All will lose

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial comments

From END Info 34 DOWNLOAD

“We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” So proclaimed the leaders of the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in a joint statement issued on 3 January, 2022. This statement, an echo of Reagan and Gorbachev from the ’80s, cannot be faulted. It is as self-evidently true in the 2020s as it was in the 1980s.

A nuclear war would kill millions in hours and could kill us all in time. The detonation of a single nuclear weapon by ‘accident’ or design could kill tens of thousands in an instant. Hundreds of thousands of corpses would surely follow. If such a war “must never be fought” in the reckoning of world leaders and of anyone with an ounce of common sense, why are so many resources dedicated to preparing nuclear annihilation? Why, in the months following the 3 January joint statement, have threats and counter-threats of nuclear war been issued with such reckless frequency?

Ken Coates notes in the introduction to his book, The Most Dangerous Decade (1984) that “Genocide is a crime”. He continues:

In order to be punished for it, hitherto, its instigators have had to lose a war. Since this happened in 1945, there have been recurrent acts which any impartial persons will regard as coming uncomfortably close to genocide. The United Nations Convention on Genocide defines the crime as an act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Article III of the Convention proclaims as punishable not only the act itself, but also conspiracy to commit it, incitement to it, attempts to perform it, and complicity in it. Article IV specifically insists that punishment applies to rulers, public officials and private individuals ...

It is, of course, assumed by Governments that preparation for nuclear war does not constitute conspiracy to prepare genocide. In Britain, those who physically resist the installation of weapons of mass-obliteration are normally charged with the offence of “breaching the peace”, however pacific their protests may be shown to have been ...

There will, however, be no Nuremberg Tribunal to order the execution of the losers in the next war. All will lose, and among any survivors laws of any kind will be part of the same poisonous ruins as the material artifacts of civilisation. The most optimistic predictions about that war assume regression on a total scale, worse prospects are commonly anticipated. It is by no means outside the technical scope of modern armourers to render the entire planet uninhabitable by people of any kind.

Not only are these things widely understood: they have penetrated people’s minds in an insidious way, alongside the realisation that conscience, in the world which plans for holocaust, is itself an outlaw. As a result, authority all-too-easily overrides it. People in the main value order, and social harmony, however conscious they may be of injustice or institutional wrongs.

END Info has previously reported upon and roundly condemned nuclear threats issued by the Russian President. In February and March, 2022, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation issued statements warning that the whole of “Europe is at evident risk of becoming ... a battlefield - even a nuclear one” (25/02/2022). Three days later, we warned that “[I]n breaking the nuclear taboo, Putin exposes the duplicity of nuclear ‘deterrence’, which really means threatening megadeath” and went on to ask: “Who will provide a ladder for Putin to climb down?” (28/02/2022). In early March we noted that Putin’s ‘deterrence’ “flips to ‘escalate to de-escalate’” and asked: “Where does that end?”

Russian officials have claimed that their nuclear threats were met with similar threats from the United States. Until recently, President Biden and his spokespeople have not issued such public threats. This has now changed.

In an essay for The New York Times May, 2022, President Biden warned that “any use of nuclear weapons in this conflict on any scale would be completely unacceptable to us as well as the rest of the world and would entail severe consequences.” He did not spell out what those consequences would be.

In comments made at the end of September, 2022, Jake Sullivan - Biden’s national security adviser - revealed that the US had warned Russia of “catastrophic consequences” in the event of nuclear use. The New York Times describes Sullivan as “a longtime student of nuclear escalation risks, and he has been walking a fine line between orchestrating repeated warnings to the Russians and avoiding statements that could prompt Moscow to raise the stakes, perhaps by beginning to move weapons toward the border in a menacing show of seriousness” (25/09/22). The paper goes on to explain that Sullivan reiterated his claims on national television, where he explained that: “We have communicated to the Russians what the consequences would be ... but we’ve been careful in how we talk about this publicly, because from our perspective we want to lay down the principle that there would be catastrophic consequences, but not engage in a game of rhetorical tit for tat.”

There can, of course, be no excuse for making nuclear threats of any kind, at any time or in any circumstance. As we have established, such threats constitute a threat of mass death and genocide. However, despite Mr Sullivan’s stated reluctance to “engage in a game of rhetorical tit for tat” it appears that this is exactly what he, his bosses and their Russian counterparts have been doing.

In the first week of October, 2022, President Biden used the platform at a Democratic Party fundraising event to issue a chilling warning to the world. According to reports in The Guardian (London) on 7 October, 2022, Biden said: 

“We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis ...

We’ve got a guy I know fairly well ... [Putin’s] not joking when he talks about potential use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons because his military is, you might say, significantly underperforming ...

I don’t think there’s any such thing as the ability to easily (use) a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon...

First time since the Cuban missile crisis, we have the threat of a nuclear weapon if in fact things continue down the path they are going...

We are trying to figure out what is Putin’s off-ramp? Where does he find a way out?”

Putin and Russia certainly need an “off-ramp”, or as the Russell Foundation put it in February, “a ladder to climb down”, but rather than solely focus on reducing nuclear tensions in order for such a settlement to be reached, we witness the trading of nuclear threats. Rather than actually attempting to reduce the prospects of mass death, nuclear genocide or, in Biden’s own words, “Armageddon”, we see the stoking of nuclear tensions.

Rather than deal with the immediate nuclear threats and tensions what Putin, Biden and the pundits, journalists and ‘analysts’ who have speculated on how one side or the other will react in the event of nuclear use have done is to normalise the use of nuclear weapons. There is now a large-scale appreciation of existing and growing nuclear threats but this appreciation has not been met with widespread understanding of what this all means. This process of ‘normalisation’ is an effort to make the obscene, the grotesque, the catastrophic and the murderous implications of nuclear weaponry appear an acceptable part of political discourse.

What fate has diplomacy suffered? Where are the negotiations? Where is the consistent, honest and open commitment to some form of peaceful settlement to the desperate situation in Ukraine from the nuclear powers? Where is the recognition that ‘security’ cannot be guaranteed by nuclear weapons, nuclear alliances and the threat of mass destruction? As we argued in the last issue of END Info (Issue 33):

The sharpening tensions arising from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine - including the stark nuclear tensions - put us all at risk. Yet the response of NATO is unlikely to reduce the tensions, nuclear or otherwise. In fact, such responses follow a pattern we have seen in the past and will undoubtedly replicate the worst possible consequences.

Nuclear weapons, nuclear alliances

and the costs of militarism

We argued further that:

If, for NATO, every problem is a nail, then the biggest hammer at its disposal is the nuclear weapon ...

A truly secure future must mean working for peaceful outcomes to these challenges, not preparing for war.

Further justification for these warnings was provided in President Biden’s new National Security Strategy (October 2022). In his introduction to the NSS Biden writes:

Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international world order ...

We have also reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability, prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years.

On page 38 of the NSS, in a section titled ‘Deepen Our Alliance with Europe’, we read:

With a relationship rooted in shared democratic values, common interests, and historic ties, the transatlantic relationship is a vital platform on which many other elements of our foreign policy are built. Europe has been, and will continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond - strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values ... America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms. As we step up our own sizable contributions to NATO capabilities and readiness - including by strengthening defensive forces and capabilities, and upholding our long-standing commitment to extended deterrence - we will count on our Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending, capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared security at this time of intensifying competition.

The world awaits the publication of the Biden administrations much-delayed Nuclear Posture Review, which deals with specifics of nuclear doctrine, but the direction of travel seems clear. What this will mean is that rather than attempt to create alternative, common security policies to ensure that war and the prospect of nuclear war is averted, the existing dynamic of tension and power politics will be reinforced: the threat of nuclear war will be increased.

To avert such prospects, it is essential that nuclear tensions are drastically reduced. This should be the number one priority of all governments, but special responsibility lies with the nuclear armed states. First and foremost, this means jettisoning any and all nuclear threats with immediate effect. Second, it means engaging in real and meaningful diplomacy to resolve the war in Ukraine. Third, it means adopting alternative approaches to security based on the idea that the security of one state cannot be achieved at the expense of another.

Achieving all of this is no easy task. Humanity faces manifold and interconnected crises. Each one of these crises, from climate emergency to falling living standards, is driven by a system that is incapable of addressing, let alone solving, the terrible effects. Worse still, the systems’ attempts to address pressing needs often exacerbate the situation. Take, for example, Prime Minister Truss’ now-aborted plans to tackle the energy price crisis. If we take her at her word, the whole point of the disastrous mini-budget was to protect the British population from excessive energy bills over a two year period. The result? Chaos. In an effort to resolve this chaos, a new Chancellor of the Exchequer looks set to impose yet more austerity on the nation. The result? More suffering. Only a very different approach will ensure an end to chaos and an end to suffering.

The dominant approaches to questions of ‘defence’ and ‘security’ suffer in the same respect. The words ‘defence’ and ‘security’ should be used with great caution for any number of reasons but the clearest example is given by the part played by nuclear weapons in Britain’s military posture. The Johnson government’s 2021 Integrated Review – Global Britain in a competitive age – makes the following claim for Britain’s nuclear weapons: they “deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, helping to guarantee our security and that of our Allies”. NATO’s most recent strategic concept, released in 2022, claims: “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance … NATO’s nuclear deterrence [sic] posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned.” Britain is, of course, a member of NATO.

So, according to the British government and its NATO allies, ‘defence’ and ‘security’ are ultimately guaranteed by machines designed to unleash megadeath. Not only is this a foul and repugnant idea in and of itself, but it is outlandish in the extreme. Yet a publicly stated willingness to ‘press the button’ and kill millions is a shibboleth uttered by all those seeking high office, with one notable exception. Why is this idea ‘outlandish’? Imagine the reaction if all our politicians insisted that euthanasia be used as a cure for the troubles of old age? Killing millions of people, or threatening to do so, is not a credible solution to anything. Worse, it is criminal.

The majority of the world does not possess nuclear weapons and is not incorporated into nuclear alliances, like NATO. A growing number of states, particularly in the Global South, have mounted a full-frontal rejection of ‘nuclearism’ by either signing or ratifying the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. There is a growing recognition outside of Europe and America that the problems faced by the whole of humanity – be they nuclear threats, climate catastrophe, hunger, displacement or insecurity – cannot be addressed at the expense of others. Global problems require global solutions and these can only be reached by cooperation and a common approach.

In the face of this growing recognition, Britain and its allies are resorting to militarised responses and an expansionary approach. CND’s recent conference labelled this approach as one “based on threat and force rather than collective problem solving and peaceful even development.” Conference went on to agree that “This is particularly marked in the nuclear weapons sphere. On top of the ongoing replacement of the Trident nuclear weapons system, we have seen the nuclear arsenal increase, the expansion of the nuclear use policy, the withdrawal of transparency, the adoption of the AUKUS agreement, and most recently the return of US/NATO nuclear weapons to RAF/USAF Lakenheath”.

The Truss government committed itself to increased military spending, which will only mean more of the same. Will Rishi Sunak uphold this commitment? It seems likely.

As the social and economic conditions for large parts of the population spiral downwards, as poverty and insecurity stalk the land, as the health services remain underfunded and working people face pay cuts this government and others like it across Europe pledge further billions to military spending.

People cannot eat missiles. Warships cannot cure disease. Tanks cannot home the homeless. Fighter aircraft will not care for the needy. Chemical and biological weapons will not educate our children. Nuclear weapons cannot ensure security.

Adapted and expanded from ‘Killing millions of people is not a credible solution to anything’, which appeared in the Morning Star on Thursday 20 October 2022.

Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review

From END Info 34 DOWNLOAD

The much-delayed publication of President Biden’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on 27 October was a significant moment. Significant because it appears at a time when nuclear risks and nuclear tensions are sharply posed. Significant because the dominant role of the US within the nuclear-armed alliance, NATO, means that US nuclear policy influences the nuclear policies of alliance members and those countries which are part of nuclear sharing arrangements. It is also significant because of what it fails to say: there is little trace of Biden’s warnings, criticisms and alternative policy proposals aired during his election campaign.

For instance, as Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda point out: “Although Joe Biden during his presidential election campaign spoke strongly in favour of adopting no-first-use and sole-purpose policies, the NPR explicitly rejects both for now.” [FAS Strategic Security blog, 27/10/22]

Kristensen and Korda continue: “From an arms control and risk reduction perspective, the NPR is a disappointment. Previous efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and the role that nuclear weapons play have been subdued by renewed strategic competition abroad and opposition from defense hawks at home.”

The December 2022 issue of END Info will cover the NPR in more detail but it is worth looking at section V, ‘Strengthening Regional Nuclear Deterrence’, in the context of the Ukraine war and developments in Europe.

“As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”, are the opening words of the section headed ‘Strong and Credible Nuclear Deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic Region’. The NPR continues: “A strong, cohesive Alliance with a clear nuclear mission remains essential to deter aggression and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, especially in light of Russia’s aggression against its neighbors and the central role nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities play in Russian doctrine ... Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea in 2014 NATO has taken steps to ensure a modern, ready, and credible NATO nuclear deterrent. This includes modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and, with participating NATO allies, transitioning to a new generation of fighter aircraft, including the U.S. F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. The United States will work with Allies concerned to ensure that the transition to modern DCA and the B61-12 bomb is executed efficiently and with minimal disruption to readiness.”

Much of the NPR reads like a report of work already in progress - the F-35A and B61-12 deployments, for instance. Many of the measures described in the NPR appear to be doubling-down on already operational policies - the efforts made since 2014, for instance.

The troubling reality is that new nuclear-capable aircraft, new nuclear bombs and a continuation of policies in place since 2014 look unlikely to “deter aggression and promote peace and stability”. The risk is that such developments will take us closer to nuclear war than we are now.

If “[d]eterring Russian limited nuclear use in a regional conflict is a high U.S. and NATO priority”, then the world - and the people of Ukraine - needs to see serious efforts at diplomacy, negotiations and peace-making. We do not need more machines of megadeath and aggressive nuclear postures. ­­

US accelerates B61 deployment

From END Info 34 DOWNLOAD

On 26 October, 2022, the Politico news website announced that the “United States has accelerated the fielding of a more accurate version of the mainstay nuclear bomb to NATO bases in Europe, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable and two people familiar with the issue.”

As we reported in END Info 32 (June/July 2022), plans for the deployment of these upgraded bombs have been underway for some time. In the context of US plans to expand its nuclear bootprint in Europe, by upgrading nuclear storage facilities at the Lakenheath airbase (UK), the future deployment of the B61-12 is of some concern. News that the deployment is to be accelerated makes the matter even more pressing. Here’s how we described the capabilities of the B61-12 in June: 

B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

B61 nuclear bombs have been deployed in Europe under US nuclear sharing arrangements for some time. Originally designed as a Cold War weapon in the 1960s, the B61-12 (modification 12) entered production in December 2021 with the aim of extending the lifespan of these nuclear weapons. The latest modification includes ‘steerability’ and ‘dialable yields’, which means that the bombs can be launched some distance from their target (‘standoff capability’ meaning that pilots can reasonably expect not to be impacted by a nuclear blast) and that the explosive power of the bombs can be set as ‘usable’ on the battlefield. The development and deployment of these bombs to Lakenheath (and elsewhere in Europe) represents a significant and dangerous expansion of the US nuclear bootprint and an escalation in tension between nuclear-armed states.

Why accelerate the deployment? Politico quotes from the US diplomatic cable as follows: 

“Given the rising volume and scale of Russia’s nuclear rhetoric, a subset of allies requested continued consultations at NATO to ensure continued readiness and consistent messaging.”

Commenting on Twitter, Hans Kristensen notes:

“One odd part of this story is that training/certification of the European unites wasn’t supposed to begin until turn of the year ... after which the weapons would arrive. Moving up deployment would require moving up training/certification first ... Nor should people think that all the European bases will necessarily receive the B61-12s at the same time. This exchange could happen over many months.”

Given that deployment was already planned and given the need to complete training and certification on the bombs before deployment, accelerating the deployment - or announcing an acceleration, which may be a different thing - seems like a political/strategic move rather than an operational imperative.

The language in the US cable suggests pressure from NATO member states for some sort of gesture. Poland’s political leaders have been signalling eagerness to join NATOs nuclear sharing arrangement. The accelerated deployment may have been announced as a concession. Whatever the reasons the accelerated deployment of B61-12s is unlikely to reduce nuclear tensions in Europe. ­­

Persistently objecting

Tom Unterrainer

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

The presence of member and soon-to-be members of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance at the First Meeting of State Parties (1MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) raises a number of questions. First amongst these is: what were they doing there?

One, charitable, interpretation of their attendance is that such states are - in stark contradiction to their ‘voluntary’ military associations - strenuously committed to nuclear abolition. As such, any and all forums designed to discuss and further the aim of nuclear abolition are of great and sincere interest.

Another, less charitable, interpretation is that the presence of NATO and soon-to-be NATO states at such meetings is a cold and calculated legal manoeuvre.

In issues 22 and 23 of END Info the question of ‘persistent objector’ status was raised. In international law, a ‘persistent objector’ is a state or states that consistently and clearly object to a ‘norm’ of law from the time of the emergence of such a ‘norm’. It is understood that such persistent objection can act to prevent a particular law from becoming a ‘customary’ or generally accepted part of international law.

In issue 22 (Feb 2021), we looked at the Chatham House report ‘NATO and the TPNW’ and in a follow-up (issue 23, March 2021) we focussed on ‘persistent objector’ status in particular. The Chatham House report explains:

While it is a general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states, it is also an accepted principle that a rule set forth in a treaty could, under certain conditions, become binding on a third state as a customary rule ... However, this is not an automatic process. Two distinct concepts are relevant here: the concept of so-called ‘specially affected states’, and that of ‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ has explained, a lack of consent from specially affected states may have the effect of preventing the required general state practice from emerging, preventing the rule from coming into being in the first place. There is a strong argument that states with nuclear weapons and those in a nuclear alliance would be specially affected by a proposed ban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence - so-called persistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

In issue 32 (‘TPNW: the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons?’) we speculated that the presence of NATO member states at the 1MSP could represent a ‘crack’ in the ‘persistent objector’ status. What actually happened points in the opposite direction: no cracks emerged. Rather, NATO and NATO-aligned states took the opportunity of their observer status and the speaking rights afforded to them to either challenge the TPNW itself or to promote fallacies around nuclear weapons.

For instance, the statement from Sweden, delivered by Ann-Sofie Nilsson, reads as follows:

Sweden has a longstanding and continuous engagement for nuclear disarmament. Let me reiterate that the Swedish Government’s decision of 2019 to not sign nor ratify the TPNW stands. We note that the Treaty does not include any of the countries that possess nuclear weapons, which we do not see as a realistic or effective way forward...

For decades, Sweden has been a strong advocate and active promoter of disarmament and non-proliferation – these efforts will continue and will remain firmly rooted in the framework of the NPT, the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

Whilst there is no explicit defence of nuclear weapons or nuclear doctrines as such, there is explicit opposition to the TPNW and a clear affirmation of the NPT. All of this suits the nuclear-armed states which have all failed to comply with the NPT, let alone advance the aim of nuclear disarmament more generally. The suggestion that the TPNW and NPT in some way contradict each other is all-too familiar and, more to the point, wrong.

Norway’s statement is more explicit:

Norway is attending this conference as an observer. This is not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations. Norway stands fully behind NATO’s nuclear posture.

The Netherlands strikes a similar note:

• The Netherlands remains firmly committed to NATO, including its policy of nuclear deterrence and our nuclear task. And this NATO Membership remains essential for our collective security.

• The Netherlands does not have the intention to sign or accede to the TPNW. It is incompatible with our NATO obligations. However, the fact that we do not accede to the TPNW, or accept the claim that its provisions have a binding effect under customary law, does not mean that we do not appraise the opportunity to observe the discussions here today. Open and frank dialogue are essential for the Netherlands.

• In fact: this is not the first time we have participated in the TPNW discussions. We would like to remind delegations of our participation in the 2017 negotiations leading up to this Treaty, including offering concrete suggestions to make the TPNW a more broadly acceptable and credible disarmament treaty - not only to us but also possibly to other NATO Allies – which were unfortunately rejected.

Here, The Netherland’s not only objects but points out that it has been objecting since 2017! They have been ‘persistently objecting’ to the TPNW from the very start. The first prize for clarity, enveloped in a cloud of dire hypocrisy, is awarded to Germany, which stated in its address to the 1MSP that:

As a member to NATO – and as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance -, and confronted with an openly aggressive Russia, which has not only invaded Ukraine but is threatening the rules-based international order and peace in Europe, Germany cannot accede to the TPNW, which would collide with our membership in NATO including nuclear deterrence. As non-member to the TPNW we are not bound by its provisions, nor do we accept the claim that its provisions are applicable under customary law – now or in the future.

It is almost as if, like me, the Germany Foreign Office did an internet search of ‘persistent objector’ and crafted their statement to the 1MSP in order to precisely comply with the definition.

It is clear, then, that the NATO and soon-to-be NATO states in attendance at the 1MSP maintained a deliberate and coordinated approach. None of these states is itself nuclear-armed but both The Netherlands and Germany host US nuclear bombs under ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements. Sweden, in its letter of intent to join NATO, scrapped decades of neutrality and opposition to nuclear weapons for an explicit recognition and acceptance of the fact that NATO is a nuclear alliance.

Where does this leave the TPNW? As events in Vienna demonstrated, the majority of the world stands in opposition to nuclear weapons. The global majority wants such weapons to be abolished. Unsurprisingly, the minority of states with nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear states with which they are aligned have no intention - despite repeated claims otherwise - of ever giving them up: at least, not without a fight.

If the TPNW is to move from a voluntary treaty to a customary rule under international law, then the persistent objectors will have to change their tune. It is at this point that effective political action and the political change that comes with it becomes an essential consideration. Perhaps the first step would be to call-out Germany, Sweden, Norway and The Netherlands for their actions at 1MSP: make it clear that we know just how cynical they are. Those of us in nuclear-armed states who called on our governments to attend 1MSP as observers need to think about what we’re actually asking them to do: can they be trusted to positively engage in genuine discussions towards nuclear abolition or will they simply use the platform to ‘persistently object’? Current evidence suggests the latter rather than the former.

The achievements of those states, NGOs and campaigners who came together to forge the TPNW are immense. The 1MSP was a clear demonstration of majority opinion. The task of securing global nuclear abolition made a giant stride forward with this frontal rejection of nuclear weapons. The ‘persistent objectors’ represent a political roadblock to abolition. Political roadblocks are removed by political means.

Nuclear-Free Trieste?

Alessandro Capuzzo, Italy

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

The following text is the second transcript from the peace conference organised by ABFANG, Vienna, June 2022.

Moderation: We discussed about the importance of intertwining the peace and environmental struggles in order to safeguard peace and our planet, since both topics strongly connected to each other. Now we will hear from peace activist Alessandro Capuzzo from the city of Trieste, about how the TPNW can help shape the future of the territory of the Gulf of Trieste – nuclear free.

Alessandro: Hello everyone! I would like to talk to you today about how the TPNW is opening the way for a nuclear weapons free future for my city and the wider territory of Trieste. As citizens of the Gulf of Trieste, we understand that the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy defined our territory as demilitarized and neutral. Currently, Italy and Slovenia share the Gulf of Trieste with Croatia; are part of the North Atlantic Alliance and they have expressed themselves against the 1947 Peace Treaty, since they are involved in the Alliance's military nuclear programs.

The Gulf of Trieste hosts, contrary to the 1947 Peace Treaty, two military nuclear transit ports, Trieste in Italy and Koper/Capodistria in Slovenia. The very presence of these two urban centers makes it impossible to seriously prevent accidents, with respect to the nuclear propulsion of ships, the presence on board of weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of becoming a nuclear target. Moreover, the secrecy imposed "for security reasons" prevents the wide assessment of the risk in relation to the existing dangers; it forces the institutions to omit important bits of information and consequently hides the dangers of the situation to the population and nature.

We, therefore, are here to propose to the TPNW Conference, the launch of case studies on risk, and the lack of transparency in the matter, to be entrusted to the Nuclear Prevention School of the Atomic Agency (IAEA), at the International Center for Theoretical Physics of Miramare in Trieste. Not only for Trieste but for all twelve Italian military nuclear ports (besides Trieste, Venice, Brindisi, Taranto, Augusta, Castellammare di Stabia, Naples, Gaeta, Livorno, La Spezia, La Maddalena and Cagliari) and for the terrestrial nuclear air bases of Aviano and Ghedi.

And we don’t stop there: We call for a resumption of the talks for the denuclearization of the Mediterranean Sea, inspired by the Treaty for the banning of nuclear weapons; which involves our Gulf, as legally bound by the Peace Treaty with Italy after World War II, to Demilitarization and Neutrality.

In 2017 together with the former mayor of Koper/Capodistria (Slovenia) Aurelio Juri, WILPF Italia and Disarmisti Esigenti, we submitted a relevant Working Paper to Conference for the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty (TPNW), which concluded with the proposal of case studies I mentioned before; today, five years after its approval, the TPNW has entered into force, and we are in Vienna reviewing its contents and implementation. We therefore invite you to revisit our 2017 Working Paper and its proposals. These are now feasible and can be advanced, due to two Treaties mentioned: the Nuclear Ban or TPNW, and the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy.

Moderation: Coming back to you Alessandro for the second round. What would be the next steps to achieve a nuclear free Gulf of Trieste?

Alessandro: The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, which most UN member countries have set up under pressure from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) of which we feel part, can change the balance of power between nuclear states and those that are not, thanks to the introduction of substantial transparency for the benefit of civil society and the whole of Humanity.

While the implications of the TPNW are known, few are aware of the provisions from the Peace Treaty 1947, implemented by the United Nations Security Council with Resolution S/RES/16, which claimed jurisdiction over the Free Territory of Trieste, and existed as an independent state from 1947 to 1954, on the southern end of the Iron Curtain.

Elements are retained, as confirmed by former Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, in a 2015 letter to Palestinian President Abbas, listing the Territories under direct UN competence.

The Statute of the former Free Territory of Trieste contained in the Peace Treaty with Italy is a juridical unicum, comparable to the constitutional choice of Army abolition made by Costa Rica; which involves the coastal strip of the Adriatic Gulf where Italy, Slovenia and Croatia join. Disarmament and Neutrality are enshrined in there.

These norms of International Law, “forgotten” for political needs by the most involved States, if associated with the TPNW, allow the achievement of an effective denuclearization in the Gulf of Trieste. We therefore call on the NGOs and the States parties to the TPNW to test together the feasibility of this proposed implementation of the Nuclear Ban.

A particular invitation is addressed to the States registered in the Peace Treaty with Italy, for the right they have to use the International Free Port of Trieste: Austria, Czechia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United States, Switzerland, Hungary, and all the countries emerged from Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. In addition to the mentioned, Australia, Belgium, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Greece, India, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Ukraine and South Africa, are also involved in the Peace Treaty with Italy.

Neutrality in the international context

Prof. Heinz Gärtner, Austria

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

Introduction

ABFANG (Action Alliance for Peace, Active Neutrality and Non-Violence) is an Austrian peace coalition that advocates and organises for ‘active neurality’. This concept has a particular meaning in a state which has been neutral, unaligned and outside of any military alliances, since 1955. Austria’s neutral status sits alongside its status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

There is undoubtedly tremendous political pressure exerted on Austria, a well as Ireland which maintains a similar status of neutrality, to relinquish this status and to join NATO. Such a development would be a catastrophe not only for Austria itself and Europe more generally but for prospects for peace.

ABFANG convened a conference to coincide with the 1st Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was addressed by an array of activists, experts and participants in the international peace movement. Of special interest was the round-table discussion that included contributions on the importance of Austria’s neutral status, together with analyses of the impact of the TPNW.

END Info has translated one of these contributions and reproduced another with the aim of alerting others to the importance of Austria’s neutrality and in order to encourage a discussion on the legacies of non-aligned states, the role and function of ‘active neutrality’ and the implications of such positions for a very different mode of foreign policy.

We live in a very polarized world, but polarization is not new. We have the polarization already experienced during the Cold War, the East-West conflict. It is important to remember that the neutral states were able to break out during the period of bloc formation to stay out of the military alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact). Some say that neutrality was part of the Cold War, however the opposite is true. May I recall that in 1955 (when Austrian neutrality was proclaimed), the blocs were already nuclear powers and part of "Mutually Assured Destruction". Austria was at that time already a nuclear weapons-free state, since in our State Treaty the possession or acquisition of nuclear weapons was banned. At that time, for example, neutrals had states like Sweden or Switzerland, as well as Germany and Canada.

After the end of the Cold War, i.e. after 1989, there was another attempt at polarization, namely unipolarity. An American political scientist called it "The Unipolar Moment". George W. Bush tried to create US hegemony: there were wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was a bad time for neutral states because a unipolar world was incompatible with neutrality. The unipolarity/hegemony never materialized. We currently live in one polarized world, in a world of great power competition between the USA, China and Russia. Russia is the first country to attempt war in this great power competition to survive. I say the first war because more could follow.

Polarization is always associated with alliance building. We have NATO and we have the successor organization to the Warsaw Pact in parts of Eastern Europe and we have those of the US in alliances founded in Asia (AUKUS; Quad) or the “Abraham Accords” in the Middle East against Iran.

What opportunities do smaller states have in a polarized world? You can join one, join an alliance because there is a promise that it will give protection. The “nuclear umbrella" is a form of promise of protection. Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which contains an obligation to provide assistance, is the other form of protection. You get a promise of protection – you don’t know whether it will be kept not, but of course you are also "captive" and must take part in foreign wars. If Article 5 assistance comes, NATO members are obliged within the framework of "solidarity" to stand with those attacked or to stand by a threatened state.

The second option for small states (there are only two options) is to remain neutral. i.e. to remain outside of great power competition, as Austria did during the Cold War.

Now we often hear that neutrality is incompatible with solidarity, because solidarity is exclusively interpreted as military solidarity, i.e. one seems forced to join an alliance, a nuclear alliance, to show solidarity. We hear, as a logical extension of this, that to show solidarity a neutral state would have to give up neutrality and join a nuclear alliance.

The opposite is the case. Austria must, after the historical experiences of the two world wars, be very careful. Military solidarity can also be false solidarity. The opposite is the case and that is why we are in Vienna today, because neutrality is a necessary condition for the Austrian initiative for the realization of the nuclear weapons ban treaty, i.e. first in 2010 for the humanitarian initiative and then in 2017 for the Prohibition Treaty and now the TPNW State Conference in Vienna. No nuclear-armed state, no state in a nuclear alliance would have been able to take this initiative, a neutral state was necessary. That's why it was and is neutrality that is a prerequisite for building solidarity among non-nuclear weapon states. That's what Austria did, but only because it was neutral. So today Austria is the most important state in the European Union that is neutral and that can build a bridge to the non-aligned countries of the Global South. Most TPNW signatories come from the Global South. In Europe there are very few participating countries because we have NATO. Austria should therefore under no circumstances give up its neutrality.

Austria used to be a good example of a nuclear weapons-free zone, but unfortunately wider such zones were not implemented. After Austria became neutral in 1955 and was therefore free of nuclear weapons, the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki advocated that the whole of Central Europe, i.e. Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Austria, becomes nuclear-weapon-free. But the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did not want that, saying neutrality was “a poison of the Soviet Union” and the Soviet Union didn't want it either because they did not want to give up their zone of influence in Eastern Europe . Nevertheless, this idea is very good and we should not let it die.

‘Letters of last resort’

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s days are numbered. The United Kingdom will have a new Prime Minister by September. Less than 1% of the population - members of the Tory party - will make a choice between a multi-millionaire banker, Rishi Sunak, and the Johnson-supporting Liz Truss, the current Foreign Secretary. The general public will not have the opportunity of choosing between gangrene or the plague.

Harold Wilson was the last UK Prime Minister to enter office through victory in a General Election (October 1964) and to leave office through defeat in a General Election (June 1970). Is there a better measure of the long-term dysfunctionality of the UK’s democratic system than this? In fact, there is.

One of the first acts of Prime Minister Sunak or Truss will be to write four identical letters. They will write these letters in their own hand and will do so having been ‘indoctrinated’ by the Chief of the Defence Staff, who is tasked with explaining the damage that will be done by the detonation of a nuclear warhead.

These letters will be transported from No 10 Downing Street to the four nuclear-armed submarines in the Royal Navy. The letters will be locked in a safe to be opened in one circumstance only: loss of all contact and communication following a devastating attack on the United Kingdom. A ‘letter of last resort’ leaves instructions to the Captain and Commander of each submarine on how to respond in such a situation. By the time the letters are opened, it can be assumed that the person who wrote them will be dead. The Captain and Commander will have to decide whether or not to follow the instructions of a corpse.

There are a whole number of ‘grey areas’ around this process. The first of these is the fact that arrangements for briefing a new Prime Minister are not a matter of public knowledge. Will the new Prime Minister be given a series of options and asked to pick one, or are they permitted to decide their own? Will the Captain and Commander be asked to fire one or all of the nuclear missiles on the submarine? Will they be instructed to fire none at all? Who or what will be the target of such an attack? What is the legal position of the Captain and Commander? Is it illegal to disobey a dead person? If it is illegal, in what court will they be tried? There is a stench of the perverse around the whole procedure.

What of the risks associated with storing such letters aboard nuclear-armed submarines? What if a serious communications malfunction, the result of a design flaw or cyberwar, manifests? Are the Captain and Commander expected to carry on regardless or are they expected to crack open the safe?

It would be nice to imagine that the majority of those serving on nuclear-armed submarines would take a very cautious approach to any such situation. However, when it comes to the prospect of nuclear war something firmer than hope is required.

What of Mr Johnson’s letters? Will they be deposited in a memorial library, the Ministry of Defence Archives or his personal filing cabinet? No. The letters will be destroyed, as will be the letters of whoever comes next at the appropriate time.

Of all the dimensions of grim stupidity that combine into nuclear doctrine, the ‘letters of last resort’ must rank up there with the grimmest and most stupid of all. The next UK Prime Minister will be faced with spiralling cost of living, a crisis in the health service, the consequences of pandemic, looming recession, hungry children, poverty and much else. The priority on day one will not be feeding the hungry, housing the homeless or caring for the vulnerable: it will be to decide how to contribute to the total extinction of life on planet earth by way of a letter that will only be read when the poor, homeless and vulnerable - along with the rest of us, Prime Minister or not - are already a heap of ashes.

Nuclear weapons, nuclear alliances and the costs of militarism

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial comments

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that in 2021, Russian military spending stood at $66,000,000,000 ($66 billion). In the same year the United States spent approximately $801bn. Over the same period, NATO member states, excluding the US, spent $363bn. As Simon Kuper pointed out in the Financial Times (9/10 July 2022): “If the US abandons Europe after 2024” - that is, if Trump or one of his protege’s wins the Presidential election that year - “other NATO states would outspend Russia more than sixfold.”

At the recent NATO conference in Madrid, Secretary-General Stoltenberg announced that the nuclear-armed alliance’s ‘high-readiness forces’ will increase in number from 40,000 to 300,000 by 2023. This is an almost eightfold increase and will include:

battlegroups in the eastern part of the alliance ... enhanced up to brigade levels, with forces pre-assigned to specific locations; and more heavy weapons, logistics and command-and control assets ... pre-positioned.

[Dr. Ian Davis, NATO Watch Briefing Paper No. 96]

In addition to the upgrade of units and material, President Biden has promised further troop and weapon deployments in Europe and a new HQ in Poland.

The content and implications of NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept’ will be considered later but suffice to say that the global ambitions, spending commitments, reasserted role of nuclear weapons and the overall posture paint a deadly picture.

NATO is remilitarising and in so doing, enormous damage will be done to rational concepts of peace, security, investment, social security and the environment. Simon Kuper [ibid] quotes Dan Plesch of SOAS, University of London, on the implications of this new wave of militarisation. Plesch warns:

Worst case is we stumble into unintended global war. Best case is we stockpile and never use the weapons, but use our scarce resources on them.

Plesch’s warning of “unintended global war” should not be taken lightly and we should not forget what the dimensions of such a war would encompass: the risk of all-out nuclear war and the subsequent destruction of humanity.

In his opening comments to the much-delayed Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that “humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation”. In subsequent comments, he explained that relying on “luck” - which has stood in the way of such annihilation on more than one occasion - is not a strategy for human survival.

The sharpening tensions arising from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine - including stark nuclear tensions - put us all at risk. Yet the response of NATO is unlikely to reduce the tensions, nuclear or otherwise. In fact, such responses follow a pattern we have seen in the past and will undoubtedly replicate the worst possible consequences.

Spend, spend, spend

The New York Times of December 8, 1987 reported that the sum total of United States missiles, aircraft and submarines capable of ‘delivering’ so-called ‘strategic’ nuclear warheads amounted to 11,786. The targets for these weapons were 220 urban industrial centres across the Soviet bloc. As Seymour Melman points out in The Demilitarized Society: “Hence, US forces have more than fifty times overkill capability.”

Melman notes that if this “overkill capability” was reduced by 75%, a budget saving of $54.6 billion ($142 billion in 2022) would be made. Such a reduction would have left the US with an “overkill capability” of twelve. The Demilitarized Society (1988) focuses on the problems arising from sustained and extreme levels of military spending in the post-WWII US economy. He explains that whilst money, skill and effort were poured into creating machines of mass annihilation:

The US now lacks a modern rail system, a modern highway system in good repair ... The city streets are poorly paved. Between a fifth to a third of the highway bridges in the US are rated as needing major repair. Decent housing is no longer available for millions. There is a growth of homelessness and hunger ... Important parts of the population draw water from aquifers that are contaminated. The national parks are in poor repair. The libraries are poorly operated. Waste disposal systems violate modern technical standards. The public school buildings of New York City require an expenditure of $8 billion for decent repair.

Between 2002 and 2016, the top 100 weapons manufacturers and ‘military service’ companies logged 38% growth in global sales. In 2016, these sales – excluding Chinese companies – amounted to $375 billion, turning $60 billion profit. Between 1998 and 2011, the Pentagon’s budget grew in real terms by 91% while defence industry profits quadrupled.

In the 1970s, investment in the ‘information technology’ sector stood at $17 billion. By 2017, investment in this sector exceeded $700 billion. In the same year, Apple’s market capitalisation stood at $730 billion, Google stood at $581 billion, and Microsoft stood at $497 billion. Meanwhile, Exxon Mobile – the highest placed ‘industrial’ company – had a market capitalisation of $344 billion. By comparison, the arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin had a capitalisation of around $321 billion and Rolls Royce $21 billion at the end of 2017.

Whilst the United States and other countries continue to purchase – and use – vast quantities of ‘conventional’ weaponry, the extraordinary figures quoted above occurred alongside the unleashing of a ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, powered by significant leaps in capability in computing, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, ‘autonomous’ vehicles and the rest. Ever greater sums are being spent on military and policing applications of the ‘fruits’ of this ‘Revolution’. So much so, that the sociologist William I. Robinson (Race and Class, 2018) identifies a trend towards what he terms ‘militarised accumulation’ as a ‘major source of state­ organised profit-making’.

In 1988, Melman warned that:

[M]assive, sustained military spending is, qualitatively, the single most critical factor in the cumulative depletion of the industrial economy. If this is dealt with decisively then the rest can be addressed. If that factor is unattended, then the rest is rendered unmanageable, and a process of continued decline is locked in place.

Such massive, and long-term, patterns of military expenditure and the material consequences on society at large are made, consistently, in the name of ‘security’. Each and every bullet, missile, nuclear warhead, bomber, armed drone, submarine, warship and tank is - we are told - there for ‘our security’. This militarised approach to ‘security’ is riddled with contradictions.

Militarised ‘security’

Climate change constitutes a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to our national security and, make no mistake, it will impact how our military defends our country. And so we need to act - and we need to act now.

President Obama, May 2015

The US army is the most highly funded military organisation in human history. It is also the single largest institutional polluter on the planet. Obama’s eloquently delivered speeches on the risks associated with climate change morphed from initially wholesome appeals for action to save humanity, to framing the question as a matter of national security. As Nick Buxton points out (‘Securing whose future?’ The Spokesman 134):

The Pentagon is the world’s single largest organisational user of petroleum: one of its jets, the B-52 Stratocruiser, consumes roughly 3,334 gallons per hour, about as much fuel as the average driver uses in seven years.

As state level reaction to climate catastrophe incorporates more militarised ‘security’ responses and as multinational efforts at climate change reduction - such as the recent COP26 - fail to meet needs and expectations, it seems likely that militarised responses will be emphasised above other forms. After all, it is much easier to secure funding for military expenditure than for anything else and such expenditure drives corporate profiteering:

US defence contractor Raytheon openly proclaims its ‘expanded business opportunities’ arising from ‘security concerns and their possible consequences’, due to the ‘effects of climate change’ in the form of ‘storms, droughts, and floods’. (Buxton)

Neta Crawford from the ‘Costs of War Project’ at Brown University estimates that in 2017 alone, the US military emitted more carbon dioxide than Sweden, Denmark and Finland combined (Jessica Fort and Philipp Straub, ‘The Carbon Boot-Print’, The Spokesman 144). Freedom of Information Act (US) requests to the US Defense Logistics Agency, which is responsible for managing fuel purchase and distribution show that in 2017, the Department of Defense emitted 59 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and that from 2001 to 2017, a total of 1,212 million metric tons of the same gas was emitted. These figures include the period covering the bombing, invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the illegal war against and occupation of Iraq.

Not only do wars, the preparations for war and militarised responses to ‘security’ risks have immediate destructive consequences in terms of death, depletion of resources and environmental damage: each and every day that sophisticated and expansive capabilites, such as those embodied in the US military, operate means additional releases of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. The impact of US and allied military operations in Iraq could be seen on the TV screen. Civilians on the streets of Baghdad and elsewhere saw the death and catastrophe first hand. What was not reported or broadcast and what has gone largely unmentioned is the legacy of environmental harm arising from these events.

How many B-52s flew in the years of war and occupation? How many hours in total were they in the air? How many gallons does that amount to? How many cubic tons of greenhouse gasses? How many more fractions of a degree did this take us to catastrophic temperature increases? What militarised responses have been put in place to ensure ‘security’ as a consequence of this increase in temperature? How many B-52s will it take to ensure ‘security’ from the consequences of war?...

This is just one example of the contradictions that arise in militarised responses to ‘security’. In common with other examples, it shares the features outlined earlier: the enormous sums of money devoted to military spending and the way in which such spending shapes the economy more generally. This example also shares another, connected, feature with other militarised responses to ‘security’: the fact that such responses simply make matters worse.

Law of the instrument

In his The Psychology of Science (1966), Abraham Maslow made the following observation:

I remember seeing an elaborate and complicated automatic washing machine for automobiles that did a beautiful job of washing them. But it could do only that, and everything else that got into its clutches was treated as if were an automobile to be washed. I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.

Whatever else you might think of Maslow’s psychological theories, this observation - an outline of the ‘Law of the Instrument’ - seems a close fit to NATO’s approach to ‘security’. The nuclear-armed alliance is on the hunt for nails.

However, the fact that NATO is armed to the teeth with hammers is not a sufficient explanation for why it sees every problem as a nail. The purely military-industrial aspect of militarisation might indicate how NATO will react in any given circumstance but it does not account for the US-dominated, nuclear-armed alliance’s wider aims and perspectives.

The preface to the 2022 document explains:

The Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring our national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values ...

Our vision is clear: we want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all who share these goals. We stand together, as Allies, to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world.

Fine sentiments. Yet the reality of NATO’s actions, historic and contemporary, and the belligerence of certain NATO members today, exposes these sentiments as insincere waffle. NATO’s new Strategic Concept actually reflects Jens Stoltenberg’s perception - and we should assume he largely acts to telegraph the views of the US, in particular - that “we now face an era of strategic competition”.

Whereas the 2010 Strategic Concept could proclaim that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low”, the 2022 version warns: “the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace ... We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies.” Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. China is a “systemic challenge” and China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests and values.” Russian/Chinese relations are a “deepening strategic partnership”.

In the same way that President Bush Jnr concocted an ‘Axis of Evil’ to mobilise support for his wars of aggression, NATO has now outlined a new ‘Axis’ of threat, systematically aiming to link Russia and China. All the better for attempting to justify NATO’s tilt to China - some distance away from the North Atlantic area! In response, China’s mission to the European Union stated: 

NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking China. We firmly oppose it.

We previously argued that US foreign policy under the Trump administration reflected wild and reckless attempts to maintain US influence in a period of shift from unipolarity to multipolarity (‘Global Tinderbox’, The Spokesman 141). The ‘bonfire of treaties’, aggressive statements and Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review reflected these attempts. At the time, Trump could not take NATO with him and devoted some energy to attacking the nuclear-armed alliance, not least for member states reluctance to meet spending commitments.

Trump is no longer the US President, but NATO is now spending positively Trumpian amounts of money on armaments and rearmament. NATO has also fallen into line with US concerns about the emergence of alternative centres of power and influence. This is why they were happy to sign up to the new Strategic Concept and why ‘partners’ from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were welcomed in Madrid.

A nuclear-armed alliance

The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance ... NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned.

NATO 2022 Strategic Concept

If, for NATO, every problem is a nail, then the biggest hammer at its disposal is the nuclear weapon. As the Strategic Concept makes clear, it is the “supreme guarantee” of ‘security’. Only a truly sick mind could confuse a world-ending weapon of genocide withanything of the sort, but this is the reality we are dealing with.

The expansion of NATO’s nuclear bootprint across Europe (see END Info 32) and the steady incorporation of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea into NATO’s strategic thinking (see END Info 27 for analysis of AUKUS) are conceived of as ‘security measures’. These measures, along with massive increases in military spending and troop deployments, sow the seeds of potentially catastrophic outcomes. The catastrophe could be immanent, medium- or long-term, as risks multiply and as pressing concerns around climate change, hunger, pandemic and health intensify.

A truly secure future must mean working for peaceful outcomes to these challenges, not preparing for war.

Nuclear risks and realities of the Ukraine crisis

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Helena Cobban with David Barash, Cynthia Lazaroff and Richard Falk

Ukraine: Stop the Carnage, Build the Peace!

Introduction and Policy Recommendations

In March 2022, Just World Educational held a series of eight webinars on the international crisis sparked by Russia's February invasion of Ukraine. The sessions were co-hosted by JWE President Helena Cobban and Board Member Richard Falk; in each one, they conducted a broad public conversation on issues raised by the crisis with superbly well-qualified and thoughtful guests.

The multimedia records of all these conversations can be viewed at bit.ly/JWE-UkraineCrisis. Policy Recommendations arising from these conversations are as follows:

1. Ukraine-wide ceasefire now!

2. An embargo on arms shipments into Ukraine by all countries.

3. Start negotiations now, involving all relevant parties, for a lasting peace arrangement for Ukraine, and commit to completion within six months.

4. Monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and arms embargo to be led by the United Nations and the OSCE, or any other party acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia.

5. Immediate aid for rebuilding in Ukraine, including for agriculture, ports, residential areas, and related systems.

6. Immediate international talks on implementation of 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which all signatory states including the United States and Russia committed to complete nuclear disarmament, and a call for all governments to support the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons .

7. Leaders of NATO countries should oppose all manifestations of Russophobia.

8. The United States should give up all efforts at regime change in Russia.

A full report on the conversations can be accessed at justworldeducational.org

*   *  *

For our March 28 conversation, Richard Falk and I [Helena Cobban] were delighted to have as our guests two very experienced anti-nuclear scholar/activists, Cynthia Lazaroff and David Barash.

In my introduction I noted, "Most people who are under, say, 45 years old have no vivid memory of having lived in a situation of possible war between two heavily armed nuclear superpowers. But this is a scenario that looks very close today." This was thus a conversation we felt it was important to include in our series.

David Barash opened his remarks with a stark

warning that many observers might conclude from Russia's invasion of Ukraine that Ukraine should never have agreed, as it did in 1994, to give up its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, and that therefore, "We must adhere all the more closely to nuclear weapons and if anything obtain even more of them."

He warned that the war could also "serve as a massive impetus for nuclear proliferation in the future, both horizontal, other countries trying to derive a message from this, and also vertical proliferation, with individual countries, the US almost certainly among them, maintaining that we need more and 'better' nuclear weapons. So those of us in the anti-nuclear world have our work cut out for ourselves, perhaps more than ever."

Barash said people should understand, however, that historically, "There are many cases in which having nuclear weapons did not work as a deterrent." The cases he cited were: non-nuclear China sending 300,000 soldiers into Korea in 1950 to fight against the U.S. there, at a time when the U.S. had already demonstrated and used its nuclear arsenal and China had none; Argentina invading the British-controlled Falklands/Malvinas in 1982; and Iraq sending 39

SCUD missiles against nuclear-armed Israel in 1991. Of this latter case Barash said, "Clearly he [Saddam Hussein] was not deterred by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and Israel didn't do anything about it."

He concluded: "We all have a responsibility to declare a just war against nuclear deterrence, which in my mind is really at the heart of the whole nuclear problem that we all face."

Cynthia Lazaroff started with by noting an assessment former Defense Secretary William Perry had recently made, namely that, "The danger of some sort of nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War, and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger. He said, 'We're allowing ourselves sleepwalk into another catastrophe, and we must wake up'."

She continued, "The US and Russia still possess over 90% of the estimated 13,000 nuclear weapons. We still have dangers that existed during the Cold War, such as the risk of inadvertent nuclear war due to accident, blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. We still have ICBMs on launch-on-warning postures with the presidents just having minutes to decide upon receiving warning of a nuclear attack. And these missiles have triggered many false alarms in the past. Plus, we have a whole host of new dangers that didn't exist during the Cold War. These include destabilizing new weapons and missile defense systems, cyber warfare and the cyber-nuclear nexus, emerging technologies, and more."

She said, "We're in a moment of extremely high tensions, in some ways more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis. And... I'm most concerned about two things. First, we have to find our way to a ceasefire to stop the killing, bloodshed, and immense human suffering. And I'm deeply concerned about the risk of escalation which could lead to a nuclear exchange."

Regarding the risk of escalation, Lazaroff said, "We have both state and non-state actors who could take action that could escalate the conflict, inadvertently or intentionally. We have large numbers of NATO and Russian troops now in close proximity in the region. And this multiplies the risk of possible incidents of escalation. And we have uncertainty about where the "red lines" are for NATO and Russia. There are so many pathways to escalation."

Among the risks she noted was this: "The ambiguity in weapons systems that can lead to miscalculation and escalation such as dual-capable missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads that Russia is now using in Ukraine. And there's no way to know what kind of warhead is mounted on the missile until it strikes its target."

Turning to the question: "Would Putin actually push the button?" her assessment was, "The probability may be low, but the risk is not zero. And I believe... that the longer this war goes on, the more Putin feels frustrated, pressured, backed into a corner the more he feels like he's losing, the more his perception is that he and Russia are threatened I think the more likely we could see some kind of intentional escalation to nuclear use." She said she did not know how the U.S. and NATO might respond, but that a simulation done at Princeton that started with just one nuclear launch by Russia during a conventional war had "escalate[d] to a nuclear war with 90 million dead and injured within the first few hours."

Her strong recommendations were: "We have to end this war to make sure that we don't have an escalation that could lead to something like this or worse... We need to reduce the risk of escalation. And we need to prioritize diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations to secure a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops and work out all the points of a peace agreement. To achieve this we need better and more open channels of communication at all levels, diplomatic and military... It's omnicidal behavior to stop talking to your nuclear adversary and words matter. We need to stop the inflammatory and escalatory rhetoric on all sides."

She ended by quoting Dimitri Muratov, the editor in chief of Russia's independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last fall, who said, "Only a global anti-war movement can save life on this planet."

In his response, Richard Falk identified the inequity baked into the non-proliferation regime in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, that allowed only five countries to possess nuclear weapons, while those that do not are left in the position Iraq was in when the United States invaded it in 2003. He concluded that, "Both the critique of nuclear deterrence and the complementary critique of the non-proliferation regime lead us in the direction that Cynthia was eloquently suggesting as the only morally and rationally coherent position, which is abolition."

He endorsed Lazaroff's call for a speedy ceasefire in Ukraine and added, "Once that's done, there is an incentive to once more look around and see what can be done to reduce the nuclear danger. And I think... that we need the language of elimination and abolition."

He also underscored Lazaroff's stress on the importance of rhetoric. Just two days before our session, Pres. Biden stated in Poland that Putin "cannot remain in power." U.S. officials tried to walk back that rhetoric, but widespread suspicion remained that Biden indeed entertained an ambition to achieve regime change in Russia.

In our session, Falk termed Biden's rhetoric "inflammatory" and added: "He even hinted at regime change as a goal. Not only does that increase nuclear risks and nuclear dangers, but it also is a guaranteed way of prolonging the war, and fighting metaphorically till the last Ukrainian in order to satisfy these geopolitical objectives... Having a leader like Putin in Moscow and a leader like Biden in Washington and their interaction to me is one of the salient dangers."

* * *

The conversation that followed ranged over a number of issues including:

x the very risky fact that there is much less communication between Washington and Moscow today than there was in the 1980s;

x the erosion of the global "security architecture" that had been built up during the pre-1990 Cold War, including through steps Washington took after 2000 to abrogate treaties like the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and through Pres. Putin's decision in 2015 to cancel what bilateral nuclear cooperation remained;

x more on the riskiness of Pres. Biden's hawkishness;

x the consequences of the United States' failure to publicly adopt a posture of "No First Use"; and

x the importance of working to maintain people-to-people (as well as military-to-military) contacts between Americans and Russians.

What follows is a rough guide to some of what

we said.

* * *

At one point, I asked David Barash how we should look at the risks of nuclear-relevant miscommunication and accident. He replied: "My immediate reaction is to say we should look at these risks with enormous fear and trembling."

He noted that his wife was a prominent member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a group with members in Russia, the U.S., and other countries, and said: "IPPNW people say there is no communication of the sort that was going on during the 1980s. My understanding is there is no comparable communication going on between highranking US military officers and those of Russia... Certainly with regard to communication, I would have to say things are worse than they were in the 1980s."

Later, Cynthia Lazaroff noted that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and JCS Chairman Mark Milley reportedly had tried to contact their counterparts in Moscow, but were met with no response. She noted that, "The longer this war goes on, the risk of escalation goes on, and I think increases... I would like to hear Biden calling every day for a ceasefire. I would like to be hearing him using the words. 'We need a peace agreement. We need to end this war.' I'm not hearing that kind of language."

Cynthia Lazaroff talked about the setbacks she has suffered recently in the efforts she has pursued since the 1970s to conduct people-to-people diplomacy with Russian counterparts. She said that one project she is involved with, to bring together young and Indigenous people from each side of the Bering Strait, had already suffered long delays because of Covid, and now might need even more postponing. But she noted that a Soviet-era (then Russian) general with whom she worked, Gen. Maslin, had told her shortly before his recent death that "If there are young people still thinking about improving relations in the Bering Strait and coming together from our two countries, all hope is not lost."

She commented, "We have to really make those contacts robust again. We have to get different kinds of people collaborating...Climate scientists! We have such a potential for cooperation, and it seems so idealistic to talk about it right now, but I think the work has never been more important."

Lazaroff talked about the importance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by a number of (non-nuclear) nations in 2017. She described it as "a response to the injustices of the nonproliferation regime and the way the NPT has not fulfilled what it originally said it was going to do in Article Six, which is to... achieve eventual, total and complete disarmament. And the Treaty is a demonstration of what the world can do when we come together in alignment. People said this treaty would never happen. Then they said it would never be ratified. And now it's in force and just last week, another country [joined]. So we're now at 60 countries that have ratified it!"

She said there is, "a growing movement in the nuclear space for divestment, from the banks that fund the nuclear weapons producers. When you do the research, you discover that the biggest offender banks funding nuclear weapons are, many of them, the same ones funding fossil fuels. And we know that there's a divestment movement in the climate justice movement. So I am calling for bringing our movements together and for massive divestment... We're seeing who's profiting from this war in Ukraine. It's the arms dealers and it's the fossil fuel providers' companies. So there is a huge obvious intersection here."

In his closing, Richard Falk said, "The Ukraine crisis has generated the most serious danger of escalation close to or over the nuclear threshold since the Cuban missile crisis, in 1962. And it's a moment when... all citizens of conscience should awaken to the dangers, not only that Russia is causing, but that our own government is contributing to."

At the end, I noted that Lazaroff had been taking part with us from Hawai'i, where it was still early morning and occasionally we could all hear roosters crowing in the farmland behind her. I suggested they provided "a wake-up call for all of us!"

New Report: Common Security For Our Shared Future

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

www.commonsecurity.org

‘Common security’ can be summed up as the simple but elusive idea that “security is for all of us, or it is for none of us”. It is basic common sense but requires a large dose of good sense to be realised. We publish this dossier to encourage such realisation.

For Our Shared Future: Common Security 2022 was launched forty years after publication of the Palme Commission’s Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The new report addresses concerns not included in the original, not least questions of gender and climate change, but in fundamental respects it grapples with the same key question: how to avoid annihilation of humankind in a nuclear inferno?

Here we republish Anna Sundström’s foreword to the report. The full version with further analysis is included in the current issue of The Spokesman: Our Common Security.

Looking at the news in the morning we are faced with pictures showing the terrible cruelty of war, extreme weather events leaving people homeless, and reports on rising poverty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The international order, which enables us to prevent wars, stop global warming, fight a pandemic and tackle global challenges, simply does not work well enough. We have to fix it. For our shared future.

In times of acute crisis, there must be those who can look ahead and give a vision of a better future. Forty years ago, the relationship between the superpowers was at rock bottom. The risk of a devastating nuclear war was high. In that situation, an international commission led by Olof Palme presented a report showing that security is something we create together. More and more powerful weapons are not the answer. The concept of common security was established. That way of thinking came to play a role in future negotiations for disarmament and detente.

By taking the concept of Common Security as its starting point, the Common Security 2022 initiative has analysed the world we live in today and some of the great challenges facing humanity. When reading this report, I hope that you will feel an increased optimism about the future. It is possible to make the world better, if we do it together. The idea for this project came from a conversation in February 2020 between myself and Philip Jennings, Co-President of the International Peace Bureau. Common Security 2022 has worked with limited financial and human resources. But because many have shown an enthusiasm and a willingness to contribute their knowledge, we have created this document together. The International Trade Union Confederation, the International Peace Bureau and the Olof Palme International Center are three organisations different in nature, but we all share a vision of a more peaceful world. When starting this journey, little did we know of the situation we would find ourselves in when presenting this report. Some may say it is naïve to even talk about peace, disarmament and common security when the world is on the brink of a new world war. But, on the contrary, now more than ever, we need a stronger discourse for peace.

I would like to extend a deep thank you to all the members of our High-Level Advisory Commission for the time you have spent attending meetings and providing input to the report. The Commission consists of a highly qualified and hugely experienced group of people from all over the world. The collective knowledge within the Commission is what makes this initiative unique. I would also like to thank everyone who participated in the Common Security 2022 webinar series. The webinars provided us with valuable expertise and insights that are reflected here in the report. To my fellow Steering Committee members, thank you for your time, dedication, and engagement. But there are two people I would like to give an extra heartfelt thanks to: Björn Lindh, our coordinator, and Clare Santry, our editor. Without the two of you we would never have pulled this off.

This initiative does not end with the presentation of this report. Rather, it should be seen as the beginning of work that must continue for a long time to come. Our world is in danger, but together we can build our common security.

Anna Sundström

Secretary General,

Olof Palme International Center

* * * * * 

The following recommendations are taken from the Introduction to the report:

To turn the tide, we must:

• Reaffirm the UN Charter based on the rights and obligations of “we the peoples”. International cooperation and respect for international law must be fundamental to all states.

• Revitalise and implement the call by the UN Secretary General for a worldwide ceasefire as the starting point for peace processes in different regions of the world.

• Reinforce respect for International Humanitarian Law as a matter of urgency, given the increasing harm to civilians in recent conflicts.

• Realise that global peace and security are created jointly – that when your counterpart is not secure, you will not be secure either. There must be respect for the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force and the inviolability of borders.7

• Recognise that the threat of nuclear war and climate change are both existential threats to humanity.

• Strengthen trust between states and peoples, so that countries with different systems, cultures, religions and ideologies can work together on global challenges.

• Build a world order based on human needs. There is no development without peace, nor peace without development. And neither is possible without respect for human rights.

• Ensure inclusive governance at all levels in society, to safeguard democratic principles and the inclusion of women, young people and minorities.

Forty years on from the original Palme Commission, the challenges of our interdependent global society demand, more than ever, collaboration and partnership rather than isolation and distrust. Common Security is about human beings, not just nations. Now, in 2022, it is time to consider whether Common Security can help bring us back from the brink.

* * * * * 

From Olof Palme’s introduction to Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival

Our report expresses our deep concern at the worsening international situation, and at the drift towards war that so many perceive today. We are totally agreed that there is no such thing as a nuclear war that can be won. An all-out nuclear war would mean unprecedented destruction, maybe the extinction of the human species. A so-called limited nuclear war would almost inevitably develop into total nuclear conflagration …

On the basis of this strategy of common security, we discussed practical proposals to achieve arms limitation and disarmament. The long-term goal in the promotion of peace must be general and complete disarmament. But the Commission sees its task as being to consider a gradual process in that direction, to curb and reverse the arms race. We do not propose unilateral action by any country. We clearly see the need for balanced and negotiated reduction in arms.

Our aim has been to promote a downward spiral in armaments. We have elaborated a broad programme for reducing the nuclear threat, including major reductions in all types of strategic nuclear system[s]. We propose the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone starting in Central Europe. We also propose a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. Even the process of beginning to negotiate such limitations, we consider, would reduce political tension in Europe …

We also emphasize the importance of regional approaches to security. We propose to strengthen regional security by creating zones of peace, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and by establishing regional conferences on security and cooperation similar to the one set up in Helsinki for Europe. We believe that regional discussions – including negotiations leading to chemical-weapon and battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe – can play an important role in achieving common security in all parts of the world.

NPT RevCon: The fierce urgency of now

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

International Peace and Planet Network

The following text has been released by the International Peace and Planet Network ahead of the upcoming Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in New York in August 2022.

The Ukraine war and competition among the great powers have dangerously increased the dangers of a third, potentially nuclear, world war, and have underscored what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. over half a century ago described as “the fierce urgency of now”.

Like the period leading to the First World War, our era is marked by tensions between rising and declining powers, complex alliance structures, intense nationalism, territorial disputes, arms races with new technologies, economic integration – and competition, and wild card actors. In the best of circumstances, the end of the war in Ukraine will leave humanity confronted with intensified and dangerous geostrategic competitions, deterioration of strategic stability arrangements among the great powers, and intensified nuclear and advanced technological arms races.

The United Nations Charter and the rule of international law are increasingly being violated. With the limited exception of the New START Treaty, no meaningful arms control agreements remain in force. Cooperation among nations that is essential to contain and reverse the climate crisis and to stanch and prevent pandemics has been undermined and is almost entirely absent. With Finland’s pending accession to NATO, hopes that a 2025 Helsinki OSCE conference could have provided the foundation for negotiation of a new European security architecture have been dashed.

Obstacles to the export of grain and fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine leave the Global South facing increased food insecurity and widespread famine. The fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine is also upending global energy markets, with major implications for the global climate agenda. As U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Gutteres has explained, “Countries could become so consumed by the immediate fossil fuel supply gap that they neglect or knee-cap policies to cut fossil fuel use. This is madness. Addiction to fossil fuels is mutually assured destruction.” Food and fuel insecurity will inevitably stoke conflict and violence that could lead to more wars.

The world’s nations are being consolidated into three opposing blocs: With Russia increasingly dependent on China, and with China seeking to offset pressure from the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” and its Indo-Pacific doctrine, these two powers have entered a tacit alliance. European hopes for increasing interdependence and path leading away from U.S. hegemony have been sidelined as European nations find themselves increasingly dependent on the United States and under the thrall of still expanding NATO. And many of the world’s nations are understandably again opting for non-alignment despite pressures from the great powers to ally or collaborate with their blocs. Across the United States, Europe, Russia, China and much of the Global South, these dynamics are re-enforced by rising authoritarianism in which the governments are not accountable to their people.

Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its nuclear threats, expectations for the 10th Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference (“NPT RevCon") were low. Now, with a brutal and illegal war raging in Ukraine, and with all the nuclear-armed states committed to spending trillions of dollars in new nuclear and high-tech arms races, there is little expectation that the RevCon will even agree on a final consensus document. Faced with the further weakening of the NPT regime, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ("TPNW") and winning additional signatories and ratifications for the TPNW are even more important.

In past years, the international Peace and Planet network has mobilized nuclear abolitionists from around the world to press the NPT RevCons to demand progress by the nuclear-armed states in fulfilling their Article VI obligation to engage in good faith negotiations for “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our peace movements must prioritize deepening our collaborations and raising our voices to prevent a catastrophic world war and win the abolition of potentially omnicidal nuclear weapons. The 10th NPT RevCon provides a crucial opportunity for civil society organizations to meet, strategize, and generate maximum pressure on the world’s governments to make peace with each other, and to make a plan to realize the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

In these circumstances, the international Peace and Planet network celebrates courageous actions being taken around the world to end the Ukraine War, to replace great power confrontations with Common Security diplomacy, and to eliminate the existential dangers posed by nuclear weapons and climate chaos.

As we look to the 10th NPT Review Conference, we urgently call for:

# An immediate Ukraine ceasefire, negotiations that ensure the security of a neutral Ukrainian state, withdrawal of Russian and all foreign troops from Ukraine, and improved Russia-Ukrainian relations that can serve as the foundation for a new European security architecture;

# Mobilization of world public opinion to manifest the popular will for peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons;

Nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to halt the threat of use and deployment of nuclear weapons and to adopt a policy of non-use of nuclear weapons;

# Popular mobilizations and actions by governments to support the TPNW with additional signatures and ratifications of the Treaty;

# Renewed respect for the United Nations Charter and the rule of international law.

At the 10th NPT Review Conference itself we call for:

# The nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to commit to implement their NPT disarmament obligations and previous NPT RevCon commitments without further delay;

# The nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to commit to a timeframe of no later than 2030 for the adoption of a framework, package of agreements or comprehensive nuclear weapons convention¹, and no later than 2045 for full implementation, in order to fulfil the NPT Article VI and customary law obligation to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons no later than the 100th anniversary of the first use of nuclear weapons, the 75th anniversary of the NPT and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

# Organization of a hybrid conference on the eve of the NPT RevCon to provide a vehicle for the world’s peace movements to share their understandings of the dynamics of the increasingly dangerous world disorder and to develop common strategies for peace, disarmament and human survival.

As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. starkly pointed out in his last words, “For years now, we have been talking about war and peace. But now, no longer can we just talk about it. It is no longer a choice between violence and nonviolence; it’s nonviolence or nonexistence.”

¹ Modalities and approaches to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world include: negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention or package of agreements; negotiation of a framework agreement which includes the legal commitment to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, identifies the measures and pathways required in general terms, and provides a process for agreeing on details over time; negotiation of protocols to the TPNW or related instruments which nuclear armed and allied states would sign as part of a process for them to join the TPNW and build the nuclear destruction, elimination, verification and compliance process through the TPNW, particularly its Article 4. See WPAbolition2000WG.pdf

TPNW: the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons?

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Tom Unterrainer

1MSP

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came ‘into force’ on Friday 22 January 2021, following the fiftieth ratification, by Honduras, on 24 October 2020. The coming into force of the Treaty marks an important milestone in the ongoing campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons. For the first time since the creation of atomic and nuclear weapons there is now an explicit prohibition – in the form of a United Nations Treaty – on the development, production, possession, use, threat of use or stationing of another country’s nuclear weapons on state party’s territory.

A second important milestone will take place in Vienna, Austria, at the end of June 2022. Here, the First Meeting of State Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW will take place. This meeting will see delegations from ratifying states, observer nations and a plethora of peace activists and researchers come together to discuss the TPNW’s progress and to map out the next steps.

In assessing prospects for the 1MSP and the TPNW itself, it is worth examining which aspects of the Treaty - beyond the ‘symbolism’ of the ‘ban’ - could be linked to concerted strategic efforts by the peace movements ‘on the streets’.

One measure of the impact of the TPNW are the connected facts that the major nuclear-armed states refused to participate in any part of the negotiating process and some of them felt moved to denounce the Treaty once it was agreed. By churlish non-participation, the nuclear powers suggested that their nuclear policies were not only unpopular with the vast majority of UN member states but that they couldn’t bring themselves to mount an honest, public defence of them. The denunciations and energetic attempts to bully signatories to the Treaty into withdrawal also illustrate the degree to which the nuclear powers were rattled at the prospect of the TPNW gaining traction. This fact alone makes ‘The Ban’ and the process that negotiated it of great and lasting value: “a frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity” according to Richard Falk.

TPNW

What of the Treaty itself? What does it say and what does it do? What doesn’t it do?

The TPNW is based in international law and now that it has come ‘into force’, comprises part of the system of international laws, overseen by the United Nations, which are supposed to regulate the conduct of individual states. As is well known, nuclear armed states are perfectly willing to violate, ignore or reinterpret such laws for their own ends. Indeed, the entire system of international laws designed to prohibit or limit the waging of war have been plagued by breaches since such laws were conceived of. The ill-fated ‘Paris Peace Pact’ was, upon agreement in 1928, heralded as “The Signing of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War” and enormous crowds swelled outside the Quai d’Orsay to witness events. Within three years, Japan had invaded China and within seven, Italy invaded Ethiopia. History records the vile dimensions of what happened next. Closer to the issue of nuclear weapons, the development and use of the V2 rocket – the design on which all present-day missile technology is based – by the Nazis during World War II is an illustrative breach of another international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907, which outlawed the bombardment of undefended residential areas. In all such cases, ‘geopolitics’ – or, to put it more bluntly, imperial ambition – trumped international law with devastating effects. Nevertheless, up until the point where international laws are breached they have material effect both in the sense of establishing a series of ‘norms’ by which state parties feel compelled to abide and in the sense that civil society has a standard by which to formulate demands for the actual regulation of the behaviour of states more generally.

Daryl Kimball argues that the TPNW was “designed to fill a ‘legal gap’ in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime” left open by the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its contradictory formulation of urging disarmament whilst giving legal recognition to nuclear-armed states. Further, Kimball argues that the TPNW is a “much-needed wake-up call that has the potential to stimulate further action and take us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.”

European impact

If we examine the impact of the TPNW on European states – a thorny nest of alliances and US-dominated interests – Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Högstra argue that, with:

“its entry into force, the ban on nuclear weapons will be another step towards developing a norm against possessing nuclear weapons. It will positively influence the behaviour of states that are not party to the treaty, including so-called ‘nuclear umbrella states’ … most of whom are on the European continent.”

One aspect of the Treaty which might concentrate the minds of European leaders is the degree to which the “classification of nuclear weapons as ‘controversial weapons’ by finance industry observers and investors” will impact financial markets and individual businesses. Echoing Falk’s characterisation of the TPNW as a “rejection of nuclearism”, Fihn and Högstra argue that The Ban could force greater transparency from European states about the full extent of their participation in and involvement with nuclear weapons. This is particularly clear when it comes to the reality of ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements across Europe, where ‘non-nuclear’ NATO member states are committed to housing and ‘delivering’ (a grim euphemism for dropping) US nuclear weapons. To date, there has been little transparency about the full extent of nuclear weaponry in bases in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Turkey and even less about the commitments to drop weapons of mass murder at the command of the US Commander in Chief. Exposing this reality, a potential outcome of the TPNW process, would be a large stride towards further delegitimising nuclear weapons. A full debate and full transparency on this issue may have some significant legal ramifications in Germany, where the constitution explicitly rules against the participation of German citizens in crimes against humanity. How does the nuclear sharing arrangement and NATO commitments to deploy such weapons square with German constitutional law?

Article 7, points 1 and 6 of the TPNW state that:

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other State Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty …

6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to the affected State Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

The first point addresses the 1MSP. Such a forum for the discussion and promotion of nuclear abolition amongst states that have already made a legal commitment to such ends will provide an important platform for addressing the recalcitrance of the nuclear-armed states and for promoting denuclearisation more widely. This is surely an important step forwards, not only for the states themselves but for everyone involved in anti-nuclear campaigning. How Russia’s war against Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences will impact progress towards further TPNW ratifications is something that requires precise attention. These developments will be considered in the final part of this article.

Point 6 highlights a means by which international cooperation can address severe injustices resulting from the testing and previous detonations of atomic and nuclear weapons. For far too long, the nuclear powers have refused to make amends or have concealed the true extent of their crimes related to nuclear tests. A case in point is the situation in Algeria, which remains severely polluted from nuclear waste produced during French nuclear tests in the 1960s. Senior Algerian officials have seized the opportunity presented by the TPNW to renew demands for France to make urgent amends. The first step in the process would be for France to finally reveal the locations where it buried nuclear waste in the Algerian Sahara. Coordinated pressure from TPNW State Parties will be a massive boost to Algeria’s determined efforts on this score. Is it beyond the realms of possibility that Ireland and Austria – both TPNW ratifying states and both members of the European Union – press the case through the European Parliament and European Commission? The current commitments of both states to the TPNW and EU suggest that this is a possible and urgent course of action. However, it would not be reasonable to assume that either the Austrian or Irish governments will pursue such ends in the absence of a determined and mobilised anti-nuclear movement in both states and across Europe more widely.

So, even with a clear critique of the ways in which nuclear-armed states conduct themselves and the limitations of international law in many cases, it is possible to see the overwhelming positives presented by the TPNW coming into force. However, Falk argues that there remains a “near fatal weakness” at the heart of The Ban. True, signatures, and even more, the formal entry into force of the treaty lends weight to the claim that the international community has, as Falk puts it:

signalled in an obligatory way the repudiation of nuclear weapons for any and all purposes … The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the TPNW process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome.”

Even before events in Ukraine, the existing nuclear powers and their allies were not active and positive participants in the TPNW process. We will now examine why this is a major problem.

Challenges

The initial approach of the nuclear-armed states and their related alliances to the TPNW was to adopt a ‘persistent objector’ status. As Steven Hill points out in his Chatham House report on NATO and the TPNW, if a state or alliance of states persistently raise their objections to a treaty, then they can - in the terms set out in international law - prevent such a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ or binding on states which have not signed up to the treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ in those states which have ratified the treaty, ‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a more general application of the treaty provisions.

As such, any engagement by nuclear-armed states or members of nuclear-alliances in the TPNW process could ‘crack open’ this carefully considered approach to preventing the TPNW from becoming a ‘customary law’. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there were a number of encouraging signs that just such a ‘crack’ could develop. For instance, the coming to power of the SDP/Green/FDP government in Germany was preceded by lively debate about the future of US nuclear bombs stored in that country. The Greens specifically campaigned on a commitment to sign and ratify the TPNW and the SDP and FDP both stated commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament (albeit in an undefined fashion).

The coalition agreement between these parties included a commitment to work toward a Germany and a world free from nuclear weapons. Mention of the TPNW was not included. However, a clear dynamic was developing and it was not unreasonable to hope that the new German government would send observers to the 1MSP. Had they done so, it would have eased the way for other non-nuclear states, formally tied to NATO or not, to send observers also. Such developments would have done some damage to efforts at maintaining a ‘persistent objector’ approach.

What changed? Far from being a ‘limited security operation’, or whatever President Putin characterises it as, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has done nothing to boost security: certainly not for the Ukrainian people; definitely not for Russia which will now see NATO expand closer to its borders; and most definitely not for Europe and rest of the world. Geopolitics is not the be-all-and-end-all of understanding events but it is essential to understand that as a result of Russia’s actions, the geopolitical developments underway prior to the invasion have benefited from a significant boost. From Sweden and Finland applying to join NATO, to the record levels of military spending now promised by European states, to the more confident - and therfore dangerous - military postures adopted by the US and NATO: the world has become a much more dangerous place.

One artefact of the danger is that it will now be more difficult for the TPNW to get a hearing in the corridors of power. Not only has the ‘crack’ in ‘persistent objection’ been filled but the idea that nuclear weapon possession and membership of nuclear alliances ensures ‘security’ has been boosted.

In recognising these challenges, the movements for nuclear abolition need to think about how to overcome them. If one thing is clear, then it is this: without a creative, vibrant, expansive and determined social movement arguing for nuclear abolition, disarmament, de-militarisation and peace then it seems unlikely that swift and decisive governmental, legal and political changes will occur. Our task is to build such a social movement. ­

Finland: “With NATO membership, nuclear disarmament will end”

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Markus Mustajärvi, Finland

Speech by Markus Mustajärvi in ​​Parliament on 16 May 2022. Mustajärvi is a Left Alliance member of the Finnish Parliament for the Lapland constituency and sits on the Defence Committee.

Mr President! During this period, I have received more information on foreign, security and defense policy issues in three committees and two working groups than any other Member of Parliament. During this season alone, I have been sitting in Parliament’s security room for hundreds of hours listening to experts. My opposition to NATO has only strengthened...

The Finnish government and foreign policy leadership have decided to abandon military non-alignment and to rely on armed security as a result of NATO membership. Military non-alignment served us well throughout the post-World War II period, staying out of the conflicts of interest of the great powers during the Cold War ... Back at the end of last year, the leadership of our country, the President and Government of the Republic, reminded us that Finland's policy of staying out of the military alliances is intended primarily for difficult times when our country may face military confrontation. Back in the autumn, it was emphasized that Finland would not allow any third country or foreign armed forces to use the soil of our country, waters or airspace for hostile purposes against another state. Now all this is forgotten.

Mr President! The political leadership does not seem to take into account the fact that the security policy situation in Finland is not improving but deteriorating under NATO policy. Finland's military position may strengthen with NATO membership, but the security situation in Finland as a whole will deteriorate. At the same time, the long common border between Finland and Russia is becoming the border of the Russian-US-led military alliance, the border of confrontation. The enlargement of the military alliance in the vicinity of Russia's most important nuclear bases in a situation where confrontation in the Arctic is escalating will in no way increase security and, as I said in the debate, no one will fall after the nuclear war. Political leadership does not seem to take into account that NATO membership of the two previously non-military Nordic countries will have a negative impact on the delicate balance of the entire northern region and also of the Arctic region. It is known that the United States also wants Finland's and Sweden's support against Russia in the Arctic, and seems to be succeeding in this.

Mr President! Naivism is not an idea. One after another, key players in the government have argued that we need to go to the nuclear bloc so that we can work more effectively for nuclear disarmament. The non-proliferation treaty enshrined in the government's program has not progressed because this government has not wanted to create obstacles to NATO membership. No NATO member state has signed the TPNW and NATO as an organization does not support it. I remind the left and the Greens that Finland is now nuclear-weapon-free. With NATO membership, nuclear disarmament will end, it will be replaced by a so-called nuclear umbrella. Finland is now making the decision to apply for NATO membership without any conditions. The Swedish Social Democrats, on the other hand, are trying to negotiate that NATO should not deploy bases or nuclear weapons in Sweden, at least in peacetime.

As a member of the military alliance, we will be involved in a major war if one breaks out in Europe. As a member of NATO, we are a leading country. With regard to nuclear weapons and the HX project, it is no coincidence that Finland ended up acquiring F-35s, and in particular a US plane. They were the only option capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and our fighter pilots will certainly be trained for that.

* * * * * * 

Markus Mustajärvi made the following intervention on 17 May 2022, setting out alternative proposals to NATO membership.

1. Finland must declare that under no circumstances will it allow nuclear weapons to be deployed in Finland or its land, airspace or sea areas to be used for the transport or transit of nuclear weapons, as this would automatically make Finland a frontrunner in nuclear war.

2. Finland does not intend to train Finnish pilots to transport and use nuclear weapons.

3. The armed forces of no other country, nor the military bases of NATO, should be permanently stationed in the territory of Finland. In this way, Finland avoids and stays outside the risks arising from the escalation of the international situation.

4. Finland does not allow or allow any other state or its armed forces to use the territory or airspace of our country for hostile purposes against other states. - This point is directly from the report adopted in the autumn.

5. A referendum must be held on Finland's membership in NATO.

In the light of the above, I submit the following statement to Parliament for approval:

“Finland is not applying for NATO membership, but will continue to be non-aligned. Only outside the military alliances does Finland have the opportunity to stay out of the war when the Great War broke out. ”

This is the presentation that will be shared with you.

Then, when Norway was mentioned here many times in a recent debate and it was said that Norway has received certain conditions, such as the absence of permanent troops on its territory and the non-acceptance of nuclear weapons on its own territory. Well, permanent forces can be rotated in such a way that they are constantly rotated. The strength remains, but the men change.

And about nuclear weapons then: Who knows which fighters or submarines or battleships have nuclear weapons. No nuclear-weapon state will tell anyone else what armaments it is carrying.

Translated from https://vasemmisto.fi/

All errors the responsibility of END Info

Sweden: Social Democratic women uphold their ‘No to NATO’

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Annika Strandhäll, Sweden

Annika Strandhäll is the Minister for Climate Change and the Environment in the Swedish government. She is the federal board chair of Social Democratic-women, an organisation with a long and proud history of campaigning for peace, disarmament and non-alignment. Social Democratic-women voiced strong opposition to government plans to join NATO. Here Strandhäll upholds this opposition and considers what will come next.

After intense and thorough discussion, the Social Democrats announced their decision on the NATO issue: the party believes that Sweden should join the defense alliance. It was an expected decision, but it was not the outcome we Social Democratic-women fought for. If the application is approved by NATO, unilateral reservations against the deployment of nuclear weapons and permanent bases on Swedish territory must be expressed.

Social Democratic-women have made a long historical struggle for peace, disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons. Our starting point has been that freedom from military alliances has served Sweden well. In the party's internal discussions, we have therefore chosen to stand up for our ‘no to NATO’. At the same time, we have said that we respect the decision made by the party board - such a major security policy issue is, of course, made democratically.

In the situation we are in now, it is important to look ahead. We will continue to work for solutions in an increasingly threatening world. Dialogue and collaboration must always be our main tools for creating stability and security. NATO membership and military rearmament must not be at the expense of our pursuit of peace and disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

It was thanks to the struggle of Social Democratic-women that the Swedish government in the 60s chose to phase out the Swedish atomic bomb program and sign the non-proliferation agreement. That position must be taken further by the government signing the current UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Sweden must clearly remain a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in both peacetime and possible wartime. The possibilities of adopting national legislation against the introduction of nuclear weapons in Sweden should be reviewed. Sweden must also work for NATO to become a military alliance without nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, Sweden's feminist foreign policy must be firmly established and strengthened. A holistic approach must be taken to build secure and functioning states governed by the rule of law, reduce poverty and meet basic requirements such as health, healthcare, schools and education. Equal development assistance is crucial. In order for development assistance to be strengthened, development assistance money must not be used as a reinforcement of the state budget. The money must always go to international efforts, with a clear focus on humanitarian efforts and educational efforts.

Nationally, too, it is important that investments in peace and relaxation go hand in hand with efforts to strengthen welfare, gender equality and the environment. We must ensure that the costs of NATO membership and military rearmament are not borne at the expense of other important policies that are crucial to a sustainable and equal society.

A broad political consensus is needed on these issues. We therefore want to see a cross-party working group working for this in the Riksdag. In troubled times, it is more important than ever that we put peace, freedom and feminism first. This is our common future!

Translated from the Social Democratic-Women website https://s-kvinnor.se/

NATO Expansion

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has, quite plainly, boosted the idea that membership of NATO ensures security. In both Sweden and Finland, opinion polling on NATO membership shifted significantly following Russia’s actions. The proposal that NATO is purely a ‘defensive alliance’ has been heavily promoted by NATO itself, by individual NATO member states and by those who wish to see the nuclear alliance expand further. This idea has been amplified by sections of the media in all NATO member states and would-be-member states - including by some who offer caveats about the need to reform the organisation.

The decision of both Sweden and Norway to apply for NATO membership should be registered and accounted for honestly: it is a major set-back for the idea of peace itself. These two countries maintained policies of non-alignment under significant international pressures over a considerable period of time. More than that, both played an important role in fostering and nurturing disarmament initiatives and wider schemes for alternative, non-militaristic, approaches to security.

Now they intend to join a nuclear-armed, expansionary and militaristic alliance within which the United States plays the dominant role. The governments of these countries will do so whilst telling their peoples and the rest of the world that they want to ensure security.

Whilst there can be no excuse for Russia’s recent actions, there should be no excuse or room for fanciful or magical thinking. The enduring role of NATO and militaristic approaches to ‘security’ all played their part. With an expanded NATO and record-levels of military spending throughout Europe, the situation will be compounded.

For instance, in what way will Finland’s accession to NATO ensure security along the enormous border it shares with Russia? What, do we suppose, will come to characterise that stretch of land? Will it be a slice of peace and harmony or will it degenerate into a flashpoint? How many troops, tanks, missile systems, warplane and drones will be needed to ‘ensure security’ along this border? How many errors, mistakes or unthinking reactions will it take for hostilities to break out there? Regardless of whether Finland or Russia intends to start a war on this border - and it should be assumed neither side wants any such thing - it will become a highly militarised and contentious border because it will represent a faultline between the nuclear-armed NATO and a nuclear-armed Russia.

In the following pages we re-publish a statement from Anna Strandhäll of the Swedish Social Democratic-Women, which makes clear the traditional approach of that country’s ruling political party. We also publish speeches from and proposals by Markus Mustajärvi, which form part of the record of debate and discussion in the Finnish parliament.

Unlike in Sweden, which seems to be pursuing an approach to NATO membership which seeks to exclude nuclear weapons from the territory, Finland has sought no such exclusions so far. As Anna Strandhäll (Sweden) says: “If the application is approved by NATO, unilateral reservations against the deployment of nuclear weapons and permanent bases on Swedish territory must be expressed.” Contrawise, in Finland: “Finland is now making the decision to apply for NATO membership without any conditions. The Swedish Social Democrats, on the other hand, are trying to negotiate that NATO should not deploy bases or nuclear weapons in Sweden, at least in peacetime”, according to Markus Mustajärvi.

The peace movements should be encouraged that opposition to NATO endures within Sweden and Finland. We must find ways to engage with and develop this opposition.

Nuclear MADness

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Ludo De Brabander

Ludo De Brabender from the Belgian peace organisation Vrede gave the following speech at CND’s Lakenheath demonstration on 21 May 2022.

Russia’s nuclear threats confirm the weaknesses of the idea of ‘deterrence’. Nevertheless deterrence was and still remains the main argument in the US/NATO doctrine for maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals. According to US documents new US B61-12 nuclear bombs are planned to be deployed at the military base in Lakenheath. Do we have to fear a new nuclear arms race? How to create a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe?

A few days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, President Vladimir Putin announced that he had ordered nuclear weapons to be placed on ‘special alert’ status. Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on the battlefield, against troops or military installations.

Regardless of whether president Putin is playing bluff poker and the risk of nuclear war has actually increased, his multiple nuclear threats are an illustration of how dependent we are on the whims of a small group of rulers, their missteps, miscalculations and emotions in times of crisis. In the summer of 2017, president Trump also threatened to launch a nuclear attack to “completely destroy North Korea”. These threats are confirmation of the weaknesses of the idea of ‘deterrence’ attached to most nuclear doctrines. Deterrence is based on the concept of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ often referred to by the acronym MAD. But it is not only an acronym. Nuclear arms are MADness. Nevertheless deterrence was and still remains the main argument in the US/NATO doctrine for maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, their use is possible. Humanity has escaped nuclear war or accidental deployment of nuclear weapons dozens of times. Before fortune fails us, we must get rid of these planet-threatening weapons of mass destruction!

The various nuclear threats from Moscow are irresponsible and must be condemned. But they also make it clear that the war must not escalate further. They show the importance of diplomacy, of serious negotiations. Europe must not go along with the US military strategy aimed at weakening Russia. A wounded animal can strike unexpectedly.

The war is causing tremendous human suffering. But it is also used by the military industrial complex to militarise Europe to levels unimaginable just a few months ago. Military budgets are skyrocketing. NATO was last year responsible for more than half of world wide military spending, 17 times more than Russia. Soon it will be may be 25 times Russia’s military spending. So, let us have no illusions. The militarisation is not intended to serve our security or to defend us, but to prepare and expand hegemonic combat, with what NATO calls systemic rivals.

The new arms race has also a nuclear component. The deployment of new US nuclear B 61-12 bombs at Lakenheath to make the UK part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, is a manifestation of that. Poland, too, has already made it known that it wants to deploy nuclear weapons if asked so. On the other side, Belarus has already lifted its nuclear-weapon-free zone status and threatened that it may well open its territory to new nuclear weapons from Russia. NATO's expansion to include Finland and Sweden or the deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland could lead to new Russian nuclear weapons being deployed in the Baltic Sea area.

If the UK joins the nuclear sharing countries there will be six of them. The atomic bombs in today's countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey) will be replaced by new ones in the coming years. These new B61-12 bombs are equipped with an electronic tail kit that can guide the bomb to its target. They have also lower yield options. The mixture of both, precision and lower yield options make them very dangerous. They could be seen by war planners as more ‘useable’. The new B61-12 will increase the danger of a war with nuclear weapons eroding the concept of ‘deterrence’ even more. So it is MADness that we’ll have to stop.

In every crisis there is an opportunity. The recent nuclear threats may set people in motion for nuclear disarmament and pressure those in power. When hopefully the war in Ukraine can soon be ended, Europe’s political world needs to reflect on lessons learned. One of these lesson’s should be that we need to get rid of the threat of a nuclear armageddon. That’s why we’ll have to re-establish a constructive political environment in which negotiations towards European nuclear disarmament are possible for all nuclear weapon systems in Europe. This is achievable if we rebuild relations with Russia, based on mutual respect for each other’s security interests and confidence building measures. Common indivisible security and disarmament is the path towards a peaceful and secure future. Europe should become a nuclear weapon free zone as soon as possible!!!

Nuclear Europe Map (updated)

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

Target: Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

During the 1980s and the last great wave of anti-nuclear activity, there existed a real sense of individuals, towns and cities being a ‘target’. The deployment of US nuclear missiles across Europe and similar deployments by the USSR created a sense that the continent could become an actual nuclear battlefield. As Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation wrote at the time: “If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home.” We can see a similar process to one Coates described unfolding forty years later. The deployment of ‘useable’ and ‘steerable’ US nuclear bombs and the advanced fighter-bombers which carry them to the UK and elsewhere in Europe will, no doubt, be matched by similar deployments by Russia. The only conceivable use for such weapons would be in a Europe considered disposable by the ‘great powers’. A Europe where nuclear deployments and expansion render the continent a potential nuclear battlefield.

To illustrate the ways in which individuals and the villages, towns and cities in which they live are still a ‘target’ for such weapons or may become victims of a nuclear accident, we have used Alex Wallerstein’s ‘NUKEMAP’ (see nuclearsecrecy.com) to model the potential effect of a nuclear detonation at Lakenheath.

The model is for the ground detonation of just one B61-7, 340 kiloton, nuclear bomb. This bomb, currently in service, is approximately 23 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Lakenheath is in a rural area of England and, as such, does not have a large population density. In this particular version of the model, the wind takes radioactive fallout away from major population areas into the North Sea.

The ground detonation of one such bomb would result in the deaths of 7,290 people and injury to more ten thousand more. Most of the immediate deaths would take place within the blast area. This is the closest model to an accident resulting in the detonation of a nuclear bomb similar to those that look set to return to Lakenheath. By way of comparison, if the same weapon was detonated under the same conditions in Nottingham (UK), where END Info is published, the fatalities would total 136,200 and injuries 164,250.

Whatever the model predicts, it seems true to state that Lakenheath will become a nuclear target at the time it becomes a nuclear storage facility and home to nuclear-capable US aircraft. Has anyone asked the people who live in that area what they think about this prospect? It seems doubtful, in the same way that no British parliamentarian, let alone citizen, has been consulted on the matter.

Destination Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

The US Air Force capabilities already deployed at Lakenheath or likely to be deployed there in the coming months include:

Fifth generation F35A Lightening II aircraft

These aircraft were deployed at Lakenheath in December 2021. According to the manufacturers website (f35.com): “The F-35 delivers an unrivaled advantage for our pilots, nation, and global partners. A decisive differentiator in near-peer warfare, the F-35 is the most advanced node in the networked 21st Century Warfare operational vision.” The website of the US Air Forces in Europe (usafe.af.mil) reports that: “The F-35A is an agile, versatile, high-performance, 9g-capable multirole fighter that combines stealth, sensor fusion and unprecedented situational awareness. The aircraft will belong to the 495th Fighter Squadron, which was nicknamed the ‘Valkyries’ during a voting contest in 2020. The new F-35 squadron will consist of 24 aircraft, delivered in a phased approach.” Those familiar with Wagner’s Operas or Norse mythology will know that Oden sent his Valkyries to the battlefields to decide which of the dead were worthy of a place in Valhalla. The “multirole” and “versatile” F35A is nuclear capable. It seems unlikely that this ‘Valkyrie’ will return to the scene of nuclear devastation.

B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

B61 nuclear bombs have been deployed in Europe under US nuclear sharing arrangements for some time. Originally designed as a Cold War weapon in the 1960s, the B61-12 (modification 12) entered production in December 2021 with the aim of extending the lifespan of these nuclear weapons. The latest modification includes ‘steerability’ and ‘dialable yields’, which means that the bombs can be launched some distance from their target (‘standoff capability’ meaning that pilots can reasonably expect not to be impacted by a nuclear blast) and that the explosive power of the bombs can be set as ‘usable’ on the battlefield. The development and deployment of these bombs to Lakenheath (and elsewhere in Europe) represents a significant and dangerous expansion of the US nuclear bootprint and an escalation in tension between nuclear-armed states.

Expanding Nuclear Bootprint

From END Info 32 | Download

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial Comments

The potential return of US nuclear bombs to the UK was announced without fanfare and – more importantly – without any discussion, debate, deliberation or the opportunity for dissent within Britain’s democratic institutions.

There was no official announcement from the British government. No ministerial statement to Parliament. No press conference with representatives from the US Department of Defense. There wasn’t even a distinct press or information release from United States government.

When the government was asked about this development by the Green MP, Caroline Lucas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence James Heappey gave the following non-reply:

“The is unable to comment on US spending decisions and capabilities, which are a matter for the . It remains longstanding and policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

News of this development emerged only after Hans Kristensen, from the Federation of American Scientists, noticed the addition of the UK to the list of nuclear storage sites to be upgraded under NATO’s $384 million infrastructure investment programme. In the 2022 US Department of Defense budget, storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey were listed. In the 2023 budget, the UK appears on the list.

Let’s untangle this a little. Nuclear developments have almost always operated under a veil of secrecy. For instance, Britain’s atomic programme was done in secret, with not even the then-Cabinet of Her Majesty’s Government being notified. More recently, the current government announced in its Integrated Review that it would “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers”.

Secrecy – or, at the very least a lack of transparency – extends to the arrangements under which the United States stations nuclear bombs elsewhere in Europe. The US and NATO have never been 100% clear on the numbers of nuclear bombs stationed under nuclear sharing arrangements.

When asked about the possibility of further US nuclear weapons coming to Europe under NATO auspices, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said – in December 2021 – “we have no plans of stationing any nuclear weapons in any other countries than we already have these nuclear weapons as part of our deterrence and that … have been there for many years.”

Stoltenberg’s comments have been interpreted as meaning that although Lakenheath’s nuclear storage facilities are to be updated, NATO has ruled out the stationing of US nukes for the time being. I do not think this makes very much sense. I would interpret Stoltenberg’s comments another way. Throughout, he is speaking as the head of NATO. When he says “we” and “our”, he is talking about the nuclear-armed alliance. In this context it is worth noting that the UK’s nuclear weapons are counted as part of NATO’s ‘nuclear capabilities’ and have been for “many years”. This response from Stoltenberg is typical of the prevalent opacity when it comes to nuclear questions.

RAF Lakenheath was the place where the US Air Force stored nuclear gravity bombs. By the early 2000s, 110 B61 bombs were stored there and US F-15E aircraft were stationed there for the purpose of dropping these bombs on command of the President of the United States.

These bombs were removed – without fanfare – in the later 2000’s and it was only in 2008 that their total removal was confirmed. For the first time since 1954, the United States did not store nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

It had already been announced that Lakenheath was to become the first location in Europe for the new US Air Force nuclear-capable F35 fighter-bombers. These arrived in December last year. 24 of them are stationed at the base and the US Air Force is scheduled to commence training for the use of the new generation of guided nuclear bombs, the B61-12’s in the coming year. These bombs will go into production very shortly. According to Hans Kristensen, these bombs look set for shipping to Europe in 2023 where they will replace the B61-3 and 4’s already stationed.

So, it looks almost certain that the US intends to station nuclear bombs in the UK again. This is a major development and one that should be taken very seriously indeed. We are not alone in taking this development seriously: our friends in the European and wider peace, anti-war and anti-nuclear movements are alert to what is happening and they stand with us in our opposition.

Even without the massively increased nuclear tensions that have been developing over the past few years, and which have become even more acute over the past months, our opposition would be sharp.

We know that even in the most stable of times, increasing the US’s nuclear bootprint would create instability. We are not living through particularly stable times.

We know that regardless of other circumstances, a nuclear storage site and an airbase for nuclear capable bombers becomes a target for a nuclear strike. We need to make everyone aware of this risk and link it to all of the other very good reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.

We know that every new nuclear development brings with it new risks, new dangers and new threats in local, regional, national and international contexts.