Appeal for Peace and Disarmament

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation is pleased to support the ‘Appeal for Peace and Disarmament’ and urges others to sign and share. Click HERE for more information and to sign.

Alarmed by statements by European leaders gratuitously portraying Russia as a threat to all of Europe if it is not stopped in Ukraine, professionals from several countries have drafted a manifesto in favour of diplomatic solutions, peace and disarmament.
While we unequivocally condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we believe that these statements, including those of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, are aimed solely at ‘manufacturing consent’ among citizens around rearmament.
The accelerated rearmament they propose will certainly have a very negative impact on public services, will erode the welfare state, will increase public debt and, above all, in the absence of arms control agreements, will make war with an atomic power like Russia more likely.
We ask for your signature to tell our governments to work for peace and not for arms companies.

Reason

Alarmed by the Orwellian language that has taken hold in European political discourse—where war is seen as the path to peace, while peace is said to lead only to more war—we call for sanity.
We, the European citizens, have become involuntary passengers on a train driven by leaders who, under the declared pretext of "making Russia bleed," choose to ignore the disastrous consequences of a conflict in which we will all be losers.
On the eve of past European conflicts, such as World War I, courageous intellectuals from the warring nations—including Jean Jaurès, Romain Rolland, Bertha von Suttner, and Bertrand Russell—publicly spoke out for peace, though sadly, their voices were not heeded.
Today, the silence of intellectuals across all countries is deafening. Like the rest of European citizens, they seem worryingly anesthetized. And when someone dares to raise their voice in favour of diplomacy, they are immediately slandered as a "puppet of Putin."
We unequivocally condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a violation of international law. However, we also recognize that this tragedy is partly a consequence of the persistence of a military organization, NATO, labelled as "defensive," which, far from dissolving after the fall of the communist bloc, continued expanding right up to Russia’s borders—despite high-level promises made to Russia at the time.
The war in Ukraine has now lasted three years. The casualties on both sides far exceed one million, including the dead, wounded and permanently maimed, though neither country provides official figures.
On top of that, millions of Ukrainians have fled the country—some to Western Europe, others to Russia—all seeking to escape the violence. A true human disaster.
Donald Trump's United States, more focused on what it perceives as China's growing power and the situation in the Middle East, seems determined to exploit Ukraine while also indebting Europe, further weakening its social welfare systems for the benefit of the U.S. military industry.
And our governments, refusing to accept that, given the imbalance of forces, the war is lost, continue to support the Ukrainian president by promising more weapons and money so that the Ukrainian army can fight to the last man or woman.
All of this while they push for the rapid militarization of our nations under the spectre of an impending conflict with Russia.
Have our leaders considered that, since the arms limitation agreements signed during the Cold War—so crucial in maintaining peace—no longer exist, a military confrontation with a nuclear power like Russia could lead to a third, and this time final, world war?
We call on politicians not to forget the two great wars that bloodied the continent in the last century. Abandoning George Orwell’s newspeak, they must work actively in favour of diplomatic solutions.
It is the only way to prevent future massacres that devastate nations for the mere profit of the powerful arms industry.

ALERT: USAF Buildup at Diego Garcia

Several sources are reporting a significant buildup of USAF aircraft at Diego Garcia. As the ‘Defence One’ website indicates: “Diego Garcia has long played a crucial role in U.S. strategic bomber operations, having hosted B-52 and B-1 missions during the Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Its remote location and long runway make it a key forward operating base for long-range operations, especially when regional basing options are constrained by diplomatic or security concerns.” In a post on ‘X’ (formerly Twitter), the account @ianellisjones, shared the following graphic, indicating the deployment of six B2 Stealth ‘Spirit Bombers’ and other aircraft [read post here]:

In addition to the increased deployments at Diego Garcia, a second US Navy ‘Carrier Strike Group’ – the Carl Vinson – is en route to the Middle East where it will join the Harry Truman CSG which has taken part the recent significant attacks on Yemen.

The Middle East Eye website states that Diego Garica is the base “the US may use if it decides to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities is a speck of an island in the Indian Ocean that few associate with the Middle East but that the US has used for decades to project military power in the region” and reports the following statement from US President, Donald Trump: “My big preference - and I don't say this through strength or weakness - my big preference is, we work it out with Iran. But if we don't work it out, bad, bad things are going to happen to Iran.” The same story records the response from Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, to calls for a resumption of direct nuclear talks with the US: Iran is “firm on not engaging in direct negotiations under maximum pressure and military threats”. The US has chosen to increase pressure and raise the military threat.

After international court rulings and a public campaign for justice, the British Government finally agreed to return the Chagos Islands (which Britain calls the ‘British Indian Ocean Territory’), of which Diego Garcia is part, to Mauritius. However, part of the deal – which has not yet been finalised and is mired in controversy in several directions – allows for an initial ‘99-year lease’ of the airbase. The United States agreed a 50-year lease (with the right to extend for a further 20 years) with the British government in 1966. The exact terms of this deal, which expires in 2036, are secret.

There is every indication that the United States intends to attack Iran. There is every indication that – as in the recent past – Diego Garcia will be the launch site for any such attack. It is clear that the nuclear status of Iran (which is not a nuclear power) will be used as a pretext for any such attack. To summarise: two nuclear-armed NATO member states, both parties to the NPT, look to be colluding to prepare an attack on a non-nuclear armed state, also a party to the NPT. Meanwhile, nuclear-armed Israel – which is not a party to the NPT and which refuses to confirm its nuclear status – is carrying out a genocide on Palestine. The difference? The US and UK are “allies” of Israel.

This nuclear hypocrisy and gross double-standards should be exposed. So should the collusion, secrecy and realities of the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Britain on Diego Garcia and elsewhere. The anti-nuclear, peace and anti-war movements must urgently demand ‘Don’t Attack Iran’.

Ukraine: this war must end

From END Info 40 - download here

Tom Unterrainer

This is an edited and expanded text of a speech given to an international meeting on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hosted by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Stop the War Coalition. A recording of the meeting is available on CND’s YouTube page.

The drivers and sparks for the war in Ukraine, including the role of NATO expansion and the war that was already taking place in the Eastern part of Ukraine – including Ukraine’s shelling of Russia-speaking majority areas – have been extensively discussed. We are aware of the role of Ukraine – and the larger ‘Eurasian’ corridor – in US strategy. NATO expansion, internal conflict in Ukraine (including ‘national questions’), long-standing US aims at influence – if they can get it, disruption is they cannot – in the ‘Eurasian’ corridor and US strategy towards Asia/China are some drivers of this conflict.

We understand that tectonic shifts are taking place on a geopolitical scale and we see many consequences. The world is no longer unipolar but the US and allies are still behaving as if it is. The US and allies seem prepared to continue taking risky and potentially deadly action in an ill-fated attempt reassert themselves on a global scale. Events in Ukraine have not progressed as Washington – and Moscow, for that matter – might have hoped. The situation in very dangerous indeed.

The global peace movement is clear – as it has been for the last two years – that the war in Ukraine must end. We are clear – as we have been from the word go – that we stand with all those who oppose this war: in the UK, across the world and we stand with those in Russia and Ukraine who have taken to the streets and made a stand against this senseless slaughter.

One of Bruce Kent’s last public acts on behalf of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was to deliver a letter to the Russian embassy, demanding the release of peace protestors, demanding an end to nuclear threats and demanding an end to the war. Part of the letter reads:

The movement for peace and against war is a global movement. From London and Washington to Saint Petersburg and Moscow, those who oppose war and strive for peace take to the streets to make their voices heard. The peace movement stands squarely with all those in Russia and beyond who have protested against the invasion of Ukraine over the past days. We defend their right to do so and insist that such a right is respected.

We demand the release of political prisoners including our friend, Boris Kagarlitsky, who has been imprisoned once again for his courageous actions. We demand the same for political prisoners everywhere: be they in Moscow or - as with Julian Assange - in Belmarsh Prison in London.

This war must end. It must end because the grinding misery of death and destruction cannot be allowed to continue. It must end because the people of Ukraine have suffered much, much more than enough. It must end because we must – we must – make every effort to reduce nuclear tensions. It must end before things escalate even further.

For the last two years, the board of experts at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists have set the hands of their Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds to midnight. Midnight is a metaphor for the complete destruction of humanity. This is the closest to midnight that the clock has ever been set.

The Atomic Scientists make their determination based on a detailed survey of the deadly risks faced by the whole of humanity. These include climate catastrophe, pandemic, emerging technologies and – centrally – the risk of nuclear war.

They warn that “the war in Ukraine and the widespread and growing reliance on nuclear weapons increase the risk of nuclear escalation”.

The early weeks of Russia’s invasion saw repeated threats of nuclear use and signs of increased readiness for nuclear use. Putin’s comments explicitly shattered what is called the ‘nuclear taboo’ – the idea that leaders of nuclear states should never directly threaten to use such weapons. The fact that United States Presidents and US officials and British Prime Ministers and British official have repeatedly made similar threats in the past seems to have been forgotten by some.

Nevertheless, combined with the facts of nuclear-armed US and NATO intervention, Putin’s disgraceful nuclear threats raised widespread alarm – and rightly so. Since these initial threats, Putin seems to have put a lid on his own threats, with the former Russian Prime Minister and similar now repeating such things. Why might Putin have made these threats and why might they have stopped?

Without doubt, Putin invoked nuclear threats for the same reason that Western leaders invoke them. We’re supposed to believe that nuclear weapons function ‘silently’ as some magical deterrent system. But the myth of ‘deterrence’ was only cooked up as a public relations excuse for nuclear weapons possession. If you examine the historical record, then you will find any number of occasions when US Presidents have used nuclear weapons – not in the sense of detonation but as a means to achieve other ends. For example, in 2002 George W Bush threatened a nuclear strike on Iraq if Iraq used its ‘non-existent’ weapons of mass destruction on American troops.

By March 2022, Russian occupied just over 25% of the Ukraine. By April, this figure fell to just under 20% following a number of disastrous – for Russia, at least – military blunders. The amount of occupied territory held at around this level for a few more months, then dropped to a figure of around 15-17% by November 2022. This is not how Putin expected the war to proceed. Hence the threats.

What happened next is that billions upon billions of pounds and dollars of military equipment poured into Ukraine from the US and NATO allies. Russia may have been able to adjust some of its previous military mistakes but the drones, missiles, tanks and other armaments deployed on by Ukraine have resulted in a stale-mate.

From November 2022 to January 2024 there has been approximately zero shift in the amount of territory occupied by Russia. All the billions of armaments, all that technology, all the support have not shifted things.

So the question is this: if either Russia or Ukraine imagines it can ‘win’ a war, what will it take to ‘win’? Even more weaponry? Even more deadly weaponry? How many dead Ukrainians? How many slaughtered on the battlefield? How much more destruction? A massive – unprecedented – escalation would be needed. Why? Isn’t Russia on the brink of economic and social collapse after the massive sanctions campaign against it? Will that not sort the mess out? No. Just look at the Russian economy. Yes, some Western foodstuffs and products are not available. Yes, inflation is high. But the Russian economy and Russian imports and exports have not ground to a halt.

Sanctions such as those imposed on Russia do not work. They have not worked. Those who impose them know it, scholars who study sanctions know it, we know it.

According to a recent report from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Russia has adopted “an attrition strategy this is gradually exhausting Ukraine’s forces, draining American military stocks, and sapping the West’s political resolve.” They go on: “Sanctions have not crippled Russia’s war effort, and the West cannot fix Ukraine’s acute manpower problems absent direct intervention in the war.” Rather, for as long as this war continues Ukraine’s economic and social development will continue to stagnate to catastrophic levels. It will become more and more reliant on ‘aid’. The prospects for independence – political or economic – will diminish steadily over time.

Contrast Ukraine’s situation with Russia’s. Despite an enormous barrage of sanctions, Russia’s economy is – in fact – doing better than even the International Monetary Fund expected. Not just because it is still able to sell oil and has maintained economic relationships with enormous trading blocs such as China, but because it has been able to achieve a considerable internal economic reorganisation.

McDonald’s may have closed and Western European foodstuffs might have disappeared from the shelves, but the Russian cheese industry is thriving (to give just one example).

In a recent article re-published in Harpers magazine, the Italian journalist Marzio Mian quotes a Russian Sturgeon farmer, Sergeeva:

Sergeeva is well-travelled and known widely for her aquaculture expertise. She could get a job anywhere, it seemed to me, so why stay? “I was born here, I studied here, my husband is Russian, my son is Russian, I’m Russian,” she said. “I wouldn’t say I’m a patriot, and I don’t want to express my thoughts on Putin and the war. But I can assure you that my life hasn’t changed. Not in the least.” She blushed as she spoke, as if the subject were uncomfortable. “The Russians are reacting to the sanctions in an extraordinary way, even with a weak ruble and the inevitable inflation. The prices of essential goods have held steady. And now we’re consuming better and healthier products than before the war, even exceptional cheeses.”

As a consequence of these sanctions, the potential of non-Western dominated trade has been revealed. Sergeeva buys feed from Iran instead of the West. This is just the tip of the iceberg: similar stories emerge across the spectrum of the Russian economy. Is Ukraine’s economy and society developing in the same way? We can see the stark differences.

Much has been made of the decision to deploy Russian nuclear missiles to Belarus. Quite right too. We have warned against such a dangerous and potentially deadly proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have also been campaigning and warning against the expansion of the US nuclear bootprint across Europe. This expansion includes plans to station US nuclear bombs at Lakenheath once more and the planned deployment of new F35 jets and new US nuclear bombs at sites across Europe.

Nuclear developments in Belarus and across Europe are similar in that plans for both pre-date the war in Ukraine. Belarus concluded a constitutional referendum removing its nuclear-free status two days before Russia’s invasion. Plans for Lakenheath, new nuclear-capable jets and new nuclear bombs have been in development for many years.

What is new is the intensity of these nuclear developments – including repeated calls to station US nuclear weapons in Poland and the latest, frankly ridiculous and dangerous, calls for a ‘Eurobomb’ by some German politicians. Add to the mix the fact that trillions of dollars are to be spent on not just upgrading but completely renewing US nuclear weapons systems. Every nuclear-armed state is rearming and upgrading. A new nuclear-arms race is in full swing.

In the middle of this, we have a war that could – for all the reasons outlined here and many others – escalate dramatically. This war, the war in Ukraine must end.

The only way out is diplomacy and negotiation. But this cannot be left to the US, UK or NATO member states. In fact, they should have nothing to do with such efforts. They should stand aside. Why? Because a nuclear-armed alliance with NATOs record has no credibility. What’s more, just take a look at how the UK, for instance, has been propping up and arming Israel’s genocide on Palestine. Look at the disgraceful shambles in the British Parliament. Look at the already-alarming dynamics of the upcoming US Presidential election. These people have zero credibility. They are not just unsuited and incapable. In fact, they are complicit. We know it. The non-nuclear world knows it. The global majority knows it.

But the non-Western global majority is not a bystander. Brazil has proposed negotiations. The BRICS countries have proposed similar. Countries from Latin America, across Africa and into Asia know that the very worst must be averted. They know that diplomacy and negotiation can end this war and remove the threats of nuclear escalation. We should give them our support.

All of which puts a special responsibility on the peace movements of Europe: we must explain the risks, explain the realities and combat propaganda aimed at undermining the efforts of those genuinely committed to a settlement in Ukraine.

We must resist the expanding nuclear bootprint and demand that our governments make way for a peaceful solution to the horrors in Ukraine, Palestine and elsewhere.

'Eurobomb'? No thanks!

From END Info 40 - download here

What has prompted recent statements from prominent German political figures and others that call - to one degree or another - for the creation of a ‘Eurobomb’? Such a ‘Eurobomb’ is imagined as an ‘independent’ nuclear weapons system developed, maintained and controlled by a coalition of European states. ‘Independent’ here means ‘independent of the United States’. The idea is not a new one, of course.

NATO’s 1957 ‘strategic concept’ was explicit about the central role of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ [sic] of Europe. The 1957 concept was itself a development of US President Eisenhower’s 1953 ‘New Look’ policy. According to Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neill (Partners in deterrence, p40):

...Einsenhower’s New Look policy ... envisaged maintaining the economic viability of the Western defence effort by substituting (cheap) nuclear for (expensive) conventional forces. The [North Atlantic Council] agreed to the introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to Europe in 1953, and to a general concept of using nuclear weapons for defending allied territory ... in 1954.

From this point onwards, nuclear weapons played a central role in NATO’s concept of ‘defence’ in Europe and became central to the development of relationships within the nuclear-armed alliance. To what extent did the German government, the German public and wider European society debate and discuss the implications of this new development?

In their ‘war-gaming’ of the use of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ of Europe, how many German lives were calculated to be ‘expendable’ for such ‘defence’? How many French lives? How much death and destruction was acceptable? If the 1954 decision was discussed in detail, it was certainly not done in public.

This changed in 1955: between 20 and 28 June of that year, NATO forces conducted a ‘field training exercise’ across Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and a section of France. Named Carte Blanche, the exercise modelled the ‘defence of Europe’ from an attack by Soviet forces. The ‘defence of Europe’ was now, following the 1954 decision, to be conducted with nuclear weapons. The outcome of the exercise indicated the ‘defence of Europe’ by nuclear means would involve the killing of 1,700,000 Germans and the wounding of 3,500,000 others.

The outcome of Carte Blanche became a matter of public discussion and debate in Germany. The population was understandably interested in and alarmed at the cost of ‘defence’ by such means. Have the German and other politicians now floating the idea of a ‘Eurobomb’ encouraged and facilitated similar debate and discussion? What would be the cost of ‘defending Germany’ by such means? Or do they consider other factors to be more important than the prospect of mass-killings?

1956 and the events surrounding Suez add a further dimension to our story. Waning colonial powers, including France and fascist Portugal, were pressuring for NATO to “take a more active interest, and perhaps active policy, outside Europe” (Timothy Sale, Enduring Alliance, p32) at the end of 1955. In this context, Germany argued that: “Wherever one of us loses, all lose”. The key element that united reaction to Carte Blanche and the pressures of late 1955 was a recognition of the obvious from NATO member states: that the ‘defence’ of Europe and the interests of European NATO member-states, including their colonial and post-colonial interests, was now in the hands of the United States. The events of October 1956 demonstrated this most clearly. Not only did the US not come to the aid of Britain, France and Israel in their military action against Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal but they “insisted that the British agree to a cease-fire and present a timetable for withdrawal or Britain would be denied access to the International Monetary Fund” (ibid, p33). That is: the US threatened to bankrupt Britain for ‘stepping out of line’. Why the US is not employing such threats against the genocidal government of Israel today illustrates the levels of sincerity on display in the Security Council and elsewhere. Following Suez, the German foreign minister declared that “NATO is dead for the moment.”

What to make of this declaration? According to a senior official of the German government, who we presume represented the settled view of that government, when the US acted in its own interest to put a stop to the Suez crisis NATO was “dead for the moment”. Contrast this to the outcome of Carte Blanche, where to protect its interests in Europe the US publicly declared its willingness to have millions of Germans killed and wounded. At this point, NATO was not “dead for the moment.” The fact that Germany had no direct interest in the French, British and Israeli colonial escapade in Egypt makes this even more startling.

By this time, Britain was already in possession of atomic weapons and with Prime Minister Eden out of the way, Harold Macmillan was able to quickly repair relations with Eisenhower (who he knew well). Other European NATO member states were not in the same position. Whereas Britain and the US concluded their Mutual Defence Agreement by 1958, cementing the end of anything like a truly independent foreign and military policy for the British, other European states who were not yet atomic powers in their own right had to contend with a changing landscape.

Both Britain and the US considered large deployments of troops in Europe to be overly burdensome. Why, when the ‘defence’ of Europe involved turning Germany into a nuclear battlefield, should so many troops be stationed there? As such, in 1957 NATO’s nuclear posture underwent another significant change to a situation where “sharing of nuclear hardware became a key element of the alliances strategic posture” (Partners in deterrence, p41). ‘Sharing’ did not amount to parity between the US and those states it ‘shared’ nuclear weapons with. For instance, a US Congressional committee visit to West Germany in 1960 observed “fighter aircraft loaded with nuclear bombs sitting on the edge of runways with ... pilots inside the cockpits and starter plugs inserted. The embodiment of control was an American officer somewhere in the vicinity with a revolver.” (ibid). This example and many others emphasised the degree to which European ‘defence’ was wholly reliant on the United States.

Such a reality, combined with US opposition to independent French plans, compelled France to work closely with Israel on the development of nuclear weapons:

Israel signed a secret agreement with then NATO member France, to cooperate in a program of nuclear research that would make Israel the world’s sixth country to possess nuclear weapons. Even here there may have been an indirect, unintended helping hand from the Eisenhower administration. In 1958, the U.S. enraged Charles de Gaulle by opposing French acquisition of nuclear weapons while publicly acknowledging that a special nuclear relationship existed between the United States and Britain.

(Stephen Green, Taking Sides, p157)

The story up to this point demonstrates the degree to which all European members of NATO had convinced themselves, against all moral reasoning and logic, to fully accept nuclear doctrines as a substitute for real security and defence. The story also illustrates the degree to which adherence to such a doctrine implied overwhelming reliance on US capabilities, with little encouragement for independent action. With the entry of France, with the aid of Israel, into the nuclear club there were now prospects for ‘independent’ initiative:

Greater desire for influence over the use of nuclear weapons was also shared by West Germany, which carefully coordinated cooperation with France and Italy to develop sovereign (European) nuclear capabilities while arguing for greater influence over nuclear use decisions in NATO ...

By the 1960s, the proposal for a sea-based [Multilateral Force] of nuclear ballastic missiles became central to transatlantic debates, as the US 

... looked to a new NATO force to counter what seemed to be an increasingly close alignment between Paris and Bonn. (Partners in Deterrence)

As we have seen, initiatives towards the development of an ‘independent’ ‘Eurobomb’ first emerged in a period of uncertainty over the actual levels of US commitment to the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and at a time when questions over levels of control emerged. What was true in the 1950s and 1960s seems to correspond to current developments.

A desperate and bloody war rages on the doorstep. NATO is expanding, the US nuclear-bootprint in Europe is expanding and intensifying. Europe is re-arming and re-militarising at an astonishing rate. To all intents and purposes, it would appear that within the questionable confines of what states understand to constitute ‘security’, Europe is meeting the ‘security challenges’ posed by recent events.

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are to receive new, enhanced, US nuclear bombs. The orders for the new, nuclear-capable jets to carry them have been placed and are to be fulfilled. The United Kingdom looks sets to be home to US nuclear bombs once more. These steps surely meet the requirements for maintaining and bolstering the “ultimate guarantor of security”? So what has prompted these calls for a ‘Eurobomb’ and what does this suggest about the near future?

As in 1950s and 1960s, uncertainty around whether or not the US can or will meet its stated obligations as a NATO member in the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and questions around control of nuclear weapons have emerged. The source of this uncertainty and these concerns is threefold. First: the prospect of a second Trump White House, the record of his first administration and recent statements about NATO. Second: the fact that the current President, Joe Biden, and his administration seem unable to secure support in Congress for military aid. Third: the overwhelming signals of political instability emanating from Washington, which are linked to the first two concerns.

“NATO is dead for the moment” worried the German Foreign Minister following the Suez debacle. German, French and other foreign ministers thought the same during the first Trump administration. In a speech on 7 February 2020, French President Macron called NATO “brain dead”. Under Trump, US-NATO relations reached a nadir, with the President demanding huge commitments to military spending (now fulfilled) and a succession of bust-ups at NATO meetings. At one point, European leaders worried about “Westlessness”: how would the world cope without a unified, nuclear-armed military alliance such as NATO?

Johann Wadephul, a senior CDU (Germany) politician who now sits on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s political committee, responded to Macron’s 2020 speculations over ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear weapons with this claim: “We need to consider working with France on nuclear weapons. Germany should be ready to participate in this nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and resources.”

As the US election campaign intensifies, the fragility of ‘European defence’ will become clearer and clearer. Since the late 1950s, European states have told themselves and the world that US nuclear weapons provide the ‘ultimate guarantor’ of ‘security’ [sic]. They have convinced themselves that the nuclear-armed NATO alliance is an essential, indispensable instrument to ensure the ‘security’ of the continent. Yet time and again, these shibboleths have collided with the concerns, priorities and ambitions of individual European states and with reality itself. This is not just a matter of over-reliance on the United States and its nuclear weapons. This is about the entire concept of ‘security’ with nuclear weapons at its core.

Such weapons are not a ‘deterrence’, they are an instrument of ‘compellence’. They compel those who rely on them, like NATO member states, to align themselves with the United States and as such they are subject to the particular interests of that country. They are also subject to the turbulence currently on display in the United States elections and the outcome of this election. Nuclear weapons compel politicians of all stripes to accept the idea that the ability to unleash nuclear genocide is a reasonable foundation for ‘security’. They seek to compel others with the threat of genocide. At a time of sharp nuclear tensions, the myth of ‘nuclear based security’ compels moves towards a proliferation of nuclear capabilities when what Europe and the world needs is more robust non-proliferation and genuine moves towards abolition.

Speculation around a ‘Eurobomb’ exposes the foolishness of ‘nuclear security’.

Lakenheath: evidence and dangers mount

From ENDInfo 39

Evidence is mounting that the United States plans to station nuclear bombs in the UK once more. Documents analysed by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a US-based organisation, note plans for the construction of a “surety dormitory” at the Lakenheath airbase. According to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the FAS:

“Surety” is a term commonly used within the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to refer to the capability to keep nuclear weapons safe, secure, and under positive control.

This latest news follows information obtained by Kristensen last year, which showed the inclusion of the UK on a list of US nuclear storage sites in Europe. This list was connected to funding proposals to upgrade and improve nuclear storage facilities.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that the US intends to return nuclear bombs to Lakenheath is the stationing of two squadrons of the new F35A aircraft at the base. It has been argued that these aircraft were designed specifically to carry the a new range of nuclear bombs, the B61-12s. Why else would so many nuclear-capable aircraft be stationed at Lakenheath if not to carry nuclear bombs?

The British media has finally taken note of these developments, with national newspapers, radio and television stations reporting on developments. Not every media outlet voices opposition to these developments but a recent survey conducted by the YouGov polling agency recorded that of those questioned, a mere 7% ‘strongly support’ the plans. 16% expressed some support, whilst 20% oppose and 39% ‘strongly oppose’ the plans. This is a clear majority of those surveyed - a representative sample of the British population - opposed to returning US nuclear bombs to Lakenheath. This level of opposition should encourage further and more vigorous protest action.

What do the politicians have to say about these developments? Very little, so far. This should be surprising as the plans to date have been developed without consultation, deliberation, opportunities for dissent or opposition within Britain’s ‘democratic’ bodies. Why is this? Why, when asked, have British and US representatives uttered the same claim that they can “neither confirm nor deny”?

Part of the explanation is that what the nuclear-armed states call their ‘posture’ relies heavily on ‘keeping the enemy guessing’. Such a ‘posture’ could make sense in a game of cards but it seems particularly foolish when the ‘wrong guess’ could lead to the extermination of life on the planet.

Another part of the explanation is the existence of the 1958 UK–US Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). This agreement regulates the nuclear relationship between the UK and the US. As John Ainslie has shown (see Spokesman 153) the UK is entirely dependent upon the US for the maintenence and upgrading of nuclear weapons systems. As such, in any agreement like the MDA, it is clear who has the upper hand.

The MDA regulates and controls a whole number of factors associated with nuclear weapons technology. One of these is ‘secrecy’. Speaking of which, the MDA has undergone a number of renewal processes, the latest of which is to conclude by the end of 2024. The process by which the renewal takes place and the lack of accountability or debate in the British parliament are deeply concerning. As is the 2004 legal opinion obtained by BASIC, which argued that renewal of the treaty contravenes Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits signatories to pursuing nuclear disarmament. The MDA does the exact opposite of this: it encourages the maintenence of nuclear weapons systems.

The MDA is just one of a whole series of agreements and treaties that allow the for a close nuclear relationship between the US and UK. For how much longer will the secrets endure?

Quite predictably and as anti-nuclear campaigners have warned, Russia has interpreted the re-deployment of US nuclear bombs at Lakenheath as a threat. A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, told reporters that they view the deployment as an “escalation”. In ‘nuclear strategy’ an escalation on one side is usually met with escalation by the other side. What will Russia do? We hope that they will show restraint given the already sharpened nuclear tensions.

As we wrote in END Info 32:

Even without the massively increased nuclear tensions that have been developing over the past few years, and which have become even more acute over the past months, our opposition would be sharp.

We know that even in the most stable of times, increasing the US’s nuclear bootprint would create instability. We are not living through particularly stable times.

We know that regardless of other circumstances, a nuclear storage site and an airbase for nuclear capable bombers becomes a target for a nuclear strike. We need to make everyone aware of this risk and link it to all of the other very good reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.

We know that every new nuclear development brings with it new risks, new dangers and new threats in local, regional, national and international contexts.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has a day of action on 23rd September. See www.cnduk.org for more information.

Nuclear Responsibility

Tom Unterrainer. From ENDInfo 39

The following speech was made via Zoom to the GENSUIKIN (Japan) World Conference on 5 August 2023 to mark the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Tom was asked to update the Japanese movement on recent developments in the UK.

Greetings and warmest wishes to our friends in the Japanese peace and nuclear disarmament movement. Let me express our admiration and gratitude for the courageous and ongoing work of the Japanese movement, which conducts its international campaign from the only country to be attacked with atomic weapons. As we all know, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 are a stain on the history of humanity and serve as a reminder to us all of the deadly - murderous - power of atomic and nuclear weapons. I am humbled and honoured to be addressing you today. Together, we say ‘Hiroshima and Nagasaki: never again!”

The Preparatory Committee of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty convened in Vienna, Austria, at the start of August. In her opening address to the PrepCom, Izumi Nakamitsu - UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs - warned of an arms control regime that is crumbling and that “there is nothing to replace it.”

When something “crumbles” it breaks apart into smaller and smaller pieces. As we know, things - be they atoms, cake or international treaties - do not break apart into smaller and smaller pieces by magic. Forces are applied, deliberate actions are taken.

Just as the decision to unleash atomic destruction on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a cold, calculated and deliberate process the fact that the treaties, agreements and initiatives painstakingly constructed over decades have been steadily undermined, scrapped and sabotaged is a consequence of a cold, calculated and deliberate process.

The ‘conveyer belt’ commenced with George Bush Jnrs withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the subsequent stationing of ABM systems, and continued through to Donald Trump’s conduct and the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the ‘Iran Deal’ and similar treaties and agreements. The global system designed to control the spread of nuclear arms lies in tatters and of the two main international treaties still standing - the already-mentioned NPT and the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - there are substantial issues.

I want to focus on the part played by the United Kingdom in generating these issues but in so doing, it will be necessary to address the close military partnership with the United States - in which the UK plays a very junior role - and the workings of the nuclear-armed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In touching on these things, it will be clear that recent decisions emanating from this relationship and from NATO work to: undermine the NPT and TPNW; contribute to, rather than reducing, the acute nuclear tensions faced by the world; destabilise the Asia Pacific region.

First: news the potential return of US nuclear bombs to the UK emerged without fanfare, discussion, debate or the opportunity for dissent within Britain’s democratic institutions. When the British government was asked to account for this potential development, it gave the following non-reply: “The government is unable to comment on US spending decisions and capabilities, which are a matter for the US. It remains longstanding policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

News of the development only emerged following close examination of the 2023 US Department of Defence budget, where the UK was added to the list of countries where US nuclear storage sites were to be upgraded. This information appeared in a small footnote in the budget. The Lakenheath airbase was the place where the US Air Force previously stored nuclear gravity bombs. These were finally removed in the mid-to-late 2000s after a long campaign. Unlike the secrecy surrounding the nuclear storage facilities, news that the US was to deploy a new generation of nuclear-capable F-35 fighter bombers to the base was promoted. The new F-35s and the new generation of B61-12 nuclear bombs act as one system. The new bombs are not conventional free-fall bombs, they have accurate guidance systems, a new ‘steerable’ tail-fin and they have a ‘dialable’ nuclear payload. These are the type of bomb that military strategists and politicians refer to as ‘usable’ or ‘battlefield’ weapons. What does this development amount to if not nuclear proliferation? The US nuclear boot print in Europe is expanding and such developments undermine the NPT.

Second: the continued opposition of nuclear-armed states and states within the nuclear-armed NATO alliance to the TPNW is not just a matter of these countries expressing their continued desire to hold the threat of nuclear annihilation over the planet, but is a deliberate move to prevent the TPNW from ever becoming customary international law. These countries are “persistently objecting”, which - in international law - is a mechanism by which states not only ensure the non-applicability of a law within their own territory but which attempts to ensure that a law never achieves the status of ‘customary international law’. This deliberate undermining clearly demonstrates the actual intentions and thinking of those states - like the UK and US - which claim to uphold and defend the norms of a democratic world order. When it comes to nuclear questions, the only thing they defend is their own capacity to unleash nuclear genocide. I’m not sure that “crumbling” quite describes this dynamic!

The new alliance between the UK, US and Australia- AUKUS - clearly demonstrates the intent of two nuclear armed states to proliferate nuclear technology, thus undermining their stated commitments. The intention is to provide Australia with nuclear-powered but conventionally armed attack submarines. The nuclear reactors on board these submarines will contain weapons-grade Uranium. Under the AUKUS agreement, Australia will be responsible for processing and storing nuclear waste. Quite apart further question of who or what these submarines are supposed to attack - and the consequences of stationing such attack submarines in the region - is the fact that nuclear technology for military purposes is spreading. This is clearly not in line with the NPT let alone a commitment to a stable world order.

None of the developments mentioned can be separated from the global picture. They cannot be separated from US policy and they cannot be separated from NATO’s posture - which now extends to the Asia Pacific region, some enormous distance from the North Atlantic! These developments relate directly to the broader dynamics of European remilitarisation, already underway before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the so-called ‘tilt to Asia’ instigated by President Obama.

It is the responsibility of the international peace movements to sound the alarm and mobilise with energy, determination and creativity to halt and reverse the spiral towards disaster.

Anti-Nuclear Action

Editorial Comments, Tom Unterrainer

From ENDInfo 39

As we have reported on and argued for some time, the risk of nuclear use is posed more sharply now that at any time since the opening of the atomic age in 1945 and certainly since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. During this second event diplomacy, negotiation and the intervention of international figures such as Bertrand Russell succeeded in averting the worst possible outcome. In 2023 the Global South has spearheaded attempts to bring about a cessation of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Efforts at negotiation and diplomacy not only seem absent from the agenda of the major Western powers but, as the record shows, they have set themselves in opposition to all such efforts to date. The peace movements are working to change this.

Christopher Nolan’s film, Oppenheimer, came to the screen in this period of acute nuclear tension. Part of the films narrative relates Oppenheimer’s opposition to the development of the Hydrogen Bomb in contrast to his commitment to developing the Atomic Bomb. Nolan’s rendering of this important aspect of the story moves from interactions between Oppenheimer and Edward Teller – the major proponent of the Hydrogen Bomb – to stark contrasts between the two personalities. The scene in the film that covers the Trinity Test shows Oppenheimer ‘up close and bunkered down’ to this first detonation of an Atomic Bomb. We see him peeking through a small viewing apparatus and our ears are engulfed with the murderous rumble of the detonation. The experience is very disturbing both mentally and physically, given the volume and intensity of the sound in a cinema setting. In contrast, Teller views the detonation from a safe distance: he sits in a deckchair, sun lotion slavered over his face and dark glasses in place. The two experiences are starkly different and speak to starkly different attitudes towards what had been created. Teller dreamed of ever-greater destructive power. Oppenheimer imagined that the Atomic Bomb would open the way to peace.

In Chapter V of his Has Man a Future? (Spokesman), Bertrand Russell writes of ‘Scientists and the H-Bomb’. He notes of Oppenheimer:

When the American Government first proposed to set to work constructing the H-bomb, Oppenheimer, who had been the main agent in the construction of the A-bomb, opposed the new project. The authorities were outraged ...

There are those who may think that there was an inconsistency in being willing to make the A-bomb, but unwilling to make the H-bomb. The A-bomb was made in time of war when it was supposed (mistakenly, though with good reason) that Hitler was on the verge of discovering how to make it. The making of the H-bomb was undertaken in time of peace, when it was certain that, if the project were proceeded with, the USSR would have it about as soon as the United States, and that it could not be a means of victory to either side.

Unlike the Atomic Bomb, the Hydrogen Bomb has not been detonated in wartime (which is not the same as claiming that it has “never been used” - see Daniel Ellsberg, Spokesman 155). Oppenheimer’s opposition to the Hydrogen Bomb and the consequences of his admirable actions in this respect resonate with another scene in the film where, just before he is to meet with President Truman (the “don’t bring this cry baby in here again” scene), Oppenheimer is accosted in the hotel lobby by Leo Szilard.

Szilard conceived of the nuclear chain reaction in 1933 and assisted Einstein in writing the infamous 1939 letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt that kick-started the Manhattan Project that Oppenheimer was to run. It is worth knowing that Edward Teller was consulted on the contents of this letter. The Einstein-Szilard letter suggested the possibility of constructing an Atomic Bomb and indicated that Nazi Germany was already working on such a device. Fast-forward six years and Nazi Germany is defeated and no such bombs are in evidence. What could Szilard do but attempt to take action against the monster he helped to produce?

Szilard accosting Oppenheimer in the film only hints at the lengths that the former went to in order to prevent the use of the Atomic Bomb. Together with other ‘Atomic Scientists’, Szilard petitioned Truman to commit to not bombing Japan (see Spokesman 154). The petition was ignored. Szilard spent the remainder of his life engaged in action against nuclear weapons.

How and why Szilard and others drew different conclusions to Oppenheimer over the Atomic Bomb is a matter of psychological speculation. Whatever their differences on this question, both were haunted by the knowledge of what they unleashed with Szilard’s ­­1949 short story My Trial As A War Criminal and similar stories demonstrating the depth of feeling on the matter.

This byway into the question of ‘Anti-Nuclear Action’ might make sense – if only in a clumsy sense – by thinking about the views and actions of Teller, Oppenheimer and Szilard in the specific circumstances 1945. Might Edward Teller represent that extreme section of current opinion (and influence) that actively promotes the role of nuclear weapon developments, the threat of nuclear use and the centrality of such threats to maintaining political and military dominance?

Would the Oppenheimer of 1945 be a sensible analogy for those who recognise the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to the future of humanity but who imagine, for whatever reason or combination of reasons, that they are in some way essential for what is termed ‘security’ or as a ‘deterrent’ to an evil enemy?

Could Szilard stand for those who see the heart of the matter and who take action against nuclear weapons and attempt to make our ‘Oppenheimers’ see sense?

Or is it the case that the reality of the nuclear threat today and the world-ending consequences of a nuclear war – in contrast to the detonation of two atomic bombs – are so extreme that the examples of Teller, Oppenheimer and Szilard are inadequate for our purposes? It might be speculated that of the three, only Teller could see in 1945 the future he helped create. He steered a steady course throughout all these developments and up to his death in 2003 at the age of 95, happy – in all likelihood – with the results. Russell was certainly not a fan of Teller, with whom he appeared on a televised debate in 1960. Recalling the debate in his Autobiography, Russell writes:

I was inhibited by my intense dislike of Teller and what I felt to be disingenuous flattery. I came away from the BBC studio feeling that I had let down all those who agreed with my point of view ...

In the same way that the stark and evident risks of climate catastrophe pose existential threats, today’s sharp nuclear tensions and the consequences of nuclear use also pose existential threats of a type probably unimaginable to Oppenheimer and Szilard in 1945. In his recent work, Human Extinction: A History of the Science and Ethics of Annihilation (Routledge, 2023), Émile P. Torres charts the development of how thinkers understood the implications of the atomic bomb. He writes:

There was, in the years following WWII, almost no explicit talk of what Russell would later, in 1954, call “universal death,” i.e. total annihilation.

By 1961 Russell was writing on the ‘Long-term Conditions of Human Survival” (Has Man a Future?, Chapter XI, Spokesman). Russell argued that we cannot ‘un-invent’ nuclear weapons but that the risks of such weaponry and the ‘innovations’ that modern science make possible – such as the invention of a ‘Doomsday Machine’ that could kill all life within days – necessitates decisive political action on a world scale to put such weapons out of use: effective abolition (though he did not use this phrase). In the same way that climate activists understand the need for such global action and link their efforts at direct action to this goal, anti-nuclear activists must begin to do the same. We have no Szilard’s or Russell’s to come to our aid and only the wide-spread combination of people, groups and movements can link global concerns to local action and vice versa. ‘Anti-Nuclear Action’ should be back on our agenda.

United States: Strategic Bases in the Far East

From END Info 38 (From the archives…)

First published in tricontinental 39, Year IV, June, 1969.

On February 7, 1965, U.S. imperialism began bombing North Viet-Nam thus systematically intensifying its war of aggression in Viet-Nam. Shortly before that, on January 27, Rear Admiral Collins of the U.S. Marine Division stationed on Okinawa, in an interview with Mr. Williams, A.P. news reporter, stated:

“The war in South Viet-Nam must be ended some time. Part of the landing forces of the Marines are always in service on the sea and can be deployed in South Viet-Nam quickly; and even the whole of the 3rd Marine Division could be sent in five days if so ordered.

lf the Marines were to be sent there, they would engage in operations in the Delta zone to the south of Saigon, Saigon city, the cities of Danang and Hue in the northern province.”

(The Ryukyu Shimpo, January 28, 1965).

At the very time the “bombing of the North” was started, the Marine Corps and the Missile Hawk Battalion were sent to Danang. From that time Okinawa has been turned more and more into an advance base for the U.S. war of aggression in Viet-Nam.

Illustrating how the U.S. bases in Okinawa have been used for the war of aggression in Viet-Nam, the then High Commissioner Watson, one year after the beginning of the “bombing of the North” said:

“The U.S.A. has an interest of grave concern in Okinawa. Okinawa is still a base for the defense [read “aggression”] of Southeast Asia, as well as a key military base for the war in Viet-Nam. The military bases in Okinawa are very important for the defense of the U.S.A., Japan and other allied countries of the West Pacific. This was shown in the quick release of troops and munitions from Okinawa to Viet-Nam.”

(Testimony at the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, March 23, 1966).

Then what importance does the U.S.A. attach and what evaluation does it give to Okinawa in its Far East strategy, including the war of aggression in Viet-Nam? U.S. Army Deputy Under Secretary Holt pointed out the strategic position of Okinawa as follows: “Okinawa is situated in the center of an arc beginning from Japan, Korea in the north, to Southeast Asia through Taiwan.”

In order to make use of this strategic position for its aggression in Asia, what did the U.S.A. do with Okinawa as the keystone? In order to answer this, we must look at the series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has set up.

At the Stockholm Tribunal (May, 1967) and the Copenhagen Tribunal (November, 1967) initiated by Lord Bertrand Russell and participated in by conscientious thinkers and scientists from all over the world, the crimes committed in the war in Viet-Nam by U.S. imperialism were completely laid bare, and at the same time, the crimes of the Japanese Government as an accessory were exposed to the light of day.

A series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has concluded (and which the U.S.A. has forced Japan to join) constitute the military and political tie-up in the U.S. Far East strategy. In these pacts Okinawa is regarded as the keystone.

Following is the list of military pacts in order of signing and effectuation.

1. San Francisco “Peace” Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Signed Sept. 8, 1961. Effectuation Apr. 28, 1952

2. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the Republic of the Philippines. Signed Aug. 30, 1951. Effectuation Aug. 27, 1952

3. Peace Treaty between Japan and the “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Signed Apr. 28, 1952. Effectuation Aug. 5, 1952

4. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the “Republic of Korea”. Signed Oct. 1, 1953. Effectuation Nov. 17, 1954

5. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Signed Dec. 2, 1954. Effectuation Mar. 3, 1955.

6. Japan – “R.O.K.” Treaty. Ratified on Nov. 12, 1965 in the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet. Ratified on Doc. 11, 1965 in the House of Councilors of the Japanese Diet.

As stated, the U.S.A., through Article 3 of the San Francisco “Peace” Treaty, acquired “the right to exercise all and any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction,” which means the right to occupy Okinawa and to establish U.S. military bases there. And through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which was concluded and effectuated at the same time, the U.S.A. has acquired the right to establish U.S. military bases and station U.S. Armed Forces in mainland Japan.

An investigation team of the. U.S. House Committee on Armed Service (led by Melvin Price) studying the problem of the military use of land in Okinawa, summarized in the form of “Price Recommendation” the results of its investigation (June 13, 1956) in which it was bluntly said:

“We stay in Okinawa because Okinawa forms an inseparable part of our defense [read “aggression”] on a global scale. The fact that U.S.A. maintains bases in Japan and the Philippines as in other parts of the world depends upon the continuous existence of our friendly governments.

On the Ryukyu Islands, in accordance with our national policy of course, we can make a plan for long-term use of our advanced military bases in a chain of islands the Parties (U.S.A.) as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other (South Korea)”

[This] means the territory which the U.S.A. considers to be placed under the administrative control of the “Republic of Korea.” When viewed from all angles, such territory can mean nothing but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Accordingly, this Treaty as concluded with the view to attacking that part of Korea north of the 38th parallel, using Okinawa as the keystone.

Defense Deputy Undersecretary Bundy testified as follows, based upon the experience of this Treaty which was partially invoked.

“The value of Okinawa bases was fully proved during the Korean War and at the time of crises around the Taiwan Straits which have often been repeated.”

(May 9-10; 1962, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services).

APPLICATION SPHERE OF U.S. TAIWAN TREATY

“For the purpose of Article II and V, the terms ‘territorial’ and ‘territories’ shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction.”

(Article 6, Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China).

Clearly, Okinawa is included. What cannot be over­looked are provisions which appear next to this.

“The provisions of Article II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”

What is meant by “mutual agreement”? On December 10, 1954, a week after the Treaty was signed, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of the U.S.A. and Foreign Minister Yeh Kung Chao of the “Republic of China” exchanged the following letters:

“The Republic of China shall have inherent right for defense over all territories which are and shall be placed under her control at present and in the future.”

The “territories ... which may hereafter be under the control of its Government” can only mean the People’s Republic of China, judging from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek is using the slogan of “counter­offensive against the Continent.” And the Treaty stipulates that Chiang Kai-shek invokes the right of defense against the People’s Republic of China, this “right of defense” is nothing but a synonym for “aggression” through U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek joint operation.

APPLICATION SPHERE OF JAPAN-TAIWAN TREATY

This is not a treaty which was directly concluded by the U.S.A. As can be judged from the date of its signing and effectuation, this is a Treaty which was urged by the U.S.A. to be hurriedly concluded between th, Governments of Japan and the Chiang Kai-shek clique on the very day when the San Francisco “Peace” Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty came into force.

Already in this Treaty, the role of accomplice which is now being played by the Sato Government of Japan in the U.S. war in Viet-Nam, has appeared in a most plainspoken form. An exchange of notes from the Chiang Kai-shek Minister to the Government of Japan on the same day as its signing laid bare its aggressive character as follows:

“In regard to the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan) signed this day I have the honor to refer, on behalf of my Government to the understanding reached between us that the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China (Taiwan), be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government.”

“All the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be under the control of its Government” (The “Republic of China”) can mean nothing but the Continent of China or the People’s Republic of China as also indicated in the U.S.-Taiwan Treaty.

This Japan-Taiwan Treaty is a military pact by which the Government of Japan, which is obliged to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces of Japan in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, is also bound to launch U.S.-Japan-Taiwan joint operations in the future for armed intervention against the People’s Republic of China.

APPLICATION SPHERE OF JAPAN-R.O.K. TREATY

The series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has concluded (in this case has forced Japan to conclude) are completed with this Treaty. That is because the circle of military pacts which have been separately concluded, in which Okinawa is a military keystone, is completed with this Japan Treaty. It is in this sense that, as has often been said, the Japan-South Korea Treaty has in fact established NEATO (North East Asia Treaty Organization).

No sooner had the Japan-South Korea Treaty been concluded than the Government of Japan established its Consulate in South Korea, and dispatched a military attaché of the Self-Defense Forces. It is by now clear enough that these constitute the Armed Forces of Japan.

It is well-known that the Government of Japan, on the eve of Japanese imperialist aggression against China which developed into the Pacific War, had dispatched armed forces on the pretext of the protection of Japanese residents. And different from the pre-war situation, South Korea has been turned into a massive military base of U.S. Armed Forces. Accordingly, by the conclusion of this Japan-South Korea joint operation by which the Self-Defense forces of Japan can be sent to South Korea for an attack on that part that lies north of the 38th parallel.

The time when the ratification of this Treaty was forces through by the Government of Japan by emergency measures including introducing police forces into the Diet building, was from November to December 1965, at the same time as the U.S.A. had stepped up its war of aggression in Viet-Nam.

Taken together, these facts show that U.S. imperialism has hurriedly made a plan for launching aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is in a hurry to gain further cooperation from the Government of Japan for this purpose, while stepping up the war in Viet-Nam ever more intensively.

Thus, the stronghold for U.S. imperialist preparation for all kinds of adventurist policies, through which it is escalating the war of aggression in Viet-Nam and expanding the war into other parts of the world, is the military base of the U.S. Armed Forces in Okinawa, that is the occupation of Okinawa.

*tricontinental was published in Spanish, English and French by the Executive Secretariat of the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OPSAAAL)


Comments on China’s GSI in relation to nuclear issues

From END Info 38

Tom Unterrainer

The is an expanded version of a contribution to a recent panel on the GSI Concept Paper organised by the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU). A recording of the panel can be viewed here.

I want to focus on nuclear weapons questions as they relate to the Global Security Initiative but in so doing, it would be wrong to conceive of nuclear risks as entirely separate from the general security issues that the GSI seeks to address. I’d go further and say that eliminating the existential risks posed by the prospect of nuclear use is a central aspect of any coherent approach to security.

Priority 3 of the concept paper addresses nuclear questions and opens with a reaffirmation of the 2022 joint statement of five nuclear-armed states, China included. This statement was, of course, a reaffirmation of a similar statement by Reagan and Gorbachev in the 1980s: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

Since the January 2022 statement, rather than a reduction in nuclear risks the world is faced with the most acute set of such risks since the opening of the atomic age.

As evidence, we need look no further than the decision of the Atomic Scientists to set the hands of their ‘Doomsday Clock’ to ’90 seconds to Midnight’. This cautionary metaphor – signalling the perils we all face resulting from the combined dangers nuclear war, climate catastrophe and technological threats – has never been as close to ‘Midnight’ as it is now. The Atomic Scientists were clear about the contribution of nuclear threats, arising from the terrible events in Ukraine, to their decision.

It goes without saying that if the proposals contained in China’s GSI were to become the norm through which states and groups of states interacted on the global stage, then we would expect to see a drastic ‘winding back’ of the minute and second hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’.

But, of course, such proposals as those contained in the GSI are not a ‘new departure’ for China. If you trace the public statements of leading spokespeople from the time of China’s emergence as an atomic and nuclear power in the 1960’s, through to the 1980s – when the concept of ‘Common Security’ was promoted by progressive forces in Europe – through to the wording of the GSI, a certain continuity of thought and concern is overt.

For example, China’s test of an atomic bomb on 16 October 1964 was not accompanied by jubilant, boastful or threatening public statements. Rather, official statements and the communique issued by Premier Chou En-Lai struck a note of regret.

China’s initial statement reported: “The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. If this had been achieved, China need not have developed nuclear weapons. But our proposal was met with stubborn resistance…” The statement further made clear that: “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons”, a statement of a ‘No First Use’ policy which remains central to China’s nuclear posture to this day. Worthy of note is the fact that the US and UK, for instance, repudiate a ‘No First Use’ commitment. This statement also proposed:

“That a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference should reach agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones nor against each other.”

Chou En-Lai’s communique to world leaders, sent on the 17 October 1964, reiterated this proposal and explained that – to quote – “China’s mastering of nuclear weapons is entirely for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from … nuclear threat.”

It could be argued that Chou En-Lai’s attempt to rationalise China’s attainment of nuclear weapons capability is similar to rationalisations employed by every state that has achieved nuclear weapon capabilities. This argument is not completely false, in my view, but China’s continued arguments for nuclear abolition and proposed mechanisms to achieve this – before and after 1964 – are a matter of record.

It is also a matter of record that China had been repeatedly threatened with nuclear attack, first by Truman in 1950, then by Einsenhower in 1953 and again-and-again throughout the 1950s. The UK National Archives report that the British Government considered issuing the threat of nuclear attack against China in 1961. As the record also shows these nuclear threats came not only from the West, but also from the Soviet Union during the nadir in relations with China.

It is probably true to say that of all the threats issued by nuclear-armed states, more have been issued against China than any other nation.

China has made repeated efforts to advance proposals for and potential roads towards nuclear disarmament, from before and up to 1964, through to the 1982 UN Special Session on Disarmament right through until today. In the intervening six decades, China’s internal development has been staggering and the dynamics of global relations and global power have shifted to a similarly staggering extent.

All of which makes the consistency in approach to nuclear risks worthy of note.

But as interesting and instructive as the historical record is, we live in the here-and-now where nuclear risks are abundant. Priority 3 of the GSI concept paper – together with the general framework proposed in the document – offers a number of straightforward measures that could drastically reduce these risks.

The GSI calls for a strengthened “dialogue and cooperation between nuclear-weapon states to reduce the risks of nuclear war”. Today, in place of such dialogue and cooperation, we have the trading of nuclear threats and an apparent breakdown in dialogue. Ending these threats and commencing proper discussion is vital.

It further calls for safeguarding of the “international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the” Non-proliferation Treaty. All the main nuclear powers are signed up to the NPT and all of them have work to do to ensure compliance with it.

Importantly, the GSI proposes active “support [for] the efforts of countries in relevant regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones”. Such active support would not only mirror mechanisms included in previous approaches to ‘Common Security’ but would activate proper consideration of those countries which have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – 68 of them so far, from Antigua and Barbuda to Vietnam – each of which have established nuclear-weapon-free zones on their territory.

A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. China’s call for a system of “international cooperation on nuclear security” and a “fair, collaborative and mutually beneficial international security system” would be an important step forward. The question remains: how soon can progress be made on this call? This question is pressing, as the following two examples illustrate.

US/NATO Strategy

The United States and the nuclear-armed alliance within which it plays the dominant role (NATO) have a clear orientation to China. This orientation is demonstrated by the record of US involvement in the region that pre-dates Obama’s ‘tilt to Asia’ by some decades.

The immediate features of US strategy can be seen in such things as a series of diplomatic visits to Taiwan, billions of dollars of military ‘aid’ to that same country and repeated bellicose statements from US officials.

These features signal a much deeper and more worrying strategic intent. Why worrying? Because when taken as a whole the increased spending, enhanced military presence and increase talk of China as a ‘systemic threat’ strongly suggest a strategy that leads to war.

The record on NATO’s shifting and developing stance on China largely tracks that of the US. It is notable that the various disruptions to US/NATO functioning evident under the Trump presidency did not fundamentally disrupt this tracking. If anything, NATO more firmly displays ‘Trumpist’ policies now than it did when he was in office. If disaster is to be averted then policies and approaches very much like those contained in the GSI must be adopted.

As global nuclear tensions increase, China - along with all other nuclear-armed states - is increasing its nuclear capabilities. As we have seen China first developed nuclear weapon capabilities in an atmosphere of nuclear threat and as it did so, it expanded existing efforts at nuclear diplomacy. China is not responsible for the current nuclear tensions and is functioning at a time of enhanced rhetoric and military activity directed against it. Yet compare and constrast the coverage of China’s expanding nuclear capabilities to the almost complete lack of coverage given to the deployment of new, enhanced US nuclear capabilities in Europe.

In the place of efforts to strip pacifist clauses from Japan’s constitution; the AUKUS alliance; tens of billions on further militarizing China’s periphery; and repeated accusations the US and NATO must recognise what growing numbers of states in the Global South recognise: security is indivisible.

Belarus

Why did Belarus remove nuclear-weapon-free status from its constitution following a referendum? Why has President Lukashenko made repeated warnings that Russian nuclear weapons could return to Belarus? Why is Russia now set to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus once again?

As documented in END Info 37 [Editorial comments], these developments did not happen by magic. Nor did they happen because Lukashenko and Putin are singularly unpleasant people. The developents unfolded over a number of years as a direct consequence of repeated threats to move US nuclear bombs into Poland and as a feature of longstanding US strategy in Eurasia. Rather than adopt an approach to ‘security’ in Europe focused on reducing tensions and threats, with a clear understanding that security is indivisible, the US and NATO have developed an approach to ‘security’ in Europe that multiplies risks. Had an approach like that outlined in the GSI been adopted, things would be very different indeed.

Conclusions

China’s Global Security Initiative should be carefully considered and discussed. Even a brief survey of world events indicates the pressing need for a different set of security arrangements from those currently pursued by the US and NATO allies.

Nuclear tensions and nuclear risks are more sharply posed than ever. If humanity is to survive these tensions and risks then new thinking and new approaches are required. The alternative is too horrible to contemplate.