Lithuania: nuclear weapon prohibition in peril
Tom Unterrainer | From ENDInfo 49, August 2026 | DOWNLOAD PDF
Lithuania looks set to follow Finland (see ENDInfo 47) in abandoning a long-standing constitutional prohibition on nuclear weapons. Like Finland, Lithuania borders Russian territory (Russia's Kaliningrad exclave) and shares a 421.8 mile border with Belarus. Belarus itself ditched nuclear-free status following a referendum staged two days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but planned well in advance.
On the day of the Belarus referendum, President Lukashenko told voters that if NATO:
“transfer[s] nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, to our borders, then I will turn to Putin to return the nuclear weapons that I gave away without any conditions.”
As we explained in ENDInfo 37 (April/May 2023), Lukashenko did not pluck the examples of Poland and Lithuania from thin air. In that issue, following increased nuclear rhetoric from the Belarussian leader, we pointed to repeated statements from Polish and US political leaders speculating on the possibility of extending NATO nuclear sharing arrangements to states to the east of Germany. At that time, Russia had not yet deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus. It is now reported that Russian nuclear-capable missiles and nuclear warheads are stationed in Belarus.
Further, we warned of a cycle of escalating tensions that would result, as night follows day, from the abandonment of nuclear-free status. Given the Finnish decision and the possibility that Lithuania will now abandon nuclear-free status, the situation looks set on further escalation and greater risks.
Lithuanian Constitution
Lithuania’s declaration of independence in 1990 was quickly followed by the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution. Article 137 of the Constitution reads:
“There may not be any weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.”
Since October 1992, there have been several amendments and revisions to the Constitution, including to allow for EU membership and over questions of land ownership. There have also been attempts at amendment and revision that have failed, specifically over the question of dual-citizenship which is proscribed under the current Constitution.
As with many written constitutional arrangements, the threshold for amendment and revision is high. Parts of the Lithuanian Constitution require popular referenda, whilst other parts are subject to parliamentary vote. In both cases, a super-majority is demanded for any change to take place.
Article 137, which has endured for more than three decades, now risks deletion from the Constitution. As per Lithuania’s arrangements, the decision on deleting the Article rests with the elected parliament, the Seimas, and its 141 members. As such, initial proposals for the change were made by Juozas Olekas, the Speaker of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament), in early July 2026. This proposal passed with 89 votes in favour, 11 against and 6 abstentions. Further debate, discussion and voting will take place before the end of the year.
What has changed?
The explanatory note to the initial proposal for the deletion of Article 137 sought to argue that:
“This constitutional provision was adopted after the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania, that is, under historical and geopolitical circumstances when Russian armed forces were still present on the country’s territory. One of the state’s most important tasks was to ensure the complete withdrawal of the occupying army, strengthen state sovereignty and prevent any forcible integration into post-Soviet Eastern unions.”
The argument proposed by those seeking a change to non-nuclear-free status is that the original Article in the Constitution was designed for the express purpose of expelling all Russian forces from Lithuanian territory – and for this reason alone.
If this was indeed the motivation, why wait until 2026 to amend Article 137? Why wait three decades or more after the last Russian troops left the territory? Why cancel Lithuania’s nuclear-free status in 2026 when it has happily maintained membership of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance since 2004: for some 22 years?
It is undoubtedly the case that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the mercilessly grinding war that resulted has changed a great deal. But this war started four years ago. If, as is claimed, nuclear-free status inhibits ‘security’, why wait four years for a constitutional change?
NATO’s Nuclear Proliferation
Developments in Lithuania cannot be separated from the well-chronicled overall expansion of the nuclear bootprint in Europe. Indeed, they follow French President Emmanuel Macron’s offer to base his country’s air-launched nuclear capabilities across Europe under NATO auspices and in addition to existing and future US nuclear sharing arrangements (see ENDInfo 46). Macron announced that:
“Today, a new step of France’s [nuclear] deterrence [sic] can now be taken. We are entering the path that I will call ‘forward deterrence’ ...
It will finally involve the temporary deployment of elements of our strategic [ie. nuclear] air forces to allied [ie. NATO] countries.”
In his speech, the French President listed a number of countries that are already in dialogue to host French nuclear capabilities. Poland is mentioned. Lithuania is not. Is it the case that the Lithuanian government is already in talks with France to host their nuclear-armed aircraft? What of US nuclear capabilities? The Trump administration signalled, following Macron’s announcement, that an expansion of the number of states hosting US nuclear weapons under NATO sharing arrangements might be possible. Is Lithuania involved in such discussions?
Speaking at the NATO summit in Turkey earlier this year Lithuania’s defence minister, Robertas Kaunas, told reporters that the country “certainly trusts the United States” to uphold ‘deterrence’ and ensure ‘security’. He went on to explain that:
“France, the United States, and other friendly countries are all strengthening their deterrence capabilities. It is welcome that France sees the need to increase deterrence in Europe – this means greater security for Lithuania as well ...
We have security guarantees, and that is probably the most important thing. Whether those guarantees are under one flag or another likely makes little difference. The key point is that they exist”.
If, as the Lithuanian defence minister contends, the United States can be trusted in the context of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance – a claim that has been widely contested in the context of the second Trump administration – and if moves by France and other NATO member states to enhance their nuclear capabilities means “greater security for Lithuania as well”, then why the need to remove Article 137? What of international law? What does the NPT imply about the prospect of a constitutionally nuclear weapon-free state renouncing such status?
Nuclear-free not anti-nuclear
Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states:
“Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or to induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”
Article II of the same treaty states:
“Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Articles I and II of the NPT seem clear enough, even if the commitments made by those who have signed up to them are encoded in ‘treaty language’. As it happens, the United States, France and Lithuania are all State Party’s to the NPT.
The first Article of Chapter XIII of the Lithuanian Constitution – the same Chapter containing Article 137 – states:
“In implementing its foreign policy, the Republic of Lithuania shall follow the universally recognised principles and norms of international law”.
It might be argued that planning to breach an international treaty such as the NPT is – by now – part of the “norms of international law”. The evidence for such breaches (see the NPT Dossier in Spokesman 163) is vast. Indeed, all nuclear-armed states that are Party to the NPT are arguably in unabashed breach of not just Articles I and II, but a whole host of other provisions.
However, the whole situation surrounding Lithuania’s intent to remove nuclear-free status is too serious for glib assessments of the status of the NPT. Nuclear-disarmers should leave the glibness to those who claim that the NPT is the “cornerstone” of disarmament and non-proliferation whilst they rearm and proliferate.
The facts of the matter seem to be that whilst Lithuania has been constitutionally free of nuclear weapons, its recent history – including plans for constitutional change – indicate that the state has not been anti-nuclear. Take, for example, Lithuania’s 2004 entry into membership of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance and its persistent objection (see ENDInfo 23) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Or, more recently, its joint statement with Latvia and Estonia to the April 2025 NPT PrepCom, which claimed that NATO’s:
“nuclear deterrence arrangements [are] a necessity and a stabilizing factor in European and global security, particularly in the context of Russia’s dangerous and irresponsible behaviour and nuclear rhetoric”.
In October 2025, Lithuania reported to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that:
“For us, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is a necessity — a vital safeguard against aggression. NATO’s posture has always been fully compliant with the NPT and contributes to stability. Let us not be misled: the real threats to the NPT come from those who engage in irresponsible rhetoric, expand arsenals opaquely, and develop nuclear weapons and missile programmes in violation of international law — not from NATO, whose doctrines remain transparent and consistent for decade”.
In a separate contribution to the same Committee Lithuania’s Ambassador to the UN, Rytis Paulauskas, claimed:
“Lithuania values peace. Our history teaches us the cost of lost freedom. For us, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is a necessity — a vital safeguard against aggression. NATO’s posture has always been fully compliant with the NPT and contributes to stability.
Let us not be misled: the real threats to the NPT come from those who engage in irresponsible rhetoric, expand arsenals opaquely, and develop nuclear weapons and missile programs in violation of international law – not from NATO, whose doctrines remain transparent and consistent for decades.”
More recently still, at the 2026 NPT RevCon Audra Plepytė, Lithuania’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, submitted that:
“Disarmament remains the ultimate goal. Stability will not come from alternatives to the NPT, but from all states faithfully upholding its principles and obligations. A robust and universal NPT is in all our interests. In this context, we also reaffirm our support for strengthening the NPT review process.”
So many warm words for the NPT but so little scrutiny of the implications for the course being charted by the current Lithuanian government.
Sources of opposition
The proposal to amend Lithuania’s Constitution, amounting to a single line of text reading “To declare Article 137 invalid”, was introduced into the Seimas (parliament) by its Speaker, Juozas Olekas. The ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ published on the Seimas website concludes:
“The objectives of the draft law are to remove the constitutional provision that limits the Republic of Lithuania's ability to fully participate in the NATO collective defense and deterrence system; to create legal prerequisites for the Republic of Lithuania, together with its allies, to decide on the use of all NATO deterrence measures in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania in the event of a threat of aggression or aggression; to demonstrate that the Republic of Lithuania will defend its independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order with all means of collective defense; to ensure that the Republic of Lithuania is not a weak link in NATO in the region and is not less protected than other NATO states.”
The initial discussion consisted of seven contributions from six different Seimas members, one of whom – Aidas Gedvilas, once a member of the Lithuanian Labour Party but now a member of the right-wing Dawn of Nemunas party – voted against. Out of a total of 108 votes, 89 voted in favour with 11 votes of opposition and 6 abstentions. Some Dawn of Nemunas members abstained and in other parties, the voting pattern was mixed. For instance, some members of the Lithuanian Peasants' and Greens Union voted against and others for the removal of Article 137. This party is considered to be on the left of Ukrainian politics but it represents socially conservative views and its sole MEP sits with the Conservatives and Reformists group.
There will now be two further rounds of votes, both requiring ‘super-majorities’ to pass. Given the initial vote and the political makeup of the Seimas, it looks unlikely that a specifically ‘peace movement’ perspective will be introduced. Will serious scrutiny of the NPT feature at all?
Lithuania has no public peace or anti-war organisation, though there are undoubtedly individuals and groups who oppose not only the repeal of Article 137 but nuclear weapons, NATO and the drive to war in general. Some of them are visible on social media sites. Can such individuals and groups be reached? If so, how? Such tentative questions are necessary not only because basic solidarity demands such but because the stakes are extremely high.
In states that have existing peace, anti-war and anti-nuclear organisations, efforts should be made raise the alarm and to test the extent to which warm words about the NPT, non-proliferation, international law and related issues represent sincere commitment.
European Rearmament
The fate of Article 137 is consequential because it combines concerns outlined previously (see ENDInfo 48): the indivisibility of the question of European rearmament and drastically increased nuclear risks.
Article 137 not only bans nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, but it prohibits all “foreign military bases on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.” Lithuania’s history gives context for this prohibition.
German armed forces were last in Lithuania from June 1941 to January 1945, following the Nazi invasion and occupation. During this occupation, up to 95-97% of Lithuania’s 250,000 Jews were rounded up, tortured, imprisoned and murdered. In 2027, German armed forces – commanded under a very different government – are to be invited back to Lithuania. By the end of that year 5,000 German troops are to be permanently based in Lithuania, a few miles from the border with Belarus. This deployment will be Germany’s first permanent overseas presence since 1955. Germany and their Lithuanian hosts claim that ‘Panzerbrigade 45’ will increase security. The deadly ‘logic’ at the heart of European rearmament is that increased belligerence, heightened military threat, massive arms spending and nuclear proliferation are reasonable security measures. Has any consideration been given to what potential adversaries might do in response? Has any consideration been given to how escalation, new deployments and new technologies shorten the odds on peace and shorten the route between mistake, miscalculation and potential nuclear war? It seems not.
Rather than escalation, Europe needs security arrangements based on diplomacy and the recognition that security cannot be achieved at the expense of others. That is, common security with a European nuclear-free zone at its heart. The alternative now being pursued only increases the risks.
At the very end of the Preface to his most recent book, 85 Seconds to Midnight, Carlo Rovelli explains that:
“My goal is to help avoid what seems to me to be the involuntary but hardly avoidable destination point of the current policy of the governments we have elected: nuclear war.”
Rovelli’s goal should be the collective goal of European peace, anti-war and disarmament groups.