Hold UK to account on nuclear warheads

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

In response to the UK Government’s ‘Integrated Review’, Lord McDonald of Salford – former chief civil servant in the Foreign Office – commented as follows:

“raising the cap on our stockpile of nuclear warheads looks odd. I understand that a continuous at-sea deterrent needs us to be able to deploy two boats from time to time. The new ceiling allows both boats to be fully armed. But that does not increase deterrence. It is expensive and incompatible with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In 1968, the non-nuclear weapon states accepted that as their permanent status in exchange for two things: the sharing of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, and that nuclear weapon states would work towards nuclear disarmament. The Government assert that the objective is untouched, but the announcement is a step away from its achievement.”

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For a former senior civil servant in the Foreign Office to so bluntly question the decisions contained in the Integrated Review is quite something. If such a person considers the announcements to be “incompatible” with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then everyone concerned should stop and think. It is likely the case that similar concerns were raised by those still serving in the highest positions but, of course, their advice remains largely hidden from public view. Voices of restraint and concern seem to have been ignored. As Machiavelli noted: “A prince who is not wise cannot be well advised.” Such a ‘prince’ sits in Number 10 Downing Street.

The peace movements do not need to infer breach of the NPT from the comments of an English Lord or by use of their own good sense. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done a significant service to the movement by securing a legal opinion on the matter. The opinion, titled Legality Under International Law of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Policy as set out in the 2021 Integrated Review, is clear that the British government is in breach of the NPT: it has broken international law.

The detailed opinion was drafted by Professor Christine Chinkin and Dr Louise Arimatsu, both international lawyers based at the London School of Economics. The full opinion can be read on CND’s website (www.cnduk.org) but it is worth quoting the conclusions of the report fully:

In our opinion, for the reasons set out above:

(i) The announcement by the UK government of the increase in nuclear warheads and its modernisation of its weapons system constitutes a breach of the NPT article VI;

(ii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state party to the NPT solely on the basis of a material breach of the latter’s non-proliferation obligations;

(iii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in self-defence solely on the grounds that the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities or emerging technologies, could have comparable impact to nuclear weapons.

The conclusion is clear. What next? Is there a court anywhere on the planet that might take up the case and hold the UK to account? It looks unlikely and even if such a court existed, would the British government take any notice?

As with many questions of international legality or illegality, the fundamental issues are in essence political issues. As such, political responses are required. The fact that the British government is in breach of international law should spark a widespread response, including from the overwhelming majority of states which are party to the NPT. As a priority, the peace movements and organisations in Europe should report the UK to the United Nations for being in breach of the NPT. Individuals can and should do the same. Efforts can be made to get parliamentarians either individually or collectively to report the breach. Importantly, the ongoing work of CND in this respect should be followed carefully and supported fully.

What of the NPT itself? What does the UK’s action and the legal opinion imply? The next NPT Review Conference will take place “no later than August 2021”, according to the UN’s website. This conference presents an opportunity for state parties alarmed by the UK’s announcements to make a clear intervention. If such interventions are not forthcoming, then the peace movements can use the opportunity to raise the issues on their own account.

According to UN Secretary-General António Guterres:

“The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally-binding obligations on disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime...”

If this is the case, then now seems to be the time to re-assert the “essential” character of the NPT and to finally begin the political work that has not been forthcoming in the previous 53 years of the NPT’s history. As a first step, this means working towards nuclear disarmament in line with the TPNW and halting all nuclear modernisation.

TPNW deflates nuclear sharing

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 23 available here

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“Umbrella” vs. “Sharing”

NATO was founded in 1949 with the claim that a US ‘nuclear umbrella’ would protect non-nuclear member states. In 2018, the British government affirmed that its nuclear Trident SSBN missiles are part of “the defense of our NATO allies”1. The French government, meanwhile, never made such explicit claims about using its nuclear ‘Force de Frappe’ for non-French interests.

Besides this ‘umbrella’ situation, five out of the 27 non-nuclear NATO member states (Turkey, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) have taken part in US nuclear sharing2, since the 1960s: US nuclear free-fall bombs are stored in these countries. In the event of war, fighter-bomber planes and aircrews from these countries are supposed to drop US nuclear bombs on selected targets. As the NATO commander-in-chief is always a US general, European aircrews in the nuclear sharing system function as de facto foreign legionnaires of the USA.

The operational radii of the fighter-bomber aircraft are about 1,000 km, thus (except Turkey) the ‘sharing’ targets are necessarily in European region. Given NATO’s overall posture in Europe, Russia is presumably the main target.

In this precision guided missile era the dropping free-fall nuclear bombs from decades-old manned aircraft is dangerous for the air crew. In order to drop the bomb the aircraft has to take a flight path over its target. What chance does a German nuclear fighter-bomber Tornado – a 50 year old ‘veteran’ – have to penetrate modern air defence systems?

Differing risks for NATO members

Nuclear sharing illustrates different levels of risk among the NATO states: 22 non-nuclear NATO member states are allegedly “protected” passively by the US “nuclear umbrella”. For the 5 “sharing” states this “umbrella” has holes, as they – and only they – are commanded to become accomplice to actions which otherwise would legally burden the USA alone, who are the owner state of the nuclear weapons. The US nuclear airbases in the “sharing” states obviously present high-ranking targets for any US adversary. In none of the five NATO states was nuclear sharing ever put to a public vote3. France, Czech Republic, Denmark and Iceland do not allow US bases in their territory. Iceland doesn’t even have a military. Thus even neighbouring NATO states carry widely differing risks.

“Sharing” dependent on personal decision

The functionality of nuclear sharing has a peculiarity: It doesn’t depend on government or military decisions. Instead it is up to the will of individuals, in this case air force personnel being citizens of the ‘sharing’ states. In the decision of such air force personnel to obey or refuse a nuclear command the following should be considered:

(a) the consequences of personal insubordination,

(b) the consequences of being accused as a war criminal at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (Netherlands) and

(c) personal, moral and related aspects.

Insubordination

If air force personnel refuse the command to deploy nuclear bombs, they might have a setback in their professional career, but nothing more. European ‘sharing’ states no longer shoot ‘disobedient soldiers’, as historic predecessors regularly did. This liberalization removed an ancient principle of the military: The soldier follows blindly the commands from the political leadership, they are not to ask questions. The ‘sharing’ air force personnel are citizens of democracies. They will have experienced the fact that democratic governments can fail and even lie to the public regarding the ‘justifications’ for war. The most prominent example was the 2003 US/UK Iraq invasion, as has been shown by the 2016 Chilcot Report to the British government.

Each member of a ‘sharing’ fighter-bomber crew has the personal obligation to respect the international law of warfare. To refuse a command which, according to the available information, appears illegal is no insubordination contrary to discipline but a citizen’s obligation. If the air force personnel happens to be a German citizen, they are expressly obliged to obey international law by the constitutional ‘Basic Law’.

Air force personnel as professional soldiers are trained and familiar with the international law of warfare, including awareness of its rapid development concerning nuclear weapons in the recent decades. This culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has been in force since January 2021 for the – till present – 54 states which ratified it. It is backed by the consent of 122 of the 193 UN member states. Major European states which have ratified the TPNW are Austria and Ireland. The Treaty has finally internationally stigmatised nuclear weapons in line with chemical and biological weapons. Thus the question “Is a threat or use of a nuclear weapon legal?” is no longer pending, as nuclear weapon states and their entourage kept claiming over decades, but it is answered for good by a general and unconditional “No”.

So theoretically, each crew member has to make a personal decision as to whether a given command to drop a nuclear bomb on a specific target is legal. For the details of this see the work of Robert Forsyth, former Commanding Officer of a British Polaris nuclear ballistic missile submarine, who points out1: the legal situation demands for the soldier (a) to know the identity of the target (which the Polaris crew didn’t) and (b) to assess the damage to be expected at this target from the bomb drop under the given conditions, particularly with regard to civilian collateral damage. For targets in inhabited areas the result is clear: such attacks are illegal.

Concerning nuclear weapons, a German Bundeswehr airman or airwoman is in a legally clear situation: According to the MoD service instructions of 2006, it is forbidden for her or him to use anti-personnel mines, nuclear weapons, bacteriological weapons and chemical weapons5. So he or she doesn’t have the choice but the obligation to refuse a command to drop a nuclear weapon, regardless what the government does.

Accusation of war crime

The Rome statute of 1998, the basis of the International Criminal Court, contains a clear definition of which actions are treated by the court as war crimes. It refers explicitly or implicitly to long existing international law like:

- the Hague Convention of 1907 (prohibiting firing into dwelling quarters),

- the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 (declaring that a command doesn’t free the soldier from his or her obligation to check if this command may be illegal, if he or she had the personal choice to refuse an illegal command),

- the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 with their Protocol Additional I of 1977 (prohibiting attacks which cannot discriminate between combatants and civilians) and

- the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 1996 (declaring both the threat and the use of any nuclear weapon to be illegal).

The US law professor Richard Falk4 adds that the unwritten nuclear taboo (never to use nuclear weapons) has been in effect for more than seven decades and therefore is evidence that it is a customary legal norm.

Since 2002 the ICC searches, prosecutes, judges and punishes war criminals. Following the Rome statute and seeing the effects of nuclear weapons, the use of a nuclear weapon in an inhabited area is unavoidably a war crime, regardless of weapon yield and air or ground burst. In other words: No scenario is known where use of a nuclear explosion in an inhabited area could be legal.

The ‘sharing’ air force personnel who pressed the nuclear button and survived the mission flight despite air defence finally will stand alone in front of the ICC. Except for the US and Turkey, all NATO states are members of the Rome statute. Thus the US denies the responsibility of the ICC for actions of their military personnel which might be assessed as war crimes according to the Rome statute definition. This may be formally right, but is it acceptable for NATO’s supreme command? In the case of nuclear sharing the US will – perhaps rightfully – argue that the ‘sharing’ air force personnel were not their citizens so the US are not involved. NATO will – perhaps rightfully too – refuse any responsibility for nuclear sharing and will point to the national government of the personnel concerned. However, this government will not be able to protect its personnel from the ICC procedures. In case of a ‘sharing’ nuclear explosion the responsible government officials (MPs, MoD and air force command chain) will to be accused at the ICC too, comparable to the Nazi offenders at the Nuremberg tribunal from 1945.

Before the TPNW came into force the ‘sharing’ air force personnel could claim for her or his defence that they trusted, in good faith, the legality of the actions and commands of their government to which they may have sworn an oath of loyality. With the TPNW in force it is no longer a debatable political opinion but an undisputable fact, regardless of whether a particular government has signed the treaty or not: The military strategies of the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are based on the preparedness to commit monstrous war crimes.

Personal aspects

If the air force personnel has family she or he might think about their children at home who will ask one day what they had done in the war. Shall they tell them: “I pressed the button and killed some ten or even hundred thousand people. For a similar number of surviving people I made their future life hell. These people had never harmed our country. I made their country uninhabitable for generations. This crime carries my name. I could have refused the command but I obeyed”?

The airman or airwomen knows that ‘the system’ or ‘the politicians’ do not press the nuclear button, but they themselves according to their free will. They also might think about how for the rest of their life they will be chased in their dreams by the nightmare scenes on the target ground, either learnt from media reports or from their own imagination. They wouldn’t only ruin the lives of the victims. They would ruin their own and their family’s lives too.

And even if they somehow escaped punishment by the ICC: their name as a crew member responsible for the nuclear bombing will be in the history files. Therefore they might expect personal revenge by a secret service of the victim state or even privately by survivors who will trace and find them. Similar has happened: In 2002 a midair collision of two airliners occurred over Southern Germany, killing 71 people including 49 children. In 2010 the father of a victims family met the responsible ground based air traffic controller who had ‘mis-performed’ and stabbed him to death.

Nuclear sharing in retreat

NATO claims that the TPNW is irrelevant because the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are not members. This is formally correct. But since the TPNW, according to the will of the majority of the UN states, stigmatises nuclear weapons like chemical and biological weapons, there is no longer space for claims that there are conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons might be legal.

A side problem for NATO is that non-NATO countries consider the US nuclear sharing a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and an illegal nuclear proliferation: After take-off the non-US national air crew has the power of disposal over a nuclear weapon. Exactly this is prohibited by the NPT. For instance the crew could decide to desert and emergency-land with the nuclear weapon on enemy ground.

To further illustrate the problem, one may think about a fictional nuclear sharing, legally a copy of NATO’s action: Saudi-Arabian or Iranian aircraft carry nuclear bombs shared by Pakistan as the owner state.

NATO member state governments keep claiming that the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ is ambiguous for the extreme case that nuclear weapon use is the “Last Resort” to save the very existence of a state, and therefore it could be legal (on this question the ICJ judges voted 7:7 undecided). Whatever this could mean for a nuclear weapon state, such a “Last Resort” scenario can only be valid for the nuclear weapon state itself, not for any third parties like its allies, thus not for the five European states involved in nuclear sharing.

Will there be at any time any Turkish, Italian, German, Belgian or Dutch air force personnel of clear mind and morality prepared to obey a command to drop a nuclear bomb on any target in Europe? How will the air forces of the five European nuclear sharing states under the TPNW – regardless if signed by them – recruit their nuclear bomber crews? What will be the result of an open public discussion on this question? It looks like the TPNW indeed has deflated US nuclear sharing.

Steadfast Noon

An open question will probably remain as to whether the participation of air force personnel of the “sharing” states in the yearly NATO maneuver ‘Steadfast Noon’ is legal. With or without nuclear bomb mockups, nuclear missions are practiced in this maneuver. Is it a threat against Russia and her ‘allies’? According to the ICJ 1996 Advisory Opinion it is. The ‘sharing’ governments may claim it isn’t. By principle a valid statement could be obtained from the ICC following an accusation from a state which might see itself as threatened, as a member of the Russian-led “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO): Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. But these states are not members of the Rome statute, with the exception of Tajikistan. This country, however, is located more than 2,000 km from the nearest NATO area (eastern Turkey), so technically it is out of range of US ‘nuclear sharing’.

Notes:

1 Robert Forsyth, Why Trident?, Nottingham 2020: Spokesman, ISBN 978-0-8512-4890-5.

2 Nuclear Sharing: the facts, END Info Issue 22, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/ENDINFO22.pdf

3 Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Hogsta, Changing Europe’s Calculations - Treaty on the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, The Spokesman No. 147, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, ISBN 978-0-8512-4895-0.

4 Richard Falk, Challenging Nuclearism, The Spokesman No. 147, see above.

5 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung R II 3, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03 Humanitäres

Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, August 2006, DSK SF009320187,

www.bits.de/public/documents/taschenkarte03-2006.pdf

Remembering and shaping the future: for a policy of common security

by Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

From END Info 23 available here

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More and more people have the feeling that we are living in a time of escalating confrontation and even the possibility of a great war again presents itself. Uncertainty shapes our daily life more and more. The statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that their ‘Doomsday Clock’ remains at ‘100 seconds to Midnight’, is a concise expression of these dangers threatening us all, especially - in the long term - the climate disaster, and directly the 14,000 nuclear weapons on earth.

Is there an alternative that a social and political majority - nationally and internationally – will support? An alternative that helps to ensure survival and ensure a better life? A strategy that combines historical experiences with answers to current challenges? As Willy Brandt, among others, put it: “Peace is not everything, but everything is nothing without peace”!

The political alternative is a policy of “common security” – a policy that is conservative and revolutionary at the same time. Conservative because it does not aim to change the social systems and political orders of the individual countries; it accepts socialism and capitalism, or whatever the rulers characterize their system. It recognizes the variants of an authoritarian, liberal and welfare state-regulated capitalism as well as a democratic or authoritarian constitution of non-capitalist states as systems that exist and which can only be legitimately changed only from within. In this way, it creates the prerequisites for peaceful competition between these systems in the first place.

It is revolutionary because it excludes war as the continuation of ‘politics by other means’, because it no longer allows this murderous method of ‘conflict resolution’, which has cost hundreds of millions of deaths over millennia and has raised the question of the very existence of humanity for more than 60 years. In other words, it raises humanity and the planet to a new level of coexistence based on elementary humanism.

The policy of common security can bring us closer to one of the great aims of humanity: a world without war!

Almost 40 years ago, common security was formulated as a concept in Olaf Palme’s report Common Security a Blueprint for Survival, written by an international group of experts. Next year it is to be updated with the participation of the International Peace Bureau and International TUC.

What are the basic principles of this still current concept?

- In the atomic age, security cannot be created by an individual state or in opposition to other states, but only together and in partnership

- War is no longer a political tool in the atomic age; all conflicts and controversies must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation. Violent changes of borders, the appropriation of territory are excluded and state sovereignty and supranational unions remain untouched.

- Cooperation is the basis for peaceful coexistence, this must develop in steps and includes the development of trust. Cooperation encompasses all levels: economy, ecology, science, culture, sport. Consultations at all levels and joint crisis responses are part of this.

- Human rights are respected and their realization is repeatedly urged in negotiations and discussions - from all sides and in relation to all human rights: civic and social. However, human rights are not a fighting instrument in interstate disputes in order to label the other as “bad guys”.

- Armaments limitation and disarmament are indispensable. This always includes small first steps to demilitarization, equalization of troops and other confidence-building measures such as contacts between the military. Openness and verifiability of measures are essential. In the long term, exclusive military alliances like NATO should either be demilitarized into existing inclusive networks and completely redesigned (like the OSCE in Europe) or dissolved.

If the policy of common security was originally a Euro-Atlantic concept, it is now a global one and precisely for this reason it must be regionalized more intensively.

Very specific concepts are necessary for common security strategies for different regions of the world, not only for Europe.

The détente policy of the 21st century is unthinkable - this is also a further development compared to approaches from the 70s and 80s of the last century - without the peace movement as one of the large, cross-border social movements and without an international civil society. They are the engine for a new policy of détente, drive these developments forward and secure them against crises through comprehensive diplomacy from below.

The basic idea of the Palme Report is very simple: My safety is only guaranteed if the safety of my counterpart is also guaranteed. There is only security if it is reciprocal.

Disarmament - also a lesson from the 1970s and 1980s - is the indispensable “materialization” of détente policy. That is why disarmament is absolutely crucial. It could be decisively advanced through unilateral calculated steps, especially by those in the stronger position. In the northern hemisphere, that's NATO.

From an economy of war to an economy of peace

by Olof Palme

From END Info 23 available here

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Speaking to the Socialist International in Helsinki in 1978, Olof Palme made a passionate speech for disarmament which was re-published in European Nuclear Disarmament, Bulletin of Work in Progress, No 1, 1980. Decades on, Palme’s speech is worth considered attention as both a historical record and as a message from the past for future generations.

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At our Geneva Conference in 1976 we stressed that “the chief object of international socialism is to substitute cooperation amongst peoples for confrontation between states.” The Socialist International recognized “the purpose of detente has been achieved and maintained through the effective participation of two super-powers” but that we “nevertheless refuse to acknowledge partition of the world between two immovable and opposing blocs that produce tension and run the risk of dangerous confrontation as a permanent fact of international relations. In the existing situation, lasting security for the world cannot be achieved merely through equilibrium between the power-blocs on the basis of shared spheres of influence. Nor can it be brought about by a balance negotiated between the super-powers alone.”

We considered that “the extension of detente must lead to greater co-operation between the nations, thus progressively reducing the sources of conflict and grounds for intervention in the great powers in fields that encroach upon the sovereignty and independence of States.”

Two trends in world politics are gradually eroding our prospects for a future of peace and justice. If unchecked, they could have disastrous consequences for [humankind] already within the next decades. One is the widening gap between rich and poor nations. The other is the arms race and the climate of confrontation and apprehension it engenders.

That rich nations grow richer while poor nations become poorer is intolerable from the point of view of solidarity and justice. But it is also intolerable because of the dangers inherent in such a situation of conflicts between the poor and rich, between north and south. The widening gap between rich and poor nations will inevitably lead to increased tensions between states and ultimately become a threat to world peace.

The arms race has now reached such levels that it is getting out of control. Intellectually one can perhaps afford the argument that there is no direct evidence of the relationship between armaments and the risks of war. In the nuclear age, complacency based on such a hypothesis becomes too risky a proposition. If the nuclear arms race continues unabated it might well become what Herbert York has called a “race to oblivion".

At the root of this gigantic arms race is the mutual distrust which has prevailed for quite a long time and which prevails between both superpowers and the nations committed to each. The policy of detente has partly dispelled this suspiciousness. When in this respect we speak of detente, it important to keep in mind that we are talking about relations between nations with vastly different social systems. Distrust among these nations can be further decreased or dispelled mainly in one way: through a dialogue, by broadening contacts, by cooperation in all possible areas. The greatest possible reciprocal openness is the only means we have at our disposal.

The conference for security and cooperation in Europe has laid an important foundation for continued efforts in this respect. Today there is a well-oiled apparatus for conferences and consultations. This should provide an incentive for all the parties of the International to go on working in this field. One of the parties of the Socialist International - the SPD - has, through its foreign policy, laid some of the most important cornerstones for a policy of detente. This entails an obligation, not only for the SPD, but for all of us who are affected by European security.

If we have a strength in this regard, it is in our ideas. We feel this strength. Only those who are weak and uncertain are reluctant to engage in discussion with those who have different views and ideas. A multitude of contacts among the various nations and peoples of Europe should be the next stage in the policy of detente. The dialogue should be elaborated into a many-facetted chorus. In this way, information and opinions can be exchanged and ideas tested against one another. This could lead to a further lessening of distrust. In the wake of this phasing out of distrust there is going to flow mutual confidence that national security can be created and maintained in ways far less financially detrimental and eternally deadly than the methods which prevail today in the military systems of all countries. We have to widen the concept of national security. A broad offensive to inject new life into all the elements of the policy of detente is thus the first point I would like to designate as basic to the disarmament efforts of the future.

My second point concerns the question of whether the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race and the related strategic weapons systems in general, are relevant, if the objective is to safe-guard national security. Alva Myrdal has maintained the theory, in her comprehensive work on disarmament, that the arms race is really just a consequence of a gigantic miscalculation. Developments in recent years have obviously confirmed this theory. The military expenditures in the world were estimated in 1977 to have amounted to close to 400 billion dollars. This means more than a billion dollars each day. These enormous expenditures stand in no kind of proportion to the increased security which they are intended to buy. In point of fact, they increase the threat to people’s security in all countries. The arms race is also intolerable because it represents a tremendous waste of human, material and technological resources for destructive instead of constructive purposes ...

But even if today we are facing a quantitative arms race of tremendous proportions, perhaps the qualitative arming is even more perilous. It seems there is no limit at all to what military research and development can cost. New weapons see the light of day, not because they are needed in any sense of the word, but because it is possible to develop and produce them. And if there is no strategy for their employment, then such a strategy is invented ...

Nuclear disarmament remains the most important objective. It is obvious that the two major nuclear weapons states, the Soviet Union and the United States, will have to take the lead in this disarmament process. That the powers have been able to achieve agreement on limitations of their nuclear arsenals must be regarded as an important victory for statesmanship and rationality. On the other hand, they have not been able to agree on any genuine measures of disarmament, and they have not been able to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty, long overdue. They have given solemn pledges to the world community to reach real results in their talks in nuclear disarmament. Impatience in the world community is growing, not least in view of the fact that other nations have been queuing up to acquire nuclear weapons and the chimerical status and security that go with these weapons.

As my third point, I would like to take up a special aspect of the nuclear arms race. The vast nuclear weapons arsenals on the European Continent pose a threat not only to their possessors and the countries allied with them. They pose a threat, as well, to all the peoples of Europe. All the ideas and every initiative which can remove or decrease these threats are to be welcomed. A former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén, once presented the thought to the United Nations of a nuclear-free club some 15 years ago. This thought has continually been revised in various forms ever since, in international discussions.

In Europe there are no immediate or acute threats of conflicts of a military nature. But the disagreements between the great power blocs still cast their shadows across Europe. No tangible progress in the disarmament talks has been achieved during recent years. This is disturbing.

Thus Europe is no special zone where peace can be taken for granted. In actual fact, it is the centre of the arms race. Granted, the general assumption seems to be that any potential military conflict between the superpowers is going to start someplace other than in Europe. But even if that were to be the case, we would have to count on one or the other party - in an effort to gain supremacy - trying to open a front in our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal has recently pointed out, a war can simply be transported here, even though actual causes for war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre of war. Here there have been great military forces for a long time. Here there are programmed weapons all ready for action …

Today more than ever there is, in my opinion, every reason to go on working for a nuclear-free zone. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be a nuclear-free Europe. The geographical area closest at hand would naturally be Northern and Central Europe. If these areas could be freed from the nuclear weapons stationed there today, the risk of total annihilation in case of a military conflict would be reduced.

This would make it possible to fully exploit the international agencies to prevent, postpone and ameliorate the effects of a conflict. It would improve the possibility to prevent a nuclear war being started by mistake.

Here I would like, as a fourth point, to remind you of the negotiations which have been going on since 1973 in the Austrian capital on arms limitations in Europe. The risk that a conflict will be transmitted to our continent would be reduced if the weapons arsenals of Europe could be radically reduced. During the five years that these talks have been going in Vienna, however, no positive results have been achieved, so far. Instead, the negotiations seem to have more nearly been paralyzed. There has been no lack of concrete proposals but the paralysis is of political nature ...

This brings me to my fifth point. I firmly believe that it is imperative to start a process of disarmament for development, a process of redeploying the resources spent on armaments to civilian purposes. Two trends which threaten peace - the arms race and the growing disparities between rich and poor in the world - could be transformed into one process that would enhance the possibilities of peace.

The human, material, technological and financial resources spent on armaments constitute on immense potential reserve for development purposes, for a new international economic order.

The changes in the flow of resources which we are working to achieve - away from military expenditures over to constructive appropriations for development - present a challenge to our common sense and an incentive for radical initiatives in all countries. It is essential to talk over the various kinds of adjustment problems which can arise in the industrialized countries as well, when resources for research and development and for production are switched over from military to civilian ends. The structure of the arms industry should be investigated and an alternative use of military-industrial technology for civilian purposes promoted, in an effort to contribute toward a continued economic development which can be used to satisfy social needs. Studies of the economic and other consequences of such a changeover can facilitate disarmament talks …

Both at the international and national level we have to make the general public aware of the magnitude of the resources that are now devoted to armaments and the tremendous potential for development these resources represent.

Trade unions can play an important role in a process of disarmament. One of the greatest obstacles is the widespread misconception that disarmament. will lead to unemployment and a lower standard of living. I would like to stress here that the labour unions have a decisive role in working out plans for change in the employment structure and to make such a change acceptable to their members.

My emphasis on the need to inform and mobilize public opinion derives from my faith in the principles of democracy and in the sound judgment and reason of ordinary people. I believe that the vital issues of our time can be grasped by anybody who is in the possession of the basic facts. People need not be defenceless victims of technological progress. And I believe in particular that public opinion will react very strongly once it has been made aware of the contrast between the needs of the poor and the waste of resources represented by the arms race.

A strong and informed public opinion is also necessary in order to turn the tide. It is essential to underpin and strengthen political will in the effort to initiate the process of disarmament and development. It is now time to switch over from a world economy based on the threat of war to one dedicated to peaceful social construction and social needs, - in a word, from an economy of war to an economy of peace.

To establish peace in today's world is first and foremost a question of creating a just social order for all the world’s people. The responsibility for failing to economize the world’s resources lie with the rich countries who spend colossal resources on military weapons. It is these countries who must create an economy of peace. The change has to begin there. The change has to begin now.

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The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has an extensive archive of materials from the END initiatives of the 1980s. Get in touch to find out more.

Persistent objectors

by Tom Unterrainer

From END Info 23 available here

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END Info 22 (Feb 2021) reported on a recent report from Chatham House, ‘NATO and the TPNW’ (page 5). This report is, available online, is worth closer examination in one particular regard: the matter of ‘persistent objectors’. The report states as follows:

While it is a general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states, it is also an accepted principle that a rule set forth in a treaty could, under certain conditions, become binding on a third state as a customary rule ... However, this is not an automatic process. Two distinct concepts are relevant here: the concept of so-called ‘specially affected states’, and that of ‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ has explained, a lack of consent from specially affected states may have the effect of preventing the required general state practice from emerging, preventing the rule from coming into being in the first place. There is a strong argument that states with nuclear weapons and those in a nuclear alliance would be specially affected by a proposed ban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence - so-called persistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

What does all this mean and what does it explain? It seems that the hope that the TPNW will create a decisive ‘normative shift’ in international law with respect to nuclear weapons is in question. What Steven Hill1 points out in his Chatham House report is that if a state or alliance of states persistently raise their objections to a treaty, then they can - in the terms set out in international law - prevent such a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ or binding on states which have not signed up to the treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ in those states which have ratified the treaty, ‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a more general application of the treaty provisions.2

How to address this potential barrier? How to react to the ongoing insistence of the nuclear-powers that their possession of instruments of mass murder is in any way legitimate?

An important step is to understand that the TPNW will not steadily accrue widespread legal status through the ongoing workings and mechanisms of international law. The ‘persistent objections’ of the US, UK, NATO and whoever else must be met with organisation and mobilisation of great legions of persistent objectors on the streets, in the conference rooms, inside political parties and social movement organisations. We must continue to find creative and imaginative means to apply the concrete lessons of the TPNW, to mount sharp arguments against ‘nuclearism’, to sound the alarm about the manifold dangers presented by such weapons and the geopolitical strategies of their possessors.

There is much work to do.

Notes:

1 Hill, Steven (2021) ‘Nato and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Chatham House, London accessed at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

2 See Falk, Richard (2021) ‘Challenging Nuclearism’ in The Spokesman 147: Challenging Nuclearism, Spokesman, Nottingham for an extended discussion on this a related point

Call for action: For a nuclear weapon free Europe

The world stands at a crossroads. It is time for Europe to make strategic choices in facing existential threats. For two consecutive years, the Bulletin for Atomic Scientist have placed the Doomsday Clock at 100 seconds to midnight. Never has this symbolic clock been closer to a possible nuclear and climate nightmare. Nuclear weapon states are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. The US wants to deploy new B61-12 nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

From END Info 23 available here

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The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that we must work together to overcome the two existential threats of the 21st century: nuclear war and global warming. Increased military expenditure reduces investment in social infrastructure, while extensive military exercises and operations create major carbon emissions, driving us closer to extinction in more ways than one.

For years the people of Europe have expressed their desire to be nuclear-weapon-free by calling for the removal of US nuclear weapons. Now they are pushing for their governments to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). According to recent online surveys in 6 countries, between 77% and 89% of the population want their countries to join the TPNW.

We must work together in the light of an understanding that all lives on the planet are interwoven, rethink what we mean by protection, redefine ideas of defence and develop towards a ‘common security’. A nuclear weapon free Europe would be the most important step in the transition to a civil and shared security, abandoning the road of continuous militarisation.

We call on all citizens to organize against our possible extinction and to fight for a just, green and peaceful Europe, free of nuclear weapons, with security for all provided through other means. The situation is urgent. As the risks of nuclear confrontation spread from Europe, through Russia, the Middle East, China and the Korean peninsula, Europe must take a stand.

We appeal to everyone in Europe to act and to take part in a European month of action - September 2021. We ask social organisations, trade unions, environmental, youth and woman’s movements, north-south and political organizations, people of all faiths and persuasions to join, endorse, promote and support the appeal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.

We call on European governments to:

- stop spending valuable resources on new nuclear weapons and their deployment

- end nuclear sharing

- sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

10 reasons why increasing the number of warheads is wrong

by Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

From END Info 23 available here

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1. The UK is one of three official Depositaries for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to administrative duties, UK is required to set high standards of conformity. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development & Foreign Policy appears to be in breach of the letter of the NPT and definitely in breach of the spirit.

2. One 100kt Trident warhead is sufficient to physically destroy hundreds of thousands of people along with the infrastructure of a small State. It would also inflict generations of radiation effects on all its neighbours. The previous limit of 180 warheads was sufficient to kill millions of people and cause such devastation as would lead to a nuclear winter and extinction of multiple lifeforms. An additional 80 achieves no more than doubling up on this and ensuring any surviving life forms are extinguished

3. It may be that the Government envisages using low yield (5 - 10kt) warheads against chemical and biological threats - even from NPT signatories. While these may be slightly less than Hiroshima’s blast and radiation effects – still being experienced 75 years later – their use could well trigger a nuclear exchange between third parties whose effects would be totally disproportionate to the reason for using them and replicate delivery of several 100kt warheads.

4. The threat of use of nuclear weapons in the past has not prevented non-nuclear warfare e.g. Korea and Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that it would deter cyber or chemical/biological attacks or any other form of non-nuclear warfare.

5. The increase in warheads undermines the UK commitment to Article VI of the NPT and so significantly weakens the Treaty, i.e. ‘The haves can have more with impunity but not you’ is not a good message.

6. The implication that UK may use nuclear weapons to counter non-nuclear attacks may encourage non-nuclear weapon States to provide themselves with nuclear weapons to have similar enhanced protection.

7. The ‘Global Reach’ military ambitions of the recent Integrated Review exceeds the capability available, even after implementing its recommendations, because of the extreme cost of nuclear weapons.

8. Nuclear weapons are a very blunt Cold War era instrument entirely inappropriate for nuanced reaction to say Russian incursions in the Baltic or China in the Pacific. Neither country would seriously consider that UK would actually launch a nuclear attack against them and so would proceed knowing we lacked the conventional force to oppose.

9. UK professes to be a ‘rules based’ society. The targets at which a nuclear warhead could be lawfully fired and arguably be compliant with current international laws are limited to mid ocean or uninhabited desert - provided there is no prevailing wind.

10. The US Biden administration is contemplating reducing nuclear weapons and to be used on a ‘sole use’ and not first use basis i.e. only to deter/retaliate to a nuclear weapon attack. The UK policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ which, by denying nothing, embraces all, will conflict with the US. The risk is that technical/political support for UK Trident might be withdrawn. The US is so deeply embedded in UK Trident, from supply of missiles, warheads, targeting procedures and the launch system, that it has the means to render UK Trident inoperable if it so wishes.

Letter of protest

The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs sent the following letter to UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, in response to the warhead announcement.

From END Info 23 available here

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In its integrated review of the national defense and foreign policy for the next 10 years published on March 16, the U.K. government announced that it would increase the cap of its nuclear warheads from the current 180 to 260.

With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on January 22, to develop, test, produce, possess, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons have all become illegal. The recent decision of your government runs counter to this global trend. On behalf of the only A-bombed nation, we strongly protest against, and urge you to retract the decision.

The 10th NPT Review Conference will be convened on August 2. What is required to do in the current world is to cooperate in tackling such imminent problems facing the humanity as COVID-19, climate change, wealth gap and poverty, human rights suppression and genderrelated issues. To that end, the implementation of the previously agreed commitments is called for, including “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (2000) and “to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (2010). The five nuclear weapon states, including the U.K., should be held most accountable for their implementation.

According to an opinion poll in the U.K., almost 60% of the public supports the government signing up to the TPNW. You must respond to the voice of the majority of your people in good faith.

Warhead Alert!

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated the following letter in response to the UK government’s warhead announcement. The letter was sent to Josep Borrel, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European Union External Action Service; Marjolijn Van Deelen, Head of Disarmament Policy at EEAS; David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament and to other politicians engaged in EU foreign policy. We will publish any responses in future.

From END Info 23 available here

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18/03/2021

Dear ....,

If 180 warheads are sufficient to cause a world-ending nuclear winter and achieve the worst nightmare that any environmentalist could ever imagine, why would the UK need 260? The answer is to persuade the US not to delay or postpone the joint W93 warhead programme on which the UK’s ‘independent’ Trident missile submarines are totally dependent. The artificial justification is a thinly veiled suggestion that China - whose policy for nuclear weapons is significantly less aggressive than UK’s - might pose a nuclear threat. The UK’s expanding nuclear warhead programme undermines the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a time when the European Union and others are urging renewed compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. We repudiate this regressive move by the UK and urge proper compliance with the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Yours sincerely,

Signatories:

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) 2nd in Command Polaris submarine, commanded two other submarines and the Commanding Officer’s Qualifying Course

Commander Rob Green Former nuclear-armed aircraft bombardier-navigator

Denis Halliday Former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ireland

Julie Ward MEP 2014-2020, UK

Marian Pallister Chair, Pax Christi Scotland

Jeremy Lester Clerk (Chair) Quaker Council for European Affairs & Chair, Saferworld Europe

Ludo De Brabander Vrede vzw, Belgium

Reiner Braun Executive Director, International Peace Bureau, Germany

Colin Archer Secretary-General, International Peace Bureau (retired)

Professor Stuart Holland University of Coimbra, Portugal

Professor Steven Rose Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience, Open University, UK

Professor Andreas Bieler School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Axel Ruppert Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Brussels Office

Carol Turner Co-Chair Labour CND

Earl Turcotte Chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Canada

Tony Simpson & Tom Unterrainer Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Rae Street & Pat Sanchez Rochdale and Littleborough Peace Group, UK

TJ Milburn Chair, Exeter CND, UK

Christine Bousfield UK

Christopher Butler UK

Ulla Grant UK

Ian Hewitt UK

Till Geiger UK

Brian Winters USA

UK warhead announcement: Immoral, Illogical, Illegal

“We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons” claims the British Government in their ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’: Global Britain in a competitive age. It is unclear quite how this sentiment fits with a renewed commitment to Britain’s nuclear weapon system and the announcement that the overall ceiling on nuclear warheads is to be increased: “the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

From END Info 23 available here

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If the empty pledge on disarmament and the alleged imperative of Britain retaining a nuclear capability came as no surprise, the announcement that the long-established intent to reduce the overall number of warheads was to be dispensed with sent a shockwave across the planet. A further shocking element of the report comes in the following passage: “we reserve the right to review this assurance [that the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT state parties] if the future threat of ... emerging technologies ... makes it necessary.”

Immoral

The British public, like the vast majority of the world’s population, opposes nuclear weapons. Repeated polling has not registered majority support for UK nuclear weapons, and a recent survey found that 77% of the population agreed that all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

The British government is massively out-of-step with the population on this question, yet unknown billions of pounds have been pledged to manufacture instruments of mass-murder just days after nurses were subjected to what, in effect, amounts to a pay cut.

The current British government is a serial rule-breaker and the scrapping of intent to reduce the overall number of warheads fits into this pattern of conduct. Far from providing increased ‘security’ the British decision to not only retain nuclear weapons but to increase the number of warheads can only increase tensions and generate greater risks.

Illogical

At the time of the announcement, the British government made no effort to justify its decision beyond general statements about “adversaries”, “threats to stability” and the “evolving security environment”. In subsequent interviews the Secretary of Defence, Ben Wallace, claimed that an increased number of warheads was a response to alleged changes to Russian missile defence. When questioned, Mr Wallace could not explain how 260 rather than a smaller number of warheads would make a difference.

As the Russian government has pointed out, the British decision comes weeks after agreement was reached between the US and Russia to extend New START for a further five years: an agreement that will reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. How does the British decision fit with the global trends? What does the US, on which Britain is dependent for the vast majority of its nuclear capability, make of the announcement?

Could the failure to adequately explain the need for more warheads be linked to the fact that there is no good reason? Or could it be that the real story behind this decision is being deliberately withheld? How does Britain’s lobbying of the US Congress over the W-93 warhead fit into the picture? Might Britain be planning to increase the number of Trident submarines on ‘Continuous At Sea’ patrol, which might make it necessary to have more warheads?

Does the shift in nuclear posture embodied in “reserve the right to review” and in the direction of travel detailed in the wider report suggest a potential ‘war fighting’ nuclear posture, rather than an alleged ‘deterrence’ posture? Might Britain need more warheads if such warheads are to be ‘useable’?

The basic lack of transparency on nuclear questions and the illogical stance offered by the government generates large numbers of questions, all of which demand closer examination.

Illegal

Britain is not only a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands ‘effective measures’ to end the ‘arms race’ (Article VI) but it is one of three ‘Official Depositories’ of the NPT. This status demands exemplary conduct and action from such states.

The decision to increase the number of warheads appears to be in breach of Article VI and Britain’s status and could, therefore, be illegal under international law. It will be left to international lawyers and the other parties to the NPT to decide whether or not this is technically the case, and it should be noted that several NPT signatories are already in breach. Whatever the material legal status, Britain’s decision will clearly act against the interests of non-proliferation and will surely induce other states - both nuclear armed and non-nuclear - to assess their own positions.