 11 April 1955, was also his final public act: he died eight days later at the age of 76. Russell lived for another 15 – very active – years, where, amongst other things, he was imprisoned for his anti-nuclear activities and pioneered opposition to America’s genocidal war in Vietnam. His final public act was in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Why recount this history in the context of Rovelli’s book? Firstly, because Rovelli touches on it himself in a chapter titled ‘Voices of Reason’. Secondly, because the clear and unequivocal words of the 1955 Manifesto – “All, equally, are in peril … We have to learn to think in a new way …” – are reflected in Rovelli’s own prose. Like many of the greatest physicists – those practitioners of complex thought and masters of complex mathematical systems – Rovelli is a master at asking simple and arresting questions: “Why is this crucial with respect to today’s situation?”, “What if we stopped?”, and my favourite:

Does it seem reasonable to you that humankind, made up of people that are sometimes reasonable, like you, dear reader, and me, accepts such a level of risk?

Likewise, he has the skill and authority to render the complex and unthinkable – the risk of nuclear annihilation and its causes – in a straightforward and horribly thinkable fashion. Moreover, because this short book is more of a Manifesto for 2026 than a detailed analysis Rovelli calls on us to act:

Those who know how to write, please write; those who know how organize, please organize; those who know how to convince, please convince; and those who have to make the decisions, please think about the long term, for the good of all.

Lithuania: nuclear weapon prohibition in peril

Tom Unterrainer | From ENDInfo 49, August 2026 | DOWNLOAD PDF

Lithuania looks set to follow Finland (see ENDInfo 47) in abandoning a long-standing constitutional prohibition on nuclear weapons. Like Finland, Lithuania borders Russian territory (Russia's Kaliningrad exclave) and shares a 421.8 mile border with Belarus. Belarus itself ditched nuclear-free status following a referendum staged two days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but planned well in advance.

On the day of the Belarus referendum, President Lukashenko told voters that if NATO: 

“transfer[s] nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, to our borders, then I will turn to Putin to return the nuclear weapons that I gave away without any conditions.”

As we explained in ENDInfo 37 (April/May 2023), Lukashenko did not pluck the examples of Poland and Lithuania from thin air. In that issue, following increased nuclear rhetoric from the Belarussian leader, we pointed to repeated statements from Polish and US political leaders speculating on the possibility of extending NATO nuclear sharing arrangements to states to the east of Germany. At that time, Russia had not yet deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus. It is now reported that Russian nuclear-capable missiles and nuclear warheads are stationed in Belarus.

Further, we warned of a cycle of escalating tensions that would result, as night follows day, from the abandonment of nuclear-free status. Given the Finnish decision and the possibility that Lithuania will now abandon nuclear-free status, the situation looks set on further escalation and greater risks.

Lithuanian Constitution

Lithuania’s declaration of independence in 1990 was quickly followed by the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution. Article 137 of the Constitution reads:

“There may not be any weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.”

Since October 1992, there have been several amendments and revisions to the Constitution, including to allow for EU membership and over questions of land ownership. There have also been attempts at amendment and revision that have failed, specifically over the question of dual-citizenship which is proscribed under the current Constitution.

As with many written constitutional arrangements, the threshold for amendment and revision is high. Parts of the Lithuanian Constitution require popular referenda, whilst other parts are subject to parliamentary vote. In both cases, a super-majority is demanded for any change to take place.

Article 137, which has endured for more than three decades, now risks deletion from the Constitution. As per Lithuania’s arrangements, the decision on deleting the Article rests with the elected parliament, the Seimas, and its 141 members. As such, initial proposals for the change were made by Juozas Olekas, the Speaker of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament), in early July 2026. This proposal passed with 89 votes in favour, 11 against and 6 abstentions. Further debate, discussion and voting will take place before the end of the year.

What has changed?

The explanatory note to the initial proposal for the deletion of Article 137 sought to argue that:

“This constitutional provision was adopted after the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania, that is, under historical and geopolitical circumstances when Russian armed forces were still present on the country’s territory. One of the state’s most important tasks was to ensure the complete withdrawal of the occupying army, strengthen state sovereignty and prevent any forcible integration into post-Soviet Eastern unions.”

The argument proposed by those seeking a change to non-nuclear-free status is that the original Article in the Constitution was designed for the express purpose of expelling all Russian forces from Lithuanian territory – and for this reason alone.

If this was indeed the motivation, why wait until 2026 to amend Article 137? Why wait three decades or more after the last Russian troops left the territory? Why cancel Lithuania’s nuclear-free status in 2026 when it has happily maintained membership of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance since 2004: for some 22 years?

It is undoubtedly the case that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the mercilessly grinding war that resulted has changed a great deal. But this war started four years ago. If, as is claimed, nuclear-free status inhibits ‘security’, why wait four years for a constitutional change?

NATO’s Nuclear Proliferation

Developments in Lithuania cannot be separated from the well-chronicled overall expansion of the nuclear bootprint in Europe. Indeed, they follow French President Emmanuel Macron’s offer to base his country’s air-launched nuclear capabilities across Europe under NATO auspices and in addition to existing and future US nuclear sharing arrangements (see ENDInfo 46). Macron announced that:

“Today, a new step of France’s [nuclear] deterrence [sic] can now be taken. We are entering the path that I will call ‘forward deterrence’ ...

It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic [ie. nuclear] air forces to allied [ie. NATO] countries.”

In his speech, the French President listed a number of countries that are already in dialogue to host French nuclear capabilities. Poland is mentioned. Lithuania is not. Is it the case that the Lithuanian government is already in talks with France to host their nuclear-armed aircraft? What of US nuclear capabilities? The Trump administration signalled, following Macron’s announcement, that an expansion of the number of states hosting US nuclear weapons under NATO sharing arrangements might be possible. Is Lithuania involved in such discussions?

Speaking at the NATO summit in Turkey earlier this year Lithuania’s defence minister, Robertas Kaunas, told reporters that the country “certainly trusts the United States” to uphold ‘deterrence’ and ensure ‘security’. He went on to explain that:

“France, the United States, and other friendly countries are all strengthening their deterrence capabilities. It is welcome that France sees the need to increase deterrence in Europe – this means greater security for Lithuania as well ...

We have security guarantees, and that is probably the most important thing. Whether those guarantees are under one flag or another likely makes little difference. The key point is that they exist”.

If, as the Lithuanian defence minister contends, the United States can be trusted in the context of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance – a claim that has been widely contested in the context of the second Trump administration – and if moves by France and other NATO member states to enhance their nuclear capabilities means “greater security for Lithuania as well”, then why the need to remove Article 137? What of international law? What does the NPT imply about the prospect of a constitutionally  nuclear weapon-free state renouncing such status?

Nuclear-free not anti-nuclear

­Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states:

“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or to induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

Article II of the same treaty states:

“Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

Articles I and II of the NPT seem clear enough, even if the commitments made by those who have signed up to them are encoded in ‘treaty language’. As it happens, the United States, France and Lithuania are all State Party’s to the NPT.

The first Article of Chapter XIII of the Lithuanian Constitution – the same Chapter containing Article 137 – states:

“In implementing its foreign policy, the Republic of Lithuania shall follow the universally recognised principles and norms of international law”.

It might be argued that planning to breach an international treaty such as the NPT is – by now – part of the “norms of international law”. The evidence for such breaches (see the NPT Dossier in Spokesman 163) is vast. Indeed, all nuclear-armed states that are Party to the NPT are arguably in unabashed breach of not just Articles I and II, but a whole host of other provisions.

However, the whole situation surrounding Lithuania’s intent to remove nuclear-free status is too serious for glib assessments of the status of the NPT. Nuclear-disarmers should leave the glibness to those who claim that the NPT is the “cornerstone” of disarmament and non-proliferation whilst they rearm and proliferate.

The facts of the matter seem to be that whilst Lithuania has been constitutionally free of nuclear weapons, its recent history – including plans for constitutional change – indicate that the state has not been anti-nuclear. Take, for example, Lithuania’s 2004 entry into membership of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance and its persistent objection (see ENDInfo 23) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Or, more recently, its joint statement with Latvia and Estonia to the April 2025 NPT PrepCom, which claimed that NATO’s:

“nuclear deterrence arrangements [are] a necessity and a stabilizing factor in European and global security, particularly in the context of Russia’s dangerous and irresponsible behaviour and nuclear rhetoric”.

In October 2025, Lithuania reported to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that:

“For us, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is a necessity — a vital safeguard against aggression. NATO’s posture has always been fully compliant with the NPT and contributes to stability. Let us not be misled: the real threats to the NPT come from those who engage in irresponsible rhetoric, expand arsenals opaquely, and develop nuclear weapons and missile programmes in violation of international law — not from NATO, whose doctrines remain transparent and consistent for decade”.

In a separate contribution to the same Committee Lithuania’s Ambassador to the UN, Rytis Paulauskas, claimed:

“Lithuania values peace. Our history teaches us the cost of lost freedom. For us, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is a necessity — a vital safeguard against aggression. NATO’s posture has always been fully compliant with the NPT and contributes to stability.

Let us not be misled: the real threats to the NPT come from those who engage in irresponsible rhetoric, expand arsenals opaquely, and develop nuclear weapons and missile programs in violation of international law – not from NATO, whose doctrines remain transparent and consistent for decades.”

More recently still, at the 2026 NPT RevCon Audra Plepytė, Lithuania’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, submitted that:

“Disarmament remains the ultimate goal. Stability will not come from alternatives to the NPT, but from all states faithfully upholding its principles and obligations. A robust and universal NPT is in all our interests. In this context, we also reaffirm our support for strengthening the NPT review process.”

So many warm words for the NPT but so little scrutiny of the implications for the course being charted by the current Lithuanian government.

Sources of opposition

The proposal to amend Lithuania’s Constitution, amounting to a single line of text reading “To declare Article 137 invalid”, was introduced into the Seimas (parliament) by its Speaker, Juozas Olekas. The ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ published on the Seimas website concludes:

“The objectives of the draft law are to remove the constitutional provision that limits the Republic of Lithuania's ability to fully participate in the NATO collective defense and deterrence system; to create legal prerequisites for the Republic of Lithuania, together with its allies, to decide on the use of all NATO deterrence measures in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in the event of a threat of aggression or aggression; to demonstrate that the Republic of Lithuania will defend its independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order with all means of collective defense; to ensure that the Republic of Lithuania is not a weak link in NATO in the region and is not less protected than other NATO states.”

The initial discussion consisted of seven contributions from six different Seimas members, one of whom – Aidas Gedvilas, once a member of the Lithuanian Labour Party but now a member of the right-wing Dawn of Nemunas party – voted against. Out of a total of 108 votes, 89 voted in favour with 11 votes of opposition and 6 abstentions. Some Dawn of Nemunas members abstained and in other parties, the voting pattern was mixed. For instance, some members of the Lithuanian Peasants' and Greens Union voted against and others for the removal of Article 137. This party is considered to be on the left of Ukrainian politics but it represents socially conservative views and its sole MEP sits with the Conservatives and Reformists group.

There will now be two further rounds of votes, both requiring ‘super-majorities’ to pass. Given the initial vote and the political makeup of the Seimas, it looks unlikely that a specifically ‘peace movement’ perspective will be introduced. Will serious scrutiny of the NPT feature at all?

Lithuania has no public peace or anti-war organisation, though there are undoubtedly individuals and groups who oppose not only the repeal of Article 137 but nuclear weapons, NATO and the drive to war in general. Some of them are visible on social media sites. Can such individuals and groups be reached? If so, how? Such tentative questions are necessary not only because basic solidarity demands such but because the stakes are extremely high.

In states that have existing peace, anti-war and anti-nuclear organisations, efforts should be made raise the alarm and to test the extent to which warm words about the NPT, non-proliferation, international law and related issues represent sincere commitment.

European Rearmament

The fate of Article 137 is consequential because it combines concerns outlined previously (see ENDInfo 48): the indivisibility of the question of European rearmament and drastically increased nuclear risks.

Article 137 not only bans nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, but it prohibits all “foreign military bases on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.” Lithuania’s history gives context for this prohibition.

German armed forces were last in Lithuania from June 1941 to January 1945, following the Nazi invasion and occupation. During this occupation, up to 95-97% of Lithuania’s 250,000 Jews were rounded up, tortured, imprisoned and murdered. In 2027, German armed forces – commanded under a very different government – are to be invited back to Lithuania. By the end of that year 5,000 German troops are to be permanently based in Lithuania, a few miles from the border with Belarus. This deployment will be Germany’s first permanent overseas presence since 1955. Germany and their Lithuanian hosts claim that ‘Panzerbrigade 45’ will increase security. The deadly ‘logic’ at the heart of European rearmament is that increased belligerence, heightened military threat, massive arms spending and nuclear proliferation are reasonable security measures. Has any consideration been given to what potential adversaries might do in response? Has any consideration been given to how escalation, new deployments and new technologies shorten the odds on peace and shorten the route between mistake, miscalculation and potential nuclear war? It seems not.

Rather than escalation, Europe needs security arrangements based on diplomacy and the recognition that security cannot be achieved at the expense of others. That is, common security with a European nuclear-free zone at its heart. The alternative now being pursued only increases the risks.­

At the very end of the Preface to his most recent book, 85 Seconds to Midnight, Carlo Rovelli explains that:

“My goal is to help avoid what seems to me to be the involuntary but hardly avoidable destination point of the current policy of the governments we have elected: nuclear war.”

Rovelli’s goal should be the collective goal of European peace, anti-war and disarmament groups.

International cooperation and nuclear risks

Tom Unterrainer | END Info 48 | Download PDF

The International Conference Against War, held in London on 20 June 2026, brought together thousands of people (including large delegations from France, Germany, Spain and Italy) in opposition to an escalating drive to rearmament and an increase in war-mongering rhetoric across Europe. The conference was a significant step forward in increasing international cooperation, laying the ground for united action and opening up a space for planning and dialogue. The anti-war and peace movements need many more such opportunities, not least because those coordinating the war-drive are themselves operating across borders and because the risks posed by such a war-drive know no national boundaries.

This is particularly true with respect to ever-sharpening nuclear risks. The risk of nuclear detonation by accident or design is not an incidental or secondary feature: it presents a deadly potential reality that is made more likely by the current drive to war, increased military spending and a more aggressive military posture.

Such a perspective was commonly accepted by peace and anti-war movements in the 1980s. The European Nuclear Disarmament (END) initiative took it very seriously indeed and combined a series of open, lively and participatory conventions with serious attention to nuclear risks, growing militarism and a focussed political demand for a European nuclear-weapon-free zone. Such a zone was never realised, but developments such as the Intermediate-range nuclear Forces Treaty (INF – sabotaged during the first Trump administration) worked to significantly reduce nuclear tensions and risks.

The scope for any such positive development as the INF Treaty looks slim, not least because the dominant military power in the Western alliance – the USA – is set on a project of upending, undermining and destroying the network of treaties, agreements and protocols that comprised the ‘world order’. As we have argued, this is being done in order to assert US interests within the tectonic shifts in global power (see Spokesman 141). Nevertheless, a key lesson from END in the 1980s is that even if success looks difficult or unlikely, the creative impulses unleashed by transnational campaigns can produce positive results.

What sort of rearmament?

Each and every nuclear-armed state is engaged in developing, expanding, and enhancing nuclear capabilities. This is not a very recent development. In fact, the unleashing of this drive to nuclear rearmament can be traced to the time of the first Trump administration.

The reality of this nuclear rearmament has now been joined by a public, unapologetic and rampant conventional rearmament drive across European states.

We are told that such a rearmament drive is essential to ensure ‘European security’. The given context for the drive is an acute threat from Russia, most obviously demonstrated by the invasion of Ukraine. The fact that Russia, after all-too-many years of grinding and murderous onslaught, has failed to overwhelm Ukraine seems not to have had an impact on assessments of the ‘Russian threat’. Meanwhile, Ukraine is now in a position to strike deep into Russian territory: most notably with military drone technology.

One ‘lesson’ of Russia’s war in Ukraine and, more recently, from the US/Israel war of aggression against Iran, is that broadly ‘conventional’ means of war-fighting – ‘tanks and guns’ – are being replaced by new technologies. For example, Britain’s ‘Defence Investment Plan’ (DIP) includes the announcement that the Royal Navy will not now be furnished with replacement frigates. Instead, a ship designed to transport and deploy marine battle drones will take their place. Within the DIP, the largest single budget line is for nuclear weaponry and broadly ‘conventional’ arms are in some instances to be replaced by drones and new technologies (with a large dose of ‘AI’, no doubt).

A combination of outsized nuclear spending and the implied over-reliance on nuclear weapons for ‘security’ [sic], together with new, ‘unconventional’ military technologies risks a dangerous combination. The introduction of such technologies into the business of war makes war-fighting more ‘viable’ and therefore more likely, removes human ‘safeguards’ and ratchets-up possibilities for drastic escalation: the ‘threshold’ for nuclear use is potentially lowered.

This prospect is all-the-more terrifying in the context of increased rhetoric, open talk of war and utterly diminished diplomatic initiatives.

What sort of military alliances?

NATO is, in all fundamental respects, a nuclear alliance. When this fact is noted and when nuclear developments are measured against claims that the alliance is in mortal danger, we see that NATO is in rather better health than some would claim.

Not only has the United States recently replaced nuclear bombs stationed in Europe under ‘sharing’ arrangements with new bombs with enhanced capabilities (‘steerability’ and ‘dialability’ for instance), but the UK will now join ‘sharing’ arrangements. In addition, we know that US nuclear weapons are stationed at RAF Lakenheath under direct USAF command.

Finland, a recent NATO member with an enormous border with Russia, has now ditched anti-nuclear weapons laws (see END Info 47). Lithuania, a longer-standing NATO member which borders Russia, plans to amend its constitution to remove prohibition on nuclear weapons.

France has announced plans to ‘compliment’ existing US/NATO nuclear sharing arrangements with French/NATO nuclear deployments across Europe. Following this announcement, US officials have “signalled openness” to increasing further the number of states with US nuclear bombs.

ICAN’s assessment of nuclear weapons spending in 2025 shows a 22% increase in spending by the US ($69.2 billion), a 17% increase by the UK ($12.6 billion) and an 8% increase by France ($7.7 billion) from the previous year. The UK now outspends Russia and together, the three ‘nuclear powers’ in NATO spent $89.5 billion on such weapons in 2025. In the same year, Russia spent $9.5 billion and China, $13.5 billion.

What sort of war?

NATO leaders claim that the alliance and its member states “must be ready for war with Russia by 2030”. Leave aside whether or not Russia wants war with NATO and ask “what sort of war do they mean”? NATO member states and prominent advocates for rearmament within them are quick to invoke the necessity of war readiness but rarely do they explain what such a war would entail.

Take, for example, a recent article in the Mirror newspaper published from London. The headline proclaims: “Charing Cross tube station becomes fake wartime HQ to prepare for Europe’s fight against Putin” (22 May 2026). The headline suggests that a tube station in central London would be a suitable base from which to command an all-out war with Russia. Too many will have read the headline, thought of the ‘Blitz spirit’ and been thankful that someone was working to ‘protect them’.

Others will have seen the headline and thought, “there’s no way Charing Cross station would survive a nuclear strike!” They’d be right to think so. However, the news management around rearmament and the drive to war avoids directly addressing this fact and reading below the headline, we see that in this ‘war game’, Charing Cross station stood in for NATO operations Estonia.

Some might be relieved to think that NATO is only contemplating war in Estonia, rather than central London. Any such relief would be unwarranted, not only because of the envisaged slaughter of Estonians but because a war between nuclear-armed NATO and nuclear-armed Russia would not be confined to one state and would most likely escalate quickly to nuclear use.

The war being ‘talked up’ and prepared for will be a nuclear war and as such, international cooperation against war will be much-diminished if nuclear reality, nuclear risks and nuclear disarmament are not central considerations.

How Yorkshire contributed to the US war with Iran

Dave Webb

At time of writing, we do not yet know if there is a lasting agreement of any kind between the US and Iran to stop or even pause the war. However, we do know that Keir Starmer has allowed Donald Trump to use British bases to launch his illegal bombing attacks, on the grounds of self-defence but allowing US nuclear-capable bombers to fly from RAF Fairford to back up an illegal first strike is difficult to justify. And there are other US bases in the UK that have had an important role in the Iran War that we don’t hear so much about, and both are in Yorkshire.

You may or may not have seen a report published in March by The Times that revealed how a UK radar is playing a critical role in helping the US detect Iranian missile launches. The radar involved is at RAF Fylingdales on the North Yorkshire Moors, a few miles from Whitby. Fylingdales has provided tracking data and ballistic missile warning for the US since 1963. In 2003 the US requested that Fylingdales be upgraded to be part of its National Missile Defense system and the upgrade was eventually completed in 2007. Fylingdales is now part of Trump’s Space Force and the Times reported that the radar has been actively involved in Operation Epic Fury from the start.

The powerful radar beam at Fylingdales can be scanned to cover 360 degrees at an angle of elevation from 3 to 60 degrees - with a stated range of just over 5,500 kms - and so could detect and track mid-range ballistic missiles reaching altitudes of several hundred kms or more above Iran some 4400 kms or so away. The missile tracking data can then be used to calculate the possible type of missile and their likely impact location. Any friendly troops in the area can then be notified and any possible interception methods maybe initiated.

Information from Fylingdales is transmitted to the Space Delta 2 (responsible for space domain awareness) and Space Delta 4 (missile awareness) wings of US Space Systems Command, an important part of Space Force’s Space Warfighting Architecture.

Fylingdales cannot detect actual missile launches and is notified of these by information supplied by US satellites. The US Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) of satellites detect the heat flashes of rockets during their launch phase and passes on information quickly to other parts of the missile defence network (such as Fylingdales).

If US Space Command cannot receive information from SBIRS satellites directly, because the satellites are positioned on the other side of the Earth, then communication links with ground-based stations are used to relay the information onward. In 1996 it was announced that Menwith Hill, the US spy base just outside Harrogate in North Yorkshire, had been designated as the European Ground Based Relay Station for SBIRS.

Menwith Hill also plays another role of course - its major function is to intercept electronic communications by mobile phones, emails, etc. for the National Security Agency of the US and to search for possible information that may lead to the targeting of installations, groups or individuals considered to be a threat. A very recent Guardian article published on 30 June reports that the US plans to spend $4 bn on its bases in the UK, $163m of it will go to Menwith Hill. It did not elaborate on what this sum of money would be funding but the article made a point that Menwith Hill “can capture communications as far away as the Middle East”.

So, US military satellites detect the heat generated by missile launches, transmit the information (via Menwith Hill) to US Space Command and the Fylingdales radar accurately determines their trajectories, helping to determine likely impact zones and providing data for possible interception.

The Times also reported that, before the initial US strikes, space and cyber commands had already attacked and hampered Iran’s ability to communicate and respond. This has become standard in modern warfighting methodology. The report also refers to the growing importance of space-based warfare capabilities. Major General Paul Terence Tedman, until recently commander of UK Space Command, described space as the “central nervous system” of modern military operations, playing crucial roles in communications, targeting, and weapons guidance at rapid speeds. The US military refers to this integrated system as a “kill chain,” a concept being expanded through new initiatives such as a UK “digital targeting web.”

It is worth remembering that Iran’s first response to the US attack was to destroy key US missile defence radar installations at bases in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE. The attacks were mainly by one-way drone systems. Fylingdales and Menwith Hill were too far to be attacked in this way this time.

Stop Bombing Iran: End nuclear risks, end nuclear hypocrisy

From END Info 47 | April 2026 DOWNLOAD PDF

Tom Unterrainer

As Trump and Netanyahu’s war of aggression on Iran enters a second month, the costs of war are mounting. These costs can be measured in the rising death toll, destruction and dispossession in Iran and elsewhere. They can be measured by the fact that Israel is now waging war on a number of fronts: its genocide on Palestine continues as its missiles rain down on Iran and as its troops invade and occupy Lebanon. Another metric of the ‘costs’ of war can be found in respect to what is called ‘international law’ and the ‘international order’. Already severely undermined by the consent and active support given to Israel in its genocide, notions of international ‘law’ and ‘order’ have been further undermined by a failure to unequivocally confront and condemn a second war of aggression against Iran.

Another cost can be counted in the flurry of messages emanating from the White House. Facts and intentions are being manipulated, managed and hidden. Any attempt to understand what is going on and the nature of risks to come with reference to Trump’s announcements is futile. That is probably the intention.

Yet global markets spike, prices rise, queues at petrol pumps lengthen and politicians, notably US ‘allies’, respond in kind to each social media post. For example, the British government has failed to condemn Trump and Netanyahu but the Foreign Secretary is at ease in condemning Iran for its “reckless” response to being bombed by closing the Strait of Hormuz. What, exactly, did the world expect Iran to do?

It is almost as if we are being encouraged to look away or to lay blame for the bloodshed, destruction and damage at the door of Iran. But if we look closely at the hypocrisy at the centre of Trump and Netanyahu’s war, the relative quietude of their “allies” and start to examine what has happened and what could happen next, then we see the truly horrific potential of an already dangerous and deathly situation.

It could seem alarmist to emphasise nuclear risks, but it is not. The context for what is happening in Iran and the region is framed by the fact of an ongoing genocide carried out by a nuclear-armed state. The very idea of a live-streamed genocide that the great powers of the world have either consented to, actively supported or done nothing to halt might have seemed far-fetched in the not-too-distant past. It is now a reality and it is compounded by the fact that the belligerent party in the genocide is now waging a war of aggression. The boundaries of what is and is not ‘imaginable’ must therefore shift.

The fact that some commentaries and official statements claim that Trump and Netanyahu’s war of aggression is justified as an attempt to forestall Iran’s unproven aspirations to develop nuclear weapons is another key element. Yes, this is a blatant nuclear hypocrisy in its own right but going along with it legitimises the fact that the US and Israel are themselves nuclear powers. The hypocrisy is compounded by the simple fact that everyone knows that Israel is a nuclear power but refuses to not only acknowledge the fact but also to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or join any of the international treaties relating to nuclear weapons. Is it any wonder that the number of voices suggesting that ‘Iran would never have been attacked if it actually had nuclear weapons’ is growing? This whole narrative and such speculations not only risk further nuclear proliferation but normalise the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons. Where will this end?

Further, the lessons of recent US actions provides a more solid indication of actual US policy than an analysis of Trump’s statements ever could. For example, when the US assembled an enormous naval presence off the coast of Venezuela it was thought that this was simply a show of force. What happened next is a recorded fact. Similarly, as military deployments increased in the region around Iran it was thought that this was an attempt to leverage Iran in negotiations. The fact is that Iran has consistently sought negotiations and despite considerable concessions being made by them, Israel and the US launched a war of aggression.

The point here is to suggest that for all the talk of ‘striking a deal’, when the US deploys forces in very large numbers and indicates intent then the recent record warns us to expect the worst. This makes the deployment of thousands of US marines and airborne troops a meaningful further risk: a risk that they might actually be used inside Iran and a risk that will result from the likely blood-bath.

Further still, the World Health Organisation has spoken openly of being “vigilant” about nuclear threats. Whilst it is part of the WHO’s job to remain “vigilant” it is not usual for their spokespeople to be outspoken. So when Hanan Balkhy, a WHO Regional Director, told Politico that: “The worst-case scenario is a nuclear incident, and that's something that worries us the most” and that “[a]s much as we prepare, there's nothing that can prevent the harm that will come … the region's way — and globally if this eventually happens — and the consequences are going to last for decades”, we should take note.

Lastly, the IAEA has confirmed that the site of the Bushehr nuclear reactor has come under direct attack. No radiation leaks have been reported. However, when the avoidance of an absolute nuclear disaster seems to be more a matter of luck than judgement we are in a very dangerous place indeed.

All of this nuclear hypocrisy must end. The severe nuclear risks must end. The US and Israel must stop bombing Iran.

US military forces in the UK

Democracy demands transparency

From END Info 47 | April 2026 DOWNLOAD PDF

Tom Unterrainer

The United States is making extensive use of UK bases in its war of aggression against Iran. This is despite the fact that Prime Minister Starmer has repeatedly asserted that the UK is not part of Trump and Netanyahu’s war and repeatedly implied that the British government does not believe in “regime change from the air”. Further, it seems rational to assume that legal advice received by the British government indicates that Trump and Netanyahu’s war is ‘illegal’ under international law. So how is it that the Fairford air base and - we assume - other UK bases are being so extensively used? A partial answer to this question comes in the claim that UK bases are being used for ‘defensive’ purposes following Iranian attacks on UK and allied interests in the region. As Drone Wars point out in their recent briefing (see ‘Fairford air base and US strikes on Iran’), such claims do not clearly cover every US operation. The UK government has questions to answer and a number of Members of Parliament - along with campaign groups and journalists - have been putting the questions. Unfortunately, clear answers are not forthcoming. Why is that?

The House of Commons Library has done a great service in publishing a research briefing, ‘US military forces in the UK: Legal agreements’, on 2 March 2026. The timing of this document cannot be a coincidence and it is worth looking at it section-by-section not because it provides clear answers but as a guide to the total lack of transparency - the total secrecy - at the heart of arrangements between the US and UK.

Section 1, subsection 1.1 of the briefing tells us that the “Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) regulate the presence of military forces in another country, and the extent to which those foreign military personnel are expect from local jurisdiction.” Subsection 1.2 tells us that in “1951 NATO agreed a Status of Forces Agreement to govern hosting arrangements between the alliance’s member states.” Section 1.3 tells us that the “Visiting Forces Act (VFA) 1952 incorporates the NATO SOFA into UK law” and then lists further related Acts. So far, so informative: the texts of the NATO SOFA and VFA are freely available online and look to be fairly comprehensive. However, the actual agreements regulating US forces specifically are listed in Section 2 and it is here that clarity and transparency begin to diminish.

Section 2 opens by noting the permanent presence of US forces in the UK since the end of the Second World War and quotes from the ‘Churchill-Truman Communiqué of 1952’ where a hint of vagueness is introduced:

Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by HM Government and the US Government in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

We are told that the “legal status of the [US Visiting Forces] and its personnel in the UK is established by” the previously mentioned Acts “along with supplemental bilateral acts between the two countries, some of which are classified” [emphasis added].

Subsection 2.4, ‘Permissions to use UK bases for US military operations’, claims that any “operational use of UK bases by US forces is subject to a joint decision by the UK and US governments. This includes the use of UK bases for combat operations by US Air Force aircraft.” Further:

In January 2026, the government confirmed that any request to use UK bases for military action overseas is considered on a case-by-case basis and includes ‘appropriate consideration of the legal basis for any proposed activity’.

­­In 2003, then-Secretary of State of Defence Geoff Hoon provided the following written answer to pertinent questions about US planes at Fairford:

The use of United Kingdom bases, including RAF Fairford, by the [USVF] is set out in a number of confidential arrangements ... I am withholding the release of these documents ...”

Then, as now, the actual arrangements between the US and UK remain a secret that not even parliamentary probing can reveal. Why is that? In the context of the US war of aggression against Iran, clearly judged unlawful, how can we be clear that the UK government isn’t actually complicit in illegality? Only full transparency on the nature of all agreements between the US and UK can clear up this situation. Democracy demands transparency and in its absence, who is to say that the UK is not complicit in further crimes?

Keep Finland Nuclear-Free

From END Info 47 | April 2026 DOWNLOAD PDF

Tom Unterrainer

­When Finland applied to join the nuclear-armed NATO alliance in May 2022 and when, in April 2023, membership was ratified two claims were emphasised. Firstly, that joining NATO was a rational security response in the context of Russia’s invasion of and ongoing war in Ukraine. Second, that despite joining an organisation where nuclear weapons are regarded as the ‘bedrock of security’, Finland would maintain its nuclear-free status whilst enjoying the ‘security’ provided by nuclear weapons. The plans of the current Finnish government to now remove nuclear-free status by amending Chapter 2, Section 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act demand an examination of both claims.

On the first point: Finland’s application for NATO membership did not come as a ‘bolt from the blue’ refutation of long-standing neutrality. In fact, Finland has maintained close relations with the nuclear-armed alliance since at least 1994 when it joined NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ initiative. Then, in 1997, Finland joined the ‘Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’. As NATO’s own website points out, Finland “had been one of NATO's most active partners and a valued contributor to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.” Further, NATO heralds Finland’s status as “an 'Enhanced Opportunity Partner' (a partner country that makes particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives)” whereby “Finland experienced enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies.”

It seems clear that just as NATO expanded in the post-Soviet era into former-Soviet states bordering Russia, NATO’s influence and reach steadily increased within Finland, which has an approximately 1,340km (830 mile) long border with Russia.

The extent of this border and the depth of support for neutrality within Finnish society are surely linked and taken together, go some way to explaining why it took almost three decades for formal NATO membership to be finalised. Of course, Russia’s invasion of and war against Ukraine marked a tipping point but NATO/Finnish relations were close and cordial before this. The ground for full NATO membership had been well-prepared and when Finland finally joined, it did so with political and a plurality of public support. It is worth noting that this support extended to previously anti-NATO political parties of the left. Of course, the peace movement was not convinced and protested the move.

On the second point: there is a clear contradiction between membership of a nuclear-armed military alliance and nuclear-free status. There are, of course, a number of NATO member states that are not nuclear-armed in their own right and do not permit the stationing of NATO-assigned nuclear weapons in the territory. Nevertheless, all NATO member states are by default ‘under the nuclear umbrella’. This, in fact, is the fundamental basis of the security NATO claims to offer. Whatever nuclear-free status NATO member states claim to hold, any such status dissolves at the point where the ultimate security guarantee NATO offers is invoked.

Despite this contradiction, it is the case that most NATO member states bordering Russia do not house NATO nuclear capabilities: and for very good reason. The reason is illustrated by the reaction to suggestions during the first Trump administration that Poland would be willing to join NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. This suggestion was made in the context of debates at the time in Germany over continuing participation in the scheme. Both the then-Polish government and then-US Ambassador to Poland heralded the idea (see END Info 37). This was in 2020. On 27 February 2022, three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Belarus concluded a constitutional referendum which removed nuclear-free status. This move has little to do with Russia’s invasion and everything to do with responding to Poland’s offer. The border between Poland and Belarus is approximately 400km, less than a third of the length of the border between Finland and Russia. The geography matters!

Which is why when Kremlin spokesperson Dimtry Peskov warns that Finland’s plan “leads to an escalation ​of tensions on the European continent” and that “by deploying ⁠nuclear weapons on its territory, Finland is beginning to threaten” Russia we should take note. Why? Because the border matters and if the current Finnish government insists that NATO membership and potential nuclear status enhance security then there will be a symmetric response from the other side of the border: tensions will continue to escalate and actual security will be diminished. It’s time to re-learn the lessons of common security initiatives of the 1980s, particularly the simple idea that security for one cannot be achieved at the expense of others. Security is indivisible and is certainly not achieved by nuclear means.

NO EUROBOMB! Stop European Nuclear Proliferation

From END Info 46 | March 2026 | Download

Tom Unterrainer

In his opening speech to the 2026 Munich Security Conference (14 February), German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that he has “started first talks with the French President Emmanuel Macron about European nuclear deterrence … to be clear, we absolutely stick to our legal obligations. This will be fully embedded in our nuclear sharing within NATO”.

Merz’s declaration has been confirmed by President Macron, who delivered a substantial address on France’s nuclear capabilites and intentions at the Île Longue Operational Base on 2 March. We republish some of Macron’s speech in the following pages, but it is worth highlighting some of what was said here. For instance:

Today, a new step of France’s deterrence can now be taken. We are entering the path of what I will call “forward deterrence”...

It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries.

In the same way that our strategic submarines dilute naturally in the oceans, guaranteeing a permanent-strike capability, our strategic air forces will also be able to be spread deep into the European continent. This dispersal across European territory, a sort of archipelago of forces, will complicate the calculations of our adversaries and will make this forward deterrence very valuable to us. It will strengthen our defence, while giving it room to operate: it will offer it a new strategic depth, in line with the challenges of European security. It will be, I believe, very valuable to partners who will follow this approach with us, and whose territory will gain a strong link with our deterrence.

In this speech, Macron strongly indicates an intention to deploy French nuclear-armed aircraft across the continent of Europe.

NATO is a nuclear-armed military alliance, dominated by the United States. Present nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO are wholly reliant on US capabilities. The US military has referred to Europe as “our territory” and considers the continent to be a potential “nuclear battlefield”.

Nuclear proliferation is generally understood as the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not recognised under the NPT. The recent deployment of new, higher-capability US B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs to bases across Europe represents one element of what can be termed ‘internal nuclear proliferation’ whereby capabilities are enhanced and/or modernised. Developments at the US air base at Lakenheath are another element. The British Government’s announcement that it will again breach NPT commitments by purchasing nuclear capable jets that can launch US B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs is yet another element. These elements of ‘internal nuclear proliferation’ have now been joined by these Franco-German plans for a “European nuclear deterrence [sic]”, apparently within NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, based upon French nuclear weapons. France, a NATO member, does not currently assign its nuclear weapons to the alliance.

Merz’s Munich statement and Macron’s speech follow the Northwood Agreement (July 2025) between the UK and France to coordinate “nuclear policy, capabilities and operations … [strengthen] NATO’s deterrence posture, [reassure] European allies and [offer] a fallback should the United States’ nuclear umbrella over Europe come into question” and the bilateral Kensington treaty between the UK and Germany (July 2025), Article 7 [‘Defence Cooperation’] of which commits to close cooperation within NATO and a “close dialogue on defence issues of mutual interest and global horizon-scanning, including on nuclear issues”.

The most recent of these developments have taken place: in the aftermath of the Trump Administration’s insistence that European NATO member states massively increase military spending (a demand that has been agreed to); in the context of the US’s destruction of successive nuclear non-proliferation treaties and blatant breaches of the NPT; and at a time when European leaders warn of the collapse of the “international order” and instruct their populations to be “ready for war”.

The recent proliferation of US nuclear capabilities within NATO and the further proliferation to come stand at odds with the idea that the nuclear-armed alliance is in mortal jeopardy. Whilst it is true that considerable tensions exist within the alliance and doubts about Trump’s commitment heighten, the core nuclear element of NATO is consolidating.

The statements of Merz and Macron on plans for a “European nuclear deterrence [sic]” suggest the truth of the matter: US nuclear weapons, deployed in Europe under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, are for US purposes alone and that this is now a concern in the context of the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ approach. The joint US-Israel assault on Iran and the negative reactions from some European NATO states further illustrate a deep concern.

European nuclear proliferation is inseparable from European militarisation because NATO member states mistakenly and dangerously insist that nuclear weapons are the “ultimate guarantor of security”. There have been no obvious attempts to craft or thoroughly articulate alternative, non-nuclear and non-military, means of enhancing security. Although Macron indicates the need for dialogue with Russia what, exactly, would he expect Russia to do in response to stationing French nuclear-capable jets closer to the Russian border?

The destruction of the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and New START and the multiple breaches of the NPT represent a crisis in the “international order” that European governments either participated in or did nothing about. Likewise, for all the warnings of a crumbling ‘world order’ and breaches of international law, many of the statespeople now announcing concern did little at best and at worst were complicit in Israel’s genocide on Palestine. For many observers, particularly those outside of Europe and North America, the hypocrisy is all-too-clear. It is also clear that ‘remedies’ such as European nuclear proliferation will do nothing to enhance security: in fact, it will lead to greater destabilisation and further risks.

The British government’s Agreement with France and bilateral treaty with Germany implicates it in moves towards a European nuclear capability even if - as is the case - the nuclear weapons based in Britain are wholly reliant on the United States. Britain cannot ‘assign’ Trident to European ‘defence’ in any independent fashion. Neither will it be able to assign the B61-12 bombs destined for RAF Marham. Yet unlike the German Chancellor and French President, who have both registered Britain as part of their plans for a European Deterrent [sic], Britain’s political leaders have not commented on this development. Why is that and what can be done to extract a modicum of transparency?

The complex of elements within “European Nuclear Proliferation” will do nothing to increase security but will rather generate further instability, proliferation, tension and increase the ultimate risk of nuclear use. Rather than acting as a replacement to the existing, US-controlled and dominated NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, the plans announced by Merz and Macron will be in addition to existing nuclear deployments. Macron names “Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark” as participants in the scheme. What do the people of Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark have to say about this? Have they been consulted? Of course not, no more than the British public were consulted on the expanding US nuclear boot-print at Lakenheath and Marham. What will the people of the wider-Mediterranean region say about the return of nuclear weapons to Greece? What will the people of Russia make of French nuclear-armed jets in Poland? We can easily imagine the reaction of the Russian government.

As we have argued before, such developments point in one direction for those concerned with peace, real security and with efforts to avert the catastrophic worst: they point towards the demand for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. Even if such a zone feels like a distant prospect, the struggle to realise a common security approach to the very real risks posed by nuclear proliferation in Europe (and elsewhere) can unite a powerful, determined and creative movement for peace. Now is the time to act on this basis.