NO EUROBOMB! Stop European Nuclear Proliferation

From END Info 46 | March 2026 | Download

Tom Unterrainer

In his opening speech to the 2026 Munich Security Conference (14 February), German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that he has “started first talks with the French President Emmanuel Macron about European nuclear deterrence … to be clear, we absolutely stick to our legal obligations. This will be fully embedded in our nuclear sharing within NATO”.

Merz’s declaration has been confirmed by President Macron, who delivered a substantial address on France’s nuclear capabilites and intentions at the Île Longue Operational Base on 2 March. We republish some of Macron’s speech in the following pages, but it is worth highlighting some of what was said here. For instance:

Today, a new step of France’s deterrence can now be taken. We are entering the path of what I will call “forward deterrence”...

It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic air forces to allied countries.

In the same way that our strategic submarines dilute naturally in the oceans, guaranteeing a permanent-strike capability, our strategic air forces will also be able to be spread deep into the European continent. This dispersal across European territory, a sort of archipelago of forces, will complicate the calculations of our adversaries and will make this forward deterrence very valuable to us. It will strengthen our defence, while giving it room to operate: it will offer it a new strategic depth, in line with the challenges of European security. It will be, I believe, very valuable to partners who will follow this approach with us, and whose territory will gain a strong link with our deterrence.

In this speech, Macron strongly indicates an intention to deploy French nuclear-armed aircraft across the continent of Europe.

NATO is a nuclear-armed military alliance, dominated by the United States. Present nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO are wholly reliant on US capabilities. The US military has referred to Europe as “our territory” and considers the continent to be a potential “nuclear battlefield”.

Nuclear proliferation is generally understood as the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not recognised under the NPT. The recent deployment of new, higher-capability US B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs to bases across Europe represents one element of what can be termed ‘internal nuclear proliferation’ whereby capabilities are enhanced and/or modernised. Developments at the US air base at Lakenheath are another element. The British Government’s announcement that it will again breach NPT commitments by purchasing nuclear capable jets that can launch US B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs is yet another element. These elements of ‘internal nuclear proliferation’ have now been joined by these Franco-German plans for a “European nuclear deterrence [sic]”, apparently within NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, based upon French nuclear weapons. France, a NATO member, does not currently assign its nuclear weapons to the alliance.

Merz’s Munich statement and Macron’s speech follow the Northwood Agreement (July 2025) between the UK and France to coordinate “nuclear policy, capabilities and operations … [strengthen] NATO’s deterrence posture, [reassure] European allies and [offer] a fallback should the United States’ nuclear umbrella over Europe come into question” and the bilateral Kensington treaty between the UK and Germany (July 2025), Article 7 [‘Defence Cooperation’] of which commits to close cooperation within NATO and a “close dialogue on defence issues of mutual interest and global horizon-scanning, including on nuclear issues”.

The most recent of these developments have taken place: in the aftermath of the Trump Administration’s insistence that European NATO member states massively increase military spending (a demand that has been agreed to); in the context of the US’s destruction of successive nuclear non-proliferation treaties and blatant breaches of the NPT; and at a time when European leaders warn of the collapse of the “international order” and instruct their populations to be “ready for war”.

The recent proliferation of US nuclear capabilities within NATO and the further proliferation to come stand at odds with the idea that the nuclear-armed alliance is in mortal jeopardy. Whilst it is true that considerable tensions exist within the alliance and doubts about Trump’s commitment heighten, the core nuclear element of NATO is consolidating.

The statements of Merz and Macron on plans for a “European nuclear deterrence [sic]” suggest the truth of the matter: US nuclear weapons, deployed in Europe under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, are for US purposes alone and that this is now a concern in the context of the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ approach. The joint US-Israel assault on Iran and the negative reactions from some European NATO states further illustrate a deep concern.

European nuclear proliferation is inseparable from European militarisation because NATO member states mistakenly and dangerously insist that nuclear weapons are the “ultimate guarantor of security”. There have been no obvious attempts to craft or thoroughly articulate alternative, non-nuclear and non-military, means of enhancing security. Although Macron indicates the need for dialogue with Russia what, exactly, would he expect Russia to do in response to stationing French nuclear-capable jets closer to the Russian border?

The destruction of the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and New START and the multiple breaches of the NPT represent a crisis in the “international order” that European governments either participated in or did nothing about. Likewise, for all the warnings of a crumbling ‘world order’ and breaches of international law, many of the statespeople now announcing concern did little at best and at worst were complicit in Israel’s genocide on Palestine. For many observers, particularly those outside of Europe and North America, the hypocrisy is all-too-clear. It is also clear that ‘remedies’ such as European nuclear proliferation will do nothing to enhance security: in fact, it will lead to greater destabilisation and further risks.

The British government’s Agreement with France and bilateral treaty with Germany implicates it in moves towards a European nuclear capability even if - as is the case - the nuclear weapons based in Britain are wholly reliant on the United States. Britain cannot ‘assign’ Trident to European ‘defence’ in any independent fashion. Neither will it be able to assign the B61-12 bombs destined for RAF Marham. Yet unlike the German Chancellor and French President, who have both registered Britain as part of their plans for a European Deterrent [sic], Britain’s political leaders have not commented on this development. Why is that and what can be done to extract a modicum of transparency?

The complex of elements within “European Nuclear Proliferation” will do nothing to increase security but will rather generate further instability, proliferation, tension and increase the ultimate risk of nuclear use. Rather than acting as a replacement to the existing, US-controlled and dominated NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, the plans announced by Merz and Macron will be in addition to existing nuclear deployments. Macron names “Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark” as participants in the scheme. What do the people of Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark have to say about this? Have they been consulted? Of course not, no more than the British public were consulted on the expanding US nuclear boot-print at Lakenheath and Marham. What will the people of the wider-Mediterranean region say about the return of nuclear weapons to Greece? What will the people of Russia make of French nuclear-armed jets in Poland? We can easily imagine the reaction of the Russian government.

As we have argued before, such developments point in one direction for those concerned with peace, real security and with efforts to avert the catastrophic worst: they point towards the demand for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. Even if such a zone feels like a distant prospect, the struggle to realise a common security approach to the very real risks posed by nuclear proliferation in Europe (and elsewhere) can unite a powerful, determined and creative movement for peace. Now is the time to act on this basis.