European nuclear battlefield?

From END Info 44 | DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

The largest expansion of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe since the early 1980s is underway. The UK government’s announcement that it will join NATO’s ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements, the forward positioning of US nuclear weapons at the Lakenheath airbase in England (see END Info 43) and the deployment of new B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs across bases in mainland Europe amounts to a significant and potentially deadly escalation.

Back in 1975, NATO issued a ‘statement for Ministerial Guidance’ (quoted from Ken Coates, European Nuclear Disarmament, Spokesman Pamphlet 72, September 1980) explaining its nuclear doctrine, into which the UK and other European NATO states were integrated. Article 4 of the ‘Guidance’ reads:

“The long-range defence concept supports agreed NATO strategy by calling for a balanced force structure of interdependent strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional force capabilities. Each element of this Triad performs a unique role; in combination they provide mutual support and reinforcement. No single element of the Triad can substitute for another. The concept also calls for the modernisation of both strategic and theatre nuclear capabilities; however, major emphasis is placed on maintaining and improving Alliance conventional forces.”

Article 11b from the same document goes on to state that:

“the purpose of the tactical nuclear capability is to enhance the deterrent and defensive effect of NATO’s forces against large-scale conventional attack, and to provide deterrent against the expansion of limited conventional attacks and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Its aim is to convince the aggressor that any for of attack on NATO could result in very serious damage to his own forces, and to emphasise the dangers implicit in the continuance of a conflict by presenting him with the risk that such a situation could escalate beyond his control up to all-out nuclear war. Conversely, this capability should be of such a nature that control of the situation would remain in NATO hands.”

By 1979, the NATO Review (No. 5, October 1979) qualified the position as follows:

“All elements of the NATO Triad are of strategic, theatre nuclear, and conventional forces are in flux. At the strategic level, with or without SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks aimed at reducing the arms race of the time], the US is modernising each component of its strategic forces. And … the other two legs of the Triad are being modernised as well. Integral to the doctrine of flexible response, theatre nuclear forces provide the link between US strategic power and NATO conventional forces – a link that, in the view of many, poses the ultimate deterrent against a European war.

With Strategic parity codified in the recent SALT II agreement, and with major Soviet theatre deployments such as the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, some have perceived a loose rung near the top of the flexible response ladder. Thus, consideration is being given to new weapons systems: Pershing II, a nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and a new mobile, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).”

Why recount this history? Firstly, because the level of detail available on NATO nuclear thinking four or five decades ago stands in stark contrast to the marked lack of transparency in current times. The difference is instructive: worryingly so. Second, because the October 1979 NATO Review article announced a significant expansion of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the lessons of what happened next are of vital importance. Third, because although talk of “Triads” and “flexible response” are absent from much of what is available of more recent NATO and other documentation, it is a fact that European NATO-member states are undergoing rapid conventional rearmament; are actively talking-up the prospect of Russian attack; are committed members of a nuclear-armed Alliance that is expanding nuclear capabilities; and that for the United States – the prime power within NATO – Europe is again considered as a potential nuclear battlefield.

As we reported in March 2020 (END Info 13), unnamed senior officials of US Department of Defense (recently renamed the ‘Department of War’ by the second Trump administration) reported to journalists at a background briefing in the following terms:

“Q: In the scenario that you’ve described, did you say that the Russians had detonated a low yield weapon in their territory?

Senior Defense Official 1: No, on our territory.

Q: OK and what was the U.S. response?

SDO1: The U.S. response was — I think — I think I won’t — I won’t talk about it but it was a limited response. So I don’t want to ...

(CROSSTALK)

Q: Did it go nuclear?

SDO1: Well, yes. They attacked us with a low-yield nuclear. I mean, in the course of the exercise, we simulated responding with a nuclear weapon ...

Q: ... When you say ‘U.S. territory,’ you mean here in the continental U.S. as opposed to U.S. installation overseas, in that exercise?

SDO1: No, it was in Europe, the — they struck a target in Europe ...”

The point of reproducing this exchange is not to emphasise the exact coordinates of the ‘war game’ in question but to emphasise that, for the United States, Europe is ‘our territory’ – albeit some distance from ‘home’ – and a territory on which they envision nuclear detonations taking place. This is all the more to the point given the specifics of the nuclear weapons at the centre of the nuclear expansion. How so? Because whether they are called ‘tactical’, ‘battlefield’ or ‘theatre’ nuclear weapons, the new B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb and the new F35A dual-capable aircraft were designed for the specific purpose suggested by the three terms: nuclear-warfighting. Their deployment or projected deployment in the near-term to two additional sites in the UK and the updating of capabilities at bases in Belgium, Italy, Germany and The Netherlands represent an expansion – a proliferation – of nuclear-warfighting capabilities in Europe.

In December 2021, when asked about the possible deployment of US nuclear weapons to the UK, then-NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, responded: “we have no plans of stationing any nuclear weapons in any other countries than we already have these nuclear weapons as part of our deterrence and that … have been there for many, many years.” This reply was widely interpreted as implying that whatever developments were taking place at the Lakenheath airbase in England, the prospect of actual deployment of nuclear weapons was slim. END Info questioned this interpretation at the time, pointing out firstly that the “we” – being the US-dominated nuclear-armed NATO – did not necessarily cover the United States itself. What is commonly known as ‘RAF Lakenheath’ is, in fact, a USAF airbase. Secondly, Stoltenberg’s formulation could potentially cover the United Kingdom: the US-dependent Trident nuclear system is assigned to NATO so, arguably, NATO already had nuclear weapons in the UK. As things have transpired, the cautious interpretation of this deceptively crafted statement has been found wanting.

So, where is the evidence of NATO debates and decision-making on the extension of nuclear-sharing to include F35A aircraft at the Marham airbase – an actual RAF base – to the north of Lakenheath? How has the deployment of US B61-12’s to Lakenheath – separate from sharing arrangements but undoubtedly assigned to European areas of operation – been absorbed into NATO’s nuclear policy? To date, there are no signs of such evidence. The only scrutiny to date was covered in the last edition of this bulletin. This does not mean that signs and signals of such possibilities are nowhere to be found.

Take, for instance, Gregory Weaver’s 2023 article in NATO Review (‘The urgent imperative to maintain NATO’s nuclear deterrence’, 29 September 2023). Written in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Weaver argues in the following terms:

“NATO needs a range of continuously forward deployed, survivable theater nuclear capabilities that can reliably penetrate adversary theater air and missile defenses with a range of explosive yields on operationally relevant timelines.

Strategic nuclear forces alone are insufficiently flexible and timely to convince Russian leadership that NATO is fully prepared to counter limited nuclear first use with militarily effective nuclear responses of our own. Given Russian strategy, doctrine, and capabilities, and the potential for simultaneous theater conflicts with two nuclear peers, additional NATO theater nuclear capabilities are required.

Modernisation of NATO’s dual capable fighter aircraft capabilities is necessary and ongoing, but not sufficient. NATO’s planned theater nuclear forces are too small, insufficiently survivable, and lack adequate flexibility to address the range of military scenarios we could see from Russia. But they could be greatly improved without having to match Russia weapon for weapon.”

Weaver comes out to advocate for the deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) on US attack submarines, a proposal also foregrounded in a June 2024 article by Robert Peters, ‘A Nuclear Posture Review for the Next Administration: Building the Nuclear Arsenal of the 21st Century’, published by the Trump-adjacent Heritage Foundation. Peters writes that:

“NATO allies continue to host American B-61 nuclear gravity bombs as a means to deter regional aggression. NATO allies are transitioning their DCA squadrons from fourth-generation aircraft to fifth-generation F-35 DCA aircraft. Because of their stealthy nature, F-35s will have a greater chance of penetrating enemy air defenses and servicing relevant targets. This upgrade will enhance NATO’s deterrent posture in the face of Russian attempts at nuclear coercion. Therefore, the United States will maintain the ability to forward deploy nuclear-capable bombers”

Peters, like Weaver, argues that these existing capabilities should be supplemented by SLCM-N’s which are due for ‘fielding’ in 2035: some ten years from now. Will Trump’s expected Nuclear Posture Review include explicit plans for the deployment of SLCM-N’s? Any such commitments will not come as a shock. Will the Review account in any way, shape or form for the expansion of nuclear-sharing arrangements and the US nuclear deployment at Lakenheath? Let’s see.

What can be inferred from the actuality of this proliferation and the urgings of pro-nuclear analysts like Weaver and Peters is that the ‘credibility’ of the nuclear deterrence [sic] in Europe is being ‘bolstered’ in the interim before SCLM-N’s or capabilities like them can be deployed.

All the way back in 1980, Ken Coates warned that if

“the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home. And if we do not wish to be their hosts for such a match, then, regardless of whether they are right or wrong in supposing that they can confine it to our ‘theatre’, we must discover a new initiative which can move us towards disarmament.”

Just as risks from “the powers” remain, so does the imperative to discover a new initiative. In 1980, the backdrop to ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon expansion included the realities of the Cold War dynamic – the primary feature – but also active nuclear diplomacy (in the form of the SALT talks and other initiatives including UN Disarmament conferences and the NPT). Nevertheless, an arms race continued and despite ‘parity’ agreements on so-called ‘Strategic’ nuclear weaponry, technological developments and other pressures resulted in the expansion of ‘tactical’ systems and their eventual deployment.

It cannot be said 2025 exactly replicates these circumstances. For instance, the ‘old’ Cold War is over and the geopolitical dynamics are rather more complex. It is widely understood that the predominance of US global influence – economic, political and military – cannot be maintained: the ‘unipolar moment’ is over. Yet the US continues to forefront an ‘America First’ policy and is doubling down on such a policy in the face of the new realities. In the nuclear arena, the destruction of a whole series of treaties and agreements can be understood in terms of the US attempting to re-write the ‘nuclear order’ to their own advantage. A truly reckless approach, aimed in part at entangling China into old US/USSR frameworks, has produced a ‘bonfire of treaties’ and the literal destruction of the old ‘nuclear order’.

One recent ray of hope – slim as it is – is Russia’s offer to maintain the restraints embodied in New START. The Treaty itself will expire in early 2026 and no visible efforts at formally extending the life of an agreement that, like SALT, is designed to limit ‘strategic’ nuclear weapons. It is reported that Trump has described Putin’s offer as a ‘good idea’. It is to be hoped that some form of reciprocal offer can be formalised in short order.

However, another recent Russian announcement has a more direct bearing on the discussion here. On 4th August, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the cessation of its moratorium on deploying ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles (see Spokesman 161, ‘END Dossier’). The statement accompanying this announcement opens:

“After the United States has undertaken deliberate actions that led to termination of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 2019, the Russian Federation made proactive efforts to promote restraint in this particular area ... Regrettably, Russia’s initiatives were not reciprocated.”

The statement goes on to catalogue a series of actual and projected US deployments of dual-use (ie. potentially nuclear-capable with simple modification) missile systems – not just in Europe but in the Asia-Pacific region – in the face of Russia’s professed ‘moratorium’. To use NATO terminology from 1979, has Russia detected a “loose rung” in the ladder? If so, what might this imply?

A further, inescapable, factor in reckoning with the current situation is the fact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This bulletin was alert to the potentially disastrous implications of the disastrous scuppering of the INF Treaty well before Russia’s invasion. We have carried repeated calls for a swift end to the war and have done our part in raising the alarm around the acute nuclear risks resulting from the invasion. The Russell Foundation, which publishes this bulletin, issued a series statements, critically cataloguing the alarming nuclear threats emanating from the Russian president (see END Info 30). At the same time, we have been clear about the dangerous dynamics unleashed by NATO expansion, NATO policy and – fundamentally – the fact that NATO is dominated by US interests and US nuclear weapons. None of this is by way of excusing or explaining away Russia’s invasion and the bloody realities of war in Ukraine. At the same time, nothing that has transpired since Russia’s invasion excuses or justifies US policy, NATO’s posture or the fact that European re-militarisation looks like active preparation for war. The least charitable reading is even starker when combined with an appreciation that the US considers Europe to be a potential nuclear battlefield. The situation could not be more serious.

Whereas the US, NATO and – so it seems – the EU (which has no military) more widely considers the claim that “if you want peace, prepare for war” to be credible, the peace movements understand this claim to be not only incredible but also incredibly dangerous. Rather than look squarely at history – recent and not so recent – or attempt to untangle the deadly logic of their impulses, the ‘West’ is doubling down on and intensifying the very same dynamic that generated the acute dangers we all face.

In the 1980s, Ken Coates and the European Nuclear Disarmament movement could hold up the likes of Palme and Brandt – Western European social democrats – as tribunes of a very different approach to what is called ‘security’. Palme, Brandt and a host of others – by no means confined to the ‘democratic left’, encompassing Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church, Official Communists and many besides – advocated for a conception of common security and a nuclear weapon-free-zone in Europe. Some such voices now seem to have absented themselves. Rather, we must look not so much to Europe but to the wider Eurasian territory for voices of reason on matters of real security. China’s initiatives are a forefront example of a serious effort to avert the very worst prospects.

European Nuclear Disarmament remains a very pressing concern. The need to “find a new initiative which can move us towards disarmament” is as pressing as ever. The requirement for a European nuclear weapon-free-zone will surely be at the heart of such an initiative and even if such a prospect seems like a very distant prospect, we are duty bound to begin the discussion on how it might be achieved. The realities detailed here or only hinted at amount to substantial challenge. We haven’t long to find a wide, imaginative and creative response.