Target: Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

During the 1980s and the last great wave of anti-nuclear activity, there existed a real sense of individuals, towns and cities being a ‘target’. The deployment of US nuclear missiles across Europe and similar deployments by the USSR created a sense that the continent could become an actual nuclear battlefield. As Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation wrote at the time: “If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home.” We can see a similar process to one Coates described unfolding forty years later. The deployment of ‘useable’ and ‘steerable’ US nuclear bombs and the advanced fighter-bombers which carry them to the UK and elsewhere in Europe will, no doubt, be matched by similar deployments by Russia. The only conceivable use for such weapons would be in a Europe considered disposable by the ‘great powers’. A Europe where nuclear deployments and expansion render the continent a potential nuclear battlefield.

To illustrate the ways in which individuals and the villages, towns and cities in which they live are still a ‘target’ for such weapons or may become victims of a nuclear accident, we have used Alex Wallerstein’s ‘NUKEMAP’ (see nuclearsecrecy.com) to model the potential effect of a nuclear detonation at Lakenheath.

The model is for the ground detonation of just one B61-7, 340 kiloton, nuclear bomb. This bomb, currently in service, is approximately 23 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Lakenheath is in a rural area of England and, as such, does not have a large population density. In this particular version of the model, the wind takes radioactive fallout away from major population areas into the North Sea.

The ground detonation of one such bomb would result in the deaths of 7,290 people and injury to more ten thousand more. Most of the immediate deaths would take place within the blast area. This is the closest model to an accident resulting in the detonation of a nuclear bomb similar to those that look set to return to Lakenheath. By way of comparison, if the same weapon was detonated under the same conditions in Nottingham (UK), where END Info is published, the fatalities would total 136,200 and injuries 164,250.

Whatever the model predicts, it seems true to state that Lakenheath will become a nuclear target at the time it becomes a nuclear storage facility and home to nuclear-capable US aircraft. Has anyone asked the people who live in that area what they think about this prospect? It seems doubtful, in the same way that no British parliamentarian, let alone citizen, has been consulted on the matter.

Destination Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

The US Air Force capabilities already deployed at Lakenheath or likely to be deployed there in the coming months include:


Fifth generation F35A Lightening II aircraft

These aircraft were deployed at Lakenheath in December 2021. According to the manufacturers website (f35.com): “The F-35 delivers an unrivaled advantage for our pilots, nation, and global partners. A decisive differentiator in near-peer warfare, the F-35 is the most advanced node in the networked 21st Century Warfare operational vision.” The website of the US Air Forces in Europe (usafe.af.mil) reports that: “The F-35A is an agile, versatile, high-performance, 9g-capable multirole fighter that combines stealth, sensor fusion and unprecedented situational awareness. The aircraft will belong to the 495th Fighter Squadron, which was nicknamed the ‘Valkyries’ during a voting contest in 2020. The new F-35 squadron will consist of 24 aircraft, delivered in a phased approach.” Those familiar with Wagner’s Operas or Norse mythology will know that Oden sent his Valkyries to the battlefields to decide which of the dead were worthy of a place in Valhalla. The “multirole” and “versatile” F35A is nuclear capable. It seems unlikely that this ‘Valkyrie’ will return to the scene of nuclear devastation.

B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

B61 nuclear bombs have been deployed in Europe under US nuclear sharing arrangements for some time. Originally designed as a Cold War weapon in the 1960s, the B61-12 (modification 12) entered production in December 2021 with the aim of extending the lifespan of these nuclear weapons. The latest modification includes ‘steerability’ and ‘dialable yields’, which means that the bombs can be launched some distance from their target (‘standoff capability’ meaning that pilots can reasonably expect not to be impacted by a nuclear blast) and that the explosive power of the bombs can be set as ‘usable’ on the battlefield. The development and deployment of these bombs to Lakenheath (and elsewhere in Europe) represents a significant and dangerous expansion of the US nuclear bootprint and an escalation in tension between nuclear-armed states.

Expanding Nuclear Bootprint

From END Info 32 | Download

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial Comments

The potential return of US nuclear bombs to the UK was announced without fanfare and – more importantly – without any discussion, debate, deliberation or the opportunity for dissent within Britain’s democratic institutions.

There was no official announcement from the British government. No ministerial statement to Parliament. No press conference with representatives from the US Department of Defense. There wasn’t even a distinct press or information release from United States government.

When the government was asked about this development by the Green MP, Caroline Lucas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence James Heappey gave the following non-reply:

“The is unable to comment on US spending decisions and capabilities, which are a matter for the . It remains longstanding and policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

News of this development emerged only after Hans Kristensen, from the Federation of American Scientists, noticed the addition of the UK to the list of nuclear storage sites to be upgraded under NATO’s $384 million infrastructure investment programme. In the 2022 US Department of Defense budget, storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey were listed. In the 2023 budget, the UK appears on the list.

Let’s untangle this a little. Nuclear developments have almost always operated under a veil of secrecy. For instance, Britain’s atomic programme was done in secret, with not even the then-Cabinet of Her Majesty’s Government being notified. More recently, the current government announced in its Integrated Review that it would “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers”.

Secrecy – or, at the very least a lack of transparency – extends to the arrangements under which the United States stations nuclear bombs elsewhere in Europe. The US and NATO have never been 100% clear on the numbers of nuclear bombs stationed under nuclear sharing arrangements.

When asked about the possibility of further US nuclear weapons coming to Europe under NATO auspices, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said – in December 2021 – “we have no plans of stationing any nuclear weapons in any other countries than we already have these nuclear weapons as part of our deterrence and that … have been there for many years.”

Stoltenberg’s comments have been interpreted as meaning that although Lakenheath’s nuclear storage facilities are to be updated, NATO has ruled out the stationing of US nukes for the time being. I do not think this makes very much sense. I would interpret Stoltenberg’s comments another way. Throughout, he is speaking as the head of NATO. When he says “we” and “our”, he is talking about the nuclear-armed alliance. In this context it is worth noting that the UK’s nuclear weapons are counted as part of NATO’s ‘nuclear capabilities’ and have been for “many years”. This response from Stoltenberg is typical of the prevalent opacity when it comes to nuclear questions.

RAF Lakenheath was the place where the US Air Force stored nuclear gravity bombs. By the early 2000s, 110 B61 bombs were stored there and US F-15E aircraft were stationed there for the purpose of dropping these bombs on command of the President of the United States.

These bombs were removed – without fanfare – in the later 2000’s and it was only in 2008 that their total removal was confirmed. For the first time since 1954, the United States did not store nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

It had already been announced that Lakenheath was to become the first location in Europe for the new US Air Force nuclear-capable F35 fighter-bombers. These arrived in December last year. 24 of them are stationed at the base and the US Air Force is scheduled to commence training for the use of the new generation of guided nuclear bombs, the B61-12’s in the coming year. These bombs will go into production very shortly. According to Hans Kristensen, these bombs look set for shipping to Europe in 2023 where they will replace the B61-3 and 4’s already stationed.

So, it looks almost certain that the US intends to station nuclear bombs in the UK again. This is a major development and one that should be taken very seriously indeed. We are not alone in taking this development seriously: our friends in the European and wider peace, anti-war and anti-nuclear movements are alert to what is happening and they stand with us in our opposition.

Even without the massively increased nuclear tensions that have been developing over the past few years, and which have become even more acute over the past months, our opposition would be sharp.

We know that even in the most stable of times, increasing the US’s nuclear bootprint would create instability. We are not living through particularly stable times.

We know that regardless of other circumstances, a nuclear storage site and an airbase for nuclear capable bombers becomes a target for a nuclear strike. We need to make everyone aware of this risk and link it to all of the other very good reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.

We know that every new nuclear development brings with it new risks, new dangers and new threats in local, regional, national and international contexts.

The Russian Army

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

The Russell Foundation received the following information, together with the introductory text below, in April 2022. We re-publish it here for information. The identity of the authors has been withheld for their personal security.

A huge number of Russian citizens are against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Many express their position through open letters and appeals or simply publications on social media ... More than 1,200,000 people have subscribed under the anti-war petition written by a human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov. More than 330,000 tweets with the hashtag #нетвойне (Russian for ‘no to war’) appeared on Twitter on one of the first days of the war (The Economist, Feb 28). Representatives of many professional communities ... have signed collective open letters. In interviews and social networks a large number of famous Russians ... have published statements against the war, and several print media outlets have come out with special covers ...

The war launched a wave of protests across Russia. Between February 24 and March 20 more than 15,000 people were detained at mass unsanctioned protests or solitary pickets in Russian cities (6,500 in Moscow, 4,100 in Saint Petersburg). 712 people were arrested and 27 were accused of felony on various pretexts. Human rights activists have reported mass violations of protesters’ rights, some protesters have been tortured by police. With the new laws, implemented on March 2, Russians can now go to jail for up to five years in prison for publicly condemning the ‘special operation’ and disseminating ‘deliberately false’ information about it. More than 40 Russian media outlets have been blocked or forced to stop working under the pressure, Facebook and Twitter have been also blocked in Russia. Some people who had signed public appeals against the war were fired from their jobs or received threats (OVD-Info, Mar 10). After the implementation of these laws, protests and anti-war statements became less widespread but did not stop.

Conscripts and contract soldiers in Russian army

In the Russian army there are both conscripts and contract soldiers.

Conscripts are those who were drafted into the army for a year. They are not professional soldiers. A contract soldier is a soldier who has signed a contract with Ministry of Defense and he receives a salary for his service (not less than 2 years).

At the beginning of the military operation, the Russian authorities claimed that only contract servicemen were participating in it.

On March 9 The Ministry of Defense reported that all the conscripts were withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense said it was taking all actions to return the captured conscripts:

‘“Unfortunately, several facts of the presence of conscripts in the units of the Russian Armed Forces participating in a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine have been discovered,” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said’

Who becomes a contract soldier and how does it happen?

1. Theoretically, people can enter the contract military service after conscript service. But this is not the most common case.

People from depressed regions of the country, where there is no work for them, often enter into a contract, hoping that this will at least be their income.

2. University students can be trained in military centers, military training camps and receive the rank of reserve officer. Some students attend these way not to become a conscript.

Not all university students can and want to study in such military centers and become officers. This means that with the end of their studies, their deferment from conscription ends. They are subject to conscription after graduation. University graduates can sign a contract for military service instead of conscription.

Some men are attracted by the fact that they are promised that they will be able to live at home, and not in the barracks, that they will receive a salary for their service, and in general they are promised a lot.

But in practice, people often find themselves in the position of nearly the same as conscripts, but also for a longer period. (Conscription period is a year and a contract period is not less than 2 years. Then the contract can be renewed).

3. But most often the contract is signed by military conscripts who have already served for several months.

Relatives inform human rights activists about cases when conscripts were forced to sign a contract. Sometimes they were deceived, claiming that the contract would only be valid for two months (so much was left for the conscript until the end of his term of service)

Some reported that their relative was a conscript, he himself did not sign the contract, just like his colleagues. But then it turned out that they were on the lists as contractors. So the documents were falsified.

Personal Documents

Soldiers’ personal documents are a special issue. Very often, relatives of soldiers report that they do not have in their hands any documents that a soldier should have: neither a military ID, nor a passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation

Phones in the army

In accordance with Russian law, a serviceman is prohibited from using smartphones on the territory of a military unit and training ground, and can only use phones without access to the Internet.

The law also provides that the commander of a military unit may set the regime for the use of telephones.

The vast majority of relatives say that the phones were collected from the soldiers. They are not allowed to use their phones. Sometimes the commander allows them to call relatives from his own ( commander’s) phone.

Sometimes soldiers hide the phone and call from it when the commander does not see.

Cases

I want to share a few stories that I learned about from the appeals of relatives.

1. A young man - a contract serviceman served in a military band as a musician.One day he was informed that he was going to the exercises. He was sent to the border with Ukraine. When they arrived, they were lined up and told that these were not exercises, but that they were participating in a military special operation. Now his family is trying to get him back.

2. There were appeals from contract servicemen who are on the border with Ukraine. Realizing that a war is already going on, they filed a report to terminate the contract, because, according to their conscience, they cannot participate in this.

3. The sister of a serviceman who was sent to Ukraine, called me. The sister herself lives in Europe/ Their Mom lives in the North of Russia.

Her brother served in the east of Russia - in Khabarovsk. They were told they were on their way to training.

All of them from the unit were sent west by train. On the train, conscripts were forced to sign a contract. Not conscripts, but contract soldiers arrived on the territory of Ukraine. From Ukraine, her brother called her mother several times from someone else’s phone. He confirmed that he was on the territory of Ukraine. The sister is afraid that their mother will not be able to send the necessary applications and explain to the brother how to act.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that this family has relatives - a cousin lives in Ukraine. At the same time, now his cousin’s family remains at home, and the brother himself is working in Russia (on a rotational basis). That is, in fact, in this war, brothers literally stand on different front lines

4. The soldier got lost from his unit. He didn’t know where to go. A local resident picked him up, gave him food, sheltered him in her house.

This woman called the mother of a soldier from her phone. They talked. This soldier does not have any documents in his hands. What his status is not clear. He wants to return home.

Human Rights Activists’ Advice to relatives

Human rights activists give recommendations to relatives on how to return a serviceman to Russia, as well as how to prevent sending him to participate in a military operation in Ukraine, if he is still in Russia.

The serviceman sends a report to the commander that he asks to terminate the contract with him and dismiss him. The chance of early termination of the contract in terms of legislation is very high, but so far we are not aware of such cases.

If they do not want to terminate the contract in the military unit, then the military personnel can “scare” the commander by the fact that relatives will make such cases public, both in Russian telegram channels and in foreign media service due to the fact that participation in a special operation on the territory of Ukraine is contrary to his convictions of conscience.

The commander will ignore this report

But at the same time, relatives should send appeals to the Ministry of Defense and other authorities that their relative is a soldier and that they know that he said that he could not continue to serve for reasons of conscience. Relatives should ask the Ministry of Defense to terminate the contract with him and fire him.

You need to understand that the command will put pressure on the soldier.

The family should prepare the service member to resist this pressure. Nothing could be worse than sending to war. Unfortunately, few parents and military personnel dare to act on the advice

Why activists working to protect the rights of military personnel are afraid to give interviews to foreign journalists?

In the fall of 2021, the FSB published an order - a list of information that is not itself classified as secret.

But if this information is used by foreign countries or citizens against the interests of Russia, then the person who collected, distributed and transmitted such information will be held criminally liable. This will be considered as treason. Such information includes:

- the state of the moral and psychological state of servicemen in military units

-material support in military units

- the state of health of military personnel

- information about violation of the law

Phones of human rights defenders are tapped by FSB officers. Therefore, human rights activists are afraid to give interviews to foreign journalists.

The information that I describe here was received by me either from relatives of military personnel, or from other human rights activists, whose names I do not name for their safety.

Dark Eagle under the magnifying glass

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Joachim Wernicke, Germany

The following text is a translation of a small section from Joachim Wernicke’s forthcoming book, Germany’s Escape Route from the Dangers of War.

Trump and the new situation

US President Donald Trump made a serious mistake when he terminated the 1987 Treaty on the Prohibition of Land-Based Medium-Range Weapons in 2019 (INF Treaty, range range 500 to 5,500 km). The Treaty banned all such weapons – both US and the Soviet – from Europe, whether nuclear or conventional, including launchers. The result was some perceived security for Europe for 32 years.

It was clear that Trump’s termination of the Treaty could only have one reason: the US wanted to re-establish land-based medium-range weapons in Europe – where else? Against Russia – against whom else? This gave Russia the ‘right’ to station such weapons as well. This created a new situation for Russia, the US and NATO.

Was the 2019 termination of the INF Treaty the spontaneous result of Trump’s policies? Or did his “national security adviser”, John Bolton – more familiar with military intelligence than his boss – whisper this idea to him?: Dark Eagle as the new Super-Pershing, the hypersonic miracle weapon? Technically, there would be something to this view.

Rocket duel

If Trump was thinking of a renewed stationing of medium-range weapons in Europe, who did he want to attack or at least be able to attack? Looking at the European map allows only one answer: Russia. But what the US can do again after the termination of the INF Treaty, Russia can also do, namely to deploy new medium-range weapons. So it would be a rocket duel, as it was in the 1980s: Whoever shoots first has a – perhaps decisive – advantage. An extremely destabilizing situation.

In the sense of a military “balance”, however, neither side has really gained anything. Or maybe it has? There is a fundamental imbalance: even the most advanced Russian medium-range missile cannot be personally dangerous to any politician in Washington. Conversely, from launch points somewhere in Europe, a salvo of Dark Eagle, which can hit Moscow and kill the entire political leadership of Russia, ten minutes after the rocket salvo is launched.

After the turbulent events in the USA around the change in the presidency at the beginning of 2021, Trump’s successor Joe Biden initially had other worries than the overturned INF Treaty. But even after a year in office, Biden had neither given a sign that he had recognized Trump’s mistake, nor had he made any efforts to somehow revive the INF Treaty.

Dark Eagle

Dark Eagle is a very powerful land-based medium-range weapon that the US Army has been preparing since 2019 for operational use from 2023. Dark Eagle is a hypersonic missile system with a range of 2,700 kilometers – “1,500 nautical miles”. According to American information, the new weapons have only conventional, not nuclear warheads.

So we have a new edition of the nuclear NATO retrofit of the 1980s but this time non-nuclear – or so we are told.

Are Dark Eagles really just conventional? Conventional warheads can turn buildings into craters, but they cannot harm deep underground concrete bunkers. This requires nuclear warheads.

Technically, Dark Eagle could also be nuclear armed. But the arrangement of the Dark Eagle fire unit with the missiles in closed canisters for storage and vertical launch does not allow for easy removal of the warhead to store and guard it separately. Only a conventionally armed Dark Eagle is possible for launch from the canister.

The strongest argument for the fact that the Dark Eagle missiles – and also the Tomahawk cruise missiles – are not nuclear, but conventionally equipped is this: Unlike nuclear weapons, these weapons can be used in real life. In its wars of aggression since 1991, the US has fired around 2,000 conventional Tomahawks. The end effect – Dark Eagle or Tomahawk – is comparable to a Luftmine [German ‘parachute mine’, weighing up to 2,200lb] of the Second World War.

What is so special about “land-based”? Can’t ships or submarines also fire medium-range missiles? Both the US and Russia have ships with magazines full of guided missiles. In this case, these are cruise missiles with medium-range range – i.e. US ships with Tomahawk and Russian ships with Kalibr – and short-range missiles. So far, neither side has missiles with medium-range range on surface ships. That’s because these missiles are much larger and heavier and don’t fit into the existing launch magazines on the ships.

Both sides have submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, these missiles are technically unsuitable for the fast shooting over medium-range ranges. Their typical flight duration over a quarter of the Earth’s circumference is half an hour. These intercontinental ballistic missiles are several times larger and heavier than Dark Eagle – and much more expensive.

The U.S. Navy has ordered a variant of Dark Eagle for submarines, called CPS, delivery starting in 2025. Three CPS units fit into the launch tube for a Trident intercontinental. But the valuable missile submarines of both sides operate only on the oceans, where they can hide at great depths if necessary.

The decisive military advantage of land-based medium-range missiles is the possibility of firing a large volley of such missiles simultaneously – within seconds. Ships and submarines can only fire missiles one after the other, with pause intervals between two shots of at least a few seconds. But with the first shot, the ship or submarine betrays its position.

Incidentally, in order to target Moscow with a short flight time, the US Navy would have to shoot from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. There, however, every American warship or submarine will have a Russian escort ship nearby, which would immediately torpedoe and sink the intruder after the first missile launch.

A decapitation strike against the Moscow leadership in a matter of minutes is therefore not possible from the sea. Conversely, this would also apply to the US leadership in Washington. A decapitation strike needs land-based medium-range missiles, and they need to be stationed on the nearby mainland. The USA has Germany in Europe. Russia does not have a single point of support on the American continent.

NATO in self-contradiction

In Europe, medium-range weapons do nothing but threaten, i.e. disrupt the peaceful neighbourhood in the “common home of Europe”. For 32 years, Europe looked safe from such dangers.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized in a press conference in January 2022: “NATO is a defense alliance, an alliance that threatens not a single country, not even Russia.” But what other capabilities does Dark Eagle have than to threaten Russia as its NATO adversary? Should the Russian leadership be personally threatened?

Stoltenberg continues: “We call on and encourage Russia to engage in talks with us, including the reduction of missile systems and nuclear weapons.” Before the reduction, the first thing to do is not to carry out any new deployments of missile systems, i.e. to participate in the moratorium, Russia’s proposal. Why doesn’t NATO want a moratorium?

Here NATO has maneuvered itself into a self-contradiction. Regardless of an anti-Russian turn in German public opinion after the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the German majority would probably reject a new deployment of far-reaching US offensive missiles in the country – if only they knew about it.

But one NATO line has become clear since 2019, namely that the new US missile deployment should not become a public issue. The German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel apparently covered this line: there are no public statements by the government or press reviews about it. Surprisingly, the change of government in 2021 to red-green-yellow brought no change here.

Multi-Domain Task Force

It became known in 2021 that the US Army had begun a revolution in its long-range missile artillery in Europe, with a wide range of firing ranges. For these new “miracle weapons”, the US Army introduced a new troop structure, called MDTF, Multi-Domain Task Force. The combat zone of this type of modern army soldier is no longer the trench, but the computer work station.

In the MDTF of the US Army, three systems of missile artillery are combined under one command:

- The smallest system is HIMARS, an older but modernized self-propelled rocket launcher with a short-range range of up to a few hundred kilometers.

- The second Typhon system is a medium-range weapon, technically not new, but new for the US Army: On trucks are mounted vertical launchers of the type Mark-41 for four missiles each, as they have been in use for decades on US naval ships and since 2016 at the Aegis missile station of the USA in Romania. In the Army, the Mark-41 are to fire two types of ammunition: SM-6 surface-to-surface short-range missiles or Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles. With a range of 1,600 kilometers, Tomahawk is the direct further development of the GLCM cruise missiles, which were stationed in Europe during the NATO retrofit in the 1980s, also in West Germany.

- But the centerpiece of the army’s innovation is the third and largest system: the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile (also known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, LRHW) with a range of 2,700 kilometers.

Official voices from Russia

The Russian leadership needed a few months to clarify the new situation. A statement from Russia, in December 2021, describes the Western focus on the Ukraine conflict as a pretext to distract from the fact that in NATO territory, “attack missile systems are stationed with minimal flight time to central Russia, plus other destabilizing weapons.” From the Russian point of view, the truth is not about Ukraine at all, but about new US long-range missiles in Europe. NATO has reasons to conceal this from the Western public. Subtracting a propaganda component: was this claim simply plucked out of thin air?

“We call on Washington to join Russia’s unilateral moratorium on the deployment of land-based short- and medium-range missiles in Europe.” That is to say, despite the termination of the INF, Russia will for the time being continue to unilaterally refrain from deploying such missiles in Europe. And Russia also includes short-range missiles. Can’t you take them at their word?

Missiles withdrawn from Kaliningrad? The short-range missiles are a surprise, because in 2018 in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg/East Prussia, exactly such missiles had appeared (Iskander, firing range 500 kilometers). From Kaliningrad to the US military bases in Germany, it is about 1,000 kilometers, the shortest possible route from Russian territory to these destinations, and thus the shortest flight time.

However, the short-range missile Iskander only comes about as far as Berlin. There are no military targets there that would be worth the use of an expensive missile for Russia. If the Russian moratorium is true, the Iskanders were moved back to the Russian heartland by the end of 2021. Given their important statement, would Moscow risk being caught and paraded as a fraud by NATO?

NATO’s response

In response to the Russian statement, NATO expressed “strong concern” about Russian troop deployment on the border area with Ukraine in a counter-statement in December 2021.

NATO is ready for negotiations with Russia within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. As for the OSCE: it is “also a relevant platform” but there is no commitment to include it in the process. NATO therefore considers ‘quarrels’ between NATO-Russia to be more expedient. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 reads quite differently: “The OSCE, as the only all-European security organization, has a key role to play for peace and stability in Europe.” In other words, the OSCE is the ideal neutral mediator, especially for NATO-Russia disputes. What can be said against it? Should this no longer apply?

If instead of the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE was to become the independent mediator of the negotiations between the USA/NATO and Russia, this would be the beginning of the end of the two opposing military alliances NATO (USA) and CSTO (Russia). Both sides know this.

Further from the NATO text: “Should Russia take concrete steps to reduce tensions, we are ready to work on confidence-building measures.” In other words, before negotiations begin, Russia must make advances. Strikingly, in the entire NATO declaration, there is not a word about medium-range missiles.

Clarification from Moscow

At the Russian government's annual press conference at the end of 2021, British journalist Diana Magnay (Sky News) asked President Putin whether he could unconditionally guarantee not to invade Ukraine. Putin's answer:

"It is not the negotiations themselves that are important to us, but their results. (...) They demand guarantees from me. It is you who must give us guarantees, and you must do it immediately, now, instead of decades of talking about it and doing what you want."

Another quote from Putin in response to the subject of missiles:

"What would the Americans say if we stationed our missiles on the border between Canada and the United States, or between Mexico and the United States?"

Also at the end of 2021, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov spoke about the Russian missiles banned under the INF Treaty: "At the moment they do not exist. We have a unilateral moratorium. We call on NATO and the US to join this moratorium," but "they simply do not respond to our proposals."

Did Ryabkov tell the truth about the "non-existent" missiles? Until the termination of the INF Treaty in 2019, Russia could not expect to ever be allowed to deploy medium-range weapons again, so it made no sense to build such a thing. But the technology is still there, and has been for decades. In response to the stationing of the Pershing missiles in West Germany from 1984 onwards, the Soviet Union deployed SS-23 short-range nuclear missiles targeting the Pershing positions and other U.S. facilities in West Germany. The successor of the SS-23 was the modern Russian model Iskander. In the 1980s, an SS-23 with a second propulsion stage and steerable warhead was in development, the medium-range missile of the type Volga. It would have brought capabilities such as the American Pershing missile, but development was halted with the INF Treaty.

Deputy Minister Ryabkov became even more precise: There are "indirect signs" that NATO is again stationing medium-range missiles. Rather casually, he mentioned that the 56th Artillery Command of the USA had just been re-established. This unit had operated the Pershing missiles in Germany from 1984 to 1987 – in fact even until 1991.

On the question of what the Russian government might mean by military measures against the US missile deployment, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko became relatively concrete in December 2021: Russia had offered NATO a draft treaty to address the military situation. But if this were not followed by negotiations, "we too would go into the mode of creating counter-threats. But then it will be too late to ask ourselves why we made this and that decision and why we have stationed this and that system in the respective place." "Systems" here apparently means new Russian medium-range missiles and "respective location" probably also or mainly Kaliningrad. Again, Grushko on what it is about from the Russian point of view: "If attack systems that can reach our command centers within minutes are stationed on the territory of NATO countries, we will have to create an appropriate situation for them."...

The official responses of the US and NATO

At the end of January 2022, Russia received written responses to its draft treaties of December 2021. According to statements from Moscow, they did not address the individual Russian points, but rejected them in general form. The focus was on the sovereign right of states to choose their own alliances: "NATO's door is open and remains open," said US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.

But this misses the point: the dispute is not about association membership, but about the presence of foreign troops in the member states. Allowing such presence is not a condition of NATO membership. 22 of the 30 NATO member states do not allow foreign bases, including Germany's neighbours France, Denmark and the Czech Republic. Kosovo is not a NATO member, but has a US base, Camp Bondsteel, with 7,000 troops – larger than Kosovo's own army.

The original texts of the Russian draft treaties were immediately published by the Russian government, and the answers of the USA and NATO remained secret. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged receipt of the responses, complaining: "There is no positive answer to the main question in this document. The main question is our clear position on the inadmissibility of further NATO eastward expansion and the stationing of weapons that could threaten Russian territory."

Accordingly, in the US response, not a word about the stationing of US offensive weapons, i.e. Dark Eagle.

In early February 2022, a few weeks before the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Spanish newspaper El Pais managed to get hold of the texts of the US and NATO responses to Russia and published them as facsimiles. This made it possible to analyse Russian criticism of those responses. Looking at these answers, the question arises as to why the US and NATO are keeping them secret after the Russian papers were immediately published. Which side stands for transparency?

The Russian draft treaty to the US addressed the two main concerns, which – embedded in broad criticism of Russian measures – were answered by the US as follows:

- On stopping NATO's eastward expansion, especially Ukraine's non-admission to NATO: "The United States continues to strongly support NATO's open door policy and believes that the NATO-Russia Council is the appropriate forum for discussing this issue." So not a concrete proposal, but the shifting of the topic to "discussions". Even without Ukraine's NATO membership, the US could have concluded bilateral military agreements with Ukraine in the meantime.

- On the new US medium-range weapons: "The United States is ready to discuss condition-based mutual transparency measures and mutual commitments of both the United States and Russia, to refrain from stationing offensive land-based missile systems and permanent forces with a combat mission on the territory of Ukraine." "The U.S., in close coordination with our allies, is ready to begin discussions within the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) on arms control for ground-based medium-range and short-range missiles and their launchers." Not a concrete proposal, but again the postponement to "discussions". In the meantime, the US may have long since stationed its Dark Eagle missiles in Europe, thus creating a fait accompli.

… In the Russian draft treaty to NATO members, one main Russian concern was in the foreground: the reset of the military situation of the Eastern European NATO members to the state of 1997, before the beginning of NATO's eastward expansion. Overall, the NATO response was in line with the US response, and this point, which – for the sake of competence – was only included in the draft treaty for NATO members, was not addressed in the NATO response.

What can Russia deduce from this overall tenor other than that the US and NATO ignore Russia's security needs and, in particular, keep the Dark Eagle problem under wraps?...

Dark Eagle is the new Pershing

Immediately after the INF was terminated (August 2019), the US began testing new land-based medium-range weapons for the army, using conventional warheads, i.e. non-nuclear. These tests were of target-guided missiles, with accuracy in the meter range – every shot is a direct hit, no matter what the range of fire.

The precision-determining target guidance is done via satellite navigation, in the case of the USA via GPS (Global Positioning System). A second system, called INS (Inertial Navigation System), uses accelerometers and rotary sensors in the missile to allow it to dance wildly around the GPS target trajectory without loss of precision in order to trick out flight and missile defense.

The Dark Eagle has two drive stages and is about 8 meters long, 0.9 meters in diameter, weight class probably around 8 tons. Like Tomahawk, Dark Eagle is transported in erectible canisters on trucks, two of them on a truck. In these canisters, the Dark Eagles are stored in weatherproof conditions, and are fired after they have been erected by hydraulic arms. Dark Eagle is a modernization of the Pershing missile of the "NATO retrofit" of the 1980s, even from the same manufacturer. A Dark Eagle fire battery comprises four rocket trucks, i.e. eight missiles, plus a command vehicle.

Hypersonic means at least five times the speed of sound. In fact, Dark Eagle flies at about twelve times the speed of sound. But the warhead does not necessarily fly in a high ballistic parabolic arc through the vacuum, but can also fly at a lower altitude at the upper edge of the atmosphere. There, the glider can maneuver with rudders. Therefore, enemy missile defenses cannot adjust to a uniform trajectory of its target, that is, the hypersonic warhead penetrates every missile defense…

When and where will Dark Eagle be stationed?

For the triple capabilities of the missile artillery (HIMARS, Typhon, Dark Eagle), the US Army has created a new troop structure, MTDF. Of these, a first unit was set up in 2017, located in the northwest of the USA, in Lewis-McChord in the state of Washington. In 2021, a second MDTF, stationed in Germany, in Mainz-Kastel, close to the European High Command of the US Army in Wiesbaden, followed. There are no further MDTFs so far, and no further one is planned in Europe.

In December 2021, the U.S. Secretary of the Army declared that the Dark Eagle missiles "will probably be deployed in the U.S., rather than in allied countries near China.” A low-content statement: Of the fire positions in the heartland of the USA, Dark Eagle only reaches Canada, Mexico or water surfaces in the Atlantic and Pacific. Asian countries have already thankfully waved off the issue of stationing Dark Eagle against China. Dark Eagle could be deployed on the US island of Guam in the South Pacific, but from there the missile cannot even reach the coast of China, 3,000 kilometers away. So Dark Eagle is useless for the conflict with China.

The minister did not talk about Dark Eagle stationing in Europe. But according to a quasi-official report, the US Army is – unsurprisingly – trying to station Dark Eagle in Europe. Where else in the world? And where in Europe? The command and operational units for Dark Eagle have been set up in Germany since 2021. The operational units in Germany, the missiles elsewhere? What are the operational units without missiles and the missiles without operational units supposed to do? But officially so far not a word about it.

An unbiased look at the map: From where in NATO Europe could Dark Eagle reach Moscow in a short flight time? France and Denmark will certainly say "no, thank you" to new American medium-range weapons on their soil, as will Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium. The Eastern European NATO members are absent, because the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1990 prohibits such important US deployments there.

All other NATO countries are too far away from Moscow, too long a missile flight time. So the remaining option for stationing Dark Eagle is ‘Pershing country’: Germany …

Flight tests with real Dark Eagle missiles should begin in early 2022. When the first missiles are delivered to Germany 'in the fiscal year 2023' (that is, in principle, from October 2022, the beginning of the financial year 2023), then the training in the USA will be completed and the Dark Eagle soldiers will be transferred back to Germany. You can fire immediately, because every move and every calculation is thoroughly practiced. When the missiles are delivered, they are also immediately ready for use.

So the deployment of Dark Eagle (and also the land-based Tomahawk) actually started in 2021, in Germany, in no other European country. And hardly anyone notices it.

Who decides on the stationing?

Who actually decides on the stationing of Dark Eagle in Germany – the US government or the German government? Actually, it is clear in a sovereign country: its government decides. But the decades of experience with the claim to sovereignty or the obedience of the German governments cast doubt on the fact that this will happen …

Why the government, not parliament? Why does the Federal Government and not the Bundestag decide, when the Bundeswehr is a "parliamentary army"? This dispute had first broken out in 1984 over the stationing of the Pershing missiles: The Parliamentary Group of the Greens had complained to the Federal Constitutional Court that the Bundestag had to decide on the missile deployment. The Federal Government, on the other hand, felt that it was sufficient for the Bundestag to discuss it. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the stationing was the decision of the Federal Government. At that time, the whole thing was a purely cosmetic process, for the United States, as the occupying power, had decided to deploy it. There were no Germans as decision-makers. But the stage design, painted as democratic, was maintained...

Main factor German public opinion

... Since reunification in 1990, German public opinion has ultimately been the force that can maintain or change their country's role as a potential NATO battlefield.

German public opinion must be mobilised again if we are to prevent Dark Eagle missiles from being stationed in Europe.

Translated by TU. All errors are the responsibility of the translator.

War in Ukraine: Nuclear Danger

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

The following text is an edited transcript of a speech given to a joint public meeting of Birmingham Stop the War and West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on 29 March 2022.

In March 1961, Bertrand Russell addressed the Second Midlands Conference for Peace in Birmingham. Perhaps some in attendance tonight remember the meeting? Maybe not.

Anyway, I re-read what Russell had to say at this meeting this morning and was struck by its relevance for the issues we face today. It’s almost as if the world hasn’t moved on very much in the last sixty one years! In opening his argument, Russell insisted that:

Our main purpose must be to prevent a war using weapons of mass destruction – and not only to prevent it for a time by makeshift devices, but to establish such institutions in the world as shall make it reasonably certain that a war of extermination will not occur in the foreseeable future.

What were these weapons of mass destruction to which Russell refers? Why was he so concerned that they might lead to a war of extermination?

The weapons were nuclear weapons and he was concerned about the prospect of extermination of human life because once you get beyond the lies that such weapons are a “deterrence”, that they ensure “security” and that they guarantee “defence”, you must understand that nuclear weapon use means extermination. If, as is claimed, ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’ then nuclear war points towards a politics of genocide.

I am afraid that recent events have put the prospect of such a war and such politics back on the global agenda. I will seek to explain why but in doing so, I will argue that such prospects have been very much alive for decades. If we take them seriously now, we must continue to take them seriously in all that we do and in all of our reckonings going forward.

We are gathered here because of President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and the issue of nuclear war is on the agenda because he has quite clearly shattered the nuclear ‘taboo’: that is, whereas the leaders of most nuclear armed states think it impolite to explicitly threaten nuclear use, Mr Putin has broken with this grim charade.

First things first: we must clearly oppose Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They should never have happened in the first place and all Russian military activity should cease immediately. For the sake of humanity, if for nothing else, the killing has to stop. It is quite clear that a military ‘victory’ is unthinkable unless you are prepared to think about tens of thousands of deaths - maybe more - and the utter destruction of scores of villages, towns and cities.

Secondly, we stand squarely with the enormous mobilisation of anti-war opinion within Russia itself. One section of this movement warned that “This war will turn Ukraine into rubble and Russia into a prison.” News from Ukraine and what we’ve seen of the treatment of anti-war protestors in Russia confirms this warning.

It is absolutely right to condemn explicit nuclear threats, wherever they come from. But it is not right, as school history books and some misguided teachers tell us, that nuclear weapons have “only been used twice”: in 1945 when the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The terrible truth is that nuclear weapons have been in daily use from this point onwards. Their possession and the implicit threat of use that comes with such possession have shaped global politics and continue to do so. What do I mean by ‘use’ in this context? Daniel Ellsberg, former nuclear-planner turned peace activist, puts it this way:

A gun is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.

Nuclear weapons are in daily use and the circumstance of their use is actually much worse than the scenario described by Dan Ellsberg. There is more than one gun. The guns keep getting more powerful. One side has dished out smaller guns to friends, they’ve formed a gang – even gave it a catchy name – and together, they have started edging towards their enemy.

What’s the name of the ‘gang’? NATO. Now, some people insist that in the present circumstances, criticism of NATO is beyond the pale. People in other circles would have you believe that NATO is nothing more than a defensive alliance. Others would kick you out of polite company for opposing this nuclear-armed alliance and for pointing out facts about its function. I’m afraid that such people are at best talking complete and utter rubbish and at worst, they are lying.

This so-called ‘defensive alliance’ was created to, in the words of Lord Ismay who became the first Secretary General of NATO in 1952, “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”, with keeping the Americans in Europe very much a priority. It is worth noting that the North Atlantic Treaty – signed in April 1949 – preceded the creation of the Organisation and an integrated military structure. Amongst the initial members of NATO were the fading colonial powers – Britain and France – and fascist Portugal, a colonial power in its own right. So far, so undemocratic. Yet we’re supposed to believe that NATO has always functioned as a defensive alliance of liberal, democratic states. More than that, we’re supposed to entertain the idea that it is a key plank in what is termed the ‘international rules based order’. More on this later.

Initially, the United States was the only nuclear armed state within the Alliance. It was soon joined by Britain in 1952 – which explains the ascendancy of Lord Ismay – and by France in 1960. By this point, NATO was very much a nuclear armed alliance and so it remains.

With America very firmly in Europe and West Germany integrated into NATO by 1955, Ismay’s characterization of the nuclear alliance needed updating. The prime function of NATO was to maintain US influence in Europe, thereby ‘containing’ the Soviet Union, with member-states under the US dominated ‘nuclear umbrella’.

You simply cannot remove nuclear weapons from your understanding of NATO. Neither can you remove American imperialism from the NATO equation.

Why do these things matter? Because unless you understand these things, the whole history of the last thirty years in Europe is utterly incomprehensible.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact offered the chance for a real security order in Europe. Such an order would have meant disbanding NATO, which – we were told – existed to defend Europe from the Soviets. At the time, people were writing articles with titles such as “Europe without an Enemy” which called for a system of common security based on the entirely rational notion that security is for everyone or it is for none of us. Trade Union leaders in the UK, like Ron Todd of the TGWU, were grappling with the notion of a ‘peace dividend’ – that is, what would happen to arms manufacturing now that huge arsenals were no longer required. Such work revived ideas pioneered during the days of the Lucas Plan and foreshadow much of the work done today on green transition and similar.

The peace and anti-war movements were all calling for similar. But what happened? NATO did not disband, it steadily expanded. The nuclear-armed states did not disarm. The stockpiles remained and US nuclear bombs remain in Europe to this day.

By 1999, the lie that NATO is purely a defensive alliance should have been shattered once and for all. Between March 24 and June 20 1999, NATO unleashed an aerial bombardment on what was then Yugoslavia. NATO called its mission ‘Operation Allied Force’. Thirty-eight thousand sorties were launched, of which almost ten and a half thousand were actual air strikes. ‘Authority’ for this bombardment was assumed by NATO alone. The United Nations was not consulted. The bombardment ratified pure power politics in Europe and removed any pretence to a constitutional international order.

This is important to understand. When we hear appeals for adherence to a ‘rules based order’ from politicians and states people in NATO member states, then know that they are appealing to for the rights of America, Britain, France and the rest to break the supposed norms of this order at will. Geopolitics has three strands: economic, legal and military. They all interact in the course of usual function but properly understood – that is, understood from the viewpoint of historical fact and material reality – the economic and military ultimately usurp the supposed legal leg of the framework. Rules are broken without consequence and, especially in terms of military matters and questions of war, they are broken without sanction, without embarrassment and they are usually broken with a good dose of treachery and deceit mixed in.

We are supposed to believe that the USA – yes, the same USA responsible to war crimes in Vietnam, Guantanamo Bay, the invasion of Iraq and the rest, the same USA over which Donald Trump presided and may well preside again – is the ultimate guarantor of this rules-based order. The world is supposed to believe it. We are supposed to accept the nuclear status of NATO member states and accept their collective efforts to destroy the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons whilst at the same time believing that they are upholding an international rules-based order? Give us a break.

You see, NATO didn’t just expand geographically – in terms of membership – after the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw pact – although this was bad enough. NATO also expanded its field of operations: its perceived sphere of influence. We now have ‘global NATO’, with an ‘area of operations’ that extends to the Asia-Pacific region: a long way from the Atlantic. NATO also inflated its overall posture, and continues to do so. Rather than lay the foundations for security, military means are asserted. Lastly, it has continued to modify its nuclear capabilities which are now to include ‘useable’ nuclear weapons: something President Biden called a ‘bad idea’ during the election but which he signed-off on in the last Pentagon budget (signed into law by Biden two days after Christmas 2021).

There is much else to say, but I will finish on these point: There can be no excuse for Putin’s war against Ukraine. He has chosen a course of action all by himself. Yet the peace and anti-war movement have been warning of the consequences of continuing on the same course with respect to war, NATO and nuclear weapons for decades. We have argued that so-called defence should be replaced with genuine efforts for security. We were ignored.

Our work begins once more and it starts in the most dangerous of moments: when the prospect of nuclear war is on the agenda and when war rages in Ukraine.

We must dedicate ourselves to arguing for the end of this war, towards preventing its spread and to alerting the world to the acute dangers presented by nuclear threats.

If the dull hum of a nuclear warhead ever mutates into a deafening and life-ending roar of a nuclear explosion, humanity will be extinguished. We cannot and will not let this happen.

Ukraine Negotiations: No Fly Zone, Nukes, Neutrality, and Disarmament

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Joseph Gerson, USA

Regardless of whether we agree with him or not, President Biden's statements that Vladimir Putin cannot remain in power and that Putin is a war criminal have compounded already complex negotiations to end Moscow's devastating and nationally self-defeating war of aggression.

Humanity will be sleepwalking to its doom unless the great powers negotiate nuclear disarmament, and to collaborate to stanch the climate chaos that haunts humanity's future.

With Russia's military advances in Ukraine stymied, and with the mounting death tolls, we are receiving contradictory reports about the state of Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy. Ukraine's lead negotiator Mykailo Podolyak reports that the negotiations with Moscow are "absolutely real", but that the Kremlin hasn't pulled back from its most ambitious war aims. Negotiations, he has said, could continue for months. Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, Brig. General Kyrylo Budanov is less optimistic, reporting that the negotiations are "vague and unpredictable". Turkey's President Erdogan, who has met with both the Russian and Ukrainian presidents in his efforts to mediate an end to the war, reports that negotiators have reached "understandings" about Ukraine and NATO, partial Ukrainian disarmament, collective security, and the use of the Russian language, but there have been no agreements on the future status of Crimea or the Donbas. And, contrary to Podolyak, the New York Times claims that Russia is signaling a change in its war goals, announcing that the "first stage of the operation" has been "mainly accomplished." While it "does not exclude continuing attacks on major Ukrainian cities, the Times reports that they are not Moscow's "primary objective". It contends that Russian forces will be concentrated on the "liberation of the Donbas."

Ukrainian and Russian lives will continue to be shattered until either a ceasefire or completion of successful negotiations are announced.

In recent months, I have been privileged to be a set of ears in a confidential series of track II discussions, initially designed to prevent the war and now to help frame diplomatic compromises that could end the bloodletting. Participants include former U.S., Russian and European officials—including military officers, advisors to their respective governments and scholars. A number of the participants communicate with their country's policy makers. A number of these people, despite their differences, have negotiated and otherwise worked together over many years. And even as emotions run high, the discourse is civil and "professional." While there could be unhappy professional consequences for some of the Western participants, one of the senior Russians has commented that "No new initiative comes without the risk of punishment."

This past week, as Ukrainian and Russian negotiators were meeting and other governments weighed in, one of these track II sessions was held to discuss the advocacy and dangers of a possible Western no-fly declaration, as well as what Ukrainian neutrality and disarmament would entail. With the exception of near unanimous opposition to the exceedingly dangerous possibility of a no-fly zone declaration, as described below, a range of possibilities were identified which hopefully will inform the diplomacy needed to end the war.

A No-Fly Zone and NATO "Peacekeepers"

While Russian forces grind away at Ukrainian resistance, there is glee in Washington that Moscow may have trapped itself in an Afghanistan-like quagmire. But one thing that thoughtful U.S. and Russian elites agree upon is that despite the ongoing negotiations, the situation may be as dangerous as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then the Kennedy Administration believed the odds were between a third and a half that the crisis would result in a thermonuclear exchange between the world's two most heavily armed nuclear powers.

Just as the United States has done at least thirty times during international crises and wars, Vladimir Putin has threatened the possible use of nuclear weapons and increased the alert status of his nuclear arsenal. In the words of former U.S. Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Charles Richard, the U.S. has used its strategic nuclear forces to "create the 'manoeuvre space' for us to project conventional military power strategically." This strategy works both ways. It has prevented the U.S. and NATO from establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine to eliminate aerial support for Russian ground forces. As was the case during the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear alerts increase the danger of accidents, insubordinations, or miscalculations triggering the unimaginable. There are also fears that if the Russian military and President Putin find themselves on the defensive, in desperation Putin might fall back on attacking with chemical or low-yield nuclear weapons, risking escalation up the nuclear ladder.

Zelensky has repeatedly appealed for NATO to impose a no-fly zone, an appeal that has found resonance in Congress. Fortunately, thus far NATO leaders have bowed to the reality that enforcing a no-fly zone against Russia would inevitably trigger World War III, in the form of genocidal or omnicidal nuclear exchanges. Enforcing a no-fly zone would require attacking Russian anti-aircraft installations and shooting down Russian planes, to which Russia would respond in kind. Yet, in the track II discussion, a senior American warned that the longer the war continues, and as the Russian military is degraded, the temptation to impose a no-fly zone will grow.

A second reckless proposal, which was fortunately disregarded in Brussels, was made by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Poland's president in the run up to the NATO summit. Standing beside Volodymyr Zelensky, he floated the idea of dispatching NATO "peacekeeping" forces, capable of defending themselves, to operate in Ukraine. His spokesman later elaborated that the operation would involve deploying NATO and other forces in regions of Ukraine that have yet to be occupied by Russia and protecting them "against further Russian activities" .

In the track II session, a senior Russian advisor commented that "If Poland moves to impose a no-fly zone or otherwise intervenes in Ukraine, it will be considered an attack by a NATO member state." Similarly, immediately following the NATO summit, NATO leaders warned that if weapons of mass destruction were used within Ukraine, but their fallout drifted into NATO's territory, it could be interpreted an attack on NATO, necessitating military responses.

Neutrality & Demilitarization

Every war, for better or worse, ends with negotiations. While the details of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations remain tightly held secrets, track II participants assume that Russia's invasion will end with assurances that Ukraine will never join NATO and that it will become a neutral and significantly demilitarized state. Less certain is whether Moscow will insist on regime change in Kyiv in the guise of "denazification" or if Russia's territorial conquests will remain in place.

Russian ambitions in Ukraine, undefined as they continue to be, indicate that negotiating Ukrainian neutrality is at best a complex affair. As one Russian advisor commented, Moscow will insist that there be no possible military threats emanating from Ukraine for many decades to come. Recognizing the fragility of Swedish and Finnish neutrality, with both nations currently debating the possibility of applying for NATO membership, Russian leaders believe that neutrality cannot be rooted in what they perceive to be a hostile political environment. Thus, it is argued that meaningful agreements on Ukrainian neutrality will require progress in U.S-Russian and Russian-NATO negotiations, and they will need to be confirmed by an international treaty or United Nations Security Council resolution.

As if these obstacles are not sufficiently daunting, while Moscow states that regime change is not its goal, believing that neutrality must be rooted in a nation's political system and culture, it will demand some restructuring of the Ukrainian state, perhaps in the guise of its denazification demands. Not as difficult, but no slam dunk, are indications that Russia will demand intrusive inspections to verify Ukrainian neutrality and placing Kyiv's nuclear power plants under a special verification regime or in the future to be run by international operators.

Nonetheless, first steps in the direction of Ukrainian neutrality are being made. Under the pressure of Russia's invasion, President Zelensky has stated that, despite Ukraine's 2019 constitutional commitment to seeking NATO membership, he will not press the issue. He has stated that he is prepared to discuss neutrality as part of a peace deal with Russia but it needs to be guaranteed by third parties and approved in a referendum. It is possible that Zelensky may have wanted to opt for neutrality to prevent Russia's invasion, but political pressure from right-wing Ukrainian nationalist forces—including assassination threats—raised the political (and personal) costs of pursuing that option.

Regardless of how it is designed, Kyiv agreeing to becoming a neutral state will face significant Ukrainian political opposition necessitating strong support, and likely considerable input, from the United States and other NATO states.

There are, in fact, many forms of nation-state neutrality. Swedish, Austrian, Moldavan, Irish, and Swiss neutrality differ from one another. International law would require that Ukrainian neutrality, which prevailed between its 1990 independence until 2015, would require renunciation of Kyiv's ambitions to join NATO, a ban on the presence of foreign military troops and bases, the commitment to treat warring parties equally, and guarantees from a number of countries. Militarily, Ukraine would need the ability to defend its neutrality and territorial integrity. Whether this would include Donetsk, Luhansk, and other regions now controlled by the Russian military appears to be the most divisive issue. Ukraine would also be prohibited from taking part in any international miliary conflict, making its territory available to nations at war (as Cambodia did during the Vietnam War), and providing troops or mercenaries to forces at war.

Determining how Ukraine would defend its neutrality will require intense negotiations. Sweden maintains a professional military, reinforced by conscripts, and its military-industrial complex produces weapons for export as well as for national defense. Switzerland has universal male military service. And at the end of the neutrality spectrum is Ireland which spends little on its military and is widely believed to be unable to defend itself against possible aggression, theoretical though it may be. That said, a neutral Ukraine would require some form of police for domestic security, a border/customs patrol, and a minimal military. Determining where weapons and related training for these forces would come from implies further questions about orientation and influence, and would be another highly contested issue.

Guaranteeing Ukrainian neutrality raises other questions. President Zelensky has said that it would require guarantees from the United States and other NATO nations. Russians respond by asking how this would differ in substance from Ukraine formally joining NATO. There is also the reality that nothing, even constitutions and international treaties that guarantees they will endure. With the people of and governments of Sweden and Finland debating whether to end decades of neutrality and apply for membership in NATO Russian analysts are wondering how Ukrainian neutrality could be guaranteed.

What Then?

Ukrainian civilians and soldiers and Russian soldiers are being killed and maimed every day. Many of Ukraine's cities are being reduced to rubble. And indiscriminate sanctions are wreaking havoc and delivering despair to innocent Russians across that continental empire. These must all end.

International civil society has almost universally condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With our demands for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, a negotiated settlement to the war, and the withdrawal of all foreign military troops, we have helped to frame and apply international pressure to end this unjustified and tragic war. No one should be sacrificed or displaced while political leaders and diplomats debate the fine points of the negotiated settlement of the war. Negotiations can take place amidst a ceasefire. This must be our immediate demand.

Looking to the future, after the guns are silenced we will face the shattered remains of the post-Cold War order, especially the continuing existential nuclear and climate existential threats. Recalling that NATO's expansion to Russia's borders was a contributing cause of the Ukrainian disaster and the long record of devastating U.S. imperial wars, Americans would do well to approach the new era with humility.

Putin has given us new lessons about the catastrophic perils of the arrogance of power. Slow though the restoration of trust and normal diplomatic relations will be, we will face the urgent necessity of Common Security negotiations. The imperatives will be to replace the new ice age of a Cold War with a new Euro-Atlantic order in which no nation seeks to ensure its security at the expense of other nations. This was the promise of initial post-Cold War diplomacy, including the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. And humanity will be sleepwalking to its doom unless the great powers negotiate nuclear disarmament, and to collaborate to stanch the climate chaos that haunts humanity's future.

First published at Common Dreams, 28/03/22

www.commondreams.org

Joseph Gerson is President of the Campaign for Peace, Disarmament and Common Security, Co-founder of the Committee for a SANE U.S. China Policy and Vice President of the International Peace Bureau. His books include Empire and the Bomb, and With Hiroshima Eyes.

Europe is militarising at lightening speed

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Ludo De Brabander, Belgium

What came before

NATO’s relations with Ukraine date back to immediately after independence in 1991. The North Atlantic Alliance included the country in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace program (1994). From 1997, cooperation was deepened with the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). In 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest decided that Ukraine could eventually become a member of the military alliance, without, however, opening the procedure for this (Membership Action Plan, MAP). Russia responded by labeling Ukraine’s membership as a “red line.” In 2009 the Euro-Atlantic military integration of Ukraine was started through an ‘Annual National Programme’.

Ukraine has been actively contributing to NATO military operations ever since. From then on, NATO also conducts annual multinational manoeuvres in Ukraine (under the name ‘Rapid Trident’) and in the Black Sea. The latter regularly take place off the coast of Crimea, which led to a serious incident last year between a British frigate and the Russian army, during which warning shots were fired. Moscow considers such military exercises ‘provocations’. Secret British documents that were unintentionally made public show that scenarios of possible Russian reactions were calculated in advance .

Since the Warsaw summit (2016), NATO support to Ukraine has been provided through a ‘Comprehensive Assistance Package’. In 2019, Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership was constitutionally enshrined by Kiev. In 2020, Ukrainian President Zelensky approved the New National Security Strategy to further develop ties and integration with NATO into full membership.

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbass region (2014), NATO responded with troop deployments, rising military budgets and arms supplies to Ukraine. That same year, at the summit in Wales, NATO heads of government agreed that member states’ military budgets must be at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2024. At that time, only Greece, the United Kingdom and the US reached that standard. Between 2015 and 2021, NATO’s combined budgets grew by $155 billion.

The developments in Ukraine also have major repercussions for the Belgian military-budgetary trajectory. In 2017, the Swedish coalition decided to commit 9.2 billion euros in a program law for investments in weapons systems. The government is thus making an important concession to that other NATO standard of Wales, to set aside 20% of the military budget for military investment. In addition, the Michel government approved a defense growth path that should bring the military budget to 1.3% of GDP by 2030.

Belgium also responded to NATO by supplying around 300 soldiers to be stationed in Estonia and subsequently in Lithuania. They are part of the 4 multinational ‘battlegroups’ that the military alliance in Poland and the Baltic States developed in the context of the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’, a decision of the NATO summit in Warsaw (2016).

In response to Russian military action in and around Ukraine, which eventually culminated in open war, NATO decided to increase its military presence in Eastern Europe. There are now 40,000 troops under NATO command with another four new multinational battlegroups in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Belgium pledged 300 troops to reinforce NATO’s flank in Romania.

Military budgets are rising sharply

From the beginning of this year, European armaments and militarization gained momentum. Immense budget increases - until recently seen as unfeasible - are now becoming reality without significant debate.

In Belgium, at the end of January 2022, the government gave the green light to the STAR plan – ‘Security, Technology, Ambition and Resilience’ – which foresees that defense resources should increase to 1.54% of GDP by 2030. This includes a new investment plan worth more than 10 billion euros. The government approved a preliminary draft law for this at the end of February “for updating the military program law and the defense budget up to and including 2030”. Additional costs have to be added to this for increasing the number of personnel from 26,000 to 29,000 and for the implementation of the POP plan (People-Our-Priority plan), which is intended to improve working conditions and the pay of the troops. Additional expenditure is also made for investments in infrastructure and in research and development of new technologies in collaboration with Belgian industry. The STAR plan reserves 1.8 billion euros for the latter.

Ultimately, the military budget is expected to amount to 6.9 billion euros in 2030, compared to 4.4 billion today. In reality, that could be even higher. In the run-up to the NATO meeting in Brussels at the end of March, the De Croo government has decided to allocate an additional 1 billion over the next three years for arms and ammunition stocks, protective equipment, anti-tank weapons, the vehicle fleet and IT and communication systems. This means that over a five-year period, a total of more than EUR 20 billion in military investments in weapon systems has been committed.

The same pattern can be seen in almost all NATO member states.

Immediately after the invasion, the German government announced that it would invest another 100 billion euros in the army this year. A growth path had already been mapped out for the German defense budget that was budgeted at 53 billion euros in 2022, an increase of 3.2% compared to the previous year. The war in Ukraine means that not since the defeat of the ‘Third Reich’, will so much money be invested in the military apparatus in such a short time. Chancellor Scholtz said his country would immediately increase its military budget to above 2% of GDP, up from 1.53% now.

In the Dutch coalition agreement of December 2021, it was already agreed that a structural additional 3 billion euros would be added for defense, to reach 1.85% of GDP in 2024. According to recent reports, the Rutte government is working on a plan to go to 2% of GDP in order to respond to a parliamentary motion that was passed with a large majority.

On March 16, the Italian parliament voted by a large majority to increase the military budget from 1.41% to 2% of GDP, or from 29.8 billion euros to 41 billion euros.

Although the US already spends astronomically high amounts on the military apparatus - almost 40% of global military expenditure - Washington is also planning another billion-dollar injection. US President Biden proposes increasing the military budget for the next fiscal year (starting this fall) to $813 billion, which would be an increase of $31 billion in one year.

French President Macron, who is in full electoral battle, has announced that the already planned increase in the military budget should be increased, without however giving details. According to the French military programming law (2019-2025), a strong budget increase is already foreseen. In 2025, military resources must be increased to 50 billion euros, compared to 41 billion euros this year. So probably a few billion more.

Spain, Denmark, Poland and Romania are also announcing major budget increases. Poland even wants to go to 3% of GDP next year (compared to 2.2% this year).

NATO member states together accounted for $1,049 billion in military expenditure in 2021. With the announced budget increases, many tens of billions will be added.

Russia’s military budget is about $62 billion, which is 17 times less than NATO’s military resources. Russia is unlikely to follow in the new arms race, as Moscow already spent 4.3% of GDP on military spending last year. With the sanctions on top, it looks like there’s little margin left for further increases. This suggests that the military imbalance of power with NATO will become much greater. The question therefore arises as to why all these extra military resources are needed in the NATO member states? It seems that NATO is preparing for a possible new superpower confrontation. NATO defines not only Russia, but also China as a ‘systemic rival’.

European ‘Peace Facility’ for Ukraine

A few days after the Russian invasion, the Council of the European Union decided to allow EUR 450 million worth of arms supplies to the Ukrainian army through the so-called ‘peace facility’ that came into effect at the end of March 2021. On March 23, 2022, the Council doubled the amount, so that eventually 900 million euros in arms can be supplied.

The Peace Facility was created to finance military missions and support to third countries under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EUR 5 billion planned for the period 2021-2027 will be realized outside the EU budget. After all, according to the EU Treaty, expenditure in support of military operations must be financed with separate contributions from the Member States.

EU Member States have the right to supply weapons under the ‘right of self-defence’ provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The ‘Common Position’, which regulates arms exports from the EU, also allows this in the context of self-defence. In contrast, both the Peace Facility and the Common Position impose restrictions. For example, arms transfers must not prolong or aggravate the conflict (Common Position criterion 3), which is difficult to assess in this existing war. Arms deliveries could greatly enhance the Ukrainian army’s strike capability to bring a swift end to the war. Conversely, arms deliveries can effectively prolong and aggravate the conflict.

Criterion 7 states that the weapons must not fall into the hands of ‘undesirable’ end users. That could be Russian troops in the event that they overpower Ukrainian troops, weapons that are distributed to civilians, or weapons that end up with ‘undesirable’ militias when the fighting becomes ‘unconventional’. In the event of Russian forces being expelled, such militias could target the Russian minority in the country or could be used to further fight the conflict with the insurgent republics (Luhansk and Donetsk).

Finally, criterion 2 states that the weapons may not be delivered if there is a risk that they will be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition to the reporting of Russian war crimes, there have already been reports of members of the Ukrainian army committing war crimes.

Similar provisions are also included in the Q&A of the European External Action Service which regulates arms transfers under the peace facility. However, the Council has not taken a public position on all these possible consequences of arms transfers. A concept note has been leaked that lists the above-mentioned risks, including restrictive measures, such as the provision that the weapons may not end up with entities other than the Ukrainian army. However, President Zelensky has stated at the start of the Russian aggression that Kiev will provide weapons to any civilian willing to fight.

Billions of arms deliveries to Ukraine

A large flow of weapons has been making its way to Ukraine since 2014, with the US as the main supplier. Between 2014 and 2021, the US provided at least $2.5 billion in weapons and military aid. More than $1 billion has been added since the Russian war. The Czech Republic, Poland, France, Turkey and the United Kingdom have also been supplying arms to the Ukrainian armed forces for several years, and it cannot be ruled out that they have been deployed against the insurgent rebel republics in the Donbass region.

Since the Russian invasion, arms deliveries have increased in intensity and volume. Most NATO member states (and some EU member states) have announced the delivery of defensive as well as offensive weapon systems. Belgium has stated that it will deliver 5,000 machine guns and 200 anti-tank weapons to the Ukrainian army.

The United Kingdom is one of the most active arms suppliers in this war, ranging from anti-tank and other missile systems, armored vehicles and artillery to associated ammunition. London is also committed to the delivery of eight naval vessels and a £1.7 billion frigate.

If you go over the list, you will arrive at hundreds of millions of euros in weapons and other military support.

Arms industry

Rising military budgets and massive military aid to Ukraine provide billions in revenue for the military industry. In January, a month before the outbreak of hostilities across Ukraine, US arms giants Raytheon and Lockheed Martin openly stated to their investors that the tensions “will make more business” for the arms companies. Raytheon supplies Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and together with Lockheed Martin the Javelin anti-tank missiles. Both companies are among the top five arms giants to have pumped $60 million into influencing US politics by 2020. In Washington, the arms industry employs 700 lobbyists, which is more than the number of Congressmen. At least 19 of those Congressmen have bought shares of both arms giants, some of them after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Even before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, the global military industry was predicted to grow by 7% in 2022 (from $453 billion to $483 billion). Western Europe would become the fastest growing market according to these forecasts. The military bidding with rising budgets means that the predicted increase in turnover will turn out to be a serious underestimate. Two weeks after the invasion, arms companies’ shares rose sharply. Shares of Raytheon rose by 8%, General Dynamics by 12%, Lockheed Martin by 18% and Northrop Grumman even by 22%. British BAE Systems saw its shares rise by 14% in the first week after the Russian invasion.

Rising military budgets and arms supplies are a boon to the arms industry, but are having negative repercussions on negotiations and diplomacy. If one side believes in military victory thanks to these deliveries, it could lead to a very bloody prolongation of the war in eastern Ukraine.

End this war

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

It is not possible to fully capture the appalling dimensions of a war by listing grim statistics. If such statistics made a difference to those who control the armies and institutions that wage war, then millions slaughtered in wars, large and small, over past decades would not have perished. The disturbing truth is that human life means little to war-makers. A different class of mathematical object matters much more to such people: the calculus of power.

We are the opposite of war-makers. We aim for peace and strive to remove all roadblocks to it. So in reckoning with the calamities produced by President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, we absorb the grim statistics. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that between 4am on the morning of 24 February 2022 and midnight on 12 April 2022, civilian casualties totalled: “485 men, 313 women, 31 girls, and 54 boys, as well as 72 children and 977 adults whose sex is yet unknown”. 1,932 corpses. In addition, many thousands of men, women, boys, girls and children have suffered injuries of which many will be life-changing. The report comments:

Most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, and missile and air strikes.

Added to the civilian deaths are those of the ‘combatants’. According to Ukrainian, Russian and NATO estimates, thousands on each side have died in the fighting. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces include conscript fighters.

To these numbers should be added all those who have died in the eight years of fighting in Eastern Ukraine/Donbass between 2014-2022 and all those yet to be slaughtered. As in all wars, the death toll only ever increases. This war must end.

In a 1964 letter to German social psychologist and humanist philosopher Erich Fromm, Bertrand Russell argued that: “War should be treated as murder is treated. It should be regarded with equal horror and with equal aversion.” War is organised murder. The organisers of murder together with the individual murderers richly deserve our collective horror and aversion.

In the case of the war in Ukraine, international legal procedures have been initiated to catalogue the crimes already committed and to document those that will come if the war continues. Tribunals and hearings are under preparation. The leaders of NATO member states have been very clear in describing the horrors of the war in Ukraine and in identifying a culprit. Yet Mr Biden, Mr Johnson and allies are less forthcoming in their denunciations of the wars, some of them ‘illegal’, waged by US, British and NATO forces. Mr Johnson is vocal on crimes in Ukraine but silent on crimes in Yemen, a horror-show of human suffering imposed on that country by Britain’s ally, Saudi Arabia, and fuelled by arms sales from the UK. Mr Biden sees horror in Ukraine but sees nothing wrong with the wars he supported over decades of ‘public service’.

As bad as this rank hypocrisy is, the stark fact is that the US, UK and allies in the nuclear-armed NATO alliance are already preparing for the next war. Peace, justice and human rights are not actually on their agenda.

The next war

Without doubt, ultimate responsibility for the war in Ukraine rests with Mr Putin. It would, however, be untrue to say that each and every opportunity to de-escalate was taken. END Info and other publications traced the facts of these failures and documented the troubling developments that went with them. We argued for alternative measures: real security and cooperation, denuclearisation and a nuclear-free-zone in Europe. We advocated for diplomacy rather than brinkmanship. In so doing, we echoed the calls of the peace movements throughout the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s, when opportunities for a comprehensive change of course seemed credible afterer the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Rather than taking steps to achieve real security, NATO expanded both geographically and in terms of posture. NATO is now a ‘global’ force with an ever-expanding area of operation.

Despite the growing risks, 2021 seemed like a year of real possibilities compared to today. In 2021 we witnessed widespread discussion in Germany on the future of US nuclear bombs stationed in that country under NATO agreements. We witnessed some NATO member states agreeing to send observers to the First State Parties meeting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Think-tanks and trade unions were actively engaged in developing a new approach to common security. Everything has shifted in a deadly direction.

It is common knowledge and common sense that all wars and military conflicts end in diplomacy and negotiation. Even where ‘military victory’ at the expense of murder, death and destruction is ‘achieved’ by one side or another, diplomacy and negotiation conclude the matter. It will likely be the case that the horrors in Ukraine will end in a similar fashion. Everyone knows this, yet those in power do not have the good sense to act on this basis. Rather, they are preparing for the next war.

For example, just three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a referendum in neighbouring Belarus approved a new constitution that ditched the country’s non-nuclear-weapon status (27 February 2022). According to reports, 65.2% of those who voted agreed to this change, which makes it possible, for example, for Russia to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. No doubt, Mr Lukashenko will tell the people of Belarus that such a move ‘enhances our security’. Such a turn of phrase will be familiar to the peoples of Finland and Sweden, two countries which look set to join the NATO nuclear-armed alliance to ‘enhance security’. If it’s true that the Belarus decision has made the world a more dangerous place, then it is also true that Finland and Sweden joining NATO makes the world a more dangerous place.

Military ‘solutions’ are nothing of the sort, they just bring greater risks and a greater possibility of death and destruction. ‘Security’ is not enhanced with nuclear weapons or by joining a nuclear-armed alliance. Rather than achieveing ‘security’, risks are multiplied and the foundations for the next war are established.

Militarisation

Preparations for the next war can be detected not only in the serial failures to pursue peace, the geographic expansion of NATO, the development of new nuclear weapons and the rest. Europe is now entering a period of rapid re-militarisation. If we wind the clock back a year or two, we will recall President Trump’s repeated complaints about the lack of military spending by European states. Trump has departed the political scene and we should hope that he never returns. However, Trumpian levels of military spending are now on the agenda.

As social conditions in Europe spiral ever downwards, as the prospect of widespread poverty intensifies, as living costs skyrocket and as the impacts of Covid and the deficiencies of the economy endure, European countries are pledging billions in increased military spending. Trump would be proud. These things cannot be isolated from the growth of right-wing political forces across the continent: from the Johnson government in Britain, through the streets and voting booths of France, to the government of Hungary. The situation is dangerous. Billions of Euros for machines of murder and destruction whilst the poor get poorer will not ‘guarantee security’. Quite the opposite.

The dimensions of this crisis are not limited to developments in Europe. Note the already-shifting remit of the ‘AUKUS’ alliance between Australia, the UK and US. Within the past month, it has been announced that this alliance will now cover the development and deployment of hypersonic missiles. For what purpose? Who will be the target? Additionally, further efforts have been initiated to include Japan in the alliance. Such a move would massively escalate existing tensions in the region and would mark a significant change in military posture for Japan.

The arc of militarisation extends across the Atlantic, over Europe and far into the southern hemisphere. Existential risks follow this same arc.

End this war ... stop the next one

The peace movements face a monumental challenge as a result of Putin’s war and the militarism of NATO and Europe. There are visible tensions and sharp disagreements. We are, however, united by an understanding that the immediate tasks are to end the war in Ukraine, end the death and destruction that come with it and to resist the drives to escalation. We are also united by the aim of stopping anything like this happening again. To achieve our aims, we must be clear-sighted about the longstanding dynamics and the more recent, dramatic, shifts. We must understand the potential consequences and prepare to resist them.