The TPNW and the V2 Rocket

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came into force 90 days after the 50th of 193 UN member states had ratified it. As part of international humanitarian martial law, the treaty prohibits its participating states from any activity related to nuclear weapons. Following a request from the US government, the German government stayed away from the negotiations on the treaty and has so far refused to sign it.

There is a fundamental historic connection between the TPNW projecting the end of the nuclear weapons age, and – hardly noted – its roots at the Baltic seaside village of Peenemünde (Germany), the ‘birth place’ of the V2 ballistic rocket of World War II. There, in 1937, a new Army Research Institute had been established with the task of creating a long-range artillery rocket named A4. This was a new development, namely the official repeal of international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907 – with the German Reich as a member state – which forbade the bombardment of undefended residential areas. When German warplanes bombed southern England in World War I from 1917, the victorious Allied powers then rightly demanded that those who carried them out be extradited as war criminals. With its firing range of 300 km, the A4 rocket was an innovation as an artillery weapon. But due to its kilometer-wide hit spread, it was obviously militarily useless and could only be used for terrorizing the civilian population, i.e. for war crimes, not criminal misconduct by individuals, but for the first time as an official state program. This fact led to the later propagandistic renaming of A4 as V2, ‘V’ standing for Vergeltungswaffe meaning retaliation weapon. The V2 rocket (as with its twin, the V1 cruise missile) was only used against residential areas, mainly in England.

In World War II, the bombing of cities was perfected, initially by Germany, but then increased by Great Britain and the USA. A new aspect was the total destruction of cities by the large- area fire storm, with thousands of dead and injured, initially achieved with incendiary and high-explosive bombs, then in 1945 for the first time with nuclear bombs. ‘Humanitarian law’ seemed to have been forgotten.

Initially, the US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. An immense arms industry had grown up there during the war. After 1945 it continued unabated, with the nuclear sector as an additional business area. Military budgets increased year-on-year. The air force, the navy and – in the end – the army competed for the allocation of funds. The Soviet Union under Stalin, which had been a war ally shortly before, served as a new enemy because the old enemy Hitler had been defeated. In 1947 the US Air Force first planned nuclear attacks against Moscow and other Soviet cities. War crimes had become the core of military strategy.

Stalin countered this with his own development of nuclear weapons. With the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the USA lost its monopoly. A nuclear arms race began. The Soviet military, without air bases on American soil, relied on the replication and further development of the V2 missile as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons, with the aim of a nuclear ICBM. At the same time, the US strengthened its air force and its global airbases. It was not until years later that they too succeeded with the ICBM, also a further development of the V2.

The nuclear explosive yields were increased on both sides in the 1950s. From the range of thousands of tons of conventional explosives (TNT) – as in the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – they rose to millions of tons. Such a bomb would have been able to completely destroy a metropolis like Moscow or New York, with death tolls in the millions. More and more nuclear-armed rockets and missiles replaced the manned nuclear bombers.

Generations since then grew up with the basic uncertainty that a nuclear war could wipe out all higher life forms on earth. Governments, democratic or not, advocated the belief that victory in nuclear war is impossible, so it would never happen. At the end of the 1970s, the number of nuclear warheads had reached an irrational peak of over 40,000, with over 95% in the arsenals of the USA and the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the humanitarian international law of war spoke up again in 1977, in the form of an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949: Indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that cannot distinguish between civilians and the military, became prohibited. This is especially true for nuclear weapons. But their owner states refused to recognize this, and their entourage followed.

By 1980, advances in electronics had drastically reduced the hit spread of long-range weapons, down to several meters, regardless of the firing range. This was a sensational innovation: every shot was a direct hit. It made it possible for the first time to reliably hit and destroy deep underground command bunkers with nuclear bombs. Unlike in the vast United States, the Soviet command structure was (and the Russian one now is) locally concentrated in the greater Moscow area. A surprise attack, known as a decapitation strike, by a salvo of a few dozen rockets from Western Europe seemed technically possible. It was about a so-called medium range of about 2,000 km firing range, with ballistic flight times of about 10 minutes. For the attacked victim, this would be too short for a reliable assessment of the situation, let alone for commanding the type and scope of a counter-strike. So victory in nuclear war seemed possible.

The corresponding new US Pershing-2 missiles were deployed in West Germany – and nowhere else – from 1983. Open and unprotected in mobile forest positions in the Federal Republic of Germany, the missiles, being the most important targets, in the event of a Soviet attack would have been destroyed within minutes. Obviously they were only good for a surprising first strike: “Use them or lose them”.

The Soviet side countered this US deployment in Central Europe with new short-range SS- 23 nuclear missiles in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with a flight time of only 5 minutes. A nuclear duel was armed, with the full risk of destruction of Central Europe. Electronic warning systems watched each other. A computer failure could have started a ‘limited nuclear war’. In 1987 the US-Soviet treaty to ban land-based medium-range missiles (INF treaty) eliminated this danger. In 1991 the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia as the legal successor and the heir to Soviet nuclear weapons.

The majority of states in the world were less and less willing to accept the threat to their existence from the nine nuclear-weapon states, including the USA in the lead, followed by Russia. In 1996 the UN Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the threat and use of nuclear weapons to be contrary to international law. The nuclear weapon states did not care. But in 2017 122 of the 193 states in the UN finally voted for a treaty (TPNW) that outlawed all activities related to nuclear weapons, including possession. As mentioned, this treaty has now entered into force, but only for those states that have ratified it. At that time there were 51 states, including Austria and Ireland. All nuclear weapon states and their entourage – including Germany – had stayed away from the UN negotiations. So far, the German government has refused to, against the will of the majority of its citizens. US nuclear weapons are still stored on German soil. With a German signature on the TPNW contract, that would be over.

The US military-industrial complex costs ten times more than the Russian one every year. Nevertheless, Russia is keeping up with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, at the same absurd level of over 5,000 warheads, with the corresponding costs. That is difficult to understand, because the new US competitor, China, is declaredly not participating in the nuclear arms race. China considers its 20 times smaller number of warheads – around 300 – to be sufficient against the USA. Why doesn’t Russia do the same?

The nuclear duel of the 1980s is now returning to Central Europe. Since 1999 NATO has been advancing to Russia’s borders. In 2019, US President Trump quit the 1987 INF treaty banning land-based medium-range weapons. Since then, the US military has been procuring precisely such new long-range missiles in non-defensible hypersonic technology on a large scale, with ranges of at least 2,000 km, i.e. from Germany deep into Russia. The focus is on the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon of the US Army and the Conventional Prompt Strike missile of the US Navy. The US nuclear weapons laboratory Sandia is developing the model of a precise hypersonic warhead common to the Army and Navy. So how credible is the claim that the warhead will only be equipped with non-nuclear weapons? Is a decapitation strike against Moscow being considered again? The new US missiles should be ready for use from 2023.

From then on, the nuclear duel will probably be armed again.

In 2018 the American government published a new Nuclear Posture Review, with an emphasis on “low yield” (less than 20 kilotons, comparable to the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). The US Defender Europe maneuver, the largest in 25 years, began in early 2020. It moved through Germany and Poland towards the Russian border. The corona pandemic stopped this marching earlier than planned. In another maneuver in August 2020, American B- 52 nuclear bombers flew over the non-NATO member Ukraine. A US naval base has been in operation in Ukraine on the Black Sea since 2017 (Ochakiv). All of this may be viewed as protecting Western Europe or as a preparation by the United States for war in Europe.

Russia reacted promptly to President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 by deploying SS-26 (Iskander-M) nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave. This area around the former German city of Königsberg in East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II. The small area is now sandwiched between the NATO states Poland and Lithuania. Why are the missiles not in the safety of the Russian heartland? Obviously because of the shorter flight time. A look at the map reveals what the rockets in Kaliningrad should be aiming at: The concentration of US military bases in West Germany around 1,000 km away, with a focus on Ramstein, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Bitburg, ballistic flight time from Kaliningrad around 7 minutes. The neighboring NATO states France, Denmark and the Czech Republic do not allow US military bases, as of course the neutral states Austria and Switzerland.

In order to destroy the deep underground US command bunkers, nuclear ground explosions at least “low yield” are required, because even the largest conventional bombs are too weak for this. In 2020, the Russian government published a new directive for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be read as a warning to Germany. In the German public, these facts have received little attention.

The SS-26 missile weighs 4.6 tons, with a 0.7 ton conventional warhead. The associated range is given as 500 km. A nuclear “low yield” explosive device weighs only a few tens of kilograms. A firing range of 1,000 km should therefore be possible from Kaliningrad – with the SS-26 or another type of missile from the Russian arsenal.

Will the American anti-missile system SM-3, which will be deployed near Slupsk (Poland) in the near future, be able to intercept rockets on the way from Kaliningrad to West Germany? No, this is not technically feasible, especially if the rockets maneuver only slightly during the flight.

At this point, Peenemünde comes into view as a symbolic place: Kaliningrad is located at the end of the former Baltic Sea test range for V2 rockets from Peenemünde to the east. It seems like an irony of history that over seven decades later Germany is threatened from there by nuclear missiles of a basically similar design to the V2, and not because of the German military, but on someone else’s account: namely because of the US Forces bases in the western part of the country.

The German signature under the TPNW, following the example of neighboring Austria, would end this threat. Not only will the 20 or so US nuclear airdrop bombs then have to be withdrawn from the Büchel airfield (Eifel): the US Armed Forces do not differentiate between conventional and nuclear components. With the German signature under the TPNW, the presence or transit of such conventional-nuclear forces on or over German territory would be prohibited in the future. This applies equally to the French and British military, because these two NATO states also maintain nuclear weapons. Incidentally, by the 2-plus-4 treaty of 1990 the area of the former (East-) German Democratic Republic has been declared a nuclear weapons free zone.

In the “heyday” of Peenemünde in the 1930s and early 1940s, there was still a general mood throughout Europe that a large state could not do without military defense. Today hardly anyone will deny that the densely populated Germany can no longer be defended militarily, not only in view of the state of the art of weapon technology, but especially in view of the highly centralized public supplies and, effective as “bomb amplifiers”, nuclear power stations and large chemical plants as well as the lack of any civil defense. Across all political forces in Germany today there has to be assumed accordance on one point: Under no circumstances any war weapon effects in Germany – by whomever, hostile or allied. Without the protection of the TPNW, however, this would not be achievable in Germany’s geographic location.

Peenemünde, located in what is now a holiday area, is home of a well visited technical-historical museum. The missile trail that once moved towards and which today might emanate from Kaliningrad presents meritorious occasion to make the restoration of humanitarian international law by the TPNW a public exhibition topic, precisely at the place where in 1937, as a worldwide precedent, the state organized dismantling of international martial law had begun.

Federal elections will take place in Germany in autumn 2021. The Green Party, which emerged in 1980 as a result of the wide public resistance against nuclear armament, is considered to be the likely coalition partner of the next German government. Will signing the TPNW be a non-negotiable coalition condition? Or will the temptation of ministerial posts be stronger than any principle?

Nuclear sharing: the facts

NATO isn’t particularly shy about stating the basic facts about its role with regards to nuclear weapons.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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The ‘NATO Nuclear Deterrence’ fact sheet, available on NATOs website, states the following:

Three NATO members - the United States, France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear weapons.

The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.

NATO’s nuclear deterrence also relies on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies. A number of European NATO members have dual-capable aircraft dedicated to the delivery of these US nuclear weapons. The United States maintains full custody of these weapons at all times. These “nuclear-sharing arrangements” predate and are fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [emphasis added]

From characterising the combined nuclear forces of the US, UK and France as ‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence’ to confirming that supposedly non-nuclear armed states can ‘deliver’ - in the euphemism favoured by advocated of nuclear weapons - NATO is proud to confirm the basic extent of its ability to wipe life from the surface of the planet.

What NATO is less keen to reveal are the locations and extent of the US nuclear weapons in Europe. So where are they, how many of them are there, why are they there and what risks to they present to local populations and to Europe as a whole?

Where and how many?

The location of these US weapons has been an ‘open secret’ for some time. More recently, NATO itself revealed the locations after accidentally posting a report on its website. Here’s a run-down:

Netherlands: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in The Netherlands at the Volkel airbase.

Belgium: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in Belgium at the Kleine Brogel airbase. Belgium is also home to NATOs HQ.

Germany: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored at the Buchel airbase in Germany. Germany is also home to a large number of US armed forces.

Italy: Around 70 nuclear bombs are stored at the Aviano and Ghedi-Torre airbases in Italy. Some of these bombs were previously stored at RAF Lakenheath in the UK prior to their withdrawal in 2008.

Turkey: It is estimated that 50 nuclear bombs are stored at the Incirlick airbase in Turkey.

Total: up to 180.

Why are they here?

Dates and extent of deployment varies, but the presence of these weapons in Europe can be thought of in two ways: first, as a ‘hangover’ from the ‘Cold War’ and second, as a demonstration of the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons to NATO’s overall strategy for Europe and neighbouring regions.

In the case of Germany, it has been suggested that ‘nuclear sharing’ was initiated after threats from the German government to pursue their own nuclear weapon developments. The location of US nuclear bombs in Turkey is a clear consequence of the strategic importance placed on the region to the south of that country.

The presence of US nuclear bombs in Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy is clear demonstration that these states are closely tied into the US/NATO military alliance.

What are the risks?

Many people feel that the presence of such weapons creates a ‘target’ of potential aggressors. Moreover, nuclear material - in whatever form - is never ‘risk free’. The dangers of malfunction in an atomic weapons are all the more pronounced. This is why a growing number of people demand an end to ‘nuclear sharing’ and the removal of these bombs.

Such a move would be an important first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone across the whole of Europe.

NATO 2030: United for a new era

By Rae Street

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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NATO recently commissioned a report on the future of NATO from ten experts appointed by the Secretary- General, Jens Stoltenberg. It opens with congratulations to themselves, as according to the authors, NATO is the ‘most successful alliance in history’. I guess it depends on how you define ‘success’. Provoking conflict by expansion? Not short on arrogance, the report claims that it is ‘indispensable’ with its ‘peace ensuring role’ in a world of ‘competing great powers’. Throughout the document there are references to ‘shared principles among the democratic institutions of the Atlantic community’. You might ask yourself about these shared values which include say from the USA positioning military bases in almost every country on the globe or looking to develop weapons in space or internally still in many states carrying out the death penalty.

The report identifies 13 challenges and threats of which top of the list are Russia and China. The whole report is steeped in Cold War thinking. Russia is a ‘declining power’ by ‘economic and social measures’ but it takes an aggressive stance and is ‘the main threat facing NATO in this decade’. An even bigger threat is China which poses ‘important challenges to our security’. There is also a need to ‘assess Russia and China cooperation’. While in no way being apologists for the regimes in Russia and China, talking up the military threats will not lead to stability in the world. The world this report says is characterised by ‘authoritarian states seeking to expand power and influence’. At the same time NATO is looking itself to further expansion: to bring in Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia into the alliance. It continues to make agreements with countries around the Pacific and Indian Ocean to face out China. The UK’s part in this will be to send an aircraft carrier to the Asia Pacific this spring, while the USA is increasing its military presence in the region. The US Trident nuclear armed fleet (Trident is ‘integrated’ into NATO) is now mainly based at Bangor on the west coast of the USA, having moved from the east coast, with China in its sites. There is also mention of the threat from the ‘South’. But nowhere is it made clear what this vague mention of the ’South’ means. Is that a reference to asylum seekers? It was NATO which was involved in wars against Libya, Afghanistan, in Iraq and Syria from where people now flee.

Even more chilling is the report on future of its nuclear forces. It proposes strengthening its forces in Europe on its eastern flank., providing them with ‘adequate nuclear capabilities, suitable for the situation created with the end of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces’. What is omitted is that it was the USA under President Trump which tore up the Treaty. In other words, the ten experts have asked the USA to speed up the deployment in Europe not only of the new B6-12 nuclear bombs, but also new medium-range nuclear missiles, similar to the 1980s Euromissiles.

The experts also want in future to ‘continue and revitalize nuclear sharing agreements’, which allowed non-nuclear countries – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey – to be ready for the use of nuclear weapons under US command. This has always been against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but as with all the other contradiction is the report, the experts claim they are committed to the NPT. The NPT states that the nuclear armed states should disarm in ‘good faith’. There is no good faith in NATO. Moreover, NATO blocked its member states from joining the negotiations for the UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which came into force on 22nd January thus making nuclear weapons illegal under international law. NATO cares not a jot for that – they claim it is not international law.

In the report there is a section entitled, Women, Peace and Security. But its idea of including women is to increase more women in the military exercises and operations. It ignores other aspects of the UNSC resolution 1325 which proposed more women in decision making on conflict, on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace building. But then it is a military alliance which is not going to be genuinely concerned with conflict resolution even though at the end of the report there is a brief reference to solving conflicts peacefully. There is also a reference in the report to climate change. In future NATO wants to adopt ‘green technologies’. Yet another contradiction in terms. Surely expanding its military hardware, building new planes can only increase carbon emissions?

Last, but not least, there has never been a NATO report which didn’t demand more money from member states. The report is no exception. It is essential that all allies maintain their commitment, made in 2014, to increase their military spending to at least 2% of GDP by 2024. There is no acknowledgement of the fact that increasingly people round the world are looking to decrease military funding and redirecting the money to health, social welfare and the climate change emergency. More and more people can see that the replacement of Trident, costing the people of the UK £205 billion, can do nothing against the threat of the corona virus. But, of course, NATO would want more money as behind it stands the military industrial complex. War is good business. Member states should pay up to enjoy what the report calls ‘the benefits of being under the NATO umbrella’. That ‘umbrella’ is not a benefit to the world, but a grave danger.

First published in the Morning Star

Is 'No First Strike' on the cards?

According to several reports, Joe Biden has assembled a new ‘national security team’ that looks set to ‘review decades of military doctrine.’

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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Amongst the issues on the table is that of ‘No First Strike’. Current nuclear doctrine repudiates the idea that the US should never initiate nuclear war: the US ‘reserves the right’ to launch a nuclear onslaught whenever it chooses to do so. Evidence that ‘No First Strike’ is being seriously considered comes from the fact that numerous figures from the Trump administration and other critics of arms control have come out in opposition to it.

According to a report in Politico, Biden’s new team includes a number of individuals with connections to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an arm of the ‘Council for a Viable World’ which aims to “reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.” If true and if this team can seriously push for wide-ranging changes to US nuclear policy, then the peace movements should encourage them all the way.

Likewise, the peace movements in Europe should use this opportunity to raise questions about ‘No First Strike’. In the UK, for example, there is some reticence in the Ministry of Defence and government to openly talk about nuclear posture. Like the US, the UK ‘reserves the right’ to launch nuclear weapons whenever it sees fit. This fact is ‘news’ to some politicians who have never considered the realities of Britain’s nuclear weapons. If Biden’s team is able to push through a thorough discussion of ‘No First Strike’ or even write it into US nuclear doctrine, then some significant pressure should be raised in the UK for its government to follow suit. Regardless of the progress or otherwise of US deliberations, there should be a thorough exposure of the UK’s nuclear posture, its dangers, limits and contradictions. Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) has made an invaluable contribution to such efforts in his book, Why Trident? (Spokesman, 2020).

It is overwhelmingly likely that those ‘reformers’ in the new security administration will meet massive challenges and obstacles to progress, despite whatever support they enjoy from the President himself. The political interests of those at the heart of the military establishment are deeply entrenched and unlikely to be defeated without a protracted struggle. Meanwhile, even raising the question of ‘No First Strike’ is a positive step.

NATO and the TPNW

A recent report from Chatham House titled ‘NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ has been released which warns NATO allies that “the TPNW is here to stay” and that “a focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament”

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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There’s quite a bit to unpick from these two statements but it is most likely unnecessary to spend too much time pointing out the severe problem with suggesting that NATO is committed to global nuclear disarmament. More interesting is the fact that the TPNW has been recognised as a problem for NATO and the suggestion that it should stop publicly opposing it for fear of exposing itself.

The report rehearses NATO’s public objections to the TPNW which amount to: claims that it undermines the NPT; TPNW’s obvious “incompatibility with existing NATO commitments”; “work with partner counties” and the spectre of “potential secondary effects on NATO”.

These concerns are reflected not only in the repeated efforts of NATO member states, headed by the US, to pressure non-nuclear states against signing, ratifying or otherwise engaging with the TPNW but in the rather ‘undiplomatic’ refusal of the vast majority of NATO member states to engage in any way, shape or form with the multilateral processes that have taken the Treaty to this point.

The report concludes that “Now that NATO has made its position on the TPNW clear, it is important not to overemphasize the issue in its overall messaging on support for disarmament. On NATO’s side, more nuance would be helpful as the Alliance seeks to maintain a modern deterrence posture and demonstrate tangible support for nuclear disarmament.”

There is clearly a gaping hole in the logic of this statement, unless you appreciate that what NATO means by ‘nuclear disarmament’ is that ‘everyone else should disarm apart from us.’ Such an argument can only confirm what the peace movements have long argued: NATO is a ‘Nuclear Armed Alliance’ and will continue to be one for as long as the nuclear powers maintain their aggressive military posture.

'France must take responsibility'

Bouzid Boufrioua, a senior milliary official in Algeria, has called on France to take responsibility for the extensive nuclear waste left in the Sahara following nuclear tests in the 1960s.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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following nuclear tests in the 1960s. He said that: “sixty years after its nuclear tests, France still refuses to reveal the location of its nuclear waste and fully compensate the victims of disease caused by radiation ... On 7 July 2017, 122 member states of the UN General Assembly ratified a new treaty to ban nuclear weapons ... [The treaty] clearly and explicitly recognises the ‘polluter pays’ principle; this is the first time that the international community has called on the nuclear-armed states to rectify the errors of the past.”

Boufrioua is quite right and his words highlight an important aspect of the TPNW: that even though nuclear-armed states have refused to engage with it, let alone sign or ratify it, the treaty itself brings some important points into international law.

Article 7, point 6 of the TPNW states: “Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected State Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.”

A big question will be how can the ‘polluter pays’ principle embodied in the TPNW be put into effect? The precise answer to this is a matter for international lawyers, but a non-expert reading of this clause would suggest that it only pertains to those states which have signed the TPNW. However, this should not be a discouragement to the peace movement. Is it possible to construct a set of precise and targeted demands based on this clause? Can those state parties to the TPNW like Austria and Ireland, who - like France - are also members of the European Union find a means to raise these issues in the European Parliament and European Commission? They should certainly be encouraged to.

France is not the only nuclear power which must be made to take responsibility. The British Nuclear Test Veterans Association continues to campaign for restitution for the British nuclear test veterans who took part in the British and American nuclear tests at the Montebello Islands, Christmas Island, Malden Island and Maralinga & Emu Field, South Australia. Local communities, who were often simply ignored by the nuclear testing countries, their environment and lives were also victim to tests.

For example, Operation Grapple was a set of four British nuclear weapons test series of early atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs carried out in 1957 and 1958 at Malden Island and Kiritimati (Christmas Island) in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the Pacific Ocean (modern Kiribati) as part of the British hydrogen bomb programme. Nine nuclear explosions were initiated, culminating in the United Kingdom becoming the third recognised possessor of thermonuclear weapons and the restoration of the nuclear Special Relationship with the United States with the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement.

For a place at the ‘nuclear table’, Britain - like France - staged explosive nuclear tests without sufficient regard for the longer-term impact. The nuclear powers must all take responsibility.

Atomic Scientists: It's still 100 seconds to midnight

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has maintained the ‘Doomsday Clock’ at 100 seconds to midnight.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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There had been some expectation that the removal of Donald Trump from his White House office would be sufficient to move the hands of the clock away from midnight. This was not to be. Citing multiple factors ranging from the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic to the accelerating climate catastrophe to explain their decision, the Atomic Scientists also raised the following warning about the danger of nuclear weapons:

‘Accelerating nuclear programs in multiple countries moved the world into less stable and manageable territory last year. Development of hypersonic glide vehicles, ballistic missile defenses, and weapons-delivery systems that can flexibly use conventional or nuclear warheads may raise the probability of miscalculation in times of tension. Events like the deadly assault earlier this month on the US Capitol renewed legitimate concerns about national leaders who have sole control of the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear nations, however, have ignored or undermined practical and available diplomatic and security tools for managing nuclear risks. By our estimation, the potential for the world to stumble into nuclear war—an ever-present danger over the last 75 years—increased in 2020. An extremely dangerous global failure to address existential threats—what we called “the new abnormal” in 2019—tightened its grip in the nuclear realm in the past year, increasing the likelihood of catastrophe.’

Speedy moves by Biden’s White House to reengage with certain diplomatic and non-aggressive means to bolster nuclear security must be welcomed and may well contribute to a de-escalation of risk. However, if such instances do not develop into an overall policy of establishing greater nuclear security then an opportunity to make the world a safer place will be missed. With respect to developments in weapons technology, the Atomic Scientists warned:

‘In the past year, countries with nuclear weapons continued to spend vast sums on nuclear modernization programs, even as they allowed proven risk-reduction achievements in arms control and diplomacy to wither or die. Nuclear weapons and weapons-delivery platforms capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads continued to proliferate, while destabilizing “advances” in the space and cyber realms, in hypersonic missiles, and in missile defenses continued.’

If speedy measures are not taken to halt the growing arms-race - if the hypersonic missiles, new warheads and military deployments are not reversed - then every diplomatic effort will be a sticking plaster rather than a cure.

The combination of measures is essential because of what the Atomic Scientists identify as a ‘threat multiplier’: “the continuing corruption of the information ecosphere on which democracy and public decision-making depend.” END Info and writers for The Spokesman have described the configuration of risks as being a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move - one misunderstanding or misapprehension - could spell disaster for human life. This threat multiplier doesn’t just exist within states but between states. This is why positive moves in one respect must be met with positive moves across the board. In their ‘wake-up call’, the Atomic Scientists argue that the following steps should be taken to save humanity from existential ruin:

* The US and Russian presidents should, upon extension of New START, launch follow-on talks for more ambitious and comprehensive limits of nuclear weapons and delivery systems ...

* US President Joe Biden can show leadership by reducing US reliance on nuclear weapons via limits on their roles, missions, and platforms, and by decreasing budgets accordingly. The United States should declare its commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and persuade allies and rivals to agree that no-first-use is a step toward security and stability.

These will be essential and, as importantly, achievable steps to massively reduce nuclear risks. One thing missing from this list of requests is for the nuclear armed states to constructively engage with the process now underway thanks to the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

New START extended

Biden must now reverse Trump’s ‘Bonfire of Treaties’

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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The agreed extension of New START, which places limits on the numbers of both US and Russian intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, is a very welcome development. Does it mark a new phase in nuclear agreements? If so, why is this important?

Under the Trump administration, a whole series of treaties and agreements went up in flames: a ‘Bonfire of Treaties’. This was massively destabilising in the context of increased nuclear tensions generally, an aggressive and unpredictable US military posture and a global shift in power away from US dominance. US actions can be understood as an attempt to maintain and extend ‘power’ by a risky effort to both re-write the ‘rules’ from a time when it enjoyed unrivalled influence and to ‘discipline’ strategic rivals into conformity. Without doubt, this was a very risky course, one which generated a ‘global tinderbox’ in international affairs.

As a consequence the ‘Iran Deal’ (JCPOA), which allowed Iran some relief from threat, and the Intermediate-range Forces Treaty (INF), which prevented the deployment of a whole class of nuclear missiles in Europe, were destroyed along with a series of other important agreements. Now that the new Biden administration has accepted Russia’s offer of a five year extension to New START, immediate steps must be taken to revive the JCPOA and INF Treaty as a means of reducing tensions.

The agreed extension of New START offers some hope, but official announcements from the US State Department strike a worrying tone. “President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring the U.S. leadership on arms control and nonproliferation” announced Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State. Blinken’s statement reads as if New START was purely a means to reduce the numbers of Russian intercontinental missiles rather than a joint agreement to limit both US and Russian missiles in this classification. A bit of clarity on this point would suggest at least a bit of honesty. Blinken continues: “President Biden has made clear that the New START Treaty extension is only the beginning of our efforts to address 21st century security challenges. The United States will use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons. We will also pursue arms control to reduce the dangers from China’s modern and growing arsenal. The United States is committed to effective arms control that enhances stability, transparency and predictability while reducing the risks of costly, dangerous arms races.” [emphasis added]

It’s noticeable that Blinken says nothing about the US’s dangerous nuclear weapons or the need to reverse their ‘internal proliferation’ and ‘lack of control’. ‘Why is America getting a new $100 billion nuclear weapon?’ asks Elisabeth Eaves in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (8 Feb 21). The Russians and Chinese may well be asking the same question. “America is building a new weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear missile the length of a bowling lane. It will be able to travel some 6,000 miles, carrying a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It will be able to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single shot. The US Air Force plans to order more than 600 of them” writes Eaves.

The extension of New START is undeniably for the good. Resurrecting the JCPOA, INF and similar agreements and treaties would make the world a safer place. Biden should work towards this goal. But if Biden’s aim is to simply re-engineer a ‘nuclear order’ that punishes and restrains ‘strategic competitors’ on the one hand and ‘aspiring nuclear powers’ on the other whilst the US continues to plough billions of dollars into ever-more destructive nuclear weapons capabilities, then the world will become a more dangerous place.

If Biden fails to engage in serious diplomacy with Russia and China and instead continues to talk up the risks posed by both states, then what course will Russia and China take? In particular, if Biden continues on the ‘New Cold War’ route with respect to China, then what does he expect will happen? Russia and China will meet like-for-like and continue to develop their nuclear capabilities. Others, not yet nuclear powers, may well pursue their own route to ‘nuclear security’. The world cannot afford the risks that would come with such a course of action.

UK military spending: preparing for ‘future wars’, fuelling the arms race

On Thursday 19 November 2020 the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, addressed the House of Commons to provide an update on the work of the ‘Integrated Review’ into defence, security, foreign and diplomatic work.

Mr Johnson’s update was preceded by widespread media reports of significant new spending on the UK’s armed forces: a total of £16.5bn, which amounts to a real terms increase above previously declared spending of £7bn by 2024-25. This is an enormous amount of money to dedicate to weapons of death and destruction at a time when the health, care and social systems of the UK are in crisis and when poverty, hunger and misery stalk the land after ten years of government imposed austerity.

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This spending commitment comes before the conclusion of the ‘Integrated Review’ which is due in early 2021 and which may well include further increases in spending.

Just as worrying as this mis-use of money is the political tone struck by the Prime Minister in his statement, which is laced with science fiction- like talk of artificial intelligence, drones, “directed energy weapons”, “inexhaustible lasers”, cyber war and the rest.

Each and every one of these references to putting new technologies to war signals an intensification of risk.

Peace and anti-war activists have been alert to these risks for some time. As the editorial of The Spokesman 141 - Global Tinderbox argued:

“Between 2002 and 2016, the top 100 weapons manufacturers and ‘military service’ companies logged 38% growth in global sales. In 2016, these sales – excluding Chinese companies – amounted to $375 billion, turning $60 billion profit. Between 1998 and 2011, the Pentagon’s budget grew in real terms by 91% while defence industry profits quadrupled.

In the 1970s, investment in the ‘information technology’ sector stood at $17 billion. By 2017, investment in this sector exceeded $700 billion. In the same year, Apple’s market capitalisation stood at $730 billion, Google stood at $581 billion, and Microsoft stood at $497 billion. Meanwhile, Exxon Mobile – the highest placed ‘industrial’ company – had a market capitalisation of $344 billion. By comparison, the arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin had a capitalisation of around $321 billion and Rolls-Royce $21 billion at the end of 2017.

Whilst the United States and other countries continue to purchase – and use – vast quantities of ‘conventional’ weaponry, the extraordinary figures quoted above occurred alongside the unleashing of a ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, powered by significant leaps in capability in computing, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, ‘autonomous’ vehicles and the rest. Ever greater sums are being spent on military and policing applications of the ‘fruits’ of this ‘Revolution’. So much so, that the sociologist William I. Robinson identifies a trend towards what he terms ‘militarised accumulation’ as a ‘major source of state-organised profit-making’.

If this trend endures – as it surely will, unless arrested by concerted political action – then not only will ‘battlefields’ of the future look like a science fiction dystopia, but the processes that presently blur the lines between ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime’ will surely accelerate. At what point will a large-scale computer hacking operation spill over into a ‘hot’ war? How much surveillance, how many drones, how many robotic weapons can be deployed before critical mass is reached? How many things must go wrong – and in what sequence – before these embodiments of what Mike Cooley terms our ‘delinquent genius’ might bring an end to us all?

There is already a technological ‘arms race’ and with each new drone, autonomous field gun, hack or military satellite, this race intensifies. Any such intensification will drastically increase the risks of wide-scale military confrontation, including the prospect of nuclear war.

How should such risks be addressed? An important step is to understand the scope of the problem and the present realities of how these technologies have already been deployed ...

The alarm has been sounded, but what are we to do? How can society ensure that artificial intelligence, for example, is put to work for human good, rather than making war? How to harness the miracles of robotic technology to improve, rather than destroy, our planet? How can we guarantee that nanotechnology and biotechnology are put to work for the preservation and not the eradication of life? In answering these questions, we should utilise the work already under way to develop ideas about socially useful production and defence diversification. These are just some of the very pressing questions we now must face.”

Compare these warnings to the contents of Mr Johnson’s update:

“... For decades, British Governments have trimmed and cheese-pared our defence budget. If we go on like this, we risk waking up to discover that our armed forces — the pride of Britain — have fallen below the minimum threshold of viability, and, once lost, they can never be regained. That outcome would not only be craven; it would jeopardise the security of the British people, amounting to a dereliction of duty for any Prime Minister.

... Based on our assessment of the international situation and our foreign policy goals, I have decided that the era of cutting our defence budget must end, and it ends now. I am increasing defence spending by £24.1 billion over the next four years.

... I have done this in the teeth of the pandemic, amid every other demand on our resources, because the defence of the realm and the safety of the British people must come first.

... Everything we do in this country — every job, every business, even how we shop and what we eat—depends on a basic minimum of global security, with a web of feed pipes, of oxygen pipes, that must be kept open: shipping lanes, a functioning internet, safe air corridors, reliable undersea cables, and tranquillity in distant straits.

... But extending British influence requires a once-in-a-generation modernisation of our armed forces, and now is the right time to press ahead, because emerging technologies, visible on the horizon, will make the returns from defence investment infinitely greater. We have a chance to break free from the vicious circle whereby we ordered ever decreasing numbers of ever more expensive items of military hardware, squandering billions along the way. The latest advances will multiply the fighting power of every warship, aircraft and infantry unit many times over, and the prizes will go to the swiftest and most agile nations, not necessarily the biggest. We can achieve as much as British ingenuity and expertise allow.

We will need to act speedily to remove or reduce less relevant capabilities. This will allow our new investment to be focused on the technologies that will revolutionise warfare, forging our military assets into a single network designed to overcome the enemy. A soldier in hostile territory will be alerted to a distant ambush by sensors on satellites or drones, instantly transmitting a warning, using artificial intelligence to devise the optimal response and offering an array of options, from summoning an airstrike to ordering a swarm attack by drones, or paralysing the enemy with cyber-weapons. New advances will surmount the old limits of logistics. Our warships and combat vehicles will carry “directed energy weapons”, destroying targets with inexhaustible lasers. For them, the phrase “out of ammunition” will become redundant.

Nations are racing to master this new doctrine of warfare, and our investment is designed to place Britain among the winners.

The returns will go far beyond our armed forces, and from aerospace to autonomous vehicles, these technologies have a vast array of civilian applications, opening up new vistas of economic progress, creating 10,000 jobs every year — 40,000 in total—levelling up across our country, and reinforcing our Union. We are going to use our extra defence spending to restore Britain’s position as the foremost naval power in Europe, taking forward our plans for eight Type 26 and five Type 31 frigates, and support ships to supply our carriers.

... We will reshape our Army for the age of networked warfare, allowing better equipped soldiers to deploy more quickly, and strengthening the ability of our special forces to operate covertly against our most sophisticated adversaries.

The security and intelligence agencies will continue to protect us around the clock from terrorism and new and evolving threats. We will invest another £1.5 billion in military research and development, designed to master the new technologies of warfare. We will establish a new centre dedicated to artificial intelligence, and a new RAF space command, launching British satellites and our first rocket from Scotland in 2022. I can announce that we have established a National Cyber Force, combining our intelligence agencies and service personnel, which is already operating in cyberspace against terrorism, organised crime and hostile state activity. And the RAF will receive a new fighter system, harnessing artificial intelligence and drone technology to defeat any adversary in air-to-air combat.”

* * *

‘Opposition’ parties welcomed the spending commitments and the voices of concern were thin on the ground. There were certainly no speeches warning of the dangers of accelerating the introduction of new technology into weapon systems, no concerns expressed about allowing ‘artificial intelligence’ to determine targets and weapon choice, no calls to consider the impact of further blurring the lines between war and peace.

Russia’s 2020 Nuclear Directive

Joachim Wernicke

In June 2020 the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new directive titled Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The document mentions Russia’s allies: members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO) founded in 2002. CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

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The central concern of the directive is to address the “risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence”, such as: the “build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters.”

One example of this: NATO troops and equipment including nuclear weapon carriers concentrated in countries bordering Russia or Belarus. Not surprisingly, these adversary countries are seen as nuclear targets by Russia.

Expressly mentioned are the “adjacent waters”, meaning the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. Not surprisingly, the Russians are expecting US Navy units to appear in these waters with ships that can launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles. No distinction is made between conventional and nuclear warheads of such weapons. Other concerns include:

“Deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;

- development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space.”

These points obviously refer to Romania and Poland which permit US bases which house missile defence systems. The latter point hints to Germany which is about to home an entirely new “NATO Space Center” at the US air base at Ramstein, one year after the US military established its “Space Force” as a separate military branch.

“Possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;

- uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;

- deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.”

These points evidently refer to the three nuclear weapons states in NATO (USA, Great Britain and France). But also the non-nuclear-weapon states Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey are included, due to their participation in US nuclear sharing: These five states keep special airplanes as nuclear delivery means, prepared and exercising for the dropping of US nuclear bombs. Thus they physically become – even if only temporary – possessors of nuclear weapons, in violation of their obligations from membership in the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1970. This violation can be understood as an illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly these ‘non-nuclear-weapon states’ fulfil the criterion to be Russian nuclear targets, particularly if they should move their nuclear bomber aircraft nearer to the Russian or Belarus border.

“The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation”. Nuclear deterrence comes under the “centralization of governmental control” over nuclear forces. This is a matter of course in all nuclear weapon states. Here it is nevertheless explicitly mentioned as an obvious message to the USA: There is one Russian command structure in and around Moscow – stay away from any attempt of a decapitation strike! This singularity is a specific vulnerability of the traditionally centralized Russian administration. In the more ‘decentralized’ USA the nuclear command structure is geographically distributed, so a decapitation strike against the USA cannot be successful, due to largely different flight times of any missiles fired from outside continental USA.

The conditions under which Russian nuclear weapons can be used include, as can be expected:

- “use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”, meaning a reaction. But then there is a crucial new point: Russian nuclear weapon use can also be triggered by

- “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the

Russian Federation and/or its allies”.

Thus for Russia to now use nuclear weapons evidence of a launch is not required, but rather the “arrival of data on a launch” – implicitly: happened or imminent launch – is sufficient. So for example a scenario: “US naval ships with intermediate-range ballistic missiles are gathering in European seas”. The term “reliable” in connection with “data” implies the possibility of technical or human error – or just the claim that such an error had occurred.

And a further possible trigger of a Russian nuclear weapons employment:

- “attack by an adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.”

In other words, as before: a decapitation strike against the central command structure, regardless of whether it is nuclear or “only” conventional. So, as expected, the decapitation strike is seen as a danger from a Russian point of view, with serious consequences.

In the case of nuclear attack by the USA, this point in the directive only makes sense if Russian nuclear weapon use occurs before the decapitation strike has taken place, i.e. as long as the central command structure still exists, thus as a pre-emptive attack. This fits with the term “arrival of reliable data” and the connected possibility of error, which might be used for justification or excuse of a limited pre-emptive Russian strike, for instance against US installations in Central Europe. Since these main installations are deep underground shelters, they cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs which are too weak – it requires nuclear precision ground explosions.

A successful decapitation strike requires a surprise attack which in turn requires intermediate- range ballistic missiles, since only they have sufficiently short flight times of some minutes, leaving no time for an organized reaction by the victim of the attack. Any concern about the civilian population is outside the concerns of nuclear target planners. Since – different from the Cold War era – hardly any European NATO state today will allow US intermediate-range missiles on its soil, the emphasis has changed towards US missile carrying ships in the European seas, as confirmed in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review which states the advantage of sea-launched missiles, that they “will not require or rely on host nation support”.

And as a further possible trigger for a Russian nuclear weapon deployment:

- “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

This is the reverse of the principle that the USA had claimed in the 1950s in the name of Western Europe: the Soviet Union would be conventionally so superior that a conventional defence against it was not possible – the Soviet Union would win. That is why the USA, as the ‘protective power’ of Western Europe, would immediately repel a Soviet attack by nuclear weapons.

Today, NATO is conventionally many times stronger than Russia, which can be seen from military expenditure alone. This irrational excess obviously is not caused by concerns about European security. Rather defence contracts and military career interests have a major role in propelling this development. For Russia it is not about the claim to protect other countries or about business and careers, but about protecting the existence of her own state system.

The entire Russian directive of 2020 can be read as a loud warning, especially to Central Europe as the prospective battlefield of a US-Russian war. Technically the only way to avoid

an assumedly impending US decapitation strike against Moscow is a pre-emptive attack against regional US command centres and missile ships.

Why was the Russian directive issued just in 2020? The focus on the Covid pandemic from early 2020 fogged up a series of alarming recent events hinting towards the increasing US-Russian nuclear tensions in Central Europe:

- The year before USA sabotaged the INF treaty of 1987 and immediately resumed testing of intermediate-range ballistic missiles which had been banned by this treaty.

- In early 2020 the largest US military maneuver in Europe for 25 years occurred (shortened by the corona pandemic).

- The US government signalled no extension of the NEW Start treaty of 2011 which is due to expire in early 2021.

- The US Navy develops shipborne intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads (which of course can be exchanged by “low-yield” nuclear warheads).

- The command centre for the US Navy Aegis destroyers armed with long-range missiles is located at Ramstein, Germany.

- Since 2019 Russia deploys short-range (500 kilometer) ballistic missiles SS-26 in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia). Thanks to US President Trump’s cancellation of the INF Treaty in 2019 Russia is again permitted to deploy also intermediate-range missiles, reaching from Kaliningrad to the US command and nuclear installations in Central Europe (about 1.000 kilometer).

- The US European command (USEUCOM), after being pushed out from France in 1966, for more than half a century was located in Stuttgart, Germany. By mid-2020 the US government decided to move it to Mons, Belgium, 300 kilometers further west. Is the Central European soil becoming too hot?

Is the USA planning to attack Russia? There is no proof for such an intent, and – besides all moral aspects – it is doubtful that the US Army as an invader of Russia would ever be able to control this country of twice the size of USA. The developing nuclear arms race is strongly driven by the military-industrial complexes, mainly in the USA, but partly in Russia too. However, there is the experience from the last three decades that the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were started by the US military with massive decapitation strikes against these countries, thus removing their leadership and command. None of these states was able to retaliate against the USA. Russia is in a different situation, having the means to damage the USA. But on top of this and given the end of the INF treaty it obtained the option to end an acute crisis to her favour by a prompt and limited nuclear strike against US outposts in Central Europe. The Russian actions probably will be guided by the subjective perception of the potential dangers.

It has to be hoped that a public opinion movement in Europe – perhaps enhanced by the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) valid from early 2021 – will lead to political measures to defuse the acute dangers as described. The most efficient way would be the nuclear-free zone across Europe.