First Steps Towards Secure Peace

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Bertrand Russell

Chapter 8 of Has Man A Future?, first published in 1961 – as global tensions built between the USA and USSR in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis – and re-issued by Spokesman Books in 2001.

The first steps towards the attainment of secure peace, like the first tottering steps of an infant, will almost necessarily be small and doubtful. In this chapter, I want to consider, not all that is desirable, but all that might conceivably be achieved by negotiators in a not too distant future.

The first thing that is needed is a different atmosphere in debates between East and West. At present these debates are conducted in the spirit of an athletic contest. What each side thinks important is, not the reaching of agreement, but its own victory either in a propaganda performance for the rest of the world or in securing from the other side concessions which might tilt the balance of power in what would be considered a favourable direction. Neither side remembers that the future of Man is at stake and that almost any agreement would be better than none. Take, for example, the long-drawn-out negotiations for the abolition of tests. East and West have always agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Both sides have agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers is imminent. Both sides have agreed that a ban on nuclear tests would help to prevent this spread. From these premises, both sides have felt, not that tests must stop, but that whichever side is in question must seem to wish to stop them. The negotiations began hopefully with a joint declaration of the scientists of East and West that a test anywhere could be detected by the other side. Thereupon, the American Government announced that it needed to make underground tests and that these could easily pass undetected. After some years of negotiation this obstacle was overcome. The Soviet Government thereupon announced that the necessary inspection should not be directed by one man representing the United Nations, but by three men-one East, one West, and one neutral - and that they should only act when there was unan­imity. As was to be feared these manoeuvres on the part of America and Russia made the years of nego­tiation fruitless and led to the resumption of tests by Russia. One cannot but conclude that neither side has been sincere in pretending to wish that tests should cease by agreement.

If any progress is to be made with any of the problems that cause East-West tension, negotiators must meet, not in the hope of outwitting each other, or of prolonging the dangerous status quo, but with an absolute determination that agreement shall be reached. It must be accepted that an agreement is not likely to be wholly palatable to either party. The aim should be to reach agreements which do not alter the balance of power, but do diminish the risk of war.

I can see only one motive which can lead to this change in the attitude of negotiators. This motive will have to be consciousness on both sides of the futile horror of nuclear war. At present, each side thinks it necessary for success in the war of nerves to pretend that it might win. And not only for success in the war of nerves, but also to lure its own citizens to their death by promises which Governments must know to be deceitful. One side announces, ‘We might win a hot war’; the other side retorts, ‘We shall obliterate you’. Such statements tend to promote warlike fury in whichever side is threatened. If any steps towards peace are to be achieved, both sides will have to recognize that they face a common peril and that the true enemy is not the other side, but the weapons of mass destruction which both sides possess.

If this is recognized on both sides, the problem becomes a quite different one. It is no longer the problem of outwitting the other side, or of persuading one’s own side that it is capable of victory. The first problem will have to be to find acceptable steps, however small, which can prove that fruitful negotiations have become possible.

There is a considerable amount of rhetoric, both on the warlike and on the peaceful side, which, whatever its intention, is not likely to lead to the desired result. We have formerly considered the rhetorical war propaganda embodied in the slogan, ‘Liberty or Death’, but there is an opposite slogan invented by West German friends of peace: ‘Better Red than dead’. One may guess that in some sections of Russian public opinion there is an opposite slogan: ‘Better capitalists than corpses’. I do not think it is necessary to inquire into the theoretical validity of either slogan since I think it out of the question that the one should be adopted by Western Governments or the other by the Governments of the East. Neither slogan presents justly the problem which East and West alike have to face. Given that military victory by either side is impossible, it follows logically that a negotiated detente cannot be based on the complete subjection of either side to the other, but must preserve the existing balance while transforming it from a balance of terror to a balance of hope. That is to say, co-existence must be accepted genuinely and not superficially as a necessary condition of human survival.

Perhaps the first step should be a solemn declaration by the United States and the USSR, and as many other Powers as possible, that a nuclear war would be an utter disaster to both East and West and, also, to neutrals, and that it would not achieve anything that East or West or neutrals could possibly desire. I should hope that such a declaration could be made sincerely. Both sides know that what it would say is true, but both sides are caught in a net of prestige, propaganda, and power politics, from which, hitherto, they have not known how to extricate themselves. I should like to see the neutrals taking the lead in achieving such a declaration, and I do not see how either side could incur the odium of refusing to sign.

The next step should be a temporary moratorium, say for a period of two years, during which each side would pledge itself to abstain from provocative actions. Among provocative actions should be included such measures as interference with the freedom of West Berlin, or interven­tion by the United States in Cuba. It should be agreed that United Nations observers, as impartial as could be found, should decide whether an act is provocative.

During the two years moratorium, various preliminary steps should be taken with a view to making subsequent negotiations easier. There should be on both sides a discouragement of vehement hostile propaganda and an attempt by means of greatly increased cultural contact to diminish the popular view in East and West of West and East as melodramatic monsters of wickedness. Steps should be taken to lessen the danger of unprovoked or unintended war. At the present time, each side fears an unprovoked attack by the other, and each side has a vast system of detection by which it hopes to discover such an unprovoked attack a few minutes before it occurs. Each side’s methods of detection are fallible and, therefore, each side may believe itself about to be attacked when nothing of the sort is occurring. If it believes this, it will order what it supposes to be a counter-attack, but what, to the other side, will appear merely unprovoked aggression. This is a mutual nightmare, caused by tension, but immensely increasing it. It is hardly possible that tension should be very seriously diminished while both sides live under the threat of ‘instant retaliation’, which may well be, not retaliation, but response to a mistake. It is by no means easy to see what can be done about this situation when it has once been allowed to grow up. Nuclear disarmament, of course, would solve this problem. Not long ago the danger might have been much alleviated by abolition of launching sites, or, if that were thought too extreme a measure, by making the launching sites temporarily unavailable. But, since the introduction of submarines provided with nuclear weapons, launching sites have lost a good deal of their dominant importance. The diminution of the danger of unintended or accidental war has become a technical question of much complexity and, short of nuclear disarmament, it would seem that only palliatives are possible. If a detente is genuinely desired on both sides, a technical commission composed of East and West in equal numbers could be appointed to diminish this danger, but what exactly it could recommend, it is difficult to decide, and it must always be remembered that palliatives are unreliable and that nuclear disarmament affords the only genuine protection against this danger.

There should also be an attempt on both sides, on the one hand, to increase mutual knowledge of each other’s case, and, on the other hand, to disseminate information as to the disastrousness of a nuclear war should it take place.

The main work to be performed during the moratorium would be an agreement to appoint a Conciliation Com­mittee consisting of equal numbers of members from East and West and neutrals. I think such a Committee, if it were to perform its work efficiently, would have to be small. It might, for example, consist of four members from the West, four from the East, and four neutrals. It should - at least at first - have advisory powers only. whenever it did not succeed in reaching unanimity, the opinions of both majority and minority, with the reasons for them, should be made public. Its decisions should be governed by certain principles. Of these, the first and most important should be that the pro­posals as a whole offered no net gain to either side, since, otherwise, there would be no chance of their being agreed to. For example, Russia should cease to jam Western radios provided that they abstained from virulent hostile propaganda. The second principle to be adopted should be to seek ways of diminishing dangerous friction in areas where this is occurring - as, for example, between Israel and the Arab world, or between North and South Korea. A third principle - which, however, should be subordinate to the other two-would be to allow self-determination wherever possible. There are limits to what can be done in this direction since the Russians would not agree to its application in their satellites, and it is doubtful whether the United States would agree unreservedly as regards Latin America. As regards Formosa, I have never seen any account of the wishes of the inhabitants or any suggestion by either East or West that respect should be paid to their wishes. Until the world is much less tense than it is at present, the principle of self-determination, desirable as it is, will have to give way, here and there, to considerations of power politics. This is regrettable, but is, I fear, unavoidable if agreement is to be reached between the Great Powers.

There is another matter of very great importance which should be dealt with during the moratorium, and that is the reform and strengthening of the United Nations. UNO ought to be open to every State that wishes to join it, not only China, which is the most urgent, but also East and West Germany. The problem of Germany, however, is very special, and I shall have more to say about it in a later chapter.

UNO is defective, not only because it excludes certain countries, but also because of the Veto. UNO cannot lead on towards a World Government while the Veto is retained, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to abolish the Veto while national armaments retain their present strength. On this point, as in the matter of Germany, the question of disarmament has to be decided before any satisfactory solution is possible.

It is because of the imperfections of UNO that an ad hoc Conciliation Committee would, at first, be a better body than UNO for initiating schemes of conciliation. One may hope that, if such a body, while still having only an advisory capacity, did its work wisely, it might, in time, acquire such moral authority as would make its proposals difficult to resist and would give it, in embryo, an influence that might facilitate the ultimate establishment of a World Government. The great advantage of such a body would be that the neutrals would hold the balance between East and West, and, if they thought proposals by one side more reasonable than those by the other, they could give the majority to the side they thought best on the particular issue in question. One would hope that the neutrals would be sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. Moreover, if one side, but not the other, was in danger of encountering neutral opposition - as would be bound to happen to either side occasionally -this would tend to promote moderation on both sides. The desirability of appealing to neutrals would tend to soften the acerbity of both East and West in discussions, and to generate, gradually, a world-wide point of view, rather than one confined to this side or that. Moreover, where there is a deadlock between East and West, there is better hope of a wise compromise solution being suggested by the neutrals than by either of the contesting parties of East and West. These are, perhaps, the most important things that neutrals can do towards the promotion of sanity.

It is largely because I believe that it is neutrals who will have to play the most important role in the preserva­tion of peace that I should wish to see Britain leaving NATO and trying to inspire wise action by a neutral bloc. National pride causes most Britons to think that such action would seriously weaken the West, but this is not the view of authoritative American orthodox experts. Also, paradoxically, it would make it more probable, not less, that some Britons might survive. But the most important argument for British neutrality is the help towards world peace that Britain could do as a neutral, but cannot do as a member of either bloc.

I have not dealt in this chapter either with disarmament or with territorial questions, but only with such prelimin­ary steps as might lessen the hostility between East and West. Both disarmament and territorial questions will be considered in the ensuing chapters.