(Re) Imagine Our World: voices for peace

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Tom Unterrainer

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This is an expanded version of a talk given to US peace activists on 12 June 2021.

The movements for peace, social and racial justice in the United States have set an example for the world. This is as true of the movements of the past as it is today. European activists and their organisations continue to be inspired by activism in the US, just as we carefully follow and analyse the political direction of the US government.

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and our founder have a long association with the US. The British government imprisoned Russell for his active opposition to the First World War. He was fired by Trinity College, Cambridge, as a result and found that post-war England offered a less-than-hospitable environment for him. Meanwhile, appreciation for his efforts and opportunities for work arrived from the US. Although opposition to his work eventually manifested itself, Russell’s time in America was an important episode in his life. He continued to follow political developments – including the movements against the American war against the Vietnamese people – and worked closely with American activists until the end of his long life.

So it is a privilege to be with you today and to be speaking to a largely American audience.

You will no doubt have seen images of the beauty and splendour of the Cornish coastline, in the South West of England, over recent days. The images will have shown sun-drenched beaches, blue sea and skies. The place looks prosperous and idyllic. Much of the Cornish coast is all of these things. However, if you travel just a few minutes inland a different Cornwall is revealed. A place of widespread insecurity, joblessness, low wages and poverty. As of 2011, Cornwall’s measure of wealth was just 64% of the European per capita average making it not only one of the poorest regions of England but of Europe as a whole. This measure will not have improved following a decade or more of austerity measures in the British economy.

The arrival of the G7 leaders to this remote corner of the British Isles will not have done much to ameliorate these conditions. The contrast between the presence of leaders of the seven most powerful nations on the surface of this planet and the gross deficiencies in social justice evident a few miles inland is instructive.

What were the G7 leaders doing in Cornwall? Were they discussing a global ‘levelling up’ to lift the poorest and most insecure of us out of poverty? Or were they discussing something else?

With a new US President and multiple challenges facing the US dominated political order, this G7 summit can be understood as an effort to begin redrawing the map of Western influence and power. The aim is to ensure that the political footprint, economic fingerprints and military boot prints of the west continue to leave their mark.

The challenges to ensuring such a prospect range from the impact of Covid, the fractures in the economies of the G7 states and the reality that the political order is shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar configuration. One example of how the US President and UK Prime Minister plan to respond to such challenges can be found in the new version of the ‘Atlantic Charter’ signed by Biden and Johnson immediately before the G7 met.

The original Charter was agreed and signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 1941. The Charter set out joint US/UK goals for the world after World War II. Even though the US had not yet entered the war, these two leaders saw fit to make plans for the post-war landscape. The agreement was made in the context of the US as the rising global power and Britain as an imperial power – with substantial colonies around the world.

The New Atlantic Charter has been signed in quite different circumstances where a global power other than the US in on the rise and where the UK is a politically isolated, nuclear-armed island which retains a significant financial centre and which has lumbered itself with an unpredictable and thoroughly unpleasant Prime Minister.

The New Atlantic Charter is made up of eight brief points, the first of which resolves “to defend the principles, values, and institutions of democracy and open societies, which drive our national strength and our alliances.” The fifth point affirms “our shared responsibility for maintaining our collective security and international stability and resilience against the full spectrum of modern threats”.

It is well known that there have been tensions between Biden and Johnson on both the personal and political level. It is clear that between the two, Biden is the more rational and ‘mainstream’ character. Whatever the tensions, they have been put to one side because the issues at stake for both Biden and Johnson transcend personalities: they concern the imperatives of global politics.

The new US administration has yet to put its strategy with respect to defence, security and nuclear weaponry ‘on paper’, but comments from Biden himself and his Secretary of State indicate that Russia and China will be offered no respite. Conversely, Prime Minister Johnson has put his name to an ‘Integrated Review’ [see END Info 23 & 24 for extensive coverage]. Johnson’s ‘Integrated Review’ is clear that Russia and China are considered ‘strategic competitors’ to UK/Western interests and proposes containment. Not only that, but the nuclear doctrine contained within the ‘Integrated Review’ includes a reversal on warhead numbers and raises a significant question mark over the circumstances under which the UK would consider a nuclear strike.

What is Biden’s assessment of the ‘Integrated Review’? Does he support the breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty announced in its pages? The agreement of the New Atlantic Charter would suggest that nothing within the ‘Integrated Review’ troubles him or his administration to a great extent. Donald Trump has gone, but ‘British Trump’ endures.

Under Trump, many of us spoke and wrote about the dangers of a ‘Global Tinderbox’: a configuration of risks, tensions and capabilities – both military and technological – that put the world in great danger. It seems that the ‘Global Tinderbox’ is still with us where one mistake, misstep or misunderstanding could boil over into a situation of existential risk. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and their Doomsday Clock, global risks from climate change to nuclear war are as sharply posed as they were under Trump. This is a world where tensions between the ‘West’, China and Russia continue to sharpen; where every nuclear armed state on the planet is not only renewing nuclear arsenals but developing new nuclear weapons; where the US and allies are still asserting themselves in an effort to maintain global influence and where ‘new technologies’ and the application of existing technologies to the battlefield accelerate the pace at which disaster could unfold.

If we are to find ways to de-escalate the risks, to move away from the ‘Global Tinderbox’, then we must not only talk of peace. We must identify the roadblocks to peace a develop a strategy to remove them. One example of this is the launch of the Nuke Free Europe network and their plans for a month of action (see pages 3-6). The network is calling for an end to nuclear sharing in Europe, a halt to the arms race and for European states to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Where the global powers have the G7, NATO and the rest the global peace movement have solidarity, internationalism and transnational cooperation. The Nuke Free Europe network is one example of many similar initiatives. All such initiatives will be coming together for the International Peace Bureau’s ‘World Congress’ in October this year. I hope to see many of you there in person, or online, to plan for a global, peaceful alternative.

* * * *

The Second World Peace Congress will bring together a wide variety of experts and advocates from all around the world. Speakers will come from all kinds of disciplines and backgrounds, including both high level representatives and grassroots level voices. It will equally involve diverse fields: peace organizations, feminist and civil rights groups, labor unions, environmentalists, educators, religious and spiritual leaders , development workers, human rights advocates, and more.

See the full programme at:

www.ipb2021.barcelona

The campaign to make Europe a nuclear-weapon-free zone

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Editorial Comments

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This September will see peace activists and organisations from across Europe engage in a month of co-ordinated action to demand a ‘nuke free Europe’.

Protests will be staged in England, Scotland, France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy to call for the end of nuclear sharing, a halt to the modernization of nuclear weapons and for European states to sign up to and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

From the perspective of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, this month of action is the product of not just several years of recent work but of efforts over four decades. When Donald Trump announced his intention to sabotage the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia which banned intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the Russell Foundation produced and circulated a new ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’ statement, calling “on everyone concerned with peace and security to join in raising the alarm over the likely consequences of scrapping the INF Treaty and to work towards the creation of more Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones, including Europe.”

The INF Treaty, signed in 1987, should be properly understood not simply as an agreement between the then-Soviet Union and the USA but as a product of sustained mobilising, thinking and doing within the European peace movements of the 1980s as well as a mark of profound changes underway in European and Soviet society.

The first ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’ Appeal was drafted by Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation, the historian E. P. Thompson and others in response to the original risks posed by intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The contact address for the original appeal were the offices of the Russell Foundation in Nottingham, England, where this bulletin is written and produced.

We are very proud of our history and of the things we have achieved. Unfortunately, there is much work for a small peace foundation and the very many disarmament, peace and related campaigns to do.

Trump has gone but the increasing tensions, risks, new technologies and the weapons of mass murder that sit at the centre of US, European and other militarisms endure.

Join us in September. Organise your own action. Distribute this bulletin. Get informed through our other publications. Get involved in your closest activist group and make links with the Nuke Free Europe network.

Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Ken Coates

This text was first published as a chapter in Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim - The Case of Mordechai Vanunu (Spokesman Books, 1988). The book includes an introduction and concluding chapter by Vanunu, along with material from The Sunday Times investigation into the case and further analysis. The book was published to aid the work of the International Campaign for Mordechai Vanunu, of which the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation was a supporting organisation.

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On the 6th July 1987, thirty-six British Members of Parliament wrote to the Norwegian Nobel Committee to nominate Mr. Mordechai Vanunu of Israel for the Nobel Peace Prize. Since Mr. Vanunu was currently held in prison in Jerusalem, this was an unusual nomination. What were the reasons for it?

“On the 5th October 1986” reports the proposal, “Mr. Vanunu published in the Sunday Times a detailed story about the Israeli Government’s nuclear bomb factory near Dimona in Southern Israel. In addition to a detailed description, Mr. Vanunu furnished the newspaper with photographs and diagrams, and his account of the plan was found to be ‘entirely authentic’ by a number of international experts who subsequently examined it.

The threat of nuclear proliferation into various hot spots around the world is one of the major perils confronting the international community. It takes prodigious courage for a private citizen to confront his own government on such a sensitive issue. Mr. Vanunu has paid a very heavy penalty. For revealing his knowledge, he was kidnapped in Rome, and secretly taken to Israel, where he has been locked in solitary confinement. Even his family have now been denied the right to visit him. Although be faces a death sentence, his trial is being conducted in secrecy.”

As the parliamentarians point out, there is reason for deep concern about the Israeli Government’s preparation of nuclear weapons. The decision is a provocation: if it were not challenged, on what basis could any impartial person reproach the Arab States if they were to follow suit? The nuclearization of conflict or potential conflict in one of the world’s hottest of “hot spots” can only be a terribly dangerous precedent.

But we should observe from the very outset of this discussion that Mr. Vanunu’s kidnap is itself an illegal act, which has no conceivable justification in international conventions. We cannot doubt that the Italian Government would have refused to extradite Mr. Vanunu for trial, on any of the evidence which is available. Vanunu’s revelations serve to defend the nonproliferation regime throughout the world, and are clearly a matter of conscience. Such disclosures have aroused disquiet in Italy and England, and any judge in either country would find them quite ineligible for criminal reprisals.

There can be no doubt that Vanunu is a courageous and deeply conscientious person, who has suffered from the most outrageous treatment by the Israeli authorities. We shall return to this question later.

Paranoia

First, however, we must concern ourselves with the substantive issues in this case. What caused the paranoid responses of the Israeli State in this matter? After all, it is not common for States to range across the territories of friendly countries, in order to bring about the abduction of political dissidents. Vanunu was spirited from London to Rome, where he was forcibly drugged, and chained-up for transportation to Tel Aviv. There does not appear to be any doubt that his departure from Italy was procured by illegal means, in violation of Italian laws and exit formalities. Such extreme measures put the normal conduct of inter-governmental relations under severe challenge. However we examine this affair, there can be no doubt of the culpability of the Israeli authorities. In order to understand this sequence of events, it is necessary to refer back to a succession of lsraeli policy statements on the issue which is really at stake: that of nuclear proliferation.

There is, of course, a long history of public statements by various Israeli spokesmen, on all the issues of nuclear non-proliferation policy. But for the purposes of this argument we have no need to retrace our steps further than the 7th June 1981, when the Osirak nuclear reactor was bombed by Israeli aeroplanes. In a statement purporting to justify this action, the Government of Israel pledged its continuing support for the principle of nonproliferation, for multilateral arms control agreements, and for UN decisions against nuclear proliferation. The statement, The Iraqi Threat - Why Israel had to Act, rehearsed a catalogue of diplomatic initiatives by Israel, in this sense:

“Israel ratified the partial Test Ban Treaty on 15th January 1964, and the Outer Space Treaty on 18th February 1977. On 10th June 1%8, Israel voted in favour of United Nations Resolution 2373 adopting the text of the NPT. It did so in the belief that this would enhance practical and satisfactory solutions for the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. In subsequent years, Israel has studied the NPT’s various aspects in reference to the conditions prevailing in the Middle East, and has concluded that the turbulent and constantly shifting conditions still prevailing in the region prevent the Treaty’s implementation in good faith on the part of many of the States in it.

A central assumption of the NPT is the existence of conditions of peace which do not exist today in the area. With the exception of Egypt, the Arab States do not recognize Israel’s right to exist, are continuously preparing themselves to destroy it, and are mostly specialist, were deeply shocked by photographs of a component machined in lithium deuteride. Both authorities believed that the devices shown in this and other photographs provided did not show “a simple atom bomb but a thermo-nuclear bomb”. As the Sunday Times itself concluded: “The verdict of ten senior and expert scientists approached by the Sunday Times is that Vanunu’s testimony cannot be faulted”.

If we accept this evidence, it is evident at once that Mr. Shamir’s statement at the United Nations General Assembly must have been quite untrue, even at the time he made it. If lsrael had already become “the first country in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons into the region”, the promise to refrain from this action in future can only be understood as a deliberate and particularly damaging dishonesty. There are many ways to mislead the General Assembly without telling actual lies: but on the 1st October 1981 it is quite evident that Mr. Shamir went far beyond any license which might conceivably be given to diplomatic evasion. His statement was absolute and categorical: he now owes the United Nations an explanation.

Calculated to undermine

Perhaps the Israeli spokesman is not the only diplomat to have offended in this way, grave though it is to do so. There is, however, a more serious question. On this and a large number of other occasions, as the Israeli Government statement points out, Israel has advocated the conclusion of a Treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone throughout the Middle East. To assure the United Nations that Israel “will not be the first” to introduce nuclear weapons, and to demand the creation of a nuclear-free zone, whilst all the time producing and storing a full-scale nuclear arsenal, is to present a package calculated to undermine not only the United Nations but also the very idea of nuclear-free zones. That such misleading declarations have been uttered “annually” hardly mitigates the offence. The Israeli Government itself continuously insists that it wishes to see the establishment of adequate guarantees in this field. As it argues in the text we have already cited: “Restraints of a technical or institutional nature alone can hardly protect the area from nuclear proliferation.” To appeal for the creation of a nuclear free-zone, whilst at the same time secretly building a major stockpile of nuclear weapons, is to furnish an unusually compelling kind of proof for this statement!

It remains true that of all the panoply of partial disarmament measures considered in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, one is preeminent. The agreement to create and enforce nuclear-free zones is among the more achievable objectives for States, and for their peoples, in many parts of the world. Not only in Latin America, but also in other zones such as the South Pacific, or the continent of Africa, the idea of constituting a nuclear-free zone has captured widespread popular support, and mobilized the support of many of the Governments in the areas concerned. In this connection, the experience of the campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament is that millions of Europeans have come to share the view that a nuclear-free zone in all Europe is both possible and desirable. Already there are intense practical negotiations in smaller sub-regions of the European continent, to begin to put in place some parts of what many hope will be a larger jigsaw, sanitising larger and larger areas. The particular merit of such proposals if that they provide a practical linkage between the activities of popular movements and the relevant governments, and they make a space in which a global public opinion can grow. Such an international public mobilisation is crucial to the maintenance of peace through a period of unprecedented crisis, both economic and political. As the popular pressure has begun to develop, the United Nations system has taken on a more material reality for millions of people, so that the vast demonstration which accompanied the opening of the Second Special Session could convince many of the real existence of a new potential in the world.

But the Vanunu case poses a most dire challenge to all this positive thinking. The creation of the Israeli bomb, and its analogue in South Africa, confronts us with a quite new, and very major problem of enforcement of non-nuclear commitments in the military field.

The first lesson of the Vanunu story is clear: that considerable agnosticism is required when evaluating the successive claims of governments which are poised upon the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In retrospect, we now see the French involvement in Israeli nuclear programmes, and in the initial provision of the Dimona reactor in a very clear and sinister light. It is not at all surprising that Israeli leaders can mislead the United Nations, when we remember how they responded to the enquiries of the United States Government about what was going on at Dimona in the early 1960s. “We are building a textile factory”, replied the Israelis. Now it is possible to see the meaning of various other key events in Israel’s military evolution: the French embargo on arms supplies; the pressures of the American administration for ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the later hiatus over the supply of Pershing missiles. There has evidently been some serious complicity in this act of nuclear provocation, and there are embarrassing questions to be answered in more than one of the world’s chancellories.

The first serious effort to find answers to these questions has been extensively reported in the Christian Science Monitor. The newspaper gives an account of a study by Gary Milhollin, which makes precise allegations of a violation of undertakings given to the Norwegian Government, when a quantity of heavy water was supplied in 1959.

Mordechai Vanunu has recorded that 88 pounds of plutonium are produced each year at Dimona, which quantity can be used to make something between eight and ten bombs annually. Heavy water is necessary to this process, and the Norwegian delivery amounted to 20 tons. It was obtained against firm pledges that it would only be used for peaceful purposes. It was agreed that the Norwegian authorities could maintain rights of control and inspection over the uses to which the water was put. But Milhollin has established that, up to the moment of Vanunu’s revelations, no attempt was made from Oslo to monitor the observance of these pledges.

Heavy water

After the Sunday Times publication of the real situation at Dimona, the Norwegian Government requested Israel to allow an appropriate inspection of the uses of the heavy water. It proposed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be invited to investigate and report. In September, the Israelis refused any such inspection. At the talks in question, the Israelis conceded that the heavy water was being used at Dimona, and that Plutonium was being produced with it. Per Paust, the spokesman of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has been reported as saying that the Israeli’s maintain that any IAEA report would be biased, and continue to insist that they have breached none of their obligations to Norway.

It seems that the rights of the Norwegian authorities, under international law, are comprehensive. Whether or not it can be proved that the heavy water from Norway was abused for military work, the Norwegians are entitled to the inspection for which they have asked. If tests establish that plutonium has been produced, then the Norwegians have the right to see the product, and if weapons have been manufactured they have the right to insist upon them being dismantled. Mr. Paust also believes that the water could be recalled, although no-one is quite sure how much other heavy water, from other sources, may have been supplied to Israel. What is known is that the Americans have furnished Israel with 3.9 tons, and that additional supplies have come from France. “French” heavy water originates either from the USA or Norway, and is theoretically subject to the same controls agreed between Norway and Israel. Therefore the French had no right to re-export it to Israel without permission, and any “French” heavy water used for military purposes could be recalled, not only by the French Government, but also by the American or Norwegian Governments.

Milhollin’s estimate is that Dimona uses 36 tons of heavy water. The American water has been under control since it was moved from Dimona, and the IAEA has inspected it. But it has not been tested to elucidate whether, while it was at Dimona, it was employed in Plutonium refinement. American experts did visit Dimona annually from 1963 to 1969, but they conducted none of the relevant tests, either.

If the Norwegian authorities persist in their enquiries, as they undoubtedly should, then it is evident that similar enquiries should be initiated by the French and American Governments. The IAEA should also be pressed to be more curious than it hitherto has been. All these questions are absolutely urgent, if the non-proliferation regime is to retain any credibility whatever.

But it is equally imperative to re-examine a whole history of nuclear co-operation between Israel and South Africa, with the same open-mindedness.

The nuclear test which took place in the South Atlantic on 22nd September 1979 was monitored by a United States satellite. The explosion, which gave off a characteristic double flash, took place at a height of eight kilometres, which is commensurate with the performance of the GS Howitzer, which has been manufactured in South Africa since the United States supplied Pretoria with a range of modern artillery delivery systems. The Americans have also supplied the South Africans with 300,000 shell casings, adequate to deliver a two to three kiloton nuclear device.

It has been confirmed that forces of the South African fleet were present in the South Atlantic in the area of the explosion at the time that it took place. And further, it is credibly alleged that the 1979 explosion was a joint Israeli-South African achievement, as necessary to the Israelis for verifying their technology as it was to the South Africans for threatening their neighbours. That the United Nations were persuaded to record a verdict of “not proven” about this explosion tells us a good deal about the respect of some of its experts for the rules of evidence.

Israel-South Africa

However, new evidence continually appears, and it would be instructive to reopen this enquiry in order to evaluate it. Since we now know that the allegations of Fuad Jabber, or the judgements, from a different perspective, of Robert E. Harkavy, were founded on realistic assumptions, it becomes necessary to evaluate the contemporary analyses of Israeli-South African cooperation, all over again.

Valuable evidence for such a new investigation has been presented by Jane Hunter in her most disturbing work on Israeli Foreign Policy.

“In 1965, after South Africa brought its Safari safeguarded reactor on line, Israeli scientists began advising South Africa on their Safari 2 research reactor. In 1968, Professor Ernst Bergmann, the ‘father’ of Israel’s nuclear program, went to South Africa and spoke strongly in favour of bilateral co-operation on the development of nuclear technology.

According to the authors of a novelized treatment of Israel’s nuclear program - barred from publication by the Israeli censor - as early as 1966, South Africa had invited Israel to use its land or ocean space for a nuclear weapons test. Led at that time by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Israel declined the invitation. However, according to the Israeli authors, whose sources included Shimon Peres, an enthusiastic intimate of the Israeli nuclear program, and Knesset Member Eliyah Speizer, during his April 1976 visit to Israel Premier Vorster again extended the invitation to Israel to conduct a nuclear test.

It is commonly held that Israel wanted a test venue far from the Middle East in order to uphold its longtime position that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. This ‘position’, hinging on some arcane reading of the word ‘introduce’, is as meaningless as the endlessly heard term ‘peace process’.

The following year, a Soviet satellite picked up unmistakable signs of preparation for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert. Fearing that such a test ‘might trigger an ominous escalation of the nuclear arms race,’ the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany joined the USSR in pressuring South Africa to abort the test. As to the bomb that was to be tested, “‘I know some intelligence people who are convinced with damn near certainty that it was an Israeli nuclear device’, said a high-ranking Washington official.“

At three o’clock in the morning on September 22, 1979, Israel and South Africa conducted a nuclear weapons test where the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans merge. A newly recalibrated U.S. Vela intelligence satellite recorded the characteristic double flash of light. It was a small blast, designed to leave very little evidence. The CIA told the National Security Council that a two or three kiloton bomb had been exploded in ‘a joint South African-Israeli test’. A Navy official revealed that U.S. spy planes over the test area had been waved away by South African Navy ships and forced to land secretly in Australia. The CIA knew (and later told Congress) that South African ships were conducting secret maneuvers at the exact site of the test. The South African military attaché in Washington made the first ever request to the U.S. National Technical Information Service for a computer search on detection of nuclear explosions and orbits of the Vela satellite.

Almost immediately the Carter Administration convened a special panel to conduct an investigation of the incident. The panel heard reports from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA; and representatives of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department of Energy and the State Department presented evidence to the panel supporting the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. Their findings were summarily dismissed by the Carter White House, which after a delay of seven months declared:

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this (Vela) signal was of nuclear origin, the panel considers it more likely that the signal was one of the zoo events (reception of signals of unknown origin under anomalous circumstances), possibly a consequence of the impact of a small meteor on the satellite.

Moreover, as new information became available, it was simply ignored. In one critical instance, evidence of radiation observed in the thyroid glands of Australian sheep was discounted. The initial lack of this “smoking gun,” traces of radiation, suggested to a Los Alamos scientist that the low-yield weapon tested had been a neutron bomb. However, the Carter panel had used the absence of radiation as a prime excuse in its cover-up.

Many who had been involved with the investigation were aghast and wondered by the Carter White House was ‘equivocating’. Some within the government said that the Carter Administration was hiding behind the ‘zoo’ theory to avoid dealing with the political headaches that would accompany acknowledgement of the test. An affirmative report might have affected the ongoing negotiations over the creation of Zimbabwe in which South African co-operation was needed and upset the just negotiated Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt. Carter also had reasons to fear ‘complications in gathering Jewish votes during the upcoming Democratic Party primary campaign against Sen. Edward Kennedy.’

But beyond that, as a State Department official explained, coming clean on the test ‘would be a major turning point in our relations with South Africa and Israel if we determined conclusively that either had tested a nuclear bomb. It makes me terribly nervous just to think about it.’ Of course by deciding to ignore reality the Carter administration - and following in its footsteps, the Reagan administration,which went on record May 21, 1985 as upholding the Carter ‘verdict’ - destroyed the already tattered credibility of the nonproliferation posture of the U.S. There was no challenge forthcoming from Congress. Quite the contrary: in 1981 Representatives Stephen Solarz and Jonathan Bingham withdrew legislation they had introduced calling for a cutoff of U.S. aid to nations manufacturing nuclear weapons after they learned from the State Department “that such a requirement might well trigger a finding by the Administration that Israel has manufactured a bomb.” The U.S. government turned its back on the potential victims of Israeli and South African nuclear aggression and stuck its head in the sand like an ostrich.

Cover-up

Five years later, the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund in cooperation with Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation and the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa issued a report on the 1979 nuclear weapons test. Based on documents obtained from the government under the Freedom of Information Act, the report detailed scientific evidence not taken into account by the Carter panel. It demonstrated conclusively that a cover-up had been perpetrated by the Carter Administration. Written by Howard University Professor Ronald Walters, the report warned that the cover-up, ‘coupled with the Reagan Administration’s subsequent allowance of an increase in nuclear aid to South Africa has serious implications for international peace and security.’

The sponsors of the report urged that the investigation be reopened under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineers, and also called for a Congressional investigation and ‘the release to the public of all pertinent information.

Of course whether enquiries are reopened in the USA, or the United Nations, or not, many African States are deeply uneasy about these events. Unsurprisingly, the conclusions which they have drawn reflect considerable alarm. A number of African countries have quite reasonably concluded that they are prospective candidates for nuclear bombardment by South Africa. No Government in the front-line states can possibly ignore this threat. Persistent cross-border military activity by the apartheid regime is a permanent fact of political life in the southern part of the African continent.

But it is not only in the front-line states that alarm bells have been ringing. As Oye Ogunbadejo informs us:

“Nigeria, for example, sees itself as ... a potential target. Lagos has consistently argued that any improvements in South Africa’s military power and nuclear capability, with the assistance of the west, pose direct military threats to Nigeria, and make it an open target of long-range nuclear attack. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, as President, continued to emphasise the need for his country to catch up with South Africa in the nuclear field. For the time being, however, Nigeria’s efforts are geared, essentially, towards energy purposes.”

Yet, Ogunbadejo cites other prominent African spokesmen who are very impatient with the restrictions of nuclear capacity to the civilian sector. Thus, Ali Mazrui is reported as a strong critic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty:

“From a third world point of view, I don’t believe the Treaty is worth the paper it is written on. And if I were to become President of a third world country, I would not hesitate to withdraw from it. Imperialism in the nuclear age is the monopoly stage of nuclear technology.”

Mazrui foresees an alliance of black South Africa with Nigeria and Zaire, which would develop its own African ‘deterrent’.

“Africa under its triumvirate of diplomatic leaders partly endowed with nuclear credentials, will have begun to enter the main stream of global affairs. And the world as a whole, once it discovers the lunacy of its nuclear ways, will have learned an old lesson in a new context: the lesson that wild mushrooms are dangerous.”

Of course, the attitude of the Government of Free South Africa cannot yet be determined. Fortunately, for many years, progressive people throughout the African continent have given their support to the goal of a nuclear-free zone in the whole region. Kwame Nkrumah froze all French assets because of the tests in the Sahara desert during 1961. At the same time, Nigeria severed its diplomatic contact with France. The advent of the Non-proliferation Treaty was perhaps more keenly welcomed in Africa than in any other sector of the globe. Ogunbadejo believes that only a major initiative towards nuclear disarmament by the great powers can maintain this kind of wider global commitment.

“In the maintenance of future world order, the close co-operation and understanding between the superpowers and the other states with nuclear weapons is an essential precondition.”

In small things and big

The advent of the Gorbachev-Reagan summits, and the conclusion of a Treaty to dismantle intermediate nuclear forces, welcome though it is, nonetheless arrives after the eleventh hour, when we consider the savage implications of the problems of proliferation. Conventional theories of deterrence are deeply flawed, and nowhere more than in their standard presumption of a bipolar model of nuclear confrontation. In a crude way, several thousand warheads may, when confronted by several thousand other warheads, determine a certain kind of behaviour. No such determination may be presumed, however, once proliferation has extended to the ‘pariah’ states. In the hot spots which include and surround these states, there is sufficient turbulence to encourage the insane idea that nuclear weapons can be useful as means of actual warfare. What elsewhere would be normal restraints of public opinion are here conspicuously absent.

We have more than a little evidence that neither domestic nor international law controls the potential responses of such governments.

In small things, the Israeli Government kidnaps its opponents, and visits exemplary repression upon them. In large things, it misleads the United Nations and extends the threat of nuclear destruction to two of the most dangerous areas in the contemporary world.

It is hardly surprising that good people who are facing such threats may flinch in their commitment to oppose all or any reliance on nuclear weapons. Thus, Ogunbadejo tells us:

“Edem Kodjo, the last substantive Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, caused quite a stir at the 19th summit during June 1983 in Addis Ababa, when he militantly urged African Governments to match ‘South Africa’s nuclear mights’: ‘it is the duty of member states which are able to resolutely embark on the nuclear path to do so. “‘

Nuclear proliferation is the tragic reductio ad absurdem of deterrence theory. That old cynic, Harold Macmillan, cogently expressed the problem:

“If all this capacity for destruction is spread around the world in the hands of all kinds of different characters dictators, reactionaries, revolutionaries, madmen - then sooner or later, and certainly, I think by the end of the century, either by error or insanity, the great crime will be committed.”

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the idea of nuclear-free zones, can neither of them continue unaffected by the nuclearization of the military forces of Israel and South Africa. If there is still time to maintain the civilized commitment of Africa and the Arab world to non-nuclear defence policies, it must be evident that that time is rapidly speeding away. Mordechai Vanunu has removed the last veil which had been concealing this ugly situation.

Now, in order to survive, the Non-Proliferation regime must discover how to disarm Israel and South Africa of their nuclear bludgeons. A failure to confront this intransigent issue may not at once create the field full of dragon’s teeth which will eventually grow. Problems of resources and technology will ensure an uneven development of nuclear military potential. But here, we are talking about something more fundamental than budget allocations: at stake is the whole question of the political will for peace and disarmament, as well as the deep-rooted problem of social justice. If the rest of the world abandons the front-line states to South African intimidation, including nuclear intimidation all Africa will conclude that Ali Mazrui is right. If everyone outside the Middle East remains deaf to the process which is now reopening behind locked doors in Jerusalem, then the call for an Arab bomb will become irresistible. We are members of one another, and it is at critical moments like the present that it becomes necessary to demonstrate this fact.

So widespread is the international movement for peace, that the Third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament will see continued healthy pressures for the destruction of nuclear weapons, and the extension of ever wider nuclear-free territorial agreements. Yet, it seems to me, that all these events provide us with a powerful argument that disarmament can no longer be left to governments.

There are widespread debates about the need for reform of the United Nations system, and many new proposals are emerging from the different peace movements, as they experience the weaknesses and limitations of the inherited UN system. Even within the old system, however, many voices have been raised for the creation of a new information order, as a pre-condition for an enlightened and active world public opinion.

The confrontation between Israel and its neighbours, the plight of the Palestinian people, and the abscess of apartheid are both major parts of a global crisis of militarism. This is worsening as a result of economic crisis, contraction and collapse. If the Stock Exchange crash leads through trade wars to the explosion of the world’s debt bomb, then the present proliferation of nuclear weapons is a perfect formula for Armageddon. No-one can tell where conflict will spill over, once any of these sinister devices are detonated.

So urgent is this problem that nothing less than a worldwide popular movement is needed to meet it. It cannot be left to the immediate victims of these new nuclear threats, to protest and appeal in isolation. “Send ye not”, said our English poet John Donne, “to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee”.

* * *

In warning us of these perils, Mordechai Vanunu has earned our support and help. Writing from his confinement, he sent me this inspiring message:

“I hope you received my last letters to you. Last week I received the autobiography of Bertrand Russell. Thank you very much. In this very interesting book I find I share some things in common with the life of Russell. I am also governed by unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind.

I believe many people would like to do more for those who suffer without reason, like all the refugees in the world. I tried to help them when I was a student. This activity guides me to my next action.

Even now in these inhumane prison conditions, I feel good, because I believe I did my duty and followed my conscience.

I am happy to know that many people support and understand what I did, and my hope is that more people will do more things to stop nuclear proliferation throughout the world.

We are now in a great moment when the US and the USSR are signing an agreement to reduce nuclear weaponry in Europe. This is a good step in the right direction: to destroy all the nuclear weapons in the world.

I want to thank you for your action for peace, and for spreading news of my case to more people.”

I do not think that humanity will ignore or forget the plight of this good man. In organizing solidarity with him, we shall continually remind the world of the menace against which he warned.

Double standard policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

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“I swear I believe Armageddon is near.”1

So wrote US President Ronald Reagan in his diary on the evening on June 7, 1981. What prompted this private proclamation of doom? Earlier that day, fourteen US-built F-16 aircraft flew from their base in the Negev dessert. These Israeli military jets made their way at low level across Jordanian and Saudi Arabian airspace, before reaching their target: the Osirak nuclear reactor, located just 10 kilometres southwest of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The jets dropped bombs which destroyed Iraq’s fledgling nuclear energy programme.

In conformity with diplomatic protocol, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin informed the US President through his Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis. Some accounts hold that Lewis was stunned at the news, which was conveyed to Reagan via the text of this rather bland cable:

‘At 1940 local (1740 ZULU) Prime Minister Begin contacted me and asked me to convey the following message to you as quickly as possible. Commence text. Today our air force carried out a raid on the atomic reactor near Baghdad. According to the reports of our pilots the target was completely destroyed. All our planes returned safely. End text.’2

At the time of the attack, Iraq – unlike Israel – was a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear materials at the Osirak reactor were under the supervision and safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency and, with the exception of a short period following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, had been regularly inspected.3 The volume and status of the materials at the site were such that the prospect of Iraq developing nuclear weapons from them in the short-term was close to zero. Why, then, did Israel attack the Osirak reactor at this point? Why attack when Iraq was fully signed up to international arms control and monitoring arrangements? Why attack when there was little or no prospect of Iraq developing weapons from the small quantity of nuclear materials at the site?

Israeli elections were due to take place on June 30, 1981. Begin’s Likud party and government coalition partners were thought to have only a narrow lead in the run-up to the polls. Likud and company had been behind in the polls prior to the outbreak of tensions around the placing of Syrian missiles in Southern Lebanon – itself a response to building Israeli aggression. Israel had planned to attack these missile installations, first in April and then May but was thwarted by poor weather conditions and other factors. “Was the timing of the raid on Iraq an election-month substitute for the destruction of the Syrian missiles?”, asked Anthony Fainstein in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

“It is difficult for me to avoid this conclusion; the same thoughts have occurred to the Israeli opposition. The raid did provide psychological points against Iraq, but did little else for Israel beyond helping Begin’s re-election bid.” 4

Neither did the raid prevent Israel from unleashing an attack on PLO and other targets in Lebanon just ten days later, on June 17.

What prompted President Reagan’s stark reaction? Was the attack a surprise? Not according to archival record which contains multiple warnings from Ambassador Lewis.5 Was the US opposed – in principle – to an Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor? Almost certainly not. The reaction from the White House was about something else, as was the chorus of opposition that culminated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 487, which condemned:

“the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations … [and] strongly condemns the attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”6

The main factor at play in the response was not outright opposition to Israel’s action but a concern about timing. Begin worked according to his own timetable – determined by the upcoming elections – and imperatives (more on which later), but the rest of the world – and the new US President in particular – feared a slide into widespread regional conflict that would jeopardise a clear settlement of power and influence in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war, which commenced in September 1980, was in part an attempt by the Iraqi regime to replace Iran as the preeminent regional power following the Iranian revolution. It was not until 1982 that the US officially ‘normalised’ relations with Iraq and – together with Saudi Arabia and others – started to pump money and arms into the country. The point here is that regional power and influence, beyond the role played by Israel in US regional concerns, was a key factor in the initial response to the Osirak bombing. Israel’s actions had potentially jeopardized the power settlement but in the event, the much-feared chain of events that could have led to full-scale regional conflict failed to materialise.

If timing was a factor for both Begin and Reagan in this instance, it was a marginal one in the overall dynamic. As far as Israel is concerned, its external priorities in relation to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is wholly determined by the fact that Israel is itself a nuclear power. As such, the attitudes of neighbouring states towards the acquisition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is conditioned by a nuclear-armed Israel. This is one leg of the ‘double standard policy’ that operates in the Middle East, whereby whilst Israel insists on maintaining and developing its own nuclear arsenal to ensure the ‘ultimate deterrence’, it cannot countenance any other regional power taking the same course. Official Israeli nuclear policy – insofar as it can be determined from under the veil of deliberate opacity – seems blind to the fact that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot but induce other regional states to develop their own nuclear programmes alongside the development of other weapons of mass destruction.

This point was comprehensively made by Matti Peled, onetime military commander of Gaza and Major General in the Israeli Defence Forces, turned peace activist and Knesset member. On 25 November 1987, during a speech on behalf of the Progressive List for Peace on a vote of no confidence in the Israeli Parliament, Peled stated:

“The Israel government deludes itself that being the leading Middle East state in the field of nuclear power bestows upon Israel immunity from weapons of mass destruction. This is one of the most dangerous illusions in the sphere of strategic thinking. There may be found some people, however, sticking to the argument that Israel is mainly concerned to prevent any Arab state from developing nuclear weapons … The Israeli government’s assumption that it can succeed in preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Arab states by a series of bombardments of nuclear reactors, is thoroughly unrealistic. This is another dangerous illusion distorting the strategic thinking of Israel.”7

Peled’s point being that the mere existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal is no protection and, moreover, itself presents a threat to Israel’s security. Nonetheless, this approach to regional actors endures with hostility towards Iran the starkest illustration.

Another leg in the ‘double standard policy’ relates to what Commander Robert Green refers to as a “distinct version of the concept of existential nuclear deterrence”8 whereby:

“a deliberately opaque and contradictory posture of refusal to acknowledge possession, let alone deployment, of a nuclear arsenal. Understanding the evolution of this particular, perverse notion is essential because it poses a grave danger to Israel, the Middle East and the United States.”

Green continues, quoting from the 1993 edition of Seymour Hersh’s work on Israeli nuclear doctrine, The Samson Option:

“For more than three decades, successive American administrations of both parties, the bureaucracy, and the diplomatic service have ignored the existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal … The current official position of the United States and its allies is, astonishingly, that there is no evidence that Israel is, in fact, in possession of nuclear arms.”9

Israel’s “distinct” formulation of nuclear deterrence and the continuing American disinclination to publicly recognising it, is all the more peculiar given the widespread acknowledgement and understanding that such a nuclear arsenal exists. Hersch is not the only writer to cover the story of Israel’s nuclear programme and policies. Anver Cohen’s important work, Israel and the Bomb,10 traces the development of Israeli nuclear strategy through stages of secrecy, denial, opacity and its current phase: ambiguity, whereby deliberate obfuscation and concealment are deployed.

In the last two of these phases, Israel has had a willing accomplice and enabler: the United States. Even when the US government has been presented with undeniable evidence, such as proof of joint nuclear tests between Israel and Apartheid South Africa or the materials presented by Mordechai Vanunu, no acknowledgement was forthcoming. Ken Coates presented an explanation for this state of affairs:

“Conventional theories of deterrence are deeply flawed, and nowhere more than in their standard presumption of a bipolar model of nuclear confrontation. In a crude way, several thousand warheads may, when confronted by several thousand other warheads, determine a certain kind of behaviour. No such determination may be presumed, however, once proliferation has extended to the ‘pariah’ states. In the hotspots which include and surround these states, there is sufficient turbulence to encourage the insane idea that nuclear weapons can be useful as a means of actual warfare. What elsewhere would be normal restraints of public opinion are here conspicuously absent. We have more than a little evidence that neither domestic nor international law controls the potential responses of such governments.

In small things, the Israeli government kidnaps its opponents, and visits exemplary repression on them. In large things, it misleads the United Nations and extends the threat of nuclear destruction to two of the most dangerous areas in the contemporary world.”11

Ken Coates did not have a crystal ball and could not have foreseen the coming of the Trump Administration in the US and its cooperation with the Netanyahu government in Israel. He could not have anticipated the degree to which the “normal restraints of public opinion” have degraded. However, he and other analysts were supremely alert to the trajectories of US policy in the Middle East and the terms by which the ‘double standard policy’ operated.

Notes

1. Reagan, Ronald (2007) The Reagan Diaries, Harper Collins

2. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre,

3. Fainberg, Anthony (1981) ‘Osirak and international security’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1981

4. Ibid

5. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre

6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 487,

7. Peled, Matti (1988) ‘Denuclearising the Middle East’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

8. Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

9. Hersh, Seymour (1993) The Samson Option, quoted from Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence pp 123

10. Cohen, Anver (1998) Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York

11. Coates, Ken (1988) ‘Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

A nuclear-armed state versus the Palestinian people

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

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Dateline: 16 May 2021. Al Wahda Street, central Gaza City.

Israel intensifies air-strikes on Gaza in a continuation of its latest assault on the Palestinian people. Official Israeli channels insist that such actions are “precision targeted” against individual “terrorists” and related organisations.

Al Wahda Street – in the bustling heart of Gaza – was home to many before the missiles struck. Amongst them were the family of Dr Ayman Abu al-Auf who served as head of Internal Medicine at Gaza’s Shifa hospital. By the end of the day, Dr al-Auf was dead. So were his 13 year old daughter Tala and his 17 year old son. All three killed by Israeli “precision” bombing.

According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “Rula Mohammad al-Kawlak, 5, Yara, 9, and Hala, 12 – all sisters - together with their cousin Hana, 14, and several other of their relatives, as well as sisters Dima and Mira Rami al-Ifranji, 15 and 11, and neighbour Dana Riad Hasan Ishkantna, 9” were killed in the same “precision” attacks.

The NRC reported that by the 18 May, of the 60 children killed in Israeli attacks, 11 had been receiving treatment for pre-existing trauma at one of its facilities. Tala Abu al-Auf was one of their patients.

Tala’s life was dominated by trauma, suffering, uncertainty and violence. Anywhere else in the world, the teenage daughter of a doctor might have expected a relatively care-free and comfortable life. A life loaded with opportunity, hope and joy. Such opportunities are denied to the children of Gaza, be they the children of doctors or the children of the countless jobless in that stretch of land.

Tala is no longer traumatised. Death at the hands of “precision” bombing put an end to her too-short life.

* * * 

The most recent Israeli assault on the Palestinian people looks like an all-too-familiar and all-too-tragic event. Every few years the gross ‘normality’ of the protracted oppression of the Palestinian people is punctured by an intense assault at the hands of the Israeli military. Every few years the State of Israel pushes at the boundaries of what has previously been accepted by the international community and demands more. It deploys a highly organised, heavily equipped military and demands one bit more: more Palestinian territory, more Palestinian lives, more traumatised children, more concessions from world opinion.

Rather than maintain a balance between coercion and consent as is the norm in many states – ‘liberal’ or otherwise – Israel employs brutal coercive measures and demands consent from the world. The death, trauma and suffering of the Palestinian people are secondary to the drive for one more cluster of houses, one more stretch of land. The wishes of the Palestinian people or the calculable reaction of an oppressed people are not accounted for. All-too-often the death, trauma and suffering are not recorded on the balance sheet of world opinion.

When the reaction comes in the form of children throwing stones at soldiers in bullet-proof vests with machine guns slung over their shoulders, or in the firing of scores of missiles in the expectation that some of them will penetrate Israel’s sophisticated missile defence system, we are expected to draw an equals sign. We are expected to kneel at the altar of ‘reasonableness’ and condemn an occupied and oppressed people who refuse to kneel in the face of occupation and oppression. We might be tempted to draw an equal’s sign in the name of peace, in the name of opposition to violence whatever its source.

However, we cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we can identify and understand the roadblocks to peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we are clear that powerful forces are ranged against the conquest of peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace in Palestine or the Middle East more widely without a clear recognition that in Palestine we are talking about a nuclear-armed state against a people denied a state of their own.

We cannot talk sensibly about peace in this region unless we are clear that the ‘double-standard’ policy employed by the US and allies with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons is mirrored in the double-standards deployed in the treatment of Palestinians on the streets of Gaza, the West Bank and within the Palestinian community in Israel itself.

When Israel is allowed to maintain obscurity around its nuclear weapons arsenal when other states face threats of attack, sanctions and international opprobrium for seeking the bomb, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but threatens NPT member states with attack for developing a nuclear programme, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to constructively engage in efforts towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East and finds encouragement for doing so, a double-standard policy is at work.

Where is the room for an equal’s sign? To draw such a sign would not only be a crime against mathematics but a crime against reality, a crime against morals and a crime against reason.

When a people stand up against decades of dispossession, occupation, trauma and oppression the peace movement must stand with them. When a nuclear-armed state, armed to the teeth with ‘conventional’ weapons with the help of foreign aid from the US, UK and elsewhere wages war then the peace movements are clear where we stand.

When we learn the name Tala Abu al-Auf, learn of her fate and know that she is one of legions who have suffered then we know where we stand. When we understand that a thick strand connects her killing to the lived experience of millions of Palestinians, to the fate of the Middle East and all the way to the murderous hum of Israel’s nuclear warhead stockpile, we know where we stand.

Stand with Palestine.

A version of this article first appeared on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament website, www.cnduk.org

The UK’s First Use policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

Text of a contribution made on 29th April to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of peace groups.

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I am a former British Royal Navy nuclear submarine commanding officer. In the 1970s I served in a UK Polaris submarine with responsibility for the ‘permission to fire key’ which would have launched 48 300kt warheads . I did so on the understanding that we would only be ordered to do so as a counter-attack – 2nd strike - against an incoming nuclear weapon attack by the Soviets. I would have withheld permission if I had any reason to think we were being ordered to launch a first strike. I was not prepared, under any circumstance, to start a nuclear war based on an intelligence assessment that the Soviets might be on the point of launching a nuclear attack. Intelligence can be fatally flawed, or wide open to misinterpretation or be straightforward prejudiced manipulation - as the 2003 US-UK invasion of Iraq showed all too clearly. Fortunately, UK Secretary of State for Defence’s pre-war assertion that nuclear weapons might be used to counter Saddam Hussein launching a chemical or biological weapon attack was not acted upon.

In the run-up to the 2016 UK’s Trident submarine replacement debate in the UK Parliament, I questioned the cost and utility of Trident missiles in this post-Cold War world. I was also concerned that this ignored the UK’s commitment to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT’s entry into force in 1970 - two years before I went on my first Polaris patrol - had encouraged me to think that the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction was indeed so mad that, within my lifetime, nuclear weapons would become the dinosaurs they deserved to be. How wrong I was.

So it was quite a shock for me to discover five years ago that First Use had, secretly, always been part of UK planning but had not been declared either to us at sea or to the nation. We were all under the false impression that Polaris was solely a counter-strike weapon. And still today, hiding in plain sight - but camouflaged behind the comfort blanket phrase ‘weapons of last resort’ - is the fact that the UK’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – as it is now called - could still include a First Strike as a ‘last resort’ if our conventional forces are in danger of being over-run.

This ambiguity places current UK Trident submarine Commanding Officers in an impossible position. If nothing is ruled out, then everything, including First Use, can be ruled in. However, submerged on patrol, they will have no way of knowing why they are being ordered to fire, what the target is, or the consequences on civil populations of doing so. They therefore cannot make the legal and moral judgements that the Nuremberg Principles require them to do. They will not know if they are carrying out a superior’s order to commit a war crime. They must completely trust in their Prime Minister who, uniquely among nuclear weapon States, has the sole authority for a decision to fire with no military or third party approval required.

Interestingly, another former Royal Navy submarine captain recently stated ‘I would not press the button for Boris’ – why? Because he said he did not trust Prime Minister Johnson’s judgment. Similar reservations were expressed by senior US military during President Trump’s time in office.

So I fully support this initiative to examine whether now is the time to press for a global No-First-Use policy. Much as I applaud and support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force recently, the reality is that an instant outright ban is not likely to be observed by the nuclear weapon states. But it may well apply such pressure on them that they feel the need to concede some relaxation of threat posture - such as No-First-Use - if only to show some compliance with NPT Article 6.

However, a big obstacle to overcome is that the nuclear weapon States justify possession of their weapons and the lawfulness of First Use by referring to the International Court of Justice 1996 Advisory Opinion which, by a casting vote, could not conclude whether or nor the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful if the very existence of a State was threatened; although it did decide that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would ‘generally’ be unlawful.

Similarly, the 1977 conference chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross that negotiated Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions acceded to the nuclear weapon States’ insistence that the Protocol should not ‘name and shame’ any specific weapons. This enabled the UK to include in its Military Law handbook that the use of nuclear weapons was not prohibited by the Protocol: a factually correct conclusion but speciously achieved.

I therefore wonder if the UN General Assembly could be prevailed upon to frame a more specific request for the ICJ, and also perhaps for the ICRC, for an Advisory Opinion on whether there are any circumstances in which First Use - or even the threat of First Use - of nuclear weapons would be lawful? The danger of course is that, if First Use is deemed unlawful, it may seem to justify their use (or threat of this) for a counter strike. But this may be a temporary price worth paying.

In parallel, let us also consistently remind those States not signed up to the NPT that nuclear ‘comfort blankets’ provide no comfort at all. For every £ put towards funding a nuclear armoury that is already more than big enough to end the world, they are a £ further away from being equipped to defend against far more immediate modern day threats.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://www.gcsp.ch/events/nuclear-risk-reduction-and-disarmament-it-time-no-first-use-policies-usa-and-globally

No First Use: US/UK connections

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

Text of a contribution made on 15th May to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of US peace groups.

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On 25th September 1945, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote to US President Truman in the following fashion:

“… I have so far heard no suggestions of any possible means of defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor. In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war [World War II, that is] it was [argued] that the only answer to the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to be correct. This obvious fact did not prevent bombing but resulted in the destruction of many great centres of civilisation. Similarly if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation…”

Why commence a short contribution on the question of a ‘No First Use’ policy with a quote from a letter written seventy six years ago? ‘Changing the political relationships of States’ is key.

At the time of writing, Britain was not yet a possessor of atomic weapons. It was, however, experiencing the collapse of its empire. One month before this letter was written, Truman had given the order for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after this letter was written, Attlee issued secret orders – kept secret from the majority of his administration, parliament and the people – for British scientists and engineers to begin work on what is still quaintly referred to as an ‘independent deterrent’.

Many of us gathered here will know that the ‘independence’ of Britain’s atomic weapons was short-lived, that following the successful test of a British hydrogen bomb the US waived the strictures of the McMahon Act and that the nuclear arsenal now maintained on these islands is entirely dependent on US technologies and assistance. We know that there is a ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’ between the US and UK, first signed on 3 July 1958 and which has been renewed nine times since. The next renewal date is 31 December 2024.

The extent of the UK’s reliance on the US in these matters extends from missile targeting – UK nuclear missiles are at several days’ notice to fire – to nuclear fuel for propulsion reactors. The UK’s nuclear weapon arsenal is, in fact, counted as simply a component part of the US arsenal.

So it is of some interest to trace the thoughts of two western leaders at the opening of the nuclear age. All the more so given Attlee’s warning that “if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation …”. All the more given the recent nuclear posture announced in the ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age. This document says much about a certain interpretation of how the relationship between states has changed, but says nothing about how they should and could be positively changed to avert mutual annihilation.

The headline measure in the review was the announcement that Britain would abandon the upper threshold for the number of nuclear warheads it possesses and rather than maintain a commitment to reduce the overall numbers over time, it would increase the upper threshold by over 40%, a total of 260 warheads. This increase galvanised a wave of opposition in the UK and left many commentators baffled about the reasoning behind it. Others suggest that the announced increase simply reflects the fact that rather than actually reducing the numbers of warheads as promised, the UK failed to do so and has found a means to account for the failure. The review announced that in future, the British government will not be as forthcoming about the number of warheads in its possession.

Less notice has been taken of the outline offered on the UK’s nuclear warfighting posture, which begins:

“we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons.”

The review claims that:

“This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.”

It then goes on to explain that the UK “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”

However, the British government then announces that all such policies are under review and that:

“the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact” This mean that it ‘reserves the right’ to reconsider and respond with nuclear weapons. It is not explicit by what means the reconsideration will take place, the time scale or the parameters that might guide the reconsideration.

The integrated review itself makes clear that ‘emerging technologies’ include drones, AI and cyber-attack type technologies. So here, the British government is warning of a drastic reduction in the threshold for nuclear use from a scenario where such weapons might be used to prevent a possible aggressor from using them to one where they might be used in response to the use or threat of use of a cyber attack, for example.

This posture announcement demonstrates a number of things: A complete failure of diplomacy and foreign policy in the face of a disrupted and still-changing global order; the relative incapacity of conventional British military capabilities to respond to perceived threats and a stick-not-carrot approach to engaging with the realities of the world as it is.

­­All of which has lowered the threshold at which the UK – and, we might presume – other nuclear armed states in the NATO alliance would actually use nuclear weapons.

Rather than assuring any sense or form of security, such a posture drastically increases the insecurity of life on this planet. Such a posture acts as a block on the road to changed political relationships between states. How will the other nuclear armed states – some of which are described as ‘strategic competitors’ – respond?

Such a posture makes the case for examining the feasibility of adoption of an explicit No First Use posture and a thinking-through of how such a policy might be achieved all the more pressing.

What, for instance, does the new US administration think of Britain’s nuclear posture? Will the shift in the UK’s posture be reflected in the future US Nuclear Posture Review or will it be repudiated?

What does the UK’s posture mean for mainland Europe, which is once again being thought of as a potential nuclear battleground? The Russian Foreign Ministry was outspoken in opposition. The German Foreign ministry spokesperson raised concerns about the numbers of warheads, but not much has been said about the threatened reduction in threshold for use.

The peace movements in Europe are certainly alert to these changes and have voiced their concerns, as has the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK itself.

Joining the opposition to the British governments’ posture are a growing number of voices from former Naval-personnel, who warn of the risks associated and the parlous state of the British Navy and other conventional forces.

For the first time a several years, the US has an administration that might – just might – be more thoughtful, rational and open-minded on such questions than the British government. Whilst Prime Minister Johnson dreams of a ‘Global Britain’ and ‘Empire 2.0’, President Biden seems open to a different approach. Adoption of a No First Use policy by the US – the aim of efforts underway – would be an important contribution to our work in the UK and Europe more widely.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://masspeaceaction.org/event/prohibiting-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Note on Nuclear Weapon Announcements in the UK Integrated Review

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Peter Jenkins, British Pugwash

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Summary

The United Kingdom government recently announced, in the context of an integrated policy review, that it will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 (from a previous target of no more than 180) and that it will extend its longstanding policy of deliberate ambiguity by no longer making public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warheads and deployed missiles.

These decisions are best seen as symptomatic of a belief that the United Kingdom’s and NATO’s security environment has been deteriorating and that now Russia in particular poses a grave threat to the Kingdom and its NATO allies. Pugwash has an opportunity to react constructively to the decisions by exploring the reasons for the heightening of NATO/Russian tensions in recent years.

Additionally, use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear aggressors in certain circumstances

is envisaged ( extension to the policy of deliberate ambiguity may be connected to this) and the right to review the UK’s negative security assurance to Non-Nuclear Weapon States is reserved. But nuclear weapon use in response to cyber-attacks and against non-state actors is ruled out, and the UK’s nuclear weapon submarines will remain at several days’ notice to fire.

Detail

The context of these changes in the UK’s nuclear weapons policy is a strategic review of “security, defence, development and foreign policy”. Being the first review of UK strategy since the 2016 decision to withdraw from the European Union, and inviting comparison with strategic reviews done in 2010 and 2015, the 2021 review suggests a wish to convince readers that EU withdrawal has enhanced the UK’s potential to be an important actor on the global stage. In particular, the 2021 review dwells on economic and political interests in the Indo/Pacific region and it sets out the capabilities, actual and aspirational, that the Kingdom can bring to bear on the pursuit of those interests. Nonetheless, it recognises that the North Atlantic area remains the primary concern of UK defence policies.

Increase in the Overall

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

“In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile

ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads”

Integrated Review of Security,

Defence, Development and

Foreign Policy (IR), 15 March 2021

The most specific and most logical explanation for this decision came in a TV interview that the Secretary of State for Defence gave on 21 March. He referred to improvements in Russian missile defences and implied that these meant the UK’s nuclear deterrent must grow in size to remain credible. UK governments have long taken a capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on Moscow as a yardstick for the credibility of the UK deterrent. Russia is thought to have been strengthening Moscow’s anti-ballistic missile defences in the context of a major upgrade of its anti-access and area-denial capabilities, lessons having been drawn from the first and second Iraq wars and NATO’s 1999 aerial assault on Serbia.

However, the Integrated Review itself contains no reference to Russian missile defences.

Instead, it refers to a wider, more amorphous range of threats, which has been described as “a deteriorating security environment.”

“We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states, and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals. They are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new ‘warfighting’ nuclear systems which they are integrating into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others. The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and proliferation of potentially disruptive technologies all pose a threat to strategic stability….We will continue to keep our nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.” (IR)

This explanation seems to lack logic. It is far from obvious that increases and improvements in another state’s nuclear forces require increases in a retaliatory nuclear force judged to be assured (because invulnerable to a first strike) and credible (because capable of causing a potential aggressor unacceptable damage). Nonetheless, this is the explanation to which the

Integrated Review gives pride of place.

British Pugwash has heard it said that these risk concerns centre on Russia, China, North Korea (DPRK) and Iran. Here, too, an element of illogicality enters in. China has stated publicly that it does not intend to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of a confrontation with an adversary, and it is hard to imagine the UK intending to be the initiator of a nuclear exchange with China. The North Korean government is preoccupied with what it sees as an existential threat from the United States of America. Iran is not thought to have resumed the research into nuclear weapon design and manufacture that it abandoned in 2003; its Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the possession and use of nuclear weapons; in agreeing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran pledged to remain a Non-Nuclear Weapon State; Iran does not possess a missile capable of reaching Western Europe; and Iran

has offered to refrain from developing missiles with ranges in excess of 2000 km.

It is probable, therefore, that these risk concerns centre essentially on the weapon systems and military doctrines of Russia, and that they are felt as much from a NATO perspective as from a national UK perspective. A country assessment of Russia in the review includes this passage:

“The UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia. However, until relations with its government improve, we will actively deter and defend against the full spectrum of threats emanating from Russia. Through NATO, we will ensure a united Western response, combining our military, diplomatic and intelligence assets in support of collective security ... We will also support others in the Eastern European neighbourhood and beyond to build their resilience to state threats.”

This is not the place to explore why the British government has formed a view that the United Kingdom and NATO now face a grave “spectrum of threats” from Russia. Several possible reasons will occur to anyone who has been taking an interest in the evolving character of Russia’s relations with NATO members since 2012. Suffice it to say that this grim assessment contrasts with the 2010 strategic review (which set the stockpile target at no more than 180):

“No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us under grave threat.”

The 2021 assessment also goes some way beyond the assessment in the 2015 strategic review. The latter confines its Russian threat perception to the following sentence:

“Though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it [Russia] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.”

Belief in a re-born Russian threat thus seems to be the leading explanation for the decision to increase the overall weapons stockpile. Two other possible factors mention merit, however, before turning to the decision to expand a longstanding policy of ambiguity to embrace actual stockpile and deployed nuclear weapon numbers.

One is a possible fear that in time improvements in offensive underwater technologies will affect the invulnerability of the UK’s strategic missile submarines. Behind the stockpile increase could lie an intention to maintain more than one such submarine on patrol on a routine basis.

However, an IISS commentary on the Integrated Review casts doubt on the feasibility of a two-vessel routine, at least until a new generation of submarines enters service during the 2030s:

“There are, however, potential constraints to that scenario. Among them are the well publicised problems with the refits and serviceability of the current Vanguard class, which have recently made it challenging to maintain the minimum Continuous At Sea Deterrence requirement of one submarine on patrol.”

(The UK and nuclear warheads – stretching credibility?, 26 March 2021)

Second, it could be that officials have come to the view that the 2010 decision to cut the stockpile to 180 by 2025, re-confirmed in 2015, and to deploy no more than 40 warheads on routine patrol, was ill-judged and that the stockpile needs to grow, irrespective of changes in the strategic environment and threat perceptions, to achieve credibility. This possibility has been hinted at in British Pugwash’s hearing but there is no hard evidence for it.

Withholding of Missile and Warhead Numbers

“We will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technological environment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.” (IR)

Two additional explanations for this prizing of ambiguity come to mind.

The first is that the UK government intends to deploy nuclear weapon systems to deter substrategic nuclear and non-nuclear threats to NATO on its North East front, but does not wish to reveal the number of systems designated for this purpose that will be on routine patrol at any one time. A Q & A paper issued some weeks after the Integrated Review suggests that this explanation is unlikely. In it the Ministry of Defence affirms that none of the UK’s nuclear weapons are “designed for tactical use during conflict”; instead, they exist to “deter the most extreme threats to national security”.

However, this formulation seems to leave open the possibility that ‘low-yield’ strategic systems will be deployed routinely in case a need for their use in sub-strategic/tactical contexts arises. That possibility is also left open by statements in the review that the UK’s nuclear weapons are committed to the defence of both the Kingdom and NATO allies, and that “their fundamental purpose” is, inter alia, to deter “aggression”, the qualifier “nuclear” being omitted.

The second possibility is that the UK government has come to view a greater lack of

transparency as a necessary adjunct to maintaining the option of using nuclear weapons in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks and to cope with threats which emerging technologies may pose:

“We reserve the right to review this [Negative Security] assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.” (IR)

The impression sought is perhaps that the United Kingdom will have sufficient systems deployed at any one time to be able to respond to non-nuclear WMD and emerging technology threats without impairing the credibility of its strategic deterrent.

To end on some positive notes. The Integrated Review indicates that when on patrol the UK’s strategic submarines will continue to be at several days’ notice to fire. The review states that

“since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state.” It seems, from what British Pugwash has heard, that the option of using nuclear weapons against non-state actors has been excluded. The MOD’s Q & A paper rules out their use in response to cyber-attacks. And the UK government comes down firmly on the deterrence side of the deterrence/warfighting distinction:

“We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies ... We remain committed to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction…The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.” (IR)

Conclusion

These changes in the UK’s nuclear policy are regrettable. They amount to a step backwards and away from the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. They call into question the sincerity of the UK’s advocacy of “step-by-step” movement in the direction of that vision. They raise doubt about the strength of the UK’s commitment to full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They demonstrate that the United Kingdom is still wed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

However, it would seem best for the Pugwash movement to channel concern over these decisions into a constructive initiative. One option would be for Pugwash to explore in some detail why the UK government (probably in the company of other NATO governments) has come to believe that Russia now poses a much graver threat to NATO than UK governments believed in 2010 and 2015. Such work would open up the possibility of Pugwash trying to contribute to a reduction in NATO/Russian tensions and would complement work to prevent a resumption of the nuclear arms race (see Pugwash Note on Arms Control and Disarmament, January 2021).

It is probably fanciful to imagine that the mutual confidence which characterised relations between Russia and NATO in the years that followed German re-unification can be re-built. But there is room for each side, NATO governments and the Russian government, to clarify the motives behind recent forms of behaviour that the other side has found objectionable, and to draw up mutually acceptable rules of the road for future co-existence.

The current climate of mutual incomprehension, suspicion and fear, of which the UK’s latest strategic review appears to be a product, is pregnant with nuclear risk on both sides of the NATO/Russian border.

Peter Jenkins

Chair, British Pugwash,

9 May 2021

Roadmap to end nuclear sharing

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Report on the Nuke Free Europe webinar

Compiled by Angelika Claussen, IPPNW Deutschland

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The first webinar on the “Roadmap to end nuclear sharing” on March 29, 2021, was a real success, with 87 people from all over Europe, and some from other continents, taking part. Our aim was to develop interactive connections and a common strategy for European peace and disarmament activists to approach governments.

Tom Sauer, Professor in International Politics, Universiteit Antwerpen stated at the beginning of his overview that nuclear weapons are illegal under international law since January 22nd. We peace activists now expect the nuclear weapons states to pledge to take nuclear arms elimination under Art. VI NPT seriously. Europe is over-armed with nuclear weapons, there are not only three nuclear weapons states (F, UK and RUS), but it also hosts US nuclear weapons in five countries (B, D, I, NL, Turkey) and 20 European countries are NATO members. As Tom Sauer pointed out, NATO and its dogma of nuclear deterrence policy is the key obstacle for NATO countries in Europe preventing them from signing the TPNW.How can peace activists in NATO countries proceed? Tom Sauer proposes: Tackle NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and increase pressure on the nuclear sharing countries Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. We can do this by arguing that there are five NATO countries that already refuse to allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory: Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Spain. Policies can be changed since the majority of people is opposed to any kind of nuclear deterrence. We can put forward concrete steps to join the TNPW. If all four nuclear sharing countries act together, other countries, like Poland, whose governments currently declare that they want nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, will have difficulty justifying this stance to their population. This will be the beginning of a change in deterrence policy, initiated by civil society.Tom Sauer proposed a mixed policy approach: lobbying, protesting at US military bases and systematic media work. In particular, international protests at military bases in the four nuclear host countries could address either modernisation policies or ask to withdraw the bombs and send them back to the US.

The strategies and action levels presently used in the four nuclear host countries are good, but not enough, when one compares it with the fact that 70–80 % of the public want their governments to sign the TPNW. This message has not yet been delivered to our governments. Joining the TPNW and shifting the NATO paradigm of nuclear deterrence will be the focus of our work.

What are constructive steps that could be taken in the short term? A. Stop the dismissive tone used towards TPNW advocates and make that clear at the upcoming NPT review conference. B. Do not vote against the TPNW in the UN General Assembly in future. C. Take part in the first state meeting of TPNW as an observer next year in Vienna.

The following peace groups work on TPNW in Belgium: Vrede, Pax Christi Flanders and CNAPD in the French speaking part of Belgium. Protests will be held on the September 26th at the US military airbase in Kleine Brogel. Although 77 % of the Belgian public is in favour of joining the TPNW, the Belgian government does not care – yet. However, the Belgian government coalition agreement does not dismiss the TPNW out of hand, rather seeks to find ways to engage with TPNW parties. Only the Greens and Dutch speaking Socialists agree with joining the TPNW.

Peter Buijs, chair NVMP/IPPNW Netherlands, pointed out how medical and humanitarian arguments helped to revitalise the nuclear weapons debate in Dutch politics, brought forward by allies and ourselves separately and united by the civil society coalition “Balieberaad for a nuclear weapon free world”, initiated in 2016 by the NVMP. This meanwhile includes the Dutch Council of Churches, Red Cross, Mayors for Peace, Dutch Humanists, Pugwash, Greenpeace, PAX, IALANA and the NVMP. In 2017 our common pressure resulted in a premiere: after the elections: for the first time a coalition agreement mentioned nuclear weapons: “This government actively pursues a nuclear weapon-free world”, completed by the right wing liberal party VVD (from PM Rutte) by the ‘disclosure’: “... , within the framework of alliance obligations,...”, meaning of course NATO. This regards a centre-right wing government (Rutte-III).

In order to improve this paragraph after the next elections (17-3-2021), NVMP invited the Balieberaad-partners early last summer to draft six urgent recommendations for the election programmes of the political parties. Together we finally issued a statement in July 2020, that said The Netherlands should:

1. further intensify its active pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world;

2. intensify its role as an initiator and bridge-builder in and outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with emphasis on the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states (Art. VI);

3. end nuclear sharing: phase out the remaining Dutch nuclear task, i.e. the (approx. 20) US nuclear B61 bombs at the Dutch airbase Volkel;

4. start discussion within NATO about alternatives to nuclear deterrence;

5. sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW;

6. advance a paradigm shift from spending on weapons to diplomacy and combatting root causes of war like hunger, inequality and climate change

From the 27 political parties running for parliament, nine - mostly on the centre-left side – did incorporate (partly) these recommendations in their political programmes, especially about joining the TPNW and ending nuclear sharing. Two young NVMP-board members developed a Nuclear Weapon Election Compass for the Balieberaad, used intensively on social media.

All these nine parties were elected to parliament, but none have a majority (see Susi Snyder’s: https://nonukes.nl/march-2021-dutch-election-outcomes-and-nuclear-weapons/ ). Again, there were heavy losses on the left, just as in 2017, and the biggest party, the ruling right-wing liberal VVD from PM Rutte, won again. Fortunately, the second strongest party – the winning D66 (centre-left liberal democrats) has for decades a quite positive paragraph on nuclear weapons, including signing the TPNW, and making sure that the new Dutch fighter jets are not capable of dropping nuclear weapons, in their election programme. Together with the Social Democrats, D66 is also the party behind the resolution that got the former Dutch government (Rutte-II) to participate in TPNW negotiations in 2017. But Mark Rutte, the expected new Prime Minister, is in favour of nuclear sharing.

On 13-4-2021, the Balieberaad will convene online to decide how to influence the making of a new government, resulting in a new coalition agreement, that will go beyond the one from 2017, and also beyond the recent Belgium one from 30-9-2020, which will explore “... how the TPNW can stimulate multilateral nuclear disarmament”. Peter’s conclusion: civil society should start a European Appeal to NATO to end its policy of ‘credible nuclear deterrence’, e.g. by gathering signatures from well-known European writers, physicians, scientists, religious leaders, and others, stating that we Europeans don’t want to be defended any longer by weapons that any moment can mean our own destruction and that of the rest of the world.

Lisa Clark, Co-President of IPB and Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, Italy. Lisa agrees with Peter’s idea of creating some sort of a European Russell-Einstein Appeal to put an end to the NATO dogma of nuclear deterrence. No Italian government, either centre-left or centre-right, has ever wanted US nuclear weapons to be removed from Italian soil, although in some cases they paid lip service to “a world without nuclear weapons”. The civil society campaign in favour of removing them started a long time ago, but lobbying gained momentum in 2016, when Italy voted against the convening a conference in 2017 to discuss a ban treaty. Italy has a long tradition of supporting disarmament agreements, but not in this case. The campaign concentrated on education/information on the TPNW, on the ethical and legal issues. Up to now more than 200 cities have approved council resolutions demanding that Italy sign the ban treaty. In many cases, approval was unanimous, proving that the stigma is already having effect – no one dares to speak in favour of nuclear weapons in public. Opinion polls on nuclear weapons in 2019 showed that 70% were in favour of joining the TPNW, in 2020 it was 87 %, showing that the campaign has reached a lot of people.

The coalition has grown: the Bishops of the 7 Catholic dioceses near the USAF base at Aviano endorsed activities celebrating the entry into force of the TPNW on January 22nd. In the province of Brescia, where the Ghedi nuclear base is located, 165 grassroot NGOs also endorsed celebrations for entry into force, alongside 56 local government authorities. Throughout Italy many more cities printed the campaign’s poster, informing their citizens of the entry into force of the TPNW: it was displayed in city hall’s public spaces.

A resolution was passed in parliament in 2017 requiring the government to commission research into the legal consequences of Italy joining the ban treaty. Though this resolution was passed, nothing has ever been done. This year the campaign is pressing for another resolution on this issue, which will also ask for Italy to be present at the first TPNW States Parties meeting in Vienna in January 2022.

Johannes Oehler, ICAN Germany. Johannes Oehler gave an overview of the history of nuclear sharing in Germany since 1958. At that time, the Social Democrats said that nuclear sharing should not be connected to NATO membership.

Büchel airbase today: the current CDU/SPD government decided to renew the airbase and construction is taking place right now in preparation for the new B61-12 nuclear weapons. This is in opposition to the will of the population to end nuclear sharing. We activists should continue to remind that nuclear deterrence is useless.

German groups launched the campaign: “Atombomber, nein danke” (nuclear bomber, no thanks), responding to the fact that the updated B61-12 will need new aircraft to transport these bombs. The campaign contacted many parliamentarians and thus put pressure on government policy. The Social Democrats decided that the decision to buy a new aircraft from the US for nuclear sharing should be postponed until after the German general election in September 2021.

On the future of nuclear sharing in Germany: A study of the scientific board of the German parliament stated that joining the TPNW does not conflict with either NATO or with NPT membership.

On the election on September 26th in Germany: The Social Democrats support participating as an observer at TPNW conference in 2021 or 2022 and urge the nuclear weapons states, US and Russia, to start talks on nuclear disarmament.

The Greens will support signing TPNW but without giving any timeline. In the current draft of their election programme, there is no mention of refusing to buy nuclear aircraft or opposition to the deployment of the updated B61-12 nuclear weapons.

The Left Party is in favour of signing, ratifying the TPNW, and ending nuclear sharing.

Johannes invites everyone to join IPPNW and ICAN’s action days in July 2021 at the Büchell airbase: https://buechel.nuclearban.de/

Susi Snyder, Pax Netherlands. We need support for concrete steps to implementation, for instance the member states of TPNW are obliged under the treaty to call on others to join- this is something they can do in many multilateral forums.

Last year, a letter signed by more than 50 former ministers from our countries called on our governments to join the treaty - https://www.icanw.org/56_former_leaders. A similar type of action could take place again, and if so, it should be brief and focused.

There’s been great success engaging Mayors and municipalities, including with Mayors for Peace. There is an opportunity to go back to these cities, and raise the profile of the motions or resolutions that were passed earlier. Now that the TPNW is in force, we can raise the stakes, for example by going back and asking them to make sure that the city doesn’t do business with nuclear weapon producing companies, that the city pension funds are not invested in companies that are complicit in keeping nuclear weapons around. There’s a city guide for divestment tool kit which might be useful: https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/city-guide/

Prohibited behaviour will be stigmatised since nuclear weapons are illegal. Be loud and proud. It’s not our job to equivocate about the fact that all WMD are prohibited -its those who refuse to make the worse weapons illegal that should be forced to explain the differences.

There is an opportunity with B61-12 modernisation: the old bombs will be sent back to the US to allow the new Boeing tail-kits and other parts to be added, and this is a moment to make sure that the new nuclear bombs cannot return to Europe.

We can also use the annual exercises with nuclear weapons for stigmatisation, for instance the “Snowcat” or “Steadfast Noon” exercises. (17 countries involved). The timing is usually September/ October, which gives us enough time to get former military people from several SNOWCAT countries to publish a joint op-ed in multiple outlets that stigmatise nuclear weapons.

We should continuously use our arguments on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. There is no way that nuclear weapons can be used without causing a humanitarian catastrophe. There is no help if they are used. The Red Cross will not show up, there will be no soup, no blankets, just destruction, suffering which for some will last for decades. There is no arguing this, but still, lots of people don’t know. By keeping focused to this message in our outreach last year, and giving HOPE that the ban treaty offers, we were able to increase support for the Dutch joining the TPNW by more than 15%, to now being over 75%. Here’s a link on the surveys across Europe: https://www.icanw.org/nato_poll_2021.

Removing the roadblocks to peace

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

“The world stands at a crossroads” declares the ‘Call for Action’ for a Nuclear Weapons free Europe. The organisers of the call, the Nuke Free Europe network in which the Russell Foundation participates, have initiated a month of action (see below) focussed on demanding an end to nuclear modernisation and nuclear sharing and for European states to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. These demands are a starting point towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons once and for good.

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The demands address three key ‘roadblocks to peace’ in the European context. Each and every nuclear armed state has begun a process of not just updating existing weapons, but are developing a whole new range of nuclear warheads. Billions of Euros are going towards ‘more usable’ nuclear weapons, new machines of death and destruction, at a time when we should all be focussed on remaking society in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic. A new arms race must be stopped.

The fact that US nuclear weapons have a home in Europe under nuclear sharing agreements is another roadblock. The presence of such weapons in Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands makes each country a potential target. The presence of such weapons indicates that the US views Europe as a potential nuclear battleground. They must be removed.

The refusal of the vast majority of European states to engage with the TPNW and the hostile posture assumed by some states indicates another major roadblock: a refusal to take stated commitments (through the NPT, for example) to nuclear disarmament seriously. The peace movements in Europe must organise to put the question near to the top of the political agenda.

The UK’s announcements on nuclear warheads and nuclear use indicate some of the challenges we face, but also indicate that such decisions can be challenged. The UK is in breach of the NPT and must be held to account.

The final roadblock addressed in this issue of END Info relates to the plight of the Palestinian people. The status of Israel as a nuclear-armed state and the double-standards in relation to this status indicates two things: that the Palestinian people face an occupier with military capacities beyond any other state in the region and that the failure of the international community to bring Israel into the NPT or effectively challenge serial breaches of international law in other respects means that a drastic shift in approach is required.

To give context to Israel’s bomb, we reprint Ken Coates’ detailed account of how it was developed and its impact on the region.