First Steps Towards Secure Peace

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

Bertrand Russell

Chapter 8 of Has Man A Future?, first published in 1961 – as global tensions built between the USA and USSR in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis – and re-issued by Spokesman Books in 2001.

The first steps towards the attainment of secure peace, like the first tottering steps of an infant, will almost necessarily be small and doubtful. In this chapter, I want to consider, not all that is desirable, but all that might conceivably be achieved by negotiators in a not too distant future.

The first thing that is needed is a different atmosphere in debates between East and West. At present these debates are conducted in the spirit of an athletic contest. What each side thinks important is, not the reaching of agreement, but its own victory either in a propaganda performance for the rest of the world or in securing from the other side concessions which might tilt the balance of power in what would be considered a favourable direction. Neither side remembers that the future of Man is at stake and that almost any agreement would be better than none. Take, for example, the long-drawn-out negotiations for the abolition of tests. East and West have always agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Both sides have agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers is imminent. Both sides have agreed that a ban on nuclear tests would help to prevent this spread. From these premises, both sides have felt, not that tests must stop, but that whichever side is in question must seem to wish to stop them. The negotiations began hopefully with a joint declaration of the scientists of East and West that a test anywhere could be detected by the other side. Thereupon, the American Government announced that it needed to make underground tests and that these could easily pass undetected. After some years of negotiation this obstacle was overcome. The Soviet Government thereupon announced that the necessary inspection should not be directed by one man representing the United Nations, but by three men-one East, one West, and one neutral - and that they should only act when there was unan­imity. As was to be feared these manoeuvres on the part of America and Russia made the years of nego­tiation fruitless and led to the resumption of tests by Russia. One cannot but conclude that neither side has been sincere in pretending to wish that tests should cease by agreement.

If any progress is to be made with any of the problems that cause East-West tension, negotiators must meet, not in the hope of outwitting each other, or of prolonging the dangerous status quo, but with an absolute determination that agreement shall be reached. It must be accepted that an agreement is not likely to be wholly palatable to either party. The aim should be to reach agreements which do not alter the balance of power, but do diminish the risk of war.

I can see only one motive which can lead to this change in the attitude of negotiators. This motive will have to be consciousness on both sides of the futile horror of nuclear war. At present, each side thinks it necessary for success in the war of nerves to pretend that it might win. And not only for success in the war of nerves, but also to lure its own citizens to their death by promises which Governments must know to be deceitful. One side announces, ‘We might win a hot war’; the other side retorts, ‘We shall obliterate you’. Such statements tend to promote warlike fury in whichever side is threatened. If any steps towards peace are to be achieved, both sides will have to recognize that they face a common peril and that the true enemy is not the other side, but the weapons of mass destruction which both sides possess.

If this is recognized on both sides, the problem becomes a quite different one. It is no longer the problem of outwitting the other side, or of persuading one’s own side that it is capable of victory. The first problem will have to be to find acceptable steps, however small, which can prove that fruitful negotiations have become possible.

There is a considerable amount of rhetoric, both on the warlike and on the peaceful side, which, whatever its intention, is not likely to lead to the desired result. We have formerly considered the rhetorical war propaganda embodied in the slogan, ‘Liberty or Death’, but there is an opposite slogan invented by West German friends of peace: ‘Better Red than dead’. One may guess that in some sections of Russian public opinion there is an opposite slogan: ‘Better capitalists than corpses’. I do not think it is necessary to inquire into the theoretical validity of either slogan since I think it out of the question that the one should be adopted by Western Governments or the other by the Governments of the East. Neither slogan presents justly the problem which East and West alike have to face. Given that military victory by either side is impossible, it follows logically that a negotiated detente cannot be based on the complete subjection of either side to the other, but must preserve the existing balance while transforming it from a balance of terror to a balance of hope. That is to say, co-existence must be accepted genuinely and not superficially as a necessary condition of human survival.

Perhaps the first step should be a solemn declaration by the United States and the USSR, and as many other Powers as possible, that a nuclear war would be an utter disaster to both East and West and, also, to neutrals, and that it would not achieve anything that East or West or neutrals could possibly desire. I should hope that such a declaration could be made sincerely. Both sides know that what it would say is true, but both sides are caught in a net of prestige, propaganda, and power politics, from which, hitherto, they have not known how to extricate themselves. I should like to see the neutrals taking the lead in achieving such a declaration, and I do not see how either side could incur the odium of refusing to sign.

The next step should be a temporary moratorium, say for a period of two years, during which each side would pledge itself to abstain from provocative actions. Among provocative actions should be included such measures as interference with the freedom of West Berlin, or interven­tion by the United States in Cuba. It should be agreed that United Nations observers, as impartial as could be found, should decide whether an act is provocative.

During the two years moratorium, various preliminary steps should be taken with a view to making subsequent negotiations easier. There should be on both sides a discouragement of vehement hostile propaganda and an attempt by means of greatly increased cultural contact to diminish the popular view in East and West of West and East as melodramatic monsters of wickedness. Steps should be taken to lessen the danger of unprovoked or unintended war. At the present time, each side fears an unprovoked attack by the other, and each side has a vast system of detection by which it hopes to discover such an unprovoked attack a few minutes before it occurs. Each side’s methods of detection are fallible and, therefore, each side may believe itself about to be attacked when nothing of the sort is occurring. If it believes this, it will order what it supposes to be a counter-attack, but what, to the other side, will appear merely unprovoked aggression. This is a mutual nightmare, caused by tension, but immensely increasing it. It is hardly possible that tension should be very seriously diminished while both sides live under the threat of ‘instant retaliation’, which may well be, not retaliation, but response to a mistake. It is by no means easy to see what can be done about this situation when it has once been allowed to grow up. Nuclear disarmament, of course, would solve this problem. Not long ago the danger might have been much alleviated by abolition of launching sites, or, if that were thought too extreme a measure, by making the launching sites temporarily unavailable. But, since the introduction of submarines provided with nuclear weapons, launching sites have lost a good deal of their dominant importance. The diminution of the danger of unintended or accidental war has become a technical question of much complexity and, short of nuclear disarmament, it would seem that only palliatives are possible. If a detente is genuinely desired on both sides, a technical commission composed of East and West in equal numbers could be appointed to diminish this danger, but what exactly it could recommend, it is difficult to decide, and it must always be remembered that palliatives are unreliable and that nuclear disarmament affords the only genuine protection against this danger.

There should also be an attempt on both sides, on the one hand, to increase mutual knowledge of each other’s case, and, on the other hand, to disseminate information as to the disastrousness of a nuclear war should it take place.

The main work to be performed during the moratorium would be an agreement to appoint a Conciliation Com­mittee consisting of equal numbers of members from East and West and neutrals. I think such a Committee, if it were to perform its work efficiently, would have to be small. It might, for example, consist of four members from the West, four from the East, and four neutrals. It should - at least at first - have advisory powers only. whenever it did not succeed in reaching unanimity, the opinions of both majority and minority, with the reasons for them, should be made public. Its decisions should be governed by certain principles. Of these, the first and most important should be that the pro­posals as a whole offered no net gain to either side, since, otherwise, there would be no chance of their being agreed to. For example, Russia should cease to jam Western radios provided that they abstained from virulent hostile propaganda. The second principle to be adopted should be to seek ways of diminishing dangerous friction in areas where this is occurring - as, for example, between Israel and the Arab world, or between North and South Korea. A third principle - which, however, should be subordinate to the other two-would be to allow self-determination wherever possible. There are limits to what can be done in this direction since the Russians would not agree to its application in their satellites, and it is doubtful whether the United States would agree unreservedly as regards Latin America. As regards Formosa, I have never seen any account of the wishes of the inhabitants or any suggestion by either East or West that respect should be paid to their wishes. Until the world is much less tense than it is at present, the principle of self-determination, desirable as it is, will have to give way, here and there, to considerations of power politics. This is regrettable, but is, I fear, unavoidable if agreement is to be reached between the Great Powers.

There is another matter of very great importance which should be dealt with during the moratorium, and that is the reform and strengthening of the United Nations. UNO ought to be open to every State that wishes to join it, not only China, which is the most urgent, but also East and West Germany. The problem of Germany, however, is very special, and I shall have more to say about it in a later chapter.

UNO is defective, not only because it excludes certain countries, but also because of the Veto. UNO cannot lead on towards a World Government while the Veto is retained, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to abolish the Veto while national armaments retain their present strength. On this point, as in the matter of Germany, the question of disarmament has to be decided before any satisfactory solution is possible.

It is because of the imperfections of UNO that an ad hoc Conciliation Committee would, at first, be a better body than UNO for initiating schemes of conciliation. One may hope that, if such a body, while still having only an advisory capacity, did its work wisely, it might, in time, acquire such moral authority as would make its proposals difficult to resist and would give it, in embryo, an influence that might facilitate the ultimate establishment of a World Government. The great advantage of such a body would be that the neutrals would hold the balance between East and West, and, if they thought proposals by one side more reasonable than those by the other, they could give the majority to the side they thought best on the particular issue in question. One would hope that the neutrals would be sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. Moreover, if one side, but not the other, was in danger of encountering neutral opposition - as would be bound to happen to either side occasionally -this would tend to promote moderation on both sides. The desirability of appealing to neutrals would tend to soften the acerbity of both East and West in discussions, and to generate, gradually, a world-wide point of view, rather than one confined to this side or that. Moreover, where there is a deadlock between East and West, there is better hope of a wise compromise solution being suggested by the neutrals than by either of the contesting parties of East and West. These are, perhaps, the most important things that neutrals can do towards the promotion of sanity.

It is largely because I believe that it is neutrals who will have to play the most important role in the preserva­tion of peace that I should wish to see Britain leaving NATO and trying to inspire wise action by a neutral bloc. National pride causes most Britons to think that such action would seriously weaken the West, but this is not the view of authoritative American orthodox experts. Also, paradoxically, it would make it more probable, not less, that some Britons might survive. But the most important argument for British neutrality is the help towards world peace that Britain could do as a neutral, but cannot do as a member of either bloc.

I have not dealt in this chapter either with disarmament or with territorial questions, but only with such prelimin­ary steps as might lessen the hostility between East and West. Both disarmament and territorial questions will be considered in the ensuing chapters.

Anti-nuclear news

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

‘Spy balloons’ and Spy Domes

Over the course of two or three days, much of the anglosphere media dedicated itself to the story of a Chinese balloon - or ‘Spy Balloon’, as some reports labelled it - that was making its way across the United States landmass.

According to some reports, the balloon was as large as a ‘20 storey building’ (Sky News, 07/02/23) so regardless of whether or not it was actually a ‘Spy Balloon’ it was hardly designed for stealthy operations. After some days of coverage, the United States armed forces eventually found an opportunity to shoot the balloon out of the sky.

Debris has been recovered and is currently being analysed to determine the actual function of the equipment carried by the balloon. We should assume that detailed examination will confirm the nefarious purposes of the device.

Amidst the excitement, fear and condemnatory coverage generated by this Chinese balloon very little - perhaps nothing - was said about the extensive US spying operations and installations that pepper the globe. Many of these operations and installations have a direct connection to the infrastructure of the US nuclear weapons capability.

Menwith Hill (pictured), located 7.7miles west of Harrogate, Yorkshire, UK, is an example of one such installation. Rather than using a balloon or some other rudimentary device for its spying and monitoring activities, the US has been granted permission to station a series of enormous domes on this rural and otherwise beautiful landscape.

According to the Menwith Hill Accountability Campaign (themhac.uk):

Menwith Hill is the largest intelligence-gathering, interception and surveillance base outside the US. It has many roles which are generally for US interests only (diplomatic, military and economic) – being the hub of the ECHELON global surveillance system. However, in May 2013 an unknown and very important whistle blower called Edward Snowden disclosed thousands of top secret documents which revealed the extent of the intelligence gathering and surveillance on us all by the NSA/CIA (with the help of GCHQ). Menwith Hill is mentioned several times in the documents.

The base is unaccountable, secretive and out of control of the UK government. After Edward Snowden revealed thousands of documents there have been many articles in the press about the lack of scrutiny by Parliament of US bases in general and in particular the NSA especially at NSA/NRO Menwith Hill.

We don’t see many stories about Menwith Hill and related US bases in our media. Perhaps we’d hear more about them if a balloon - Chinese or otherwise - was ever blown off-course and found itself hovering above them.

Perhaps American forces would be swifter in shooting down such a balloon over Yorkshire than over the United States.

John LaForge imprisoned in Germany, January 10, 2023

Nukewatch’s John LaForge is currently serving 50 days in a German prison for his part in actions aimed at removing US nuclear weapons from Germany. Before entering prison he was joined by other activists that have endured jail time for their anti-nuclear protests in a zoom meeting. Ongoing coverage of John’s imprisonment can be found at nukewatchinfo.org/johns-jail-updates/.

Extract from John’s first letter from prison:

January 15, 2023

This month has three important political anniversaries, anti-war and anti-nuclear holidays if you will, events I’ll celebrate privately for a change, since I’m temporarily cooling my heels in a German prison on the west end of Hamburg. It’s not that I killed or robbed very many people, but I have acted contemptuously toward the court system here and have refused to cooperate with its deeply corrupt and thoroughly dishonest protection of the nuclear weapons establishment.

Because Susan Crane and I had the gall to occupy the top of a nuclear weapons bunker that holds U.S. hydrogen bombs here in Germany, and then refuse to apologize by paying a fine for trespassing, the court has decided that seven weeks in this modern prison ought to mend my ways, or at least discourage other abolitionists...

The nine-member thermonuclear cartel, like a gang of coldblooded mobsters, acts outside and above the law by rewarding their judicial, police and prison authorities for the cover they provide, authorities who then wink and pretend that the protection racket is necessary and that the Bomb is legal.

Maybe our marching, our rebellion and the law of nations can’t denuclearize the cabal of atomic weaponeers. Maybe the nuclear mobsters won’t re-direct their war chests to useful purposes before they run our earthly train off the rails. But then nothing changes unless we demand it.

John LaForge, Billwerder Prison, Hamburg

Munich Peace Conference: More diplomacy instead of more weapon deliveries!

The International Munich Peace Conference begins on February 17, 2023. It traditionally takes place as an alternative event with qualified content to the Munich Security Conference. Under the motto "Shaping peace and justice - NO to war!", the lectures and discussions are about initiating a paradigm shift towards more diplomacy and negotiations instead of more arms deliveries.

“It was always difficult to bring the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table. The political will seems to have been lacking so far, because both Russia and Ukraine and the NATO that supports them are still hoping to gain ground on the battlefield," emphasizes Dr. medical Lars Pohlmeier, Chairman of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), one of the organizations from the sponsoring group of the Munich Peace Conference. "Chancellor Olaf Scholz's term 'Zeitenwende' has meanwhile arrived in international politics. He suggests that something has finally changed, that there is no going back to peace and security. That's wrong. Disarmament treaties and building trust, starting with small steps, are always possible. Armistice and peace negotiations are always between political opponents, not friends. Even now, Russia and Ukraine are negotiating daily about wheat deliveries from Ukraine. A more peaceful world with justice is possible if the political will is there.”

“The hope that a complete victory over Russia is achievable due to more and more arms deliveries is also doubted by military officials like US General Mark Milley. That's why we need more diplomacy instead of more arms deliveries," Pohlmeier continued.

The sponsors of the Munich Peace Conference criticize the lack of willingness for non-violent conflict resolution and diplomatic initiatives. For example, no representative of the Russian government was invited to the Munich Security Conference, allegedly so as not to provide them with a platform for propaganda. As a result, no (informal) diplomatic talks between Russia and NATO states or Ukraine are possible at the security conference, the peace conference organizations complain.

"Unfortunately, this rigid militarism once again confirms the need for demonstrations against the 'security conference' and the alternative event, the International Munich Peace Conference," says Maria Feckl, organizer of the peace conference. "At this year's peace conference, representatives of civil society (including the last generation) will have the opportunity to contrast their political priorities with the war course and the armament mania of the 'security conference'." There will also be a workshop on the concept of social defense and lectures on war interests and war narratives using the example of Afghanistan and Ukraine.

Press release from IPPNW Deutschland

NATO to meet in Vilnius

The next scheduled NATO summit will take place in Vilnius, Lithuania, in June 2023. The No To NATO - No To War network is actively considering options for a counter-summit and a series of activities around this time. Keep an eye on www.no-to-nato.org/ for the latest news and notices of planned activities.

Iraq: 20 years on

Lies, war and the ‘rules-based order’

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T[ony] B[lair] gave me assurances when I asked for Iraq to be discussed at Cabinet that no decision made and not imminent.

Clare Short, Diaries, 9 Sept 2002

Mr Blair was ‘economical with the truth’ in his assurances to Clare Short, a member of his cabinet. He was likewise economical with Parliament, the press and the people of his country. Papers leaked to the Daily Telegraph (18 Sept 2004) and further papers published by the Sunday Times (1 May 2005) [collected in The Dodgiest Dossier, Spokesman 2005] make this clear. The lies were not simply about the point at which he and his closest allies had decided - along with the Bush Administration - to wage war against Iraq but about the basis for such a decision. As Ken Coates noted:

These papers showed in graphic detail how weak was the pre-war evidence for attacking Iraq ... The briefing papers made the bald claim that ‘the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy’. They reveal that the British Government knew that there was no major threat from weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and they also knew that the claim that Iraq had links with al Qaeda was ‘frankly unconvincing’.

Ken Coates, The Dodgiest Dossier

Despite the “frankly unconvincing” claims, the lack of evidence, the absence of UN consent, divisions in the ‘international community’ and an enormous global anti-war movement and its heroic efforts to avert the very worst, the very worst unfolded. The US and UK went to war against Iraq.

In short order, the toll of Iraqi deaths rocketed as the bombs and rockets rained down. Destruction was unleashed upon the land and two decades on, the legacies of war and occupation leave their mark.

Ken Coates relentlessly analysed the roots, conduct and outcomes of events in Iraq. In his pamphlet, Tony Blair: The Old New Goes to War, Coates writes: 

The enforcement of international law is commonly not advanced by the outbreak of war. When the war itself is arguably illegal, this perception applies with redoubled force.

He then details cases of torture, the undermining of the United Nations and breaches of the Geneva Conventions which, in addition to the death-toll and destruction, reveal much about those who claim to ‘uphold the rules-based order’.

Jack Straw - who served as Blair’s Foreign Secretary - told a House of Commons Select Committee (4 March 2003) that:

... you are right it is the United States which has the military power to act as the world’s policeman, and only the United States. We live in a uni-polar world ... We will reap a whirlwind is we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are the centre of this uni-polar world.

This uni-polar moment is over. The US, in desperation to maintain influence, continues to act recklessly and dangerously. The UK and other NATO members show no signs of dissent. What new horrors are planned in the name of a ‘rules-based order’? Where will this end?

90 seconds to midnight

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

Editorial Comments Tom Unterrainer

“There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto, 9 July 1955

That these closing words from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto resonate across the decades would bring no comfort to the their authors. What would they make of today’s world, a world where nuclear weapons have not been detonated but where the threat of such detonation looms? What would they make of the choices made by those with the power to bend, shift or determine world events? Would they detect any progress towards a “new Paradise” or would they, like the Atomic Scientists of 2023, detect further risk of “universal death”.

The Atomic Scientists have moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock ten seconds closer to midnight. By their reckoning, we are 90 seconds away from “universal death”. This annual measure of existential threat to life on planet earth has never been as close to midnight as it is now.

In 1953, following the October 1952 test by the United States of the first Hydrogen Bomb and in anticipation of similar moves by the USSR, the Atomic Scientists moved the hands to 2 minutes. It took until 2018 for the clock to reach the same point again, in circumstances where the “failure of world leaders to address the largest threats to humanity’s future [was] lamentable”. Since 2018 the clock has edged ever closer to midnight, as world leaders plot a course to disaster.

This year, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moves the hands of the Doomsday Clock forward, largely (though not exclusively) because of the mounting dangers of the war in Ukraine. The Clock now stands at 90 seconds to midnight—the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been.

The war in Ukraine may enter a second horrifying year, with both sides convinced they can win. Ukraine’s sovereignty and broader European security arrangements that have largely held since the end of World War II are at stake.

If Ukraine is the main, but not the only, reason for the perilous circumstances faced by humanity at large then a number of questions are posed. For instance: How did this situation evolve? What is being done to resolve it? Do we really think that escalation will do anything other than increase nuclear risks further still?

Whilst the Doomsday Clock confines itself to measuring the dangers posed to humanity as a whole, it is important that we register the fact that for all-too-many people, midnight has already arrived. Registering and examining this fact may help us to understand how to ‘move the hands back’ on the Doomsday Clock.

Midnight arrives

Earthquake: The earthquakes that struck Türkiye and Syria on February 7, 2023 were caused by a well understood but unpredictable ‘natural phenomena’. At the time of writing, the death toll in Türkiye alone stands at over 40,000. Are all of these deaths and all of the destruction accounted for by an abrupt release of stored elastic strain along a geological fault-line? Were the 40,000 or more who had midnight - death and destruction - delivered upon them victims of a purely ‘natural phenomenon’? According to numerous reports, more than 345,000 buildings were destroyed in the quake in Türkiye (estimates for Syria are not available). People were killed in their beds, in their homes, as the buildings collapsed above, around and below them. 1 million people are now living in tents. Midnight arrived.

Anger has erupted at the Ankara government as accusations grow over multiple failures to reinforce and improve the safety of buildings following recommendations in the wake of a similar sized quake in 1999. Citizens have criticised the government for “evading accountability” and for failing to impose stricter and enhanced building standards. All of which suggests the question: if such increased standards had been imposed, if work had been done to reinforce existing buildings and otherwise improve the durability of such structures how many deaths could have been avoided? How much destruction could have been avoided? How many people would now be living out their existence in tent cities?

The enormous death toll in Türkiye is not simply the product of a ‘natural phenomena’: it also results from carelessness, corruption and a disregard for humanity. The powerful choose to be careless, corrupt and to show such disregard. It did not have to be this way. Different choices, different approaches, could have been made. Such choices and such approaches could have - if implemented in time and in earnest - have saved lives and prevented such widespread destruction.

As bad as things are in Türkiye, they could have been much worse. Take, for instance, the ongoing construction work at the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (see map below). According to Maria Arvanitis Sotiropoulou, writing on the ‘Beyond Nuclear International’ website:

The station is being built like all major projects in Turkey through non-transparent procedures with direct commissioning and guarantees from the government, just like the apartment buildings we saw crumble into rubble during the recent earthquake.

Construction at Akkuyu was cancelled in 2010 following multiple concerns over the project but work began again in April 2018. By January 2021, it was reported that sea water was “seeping through the concrete floor”. As Sotiropoulou comments:

[E]ven if the nuclear plant were structurally safe, such strong earthquakes can cause damage to piping, so a Fukushima-style disaster is to be expected.

The construction at Akkuyu is not complete. The nuclear reactors are not ‘live’. The disaster was confined to tens-of-thousands of deaths rather than millions. The level of destruction was enormous but not as widespread and as enduring as a nuclear disaster would be.

Currently, the only things standing in the way of such a widespread disaster and potentially many more deaths are time and chance: both can run out and humanity should not count on either. It would be rational and humane to halt the construction of this nuclear power plant, to reinforce the homes that have not already been destroyed and to rebuild those that have been destroyed to a high standard. Such a rational and humane approach requires rational and humane choices on the part of those in power. Can such choices be made before midnight arrives for us all?

Baghdad: Midnight arrived in Baghdad on 19 March 2003, as the ‘air war’ against Iraq commenced. The assault upon, invasion and occupation of Iraq is widely considered to have been ‘justified’ on the basis of a ‘lie’. It was a war of aggression and ‘illegal’ under international law. This did not stop the ‘defenders of the rules based world order’ from launching it [see page 6]. The ground invasion of Iraq began shortly after the missile strikes and bombing raids. More than half-a-million US and British troops and personnel (and a very small number of forces from other countries) were engaged in the invasion.

Prior to the invasion, millions took to the streets across the world to voice their opposition. Following the invasion an enormous mobilisation continued to insist that it should stop. The anti-war and peace movements were not completely ignored but the war went ahead in any case. The lie was too big to back out of.

The result? Accounts of the levels of destruction and the numbers of deaths vary widely. We do know that tens of thousands were killed, large swathes of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities were reduced to rubble, the oil wells burned, children starved - as they did before the invasion, thanks to sanctions - and unknown numbers were subject to ‘extraordinary rendition’ and torture.

Could all of this have been stopped? Millions did their best to stop it: in parliaments, on the streets, in conference rooms and in whatever venue was open. What did the powerful do to stop it? Some countries refused point-blank to join in and used diplomatic channels and procedures in an attempt to avert the worst. What has been done since to bring those responsible to account? Why have President Bush and former Prime Minister Blair not appeared before an international court?

Midnight did not arrive in Baghdad through a sudden release of geophysical energy. It arrived because of calculated and conscious choices of people with missiles, bombs, warplanes, tanks and warships at their command. Midnight arrived with Mr Bush and Mr Blair singing a tune with the words ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and ‘international rules based order’ prominent in the lyrics. No such weapons were ever found in Iraq and every such rule was broken by the US and UK.

No wonder Mr Putin feels so justified in delivering midnight to Ukrainian villages, towns and cities.

Ukraine: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which commenced on 24 February 2022, certainly delivered midnight to all-too-many - civilians, soldiers, Ukrainian or otherwise. Yet the hands of the clock had been steadily approaching this point for a number of years. An OSCE mission, stationed in the country from 2014 until shortly before the invasion, recorded the tally of missile strikes, explosions and instances of armed conflict emanating from ‘both sides’.

Tensions steadily grew and voices for calm, reduced tensions and genuine, consistent efforts at diplomacy enjoyed some recognition. But this was not enough.

Ukraine has now experienced a year of open war. The most recent figures from the United Nations estimate that more than 21,000 civilians have been killed (8,000) or injured (12,000) over the past 12 months but acknowledges that this figure may well be higher. An estimated 8 million Ukrainian’s have fled the country and a further 8 million have been internally displaced.

This is already a disaster and a tragedy of enormous proportions. The decision to invade and launch this war the decision of President Putin and he stands responsible for what has happened. Yet apportioning blame will not bring this tragedy to an end. Nor is it likely to halt further such tragedies in Ukraine or elsewhere. The lesson of Iraq tells us this much.

Midnight has arrived in Ukraine but events there could spark ‘universal midnight’. This is why the Atomic Scientists emphasise the contribution of events in Ukraine to the advance of the Doomsday Clock.

Pull back the hands of the clock

In his ‘state of the nation’ speech (21/02/23) President Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the New START Treaty. Under this treaty, both the US and Russia committed to reducing the numbers of ‘strategic missile launchers’. Although the verification commitments of this treaty had been suspended due to the pandemic and then Russia’s war in Ukraine, New START was the ‘last treaty standing’ between those two countries. It now joins the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty and Open Skies Treaty on the ‘bonfire of treaties’.

It can only be supposed that such a development, had it taken place before the 2023 Doomsday Clock announcement, would see us even closer to midnight.

This development, along with Putin’s repeated nuclear threats and reciprocal warnings from the United States, combine to make nuclear tensions and the risk of nuclear use - by accident or design - more sharply posed than they have ever been. Humanity is hurtling towards midnight.

What the examples of the earthquake, the invasion of Iraq and Ukraine suggest is that when midnight arrives it does so not as some unfathomable ‘natural’ or otherwise ungraspable phenomena: even if it starts this way. Midnight arrives by calculation, human decision making and destructive human ‘effort’. It can arrive despite warnings, despite mass opposition, despite previous experience and despite verbal commitments to ‘rules’, ‘international law’ or ‘democracy’.

If humanity is to avoid a ‘global midnight’ then alongside addressing and reversing our collective pursuit of climate catastrophe, rising sea levels, pollution, species extinction, pandemic threats, poverty, hunger, war and the rest then we must swiftly and determinedly reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear use.

As has been argued many times before, there will be no such things as a ‘limited nuclear war’ or a ‘one off’ detonation. All the modelling shows that one nuclear detonation will rapidly result in escalation and the death of us all.

An immediate means of reducing nuclear tensions and the risk of nuclear use will be to secure peace in Ukraine as swiftly as possible. This means ceasefire, negotiations, diplomacy and the rest. It means dispensing with the idea of securing ‘military victory’ for one side or the other. It means de-escalation rather than a further escalation of the fighting. It means making efforts to pull back the hands of the Doomsday Clock.

If, as some claim, it is “impossible to negotiate with Putin” then we may as well lose all hope. If he is so irrational as to be beyond the ability to negotiate then it should be assumed that he will inevitably use nuclear weapons. We must all hope that this is not the case and there is only one way to find out.

To do otherwise would be akin to categorising events in Ukraine as part of a ‘natural process’, one that is unavoidable and one that should be left to ‘run its course.’ Any such attitude is as reckless, criminal and inhumane as the attitude of those who build flimsy buildings and nuclear power stations on tectonic fault lines. Such an attitude can only accelerate a global journey towards midnight.

Nuclear ‘Deterrence’: Why we must think again

From END Info 35

Ken Coates (1981)

On May 7th 1981, while the Labour Party was spectacularly disproving all the newspaper reports about its imminent collapse, by winning landslide victories in one local authority after another, a small number of parliamentarians were still in session. The debate was on foreign policy. Denis Healey made a major speech. Next day, the headline on The Times did not concern Labour’s victories in the country, but ran as follows: “Healey backs Tories on nuclear arms and NATO”. The report went on “In his first important speech in the House of Commons since his appointment as foreign affairs spokesman last December . . . Mr Healey will have outraged a large section of the Labour Party by virtually promising opposition support for the main thrust of Conservative foreign policy”. The Times went on to cite Mr Healey as insisting “it was vital that the security enjoyed for 35 years and the conditions that had made that possible, should be maintained”. Obviously The Times was seeking to make trouble for Denis Healey, and some may think that its treatment of his speech exaggerated his conformity with Tory policy. But on the key question of deterrence, The Times was not inaccurate. For this reason, we ought to examine this question again.

Long ago, in his contribution to New Fabian Essays, Denis Healey stated his conviction that, while the Labour Party’s foreign policy normally contained an admixture of “sentimentalism” and marxism, the true state of the world meant that the best guide to it was Thomas Hobbes, who understood power politics. For Hobbes, fear was an indispensable component of the impulse to statehood, upon which depended the only resolution of the “war of each against all” which otherwise rent the society of natural man. I do not see Hobbes as the unmitigated reactionary so often parodied in textbooks of political theory, but if fear really were the ground-root of political organization, it would have certainly reached the point (in 1945, with Hiroshima) at which an international polity had become unavoidable. That polity we have not, but the fear has escalated year by year, to the point where it has almost negated itself as a social cement. Now states attempt to persuade us that the “unthinkable” option of nuclear war is really quite thinkable, and that we can expect to live through a “limited” war if only we lay in enough whitewash for our windows and canned food for the duration. This gruesome pretence has been unmasked for what it is by Edward Thompson’s magisterial pamphlet, Protest and Survive, and I have nothing to add to what it says. But the case against “security” based on nuclear deterrence does not rest on the obvious fact that it is perilous, but that it is also doomed to collapse.

When Bertrand Russell sought to explain the confrontation of the nuclear superpowers, back in 1959, he offered a famous analogy:

“Since the nuclear stalemate became apparent, the Governments of East and West have adopted the policy which Mr Dulles calls ‘brinkmanship’. This is a policy adapted from a sport which, I am told, is practised by the sons of very rich Americans. This sport is called ‘Chicken!’. It is played by choosing a long straight road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars towards each other from opposite ends. Each car is expected to keep the wheels of one side on the white line. As they approach each other, mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one of them swerves from the white line before the other, the other, as he passes, shouts ‘Chicken!’, and the one who has swerved becomes an object of contempt. As played by youthful plutocrats, this game is considered decadent and immoral, though only the lives of the players are risked. But when the game is played by eminent statesmen, who risk not only their own lives but those of many hundreds of millions of human beings, it is thought on both sides that the statesmen on one side are displaying a high degree of wisdom and courage, and only the statesmen on the other side are reprehensible. This, of course, is absurd. Both are to blame for playing such an incredibly dangerous game. The game may be played without misfortune a few times, but sooner or later it will come to be felt that loss of face is more dreadful than nuclear annihilation. The moment will come when neither side can face the derisive cry of ‘Chicken!’ from the other side. When that moment is come, the statesmen of both sides will plunge the world into destruction.”

We do not cite this passage out of piety. Russell’s parable is no longer adequate. Various things have changed since 1959. Some were beginning to change, at any rate in minds like Mr Henry Kissinger’s, even before that time. Others were rather evident to ordinary people, more or less instantly. Within the game of “chicken” itself, we had the Cuba crisis of 1962. Mr Khrushchev swerved. This persuaded certain shallow advocates of the game that deterrence actually worked. But rather more significantly, it also persuaded the more faithful apostles of the doctrine, true disciples of Thomas Hobbes, among Mr Khrushchev’s colleagues that considerably greater effort should be lavished on the perfection of a swerve-proof war machine. Consequently, the nuclear armament balance shifted, if not in the drastic manner announced by Washington alarmists, at any rate in the direction of something closer to effective parity.

In addition to this, proliferation of nuclear weaponry continued. This is discussed below, but even before we examine it, it is manifestly clear that it has complicated the rules of the game rather considerably.

The French allowed, if they did not actually encourage, public speculation about the thought that their deterrent was more than unidirectional, if their putative defenders ever showed undue reluctance to perform, in time of need, the allotted role. The arrival of the Chinese among the club of nuclear weapons states produced a possible three-way “chicken”, with both main camps holding out at least a possibility that, in appropriate circumstances, they might “play the China card”. But here the metaphor is mixing itself. Staying within the rules Russell advanced, we would have to express it like this: the Chinese “deterrent” could, at least in theory, be set to intervene against either of the other participants in the joust, unpredictably, from any one of a bewildering number of side-entries to the main collision course. As if this were not problem enough, the war technology has itself evolved, so that:

a. military costs have escalated to the point where nuclear powers are increasingly impotent if they are barred from using what has now become by far their most expensive weaponry; and

b. nuclear weapons technique aspires to (although it may very well fail to meet) infinitely greater precision in attack. This brings nearer the possibility of pre-emptive war, which is a perfectly possible abrupt reversal of standard deterrent presumptions. To these facts we must add another, powerful moment:

c. the stability of the world political economy, which seemed effectively unchallengeable in 1959, has been fiercely undermined by the collapse of the Keynesian world order, deep slump in the advanced capitalist countries, and growing social stress within the nations of the Soviet sphere of influence, which have not been able to evolve those democratic and consensual forms of administration which could resolve their political tensions in an orderly and rational manner.

In the interaction of these developments, we have seen the consolidation, amongst other delinquencies, of the doctrine of “limited” nuclear war. We can only reduce this veritable mutation in strategy to Russell’s exemplary folk-tale if we imagine that each participant car in the game carries smaller subordinate vehicles, which can be launched down the white line at even greater speed than the velocity of approach of the main challengers. These lesser combatants can, it is apparently believed, be set loose on one another in order that their anticipated crashes may permit time for the principals to decide whether it might be wise themselves to swerve or not. The smaller war-chariots are conveniently prevented from changing course to save their own drivers, because they are steered by remote control: of course, the assumption is that those involved in the “lesser” combat will necessarily be destroyed. Maybe their destruction can save their mother vehicles from perishing, although careful analysts think it more likely not.

Stated in this way, the game has become even more whimsical than it was in Russell’s original model. But stiffened up with precise and actual designations, it loses all traces of whimsy. The lesser vehicles in the developed game of “limited” war are all of Europe’s nations. Whether or not their sacrifice makes free enterprise safer in New York, or allows Mr Brezhnev’s successors time to build full communism (and we may well be agnostic on both scores) what is securely certain is that after it Europe will be entirely and poisonly dead, and that the civilisation of Leonardo and Galileo, Bacon and Hobbes, Spinoza and Descartes, and, yes, also Karl Marx, will have evaporated without trace.

At this point we can unravel the conventional doctrine of deterrence somewhat further. Advocates of this schema will often repudiate Russell’s fable of the chicken game. “It is a malicious travesty”, they will tell us. The vogue question which is then very commonly, posed by such people is this: “you complain about the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: but would these events have taken place, if Japan then had the benefit of a possible nuclear response?” Let us worry this problem a little. First, some obvious points. Did the Japanese in this speculative argument possess an equivalence of weaponry, or not? If they were nuclear-armed, but with a smaller number of warheads, or inadequate delivery systems, it is possible that their retaliatory capacity could be evaluated and discounted, in which case the American attack would presumably have gone ahead. If, on the other hand, the American Government perceived that it might not avoid parity of destruction or worse, it would in all liklihood have drawn back. It might even have hesitated for fear of less than equal devastation. “Aha!” say the deterrent philosophers: “you have conceded our case”. Well, hardly. We must first pursue it, for a few steps, but not before pointing out that it has already become completely hypothetical, and already travesties many other known facts about the real Japanese war prospects in August 1945, quite apart from the then existing, real disposition of nuclear weapons. (There are some strong grounds for the assumption that the Japanese would actually have been brought to a very quick surrender if the nuclear bombardment had never taken place, or indeed, even had it not been possible.) But for the sake of argument, we are temporarily conceding this special case of the deterrent argument. Let us see what happens when we apply it further, as might Hobbes have done.

In 1974, the Indian Government exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device. Subsequently Pakistan set in train the necessary work of preparation for an answering technology. Since partition, India and Pakistan have more than once been at war. There remain serious territorial claims at issue between them. The secession of Bangladesh inflicted serious humiliation on the Pakistan Government. What possible argument can be advanced against a Pakistan deterrent? We shall instantly be told that the present military rulers of that country are unsavoury to a remarkable degree, that they butchered their last constitutionally elected Prime Minister, and that they maintain a repressive and unpleasant adminstration. It is difficult, if not unfortunately impossible, to disagree with these complaints, all of which are founded in reason and justice. But as co-opted theorists of deterrence, we must dismiss them. Our adopted argument is, that if India and Pakistan are to be held apart from their next war, the deterrent is necessary to both sides. Their respective moral shortcomings, if any, or indeed, if all that have ever been alleged, have nothing to do with the case.

Late in April 1981, Mr F.W. De Klerk, the mineral and energy affairs minister of South Africa, publicly admitted that his country was producing a quantity of 45% enriched uranium, which announcement signified that South Africa had the capacity to manufacture its own nuclear armament. This news was scarcely electrifying, since a nuclear device had already apparently been detonated in the South Atlantic during the previous year, and it had therefore been assumed, almost universally, that the South African bomb already existed. What should the black African “front-line states” then do? Deterrence positively requires that Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique should instantly start work on procuring their opposing bombs. After all, South African troops have regularly been in action outside their own frontiers, and the very vulnerability of the Apartheid State makes it perfectly possible that serious military contests could break out over the whole contiguous zone. To prevent such war, the Angolan or Zimbabwean bomb represents a prudent and uncontentious investment.

We can say the same thing about the States of the Middle East. To them we might add those of Central America. Would Cuba have been invaded during the Bay of Pigs episode, if she had deployed nuclear weapons? To cap it all, what about Japan? Her experience, surely, would seem to be the most convincing argument for developing an extensive arsenal of thermo-nuclear warheads.

Strangely, these arguments are not heard in Japan. President Mugabe has not voiced them either. Japan’s people have not escaped the customary scissions which are part of advanced industrial society, but if one thing binds them together, it is a virtually unanimous revulsion against nuclear weapons. African states repeatedly insist that they seek protection, not by deterrence, but by the creation of a nuclear-free zone. Clearly they have not yet learnt the lessons which are so monotonously preached in the Establishment newspapers of the allegedly advanced nations.

If we admit, as Thomas Hobbes might have done, that all nation states have an intrinsic right to defend their institutions and interests by all the means available to any, then nuclear proliferation is not merely unavoidable, but unimpeachable within the deterrent model. And it is this incontrovertable fact which reduces it to absurdity: and argues that Russell was in fact right to pose the question as he did. The chicken game will not only have a cluster of three nuclear states at one end, and a single super-state at the other, with the Chinese now able to intervene from a random number of side routes: but it will shortly have twelve to twenty other possible contenders liable to dash, quite possibly unannounced, across the previously single axis of collision.

Deterrence, in short, was in the beginning, a bi-polar game, and it cannot be played in a multi-polar world. It is therefore collapsing, but the danger is that this collapse will result in universal destruction if alternative approaches are not speedily accepted. There was always, of course, a much simpler rebuttal of the doctrine. It is, was, and has always been, utterly immoral. Unfortunately, this argument, which is unanswerable, is not usually given even the slightest consideration in the world’s war-rooms, although there is a fair deal of evidence that the people who staff these often find it difficult to avoid traumatic neuroses about the effects of all their devilish labours.

Be that as it may, the conditions that maintained “security for 35 years” have already been undermined, and Denis Healey needs to think again.

Lakenheath:  No US Nuclear Weapons in Britain

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK) converged at the main gates of USAF Lakenheath, Suffolk, on Saturday 19 November to protest plans to station US nuclear weapons. This was the second protest this year, following revelations about US military spending on nuclear storage sites.

CND General Secretary, Kate Hudson, said:

“The return of US nuclear bombs to Britain and the spending of millions of dollars on upgrading NATO bases across Europe only undermines further the possibility of lasting global peace and security. The US is the only country to host nuclear weapons in other countries and appears willing to sacrifice these hosts in the event of a nuclear war with Russia.

Whether it’s the UK’s own nuclear weapons in Scotland or US ones in Suffolk, the presence of nukes in Britain doesn’t make us any safer – they make us a target. CND’s message is loud and clear: US nuclear weapons are not welcome back in Britain, and we will campaign with all our might to stop them.”

The following text is a transcript of the speech delivered by Tom Unterrainer, Chair of CND, at the most recent protest.

* * *

Nuclear weapons cannot ‘ensure security’

Welcome - I’m not sure that’s the right word - to USAF Lakenheath: ‘Home of the Liberty Wing’ where they are ‘Always Ready to Own the Skies’. Always ready to own the skies! What do they mean? How are they planning to ‘own the skies’? With what? By what means? Isn’t that message actually just a threat? It’s a threat here and it’s a threat across the world. What they mean by ‘own the skies’ and ‘liberty’ is the right of the United States of America and their allies in the nuclear-armed NATO alliance to station their machines of death, their weapons of megadeath, anywhere they want to, at any time, without taking notice of opposition, without any democratic process, without consultation or deliberation.

What is happening beyond the main gates of Lakenheath is terrifying. The F-35 nuclear-capable planes are already stationed here. For what purpose? For one purpose alone: to carry and at the orders of the United States President to drop the new B-61 range of nuclear bombs, which are on their way to Lakenheath and to sites across Europe.

Nobody asked us if we wanted these US weapons of mass-murder back and we are here to say that we do not want them back, we wanted USAF Lakenheath closed, we want their warplanes out of this country and we’re going to build a movement to make sure that their machines of death do not return here.

The United States, along with NATO allies, are expanding the nuclear bootprint. That’s what is happening at Lakenheath and that’s what is happening in Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and goodness knows where else in Europe.

They’re expanding their nuclear bootprint because - or so they tell us - these machines of megadeath “ensure our security”. They say that they make us safer. They say that they protect us. Well hear this: these people think that threatening to murder millions of people is security. Against that claim, we say: we need real security, common security. That means halting re-militarisation, it means stopping the expansion of the nuclear bootprint and for us, here, it means building the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, building the peace movements, building the anti-war movement, building the movements and ideas that represent real security in these extremely dangerous times.

Dangerous times they are! We are at a closer point than we have been for six decades to nuclear confrontation either by accident or by design. Nuclear tensions are incredibly sharp. But rather than try to reduce these tensions, rather than try to dial-down the risk and dial-down the danger untold billions will be spent on making the situation even worse.

Billions are to be spent on new weapons of death. Billions on new tanks. Billions on new machines of warfare.

But you cannot feed people with missiles. You cannot home people in tanks. You cannot educate people with weapons of mass destruction. You cannot make people secure with more military spending. You cannot make people more secure with nuclear threats.

Our job is to raise the alarm about what is happening at Lakenheath. Spread our messages and build the biggest campaign we can in opposition and to make sure that real security - common security - is put back on the agenda.

F-35E and B61-12: one deadly system, one huge threat

The new US B61-12 nuclear bombs are the product of a multi-year ‘life extension programme’ costing billions of dollars. The ‘life extension programme’ has not simply maintained the original capabilities of the B61, a megaton-yield gravity bomb, but has enhanced an developed its capabilities to the point where the B61-12’s have a ‘dialable yield’ and ‘steerability’. What these features mean is that the new bombs can be set to a lower yield and can be dropped from aircraft some distance from any target.

The ‘lower yield’ - still in excess of the power of the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki - are considered as ‘useable’ battlefield weapons by some military figures. The ‘steerability’ of the new bombs, made possible by a sophisticated tail fin design, implies that they could fulfill the function of a ‘first strike’ weapon.

The development of the B61-12 went hand-in-hand with the development of the F-35E nuclear capable jets. They were designed together as a deployable nuclear system.

As we now know, the United States is spending large sums of money to ‘upgrade’ nuclear storage facilities at sites in England, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. The addition of Lakenheath to the list of US nuclear weapons sites in Europe indicates an expansion of the US ‘nuclear bootprint’ in Europe. But expansion operates in more than a geographical sense.

The F-35E/B61-12 system and its combined features represent an intensification of nuclear risk. The combined capabilities of the system, the ‘usability’ of the bombs and the utility of the aircraft imply a reduction in the threshold for nuclear use. This is an especially dangerous combination given the destruction of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the growing nuclear threats that developed from this point onwards, to the acute nuclear tensions we now witness.

Throwing this new nuclear system into Europe - a process already underway - can only lead to increased tensions that will surely demand a response from those targeted by such weapons. A Russian Foreign Affairs spokesperson warned as much in October 2022.

Such systems cannot ensure security in Europe. Europe will not be ‘defended’ by such weapons. The F-33E/B61-12 system is a weapon of offence. The presence of such weapons in Europe can only bring heightened risk and danger to the continent.

War: The Cause and the Cure

From END Info 35

Bertrand Russell

The following excerpts are from Russell’s 1914 article ‘War: The Cause and the Cure’, first published in The Labour Leader (24 September 1914) and re-published in Bertrand Russell: A Pacifist at War (Ed. Nicholas Griffin, Spokesman Books)

In every nation, by secrecy of diplomacy, by cooperation of the Press with the manufacturers of armaments, by the desire of the rich and the educated to distract the attention of the working classes from social injustice, suspicion of other nations is carefully cultivated, until a state of nightmare terror is produced, and men are prepared to attack the enemy at once, before he is ready to inflict the ruin which he is believed to be contemplating. In sudden vertigo, the nations rush into the dreaded horror; reason is called treachery, mercy is called weakness, and universal delerium drives the world to destruction.

All the nations suffer by the war, and knew in advance that they would suffer. In all the nations, the bulk of ordinary men and women must have dreaded war. Yet all felt the war thrust upon them by the absolute necessity of preserving themselves from invasion and national extinction

... [The] nations, fearing that they might at any time be exposed to sudden attack, perfected the machinery for rapid mobilisation, and allowed their Governments the power of putting this machinery in motion at a moment’s notice. Thus the issue of peace or war rested, not with the people, who have to suffer the evils of war, but with men who would not suffer by war, who, on the contrary, would gain in importance and prestige. These men, by their constant practice of diplomacy, had become filled with the spirit of competition between rival States, and had come to think it more shameful to their country to allow diplomatic triumph to another country than to bring about the devastation of Europe.

... If, when this war is ended, the world is to enjoy a secure peace, the nations must be relieved of the intolerable fear which has weighed them down and driven them into the present horror. Not only must armaments be immensely reduced, but the machinery of mobilisation must be everywhere rendered more cumbrous and more democratic, the diplomacy must be conducted more publicly and by [people] more in touch with the people, and arbitration treaties must bind nations to seek a peaceful settlement of their differences before appealing to brute force ... none will be secured if the negotiations are left in the hands of the men who made the war.

Anti-Nuclear News

‘Accelerated deployment’

In October, Politico ran a report on plans to accelerate the deployment of the new generation of B61 bombs to Europe. The report claims:

“The United States has accelerated the fielding of a more accurate version of its mainstay nuclear bomb to NATO bases in Europe, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable and two people familiar with the issue.

The arrival of the upgraded B61-12 air-dropped gravity bomb, originally slated for next spring, is now planned for this December, U.S. officials told NATO allies during a closed-door meeting in Brussels this month, the cable reveals.”

US military sources quoted in the report declined to comment on the specifics, claiming that the modernisation and deployment is part of a “long-planned” effort. Hans Kristensen, from the Federation of American Scientists, suggested that it would be “odd” to rush the deployment, given heightened nuclear tensions.

Whether or not the deployment of the new B61-12 nuclear bombs has been accelerated, the presence of such weapons at sites across Europe, along with the F35E aircraft designed to carry them, marks a dangerous new episode in the history of US nuclear weapons on the continent.

US Mid-Range Capability battery

According to a December 3 2022 report on the ‘US Army News’ website, the United States has taken possession of the first prototype ‘Mid-Range Capability’ [MRC] battery. The new weapon “a land-based, ground-launched system with a range between the Army’s Precision Strike Missile and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon.”

The report further notes that “the MRC provides a fires capability that has not existed in the US Army since the implementation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987.”

A Congressional Research Service report, updated on 6 December 2022, notes that:

“the U.S. Army is seeking to improve its ability to deliver what it refers to as long-range precision fires (LRPF) by upgrading current artillery and missile systems, developing new longer-ranged cannons and hypersonic weapons, and modifying existing air- and sea-launched missiles for ground launch. Army leadership has stated LRPF is its number one modernization priority.

The MRC Weapon System is part of the Army’s LRPF modernization portfolio. It is intended to hit targets at ranges between the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) (about 300 miles maximum range) and the developmental Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system (about 1,725 miles maximum range).”

There is, as yet, no precise information about where these missile battery’s will be based, but the CRS report explains that:

“On March 30, 2021, the Chief of Staff of the Army discussing the LRHW, reportedly noted, “The politics of where they’re based, how they’re based, will be up to the policymakers and the diplomats.” In a similar manner, overseas basing of MRC batteries will also be subject to political decisions. Given range limitations of Army long-range precision fires systems, the inability to secure overseas basing rights for these units could limit or negate their effectiveness. On December 1, 2021, the Secretary of the Army reportedly stated, “the Army is ready, when called upon, to be able to put those kinds of capabilities in the region. But it’s really [the State and Defense Departments] that will take the lead in those discussions.” Reportedly, in May 2022, the Secretary of the Army stated the Army did not yet have basing agreements for long-range systems but “discussions were ongoing” with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Given the importance of basing, Congress might examine ongoing efforts to secure Army long-range precision fires unit basing in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.”

Developing and deploying such a conventionally-armed system, the likes of which have not existed since the 1987 INF Treaty, is yet further indication that the US has no intention whatsoever of resurrecting the Treaty: something which should be a priority for President Biden.

New B-21 Stealth bomber

"The B-21 Raider is the first strategic bomber in more than three decades," U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin said during the unveiling of the Northrup Grumman constructed aircraft on 2 December 2022. He continued: "It is a testament to America's enduring advantages in ingenuity and innovation. And it's proof of the Department's [DoD’s] long-term commitment to building advanced capabilities that will fortify America's ability to deter aggression, today and into the future."

The US Air Force is reported to have requested 100 of these new bombers, each of which cost an estimated $692 million. Time magazine has estimated that the total cost of the project over three decades amounts to $203 billion.

The capabilities and dimensions of the new aircraft are classified but it is assumed that they are capable of carrying nuclear bombs.

Safety threat of prolonged Trident patrols

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d), author of Why Trident? (Spokesman Books), has warned in an article for BASIC that “reliable anecdotal evidence suggests that Royal Navy submariners serving aboard the United Kingdom’s current Trident patrols are serving for 150 days or more.” Commander Forsyth continues: “during my appointment as the Second-in Command (and on occasion, in command) of a Polaris missile-equipped Resolution class submarine, HMS Repulse, at a time when our regular continuous submerged patrols never exceeded 60-70 days.”

Forsyth concludes: “The implications of these prolonged patrol lengths on nuclear safety is a subject which the Ministry of Defence will not acknowledge or discuss under the blanket of secrecy generally imposed on any information concerned with nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion safety ... One can only hope that there is an awareness that patrol lengths may be having a negative impact on crew wellbeing. Speaking from the outside, as a concerned citizen and former-submariner, it is hard to establish the human cost and associated risks of abnormal behaviour, unless an incident draws attention to it – by which time, of course, it will be too late.”

Bad posture: Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review

From END Info 35

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial Comments

In Æsop’s The Wild Boar and the Fox, Fox asks Boar why he spends so much time sharpening his tusks. Boar responds: “when danger does come there will not be time for such work as this. My weapons will have to be ready for use then, or I shall suffer for it.” Boars are known for their considerable aggression when faced with threat. What is less-often commented upon is their relatively high level of intelligence. In common with other members of the pig family, boars are brighter than your average animal.

There must be limits to what the boar thinks, perceives and calculates. Does the average boar ever stop to wonder what impact all this sharpening of tusks has on fellow-boars, who no doubt feel compelled to likewise sharpen their tusks? Does the average boar ever think that all that sharpening might make them more prone to damage or death? Do boars in general ponder the overall utility of extra-sharp tusks as contrasted to blunt tusks and a more peaceful approach to life? Æsop’s fox does not probe these weighty questions with the boar. The Wild Boar and the Fox insists that preparing for war is the best line of defence.

All of which brings us to President Biden’s much-delayed ‘Nuclear Posture Review’(NPR), where we read that the United States will:

“work with a sense of urgency to reduce the danger of nuclear war, which would have catastrophic consequences for the United States and the world. Developments in the security environment make these goals both more challenging and more pressing to pursue. However, we can only make progress in these respects if we are confident in the ability of our nuclear posture to deter aggression and protect our Allies and partners. Thus, for the forseeable future, nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of U.S. military power can replace. To deter aggression and preserve our security in the current environment, we will maintain a nuclear posture that is responsive to the threats we face.”

2022 Nuclear Posture Review

It turns out that President Biden has one advantage over the boar: he recognises the “catastrophic consequences” of using his tusks. Nevertheless, the NPR persists in the fiction at the heart of the global nuclear order: that nuclear weapons are in some way a guarantor of security.

President Trump’s 2016 Nuclear Posture Review was met with justifiable alarm. It marked a significant shift from the standard narrative of nuclear doctrine, focussed on the alleged ‘deterrence’ capabilities of nuclear weapons, to speculation over the actual battle-field utility of such machines of megadeath. Trump was roundly condemned for asserting such a reckless and potentially deadly posture. Trump’s NPR went hand-in-hand with his deliberate sabotage and undermining of the series of agreements, treaties and initiatives – what END Info labelled a “Bonfire of the Treaties” – that drastically undermined the established nuclear order and left a vacuum of uncertainty and risk.

The most notable victim of Trump’s “bonfire” was the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which served to exclude a discrete range of ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons from the European continent and which, together with a series of other policies, helped to maintain the ‘nuclear peace’. As we wrote at the time of Trump’s sabotage:

If the INF Treaty arose, at least in part, from the campaign for a nuclear weapon­-free zone in Europe, then it acted as an important instrument against the threat that Europe could become an actual ‘theatre’ of nuclear war. Such a function is an essential component of NWFZ proposals. It has been suggested that the INF Treaty, in combination with the START 1 Treaty and ‘Presidential Nuclear Initiatives’ signed in 1991 and the 1992 Lisbon Protocol, combined – to all intents and purposes – to create a NWFZ in the Baltic States, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. This combination of states composed the ‘core group’ of a NWFZ proposed by Belarus in 1990. The states in the core group have no nuclear weapons deployed within their boundaries. With the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty, this arrangement is under severe threat.

‘Global Tinderbox’

The Spokesman 141

Since coming to office Biden has made no effort to re-initiate the INF Treaty, no effort to boost nuclear security in Europe and no effort to put in place measures to fulfill the main operative functions performed by the INF Treaty, which mirrored some of the functions of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: reducing the threat of proliferation and confrontation.

Likewise, the Biden Administration could have re-initiated the JCPOA (Iran Deal) at an early stage but has not done so. Conversely, the US and Russia have agreed to extend the New Start Treaty – which aims to halve the number of strategic missile launchers – and have signalled a willingness to open negotiations on a similar treaty post-2026. If it is possible to come to an agreement on New Start, why not on the others?

Rather than seek to address these existing concerns or to work towards reducing sharply-posed nuclear risks resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden’s NPR maintains a striking similarity – in content, if not in tone – to the nuclear posture presented by Trump.

The main headlines from the NPR amount to a cancellation of Trump’s plans for a submarine-launched cruise missile and the retirement of the B83-1 nuclear gravity bomb. Controversially, Biden has chosen to retain the development of the W76-2 bomb which is considered to be a ‘useable’ nuclear device. During the Presidential election campaign, Biden described this bomb as a “bad idea”. Does he now think it’s a “good idea”? Also missing from the NPR is any change in posture to “sole use”, something which was much-discussed during the election campaign and in the early development of the NPR.

The US considers Russia, China, North Korea and Iran to be potential ‘nuclear adversaries’ and the NPR claims that in the:

“2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries.”

The two “major nuclear powers” are Russia and China, the latter of which is addressed at length in the ‘National Defense Strategy’ which was published alongside the NPR.

We previously analysed Trump’s NPR and overall aggressive military posture as being linked to a developing global dynamic where United States dominance was steadily diminishing. We characterised Trump’s actions as a desperate and reckless attempt to maintain this dominance and to re-write ‘global rules’ to the longer-term advantage of the United States.

A sober view of Biden’s NPR would have to conclude that not a great deal has changed. The personality delivering the message may have changed but the overall message is the same: the United States will continue to act to maintain its global military dominance, it will involve NATO in such an effort and nuclear weapons and the threat of their use is a fundamental and indispensable element of the project.

This is important to note for obvious reasons – the greatly increased nuclear tensions we all face and the miserable, murderous events in Ukraine – but also in the context of the expanding nuclear bootprint in Europe, the nuclear policies and postures of US subordinates in NATO, the widespread remilitarisation underway and the global implications of all these things combined.

Also important is the terrible reality of the American political scene, where the return of Trump to the presidency – or a ‘Trump-like’ figure – is by no means out of the question. Such a prospect should surely concentrate minds and gives context to the deadly nuclear manoeuvres underway under the auspices of the Biden administration.