Re-start New START

Editorial, Tom Unterrainer

At the time of writing, it looks almost certain that New START will expire on 5 February 2026. If this happens, the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty will join a host of other such treaties on the bonfire, risking even more acute nuclear tensions, instability and risk.

As we have previously indicated, this process began with George Bush Jnrs. scrapping of the Anti-Ballastic Missile treaty in 2002 and reached its apogee with Trump’s wilful destruction of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty in 2019. The JCPOA, or ‘Iran Deal’, met a similar fate and the process continues with the fate of New START. How else to characterise this sequence of events other than as a deliberate strategy to re-draw the nuclear order?

There has been much talk in recent weeks about the possible end of the ‘rules based international order’. For those keeping a close eye on nuclear developments – not to mention anyone noticing the US, UK and others sanctioning Israel’s genocide in Gaza – such talk seems a little disingenuous. Serious concern about such risks would surely motivate America’s allies to press for a change of course on the nuclear treaties and much else. Yet the Biden administration did nothing to reverse the course set by Trump on the ‘Iran Deal’, INF and the rest. No discernable pressure was put, notwithstanding European states persisting with the JCPOA/’Iran Deal’ process following the US exit. It does not have to be this way with New START: there is still time for an agreement on further extensions to be reached and even if the treaty expires in early February, it can be resurrected.

Under New START, each party (Russia and the USA) limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1550. In addition, the treaty limits the overall number (deployed and non-deployed) of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched missile systems and ‘heavy’, nuclear-capable bombers to 800, with no more than 700 of these being deployed. Monitoring and inspection visits are also part of the treaty.

In the absence of such limitations and verifications, both Russia and the USA would have no formal restraints on increasing the numbers of such weaponry. Any escalation by one party will surely be met by reciprocal moves. This would be a recipe for disaster.

The road to agreeing New START was not an easy one. It is the successor treaty to START I. Efforts to agree START II and START III produced deadlock. New START went through eight rounds of prolonged negotiation, debate in the Duma and Senate and much external scrutiny before ratification documents were finally exchanged in Munich (5 February 2011). New START was designed to last for ten years with a key component of the treaty being a mechanism for extension. With the consent of both parties to the treaty, it can be extended for a further five years. This is what happened in 2021 and this is what needs to happen now.

Unsurprisingly, given Trump’s wrecking operation on other treaties during his first term, negotiations running up to February 2021 did not go smoothly. On the day of Biden’s inauguration, Russia called for a more constructive approach. On this issue, if not on the INF and JCPOA/’Iran Deal’, Biden took constructive steps. On 3 February 2021, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken agreed the extension already ratified by Russia.

Much changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In ENDInfo 30 (March 2022) we reproduced statements issued by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. The first of these, written on 25 February 2022, warned that:

Humanity is confronted by increasing danger of nuclear war. Even before Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, worsening relations between the world’s nuclear-armed states and alliances made our planet a tinderbox where one false move – or misunderstanding – could result in nuclear war. President Putin’s order to invade Ukraine makes this perilous situation much worse. He publicly warns others not to interfere otherwise they will suffer ‘consequences greater than any you have faced in history’. Such nuclear blackmail must be exposed and resisted. For the sake of humanity, Russia should cease its aggression and withdraw from Ukraine without delay.

In addition to issuing nuclear threats and in the context of deteriorating relations between Russia and the USA, in February 2023 Putin also ceased all monitoring and verification activities under the extended New START. At the time, Putin explained that in a situation where the United States was continuing to develop nuclear weapons, Russia would have to consider similar developments. the USA took reciprocal measures, including revoking visas for Russian weapons inspectors.

Fast-forward to September 2025 and the situation changed again. With no obvious signs of efforts to negotiate a further extension of New START, Putin made an offer (see ENDInfo 44). In a session of the Russian Security Council, Putin said:

In order to prevent the emergence of a new strategic arms race and to preserve an acceptable degree of predictability and restraint, we consider it reasonable to maintain at this turbulent time the status quo established under New START. Accordingly, Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026.

As we reported at the time, Trump’s response, “sounds like a good idea to me”, offered a glimmer of hope but as yet, there are no concrete signs that an agreement will be reached. Could this change quickly in the context of negotiations over a ‘deal’ to end Russia’s war in Ukraine and the active diplomacy underway?

If some form of agreement is struck and if New START is resurrected, then the world will be safer for it. Of course, such a step would be the first in a long list of repairs needed to re-establish the hard-fought system of predictability and restraint in the nuclear arena. The peace movements worked for these measures and will work to salvage what can be pressured. At the same time, we remain alert to the very real dangers.