Keep Finland Nuclear-Free

From END Info 47 | April 2026 DOWNLOAD PDF

Tom Unterrainer

­When Finland applied to join the nuclear-armed NATO alliance in May 2022 and when, in April 2023, membership was ratified two claims were emphasised. Firstly, that joining NATO was a rational security response in the context of Russia’s invasion of and ongoing war in Ukraine. Second, that despite joining an organisation where nuclear weapons are regarded as the ‘bedrock of security’, Finland would maintain its nuclear-free status whilst enjoying the ‘security’ provided by nuclear weapons. The plans of the current Finnish government to now remove nuclear-free status by amending Chapter 2, Section 4 of the Nuclear Energy Act demand an examination of both claims.

On the first point: Finland’s application for NATO membership did not come as a ‘bolt from the blue’ refutation of long-standing neutrality. In fact, Finland has maintained close relations with the nuclear-armed alliance since at least 1994 when it joined NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ initiative. Then, in 1997, Finland joined the ‘Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’. As NATO’s own website points out, Finland “had been one of NATO's most active partners and a valued contributor to NATO-led operations and missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.” Further, NATO heralds Finland’s status as “an 'Enhanced Opportunity Partner' (a partner country that makes particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and other Alliance objectives)” whereby “Finland experienced enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the Allies.”

It seems clear that just as NATO expanded in the post-Soviet era into former-Soviet states bordering Russia, NATO’s influence and reach steadily increased within Finland, which has an approximately 1,340km (830 mile) long border with Russia.

The extent of this border and the depth of support for neutrality within Finnish society are surely linked and taken together, go some way to explaining why it took almost three decades for formal NATO membership to be finalised. Of course, Russia’s invasion of and war against Ukraine marked a tipping point but NATO/Finnish relations were close and cordial before this. The ground for full NATO membership had been well-prepared and when Finland finally joined, it did so with political and a plurality of public support. It is worth noting that this support extended to previously anti-NATO political parties of the left. Of course, the peace movement was not convinced and protested the move.

On the second point: there is a clear contradiction between membership of a nuclear-armed military alliance and nuclear-free status. There are, of course, a number of NATO member states that are not nuclear-armed in their own right and do not permit the stationing of NATO-assigned nuclear weapons in the territory. Nevertheless, all NATO member states are by default ‘under the nuclear umbrella’. This, in fact, is the fundamental basis of the security NATO claims to offer. Whatever nuclear-free status NATO member states claim to hold, any such status dissolves at the point where the ultimate security guarantee NATO offers is invoked.

Despite this contradiction, it is the case that most NATO member states bordering Russia do not house NATO nuclear capabilities: and for very good reason. The reason is illustrated by the reaction to suggestions during the first Trump administration that Poland would be willing to join NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. This suggestion was made in the context of debates at the time in Germany over continuing participation in the scheme. Both the then-Polish government and then-US Ambassador to Poland heralded the idea (see END Info 37). This was in 2020. On 27 February 2022, three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Belarus concluded a constitutional referendum which removed nuclear-free status. This move has little to do with Russia’s invasion and everything to do with responding to Poland’s offer. The border between Poland and Belarus is approximately 400km, less than a third of the length of the border between Finland and Russia. The geography matters!

Which is why when Kremlin spokesperson Dimtry Peskov warns that Finland’s plan “leads to an escalation ​of tensions on the European continent” and that “by deploying ⁠nuclear weapons on its territory, Finland is beginning to threaten” Russia we should take note. Why? Because the border matters and if the current Finnish government insists that NATO membership and potential nuclear status enhance security then there will be a symmetric response from the other side of the border: tensions will continue to escalate and actual security will be diminished. It’s time to re-learn the lessons of common security initiatives of the 1980s, particularly the simple idea that security for one cannot be achieved at the expense of others. Security is indivisible and is certainly not achieved by nuclear means.