Nuclear weapons, nuclear alliances and the costs of militarism

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial comments

From END Info 33 DOWNLOAD

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that in 2021, Russian military spending stood at $66,000,000,000 ($66 billion). In the same year the United States spent approximately $801bn. Over the same period, NATO member states, excluding the US, spent $363bn. As Simon Kuper pointed out in the Financial Times (9/10 July 2022): “If the US abandons Europe after 2024” - that is, if Trump or one of his protege’s wins the Presidential election that year - “other NATO states would outspend Russia more than sixfold.”

At the recent NATO conference in Madrid, Secretary-General Stoltenberg announced that the nuclear-armed alliance’s ‘high-readiness forces’ will increase in number from 40,000 to 300,000 by 2023. This is an almost eightfold increase and will include:

battlegroups in the eastern part of the alliance ... enhanced up to brigade levels, with forces pre-assigned to specific locations; and more heavy weapons, logistics and command-and control assets ... pre-positioned.

[Dr. Ian Davis, NATO Watch Briefing Paper No. 96]

In addition to the upgrade of units and material, President Biden has promised further troop and weapon deployments in Europe and a new HQ in Poland.

The content and implications of NATO’s new ‘Strategic Concept’ will be considered later but suffice to say that the global ambitions, spending commitments, reasserted role of nuclear weapons and the overall posture paint a deadly picture.

NATO is remilitarising and in so doing, enormous damage will be done to rational concepts of peace, security, investment, social security and the environment. Simon Kuper [ibid] quotes Dan Plesch of SOAS, University of London, on the implications of this new wave of militarisation. Plesch warns:

Worst case is we stumble into unintended global war. Best case is we stockpile and never use the weapons, but use our scarce resources on them.

Plesch’s warning of “unintended global war” should not be taken lightly and we should not forget what the dimensions of such a war would encompass: the risk of all-out nuclear war and the subsequent destruction of humanity.

In his opening comments to the much-delayed Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that “humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation”. In subsequent comments, he explained that relying on “luck” - which has stood in the way of such annihilation on more than one occasion - is not a strategy for human survival.

The sharpening tensions arising from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine - including stark nuclear tensions - put us all at risk. Yet the response of NATO is unlikely to reduce the tensions, nuclear or otherwise. In fact, such responses follow a pattern we have seen in the past and will undoubtedly replicate the worst possible consequences.

Spend, spend, spend

The New York Times of December 8, 1987 reported that the sum total of United States missiles, aircraft and submarines capable of ‘delivering’ so-called ‘strategic’ nuclear warheads amounted to 11,786. The targets for these weapons were 220 urban industrial centres across the Soviet bloc. As Seymour Melman points out in The Demilitarized Society: “Hence, US forces have more than fifty times overkill capability.”

Melman notes that if this “overkill capability” was reduced by 75%, a budget saving of $54.6 billion ($142 billion in 2022) would be made. Such a reduction would have left the US with an “overkill capability” of twelve. The Demilitarized Society (1988) focuses on the problems arising from sustained and extreme levels of military spending in the post-WWII US economy. He explains that whilst money, skill and effort were poured into creating machines of mass annihilation:

The US now lacks a modern rail system, a modern highway system in good repair ... The city streets are poorly paved. Between a fifth to a third of the highway bridges in the US are rated as needing major repair. Decent housing is no longer available for millions. There is a growth of homelessness and hunger ... Important parts of the population draw water from aquifers that are contaminated. The national parks are in poor repair. The libraries are poorly operated. Waste disposal systems violate modern technical standards. The public school buildings of New York City require an expenditure of $8 billion for decent repair.

Between 2002 and 2016, the top 100 weapons manufacturers and ‘military service’ companies logged 38% growth in global sales. In 2016, these sales – excluding Chinese companies – amounted to $375 billion, turning $60 billion profit. Between 1998 and 2011, the Pentagon’s budget grew in real terms by 91% while defence industry profits quadrupled.

In the 1970s, investment in the ‘information technology’ sector stood at $17 billion. By 2017, investment in this sector exceeded $700 billion. In the same year, Apple’s market capitalisation stood at $730 billion, Google stood at $581 billion, and Microsoft stood at $497 billion. Meanwhile, Exxon Mobile – the highest placed ‘industrial’ company – had a market capitalisation of $344 billion. By comparison, the arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin had a capitalisation of around $321 billion and Rolls Royce $21 billion at the end of 2017.

Whilst the United States and other countries continue to purchase – and use – vast quantities of ‘conventional’ weaponry, the extraordinary figures quoted above occurred alongside the unleashing of a ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, powered by significant leaps in capability in computing, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, ‘autonomous’ vehicles and the rest. Ever greater sums are being spent on military and policing applications of the ‘fruits’ of this ‘Revolution’. So much so, that the sociologist William I. Robinson (Race and Class, 2018) identifies a trend towards what he terms ‘militarised accumulation’ as a ‘major source of state­ organised profit-making’.

In 1988, Melman warned that:

[M]assive, sustained military spending is, qualitatively, the single most critical factor in the cumulative depletion of the industrial economy. If this is dealt with decisively then the rest can be addressed. If that factor is unattended, then the rest is rendered unmanageable, and a process of continued decline is locked in place.

Such massive, and long-term, patterns of military expenditure and the material consequences on society at large are made, consistently, in the name of ‘security’. Each and every bullet, missile, nuclear warhead, bomber, armed drone, submarine, warship and tank is - we are told - there for ‘our security’. This militarised approach to ‘security’ is riddled with contradictions.

Militarised ‘security’

Climate change constitutes a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to our national security and, make no mistake, it will impact how our military defends our country. And so we need to act - and we need to act now.

President Obama, May 2015

The US army is the most highly funded military organisation in human history. It is also the single largest institutional polluter on the planet. Obama’s eloquently delivered speeches on the risks associated with climate change morphed from initially wholesome appeals for action to save humanity, to framing the question as a matter of national security. As Nick Buxton points out (‘Securing whose future?’ The Spokesman 134):

The Pentagon is the world’s single largest organisational user of petroleum: one of its jets, the B-52 Stratocruiser, consumes roughly 3,334 gallons per hour, about as much fuel as the average driver uses in seven years.

As state level reaction to climate catastrophe incorporates more militarised ‘security’ responses and as multinational efforts at climate change reduction - such as the recent COP26 - fail to meet needs and expectations, it seems likely that militarised responses will be emphasised above other forms. After all, it is much easier to secure funding for military expenditure than for anything else and such expenditure drives corporate profiteering:

US defence contractor Raytheon openly proclaims its ‘expanded business opportunities’ arising from ‘security concerns and their possible consequences’, due to the ‘effects of climate change’ in the form of ‘storms, droughts, and floods’. (Buxton)

Neta Crawford from the ‘Costs of War Project’ at Brown University estimates that in 2017 alone, the US military emitted more carbon dioxide than Sweden, Denmark and Finland combined (Jessica Fort and Philipp Straub, ‘The Carbon Boot-Print’, The Spokesman 144). Freedom of Information Act (US) requests to the US Defense Logistics Agency, which is responsible for managing fuel purchase and distribution show that in 2017, the Department of Defense emitted 59 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and that from 2001 to 2017, a total of 1,212 million metric tons of the same gas was emitted. These figures include the period covering the bombing, invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the illegal war against and occupation of Iraq.

Not only do wars, the preparations for war and militarised responses to ‘security’ risks have immediate destructive consequences in terms of death, depletion of resources and environmental damage: each and every day that sophisticated and expansive capabilites, such as those embodied in the US military, operate means additional releases of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. The impact of US and allied military operations in Iraq could be seen on the TV screen. Civilians on the streets of Baghdad and elsewhere saw the death and catastrophe first hand. What was not reported or broadcast and what has gone largely unmentioned is the legacy of environmental harm arising from these events.

How many B-52s flew in the years of war and occupation? How many hours in total were they in the air? How many gallons does that amount to? How many cubic tons of greenhouse gasses? How many more fractions of a degree did this take us to catastrophic temperature increases? What militarised responses have been put in place to ensure ‘security’ as a consequence of this increase in temperature? How many B-52s will it take to ensure ‘security’ from the consequences of war?...

This is just one example of the contradictions that arise in militarised responses to ‘security’. In common with other examples, it shares the features outlined earlier: the enormous sums of money devoted to military spending and the way in which such spending shapes the economy more generally. This example also shares another, connected, feature with other militarised responses to ‘security’: the fact that such responses simply make matters worse.

Law of the instrument

In his The Psychology of Science (1966), Abraham Maslow made the following observation:

I remember seeing an elaborate and complicated automatic washing machine for automobiles that did a beautiful job of washing them. But it could do only that, and everything else that got into its clutches was treated as if were an automobile to be washed. I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.

Whatever else you might think of Maslow’s psychological theories, this observation - an outline of the ‘Law of the Instrument’ - seems a close fit to NATO’s approach to ‘security’. The nuclear-armed alliance is on the hunt for nails.

However, the fact that NATO is armed to the teeth with hammers is not a sufficient explanation for why it sees every problem as a nail. The purely military-industrial aspect of militarisation might indicate how NATO will react in any given circumstance but it does not account for the US-dominated, nuclear-armed alliance’s wider aims and perspectives.

The preface to the 2022 document explains:

The Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring our national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values ...

Our vision is clear: we want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all who share these goals. We stand together, as Allies, to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world.

Fine sentiments. Yet the reality of NATO’s actions, historic and contemporary, and the belligerence of certain NATO members today, exposes these sentiments as insincere waffle. NATO’s new Strategic Concept actually reflects Jens Stoltenberg’s perception - and we should assume he largely acts to telegraph the views of the US, in particular - that “we now face an era of strategic competition”.

Whereas the 2010 Strategic Concept could proclaim that “the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low”, the 2022 version warns: “the Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace ... We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies.” Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”. China is a “systemic challenge” and China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests and values.” Russian/Chinese relations are a “deepening strategic partnership”.

In the same way that President Bush Jnr concocted an ‘Axis of Evil’ to mobilise support for his wars of aggression, NATO has now outlined a new ‘Axis’ of threat, systematically aiming to link Russia and China. All the better for attempting to justify NATO’s tilt to China - some distance away from the North Atlantic area! In response, China’s mission to the European Union stated: 

NATO’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking China. We firmly oppose it.

We previously argued that US foreign policy under the Trump administration reflected wild and reckless attempts to maintain US influence in a period of shift from unipolarity to multipolarity (‘Global Tinderbox’, The Spokesman 141). The ‘bonfire of treaties’, aggressive statements and Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review reflected these attempts. At the time, Trump could not take NATO with him and devoted some energy to attacking the nuclear-armed alliance, not least for member states reluctance to meet spending commitments.

Trump is no longer the US President, but NATO is now spending positively Trumpian amounts of money on armaments and rearmament. NATO has also fallen into line with US concerns about the emergence of alternative centres of power and influence. This is why they were happy to sign up to the new Strategic Concept and why ‘partners’ from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were welcomed in Madrid.

A nuclear-armed alliance

The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance ... NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned.

NATO 2022 Strategic Concept

If, for NATO, every problem is a nail, then the biggest hammer at its disposal is the nuclear weapon. As the Strategic Concept makes clear, it is the “supreme guarantee” of ‘security’. Only a truly sick mind could confuse a world-ending weapon of genocide withanything of the sort, but this is the reality we are dealing with.

The expansion of NATO’s nuclear bootprint across Europe (see END Info 32) and the steady incorporation of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea into NATO’s strategic thinking (see END Info 27 for analysis of AUKUS) are conceived of as ‘security measures’. These measures, along with massive increases in military spending and troop deployments, sow the seeds of potentially catastrophic outcomes. The catastrophe could be immanent, medium- or long-term, as risks multiply and as pressing concerns around climate change, hunger, pandemic and health intensify.

A truly secure future must mean working for peaceful outcomes to these challenges, not preparing for war.

Nuclear risks and realities of the Ukraine crisis

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Helena Cobban with David Barash, Cynthia Lazaroff and Richard Falk

Ukraine: Stop the Carnage, Build the Peace!

Introduction and Policy Recommendations

In March 2022, Just World Educational held a series of eight webinars on the international crisis sparked by Russia's February invasion of Ukraine. The sessions were co-hosted by JWE President Helena Cobban and Board Member Richard Falk; in each one, they conducted a broad public conversation on issues raised by the crisis with superbly well-qualified and thoughtful guests.

The multimedia records of all these conversations can be viewed at bit.ly/JWE-UkraineCrisis. Policy Recommendations arising from these conversations are as follows:

1. Ukraine-wide ceasefire now!

2. An embargo on arms shipments into Ukraine by all countries.

3. Start negotiations now, involving all relevant parties, for a lasting peace arrangement for Ukraine, and commit to completion within six months.

4. Monitoring and verification of the ceasefire and arms embargo to be led by the United Nations and the OSCE, or any other party acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia.

5. Immediate aid for rebuilding in Ukraine, including for agriculture, ports, residential areas, and related systems.

6. Immediate international talks on implementation of 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which all signatory states including the United States and Russia committed to complete nuclear disarmament, and a call for all governments to support the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons .

7. Leaders of NATO countries should oppose all manifestations of Russophobia.

8. The United States should give up all efforts at regime change in Russia.

A full report on the conversations can be accessed at justworldeducational.org

*   *  *

For our March 28 conversation, Richard Falk and I [Helena Cobban] were delighted to have as our guests two very experienced anti-nuclear scholar/activists, Cynthia Lazaroff and David Barash.

In my introduction I noted, "Most people who are under, say, 45 years old have no vivid memory of having lived in a situation of possible war between two heavily armed nuclear superpowers. But this is a scenario that looks very close today." This was thus a conversation we felt it was important to include in our series.

David Barash opened his remarks with a stark

warning that many observers might conclude from Russia's invasion of Ukraine that Ukraine should never have agreed, as it did in 1994, to give up its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, and that therefore, "We must adhere all the more closely to nuclear weapons and if anything obtain even more of them."

He warned that the war could also "serve as a massive impetus for nuclear proliferation in the future, both horizontal, other countries trying to derive a message from this, and also vertical proliferation, with individual countries, the US almost certainly among them, maintaining that we need more and 'better' nuclear weapons. So those of us in the anti-nuclear world have our work cut out for ourselves, perhaps more than ever."

Barash said people should understand, however, that historically, "There are many cases in which having nuclear weapons did not work as a deterrent." The cases he cited were: non-nuclear China sending 300,000 soldiers into Korea in 1950 to fight against the U.S. there, at a time when the U.S. had already demonstrated and used its nuclear arsenal and China had none; Argentina invading the British-controlled Falklands/Malvinas in 1982; and Iraq sending 39

SCUD missiles against nuclear-armed Israel in 1991. Of this latter case Barash said, "Clearly he [Saddam Hussein] was not deterred by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and Israel didn't do anything about it."

He concluded: "We all have a responsibility to declare a just war against nuclear deterrence, which in my mind is really at the heart of the whole nuclear problem that we all face."

Cynthia Lazaroff started with by noting an assessment former Defense Secretary William Perry had recently made, namely that, "The danger of some sort of nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War, and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger. He said, 'We're allowing ourselves sleepwalk into another catastrophe, and we must wake up'."

She continued, "The US and Russia still possess over 90% of the estimated 13,000 nuclear weapons. We still have dangers that existed during the Cold War, such as the risk of inadvertent nuclear war due to accident, blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. We still have ICBMs on launch-on-warning postures with the presidents just having minutes to decide upon receiving warning of a nuclear attack. And these missiles have triggered many false alarms in the past. Plus, we have a whole host of new dangers that didn't exist during the Cold War. These include destabilizing new weapons and missile defense systems, cyber warfare and the cyber-nuclear nexus, emerging technologies, and more."

She said, "We're in a moment of extremely high tensions, in some ways more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis. And... I'm most concerned about two things. First, we have to find our way to a ceasefire to stop the killing, bloodshed, and immense human suffering. And I'm deeply concerned about the risk of escalation which could lead to a nuclear exchange."

Regarding the risk of escalation, Lazaroff said, "We have both state and non-state actors who could take action that could escalate the conflict, inadvertently or intentionally. We have large numbers of NATO and Russian troops now in close proximity in the region. And this multiplies the risk of possible incidents of escalation. And we have uncertainty about where the "red lines" are for NATO and Russia. There are so many pathways to escalation."

Among the risks she noted was this: "The ambiguity in weapons systems that can lead to miscalculation and escalation such as dual-capable missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads that Russia is now using in Ukraine. And there's no way to know what kind of warhead is mounted on the missile until it strikes its target."

Turning to the question: "Would Putin actually push the button?" her assessment was, "The probability may be low, but the risk is not zero. And I believe... that the longer this war goes on, the more Putin feels frustrated, pressured, backed into a corner the more he feels like he's losing, the more his perception is that he and Russia are threatened I think the more likely we could see some kind of intentional escalation to nuclear use." She said she did not know how the U.S. and NATO might respond, but that a simulation done at Princeton that started with just one nuclear launch by Russia during a conventional war had "escalate[d] to a nuclear war with 90 million dead and injured within the first few hours."

Her strong recommendations were: "We have to end this war to make sure that we don't have an escalation that could lead to something like this or worse... We need to reduce the risk of escalation. And we need to prioritize diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations to secure a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops and work out all the points of a peace agreement. To achieve this we need better and more open channels of communication at all levels, diplomatic and military... It's omnicidal behavior to stop talking to your nuclear adversary and words matter. We need to stop the inflammatory and escalatory rhetoric on all sides."

She ended by quoting Dimitri Muratov, the editor in chief of Russia's independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last fall, who said, "Only a global anti-war movement can save life on this planet."

In his response, Richard Falk identified the inequity baked into the non-proliferation regime in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, that allowed only five countries to possess nuclear weapons, while those that do not are left in the position Iraq was in when the United States invaded it in 2003. He concluded that, "Both the critique of nuclear deterrence and the complementary critique of the non-proliferation regime lead us in the direction that Cynthia was eloquently suggesting as the only morally and rationally coherent position, which is abolition."

He endorsed Lazaroff's call for a speedy ceasefire in Ukraine and added, "Once that's done, there is an incentive to once more look around and see what can be done to reduce the nuclear danger. And I think... that we need the language of elimination and abolition."

He also underscored Lazaroff's stress on the importance of rhetoric. Just two days before our session, Pres. Biden stated in Poland that Putin "cannot remain in power." U.S. officials tried to walk back that rhetoric, but widespread suspicion remained that Biden indeed entertained an ambition to achieve regime change in Russia.

In our session, Falk termed Biden's rhetoric "inflammatory" and added: "He even hinted at regime change as a goal. Not only does that increase nuclear risks and nuclear dangers, but it also is a guaranteed way of prolonging the war, and fighting metaphorically till the last Ukrainian in order to satisfy these geopolitical objectives... Having a leader like Putin in Moscow and a leader like Biden in Washington and their interaction to me is one of the salient dangers."

* * *

The conversation that followed ranged over a number of issues including:

x the very risky fact that there is much less communication between Washington and Moscow today than there was in the 1980s;

x the erosion of the global "security architecture" that had been built up during the pre-1990 Cold War, including through steps Washington took after 2000 to abrogate treaties like the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and through Pres. Putin's decision in 2015 to cancel what bilateral nuclear cooperation remained;

x more on the riskiness of Pres. Biden's hawkishness;

x the consequences of the United States' failure to publicly adopt a posture of "No First Use"; and

x the importance of working to maintain people-to-people (as well as military-to-military) contacts between Americans and Russians.

What follows is a rough guide to some of what

we said.

* * *

At one point, I asked David Barash how we should look at the risks of nuclear-relevant miscommunication and accident. He replied: "My immediate reaction is to say we should look at these risks with enormous fear and trembling."

He noted that his wife was a prominent member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a group with members in Russia, the U.S., and other countries, and said: "IPPNW people say there is no communication of the sort that was going on during the 1980s. My understanding is there is no comparable communication going on between highranking US military officers and those of Russia... Certainly with regard to communication, I would have to say things are worse than they were in the 1980s."

Later, Cynthia Lazaroff noted that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and JCS Chairman Mark Milley reportedly had tried to contact their counterparts in Moscow, but were met with no response. She noted that, "The longer this war goes on, the risk of escalation goes on, and I think increases... I would like to hear Biden calling every day for a ceasefire. I would like to be hearing him using the words. 'We need a peace agreement. We need to end this war.' I'm not hearing that kind of language."

Cynthia Lazaroff talked about the setbacks she has suffered recently in the efforts she has pursued since the 1970s to conduct people-to-people diplomacy with Russian counterparts. She said that one project she is involved with, to bring together young and Indigenous people from each side of the Bering Strait, had already suffered long delays because of Covid, and now might need even more postponing. But she noted that a Soviet-era (then Russian) general with whom she worked, Gen. Maslin, had told her shortly before his recent death that "If there are young people still thinking about improving relations in the Bering Strait and coming together from our two countries, all hope is not lost."

She commented, "We have to really make those contacts robust again. We have to get different kinds of people collaborating...Climate scientists! We have such a potential for cooperation, and it seems so idealistic to talk about it right now, but I think the work has never been more important."

Lazaroff talked about the importance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by a number of (non-nuclear) nations in 2017. She described it as "a response to the injustices of the nonproliferation regime and the way the NPT has not fulfilled what it originally said it was going to do in Article Six, which is to... achieve eventual, total and complete disarmament. And the Treaty is a demonstration of what the world can do when we come together in alignment. People said this treaty would never happen. Then they said it would never be ratified. And now it's in force and just last week, another country [joined]. So we're now at 60 countries that have ratified it!"

She said there is, "a growing movement in the nuclear space for divestment, from the banks that fund the nuclear weapons producers. When you do the research, you discover that the biggest offender banks funding nuclear weapons are, many of them, the same ones funding fossil fuels. And we know that there's a divestment movement in the climate justice movement. So I am calling for bringing our movements together and for massive divestment... We're seeing who's profiting from this war in Ukraine. It's the arms dealers and it's the fossil fuel providers' companies. So there is a huge obvious intersection here."

In his closing, Richard Falk said, "The Ukraine crisis has generated the most serious danger of escalation close to or over the nuclear threshold since the Cuban missile crisis, in 1962. And it's a moment when... all citizens of conscience should awaken to the dangers, not only that Russia is causing, but that our own government is contributing to."

At the end, I noted that Lazaroff had been taking part with us from Hawai'i, where it was still early morning and occasionally we could all hear roosters crowing in the farmland behind her. I suggested they provided "a wake-up call for all of us!"

New Report: Common Security For Our Shared Future

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

www.commonsecurity.org

‘Common security’ can be summed up as the simple but elusive idea that “security is for all of us, or it is for none of us”. It is basic common sense but requires a large dose of good sense to be realised. We publish this dossier to encourage such realisation.

For Our Shared Future: Common Security 2022 was launched forty years after publication of the Palme Commission’s Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. The new report addresses concerns not included in the original, not least questions of gender and climate change, but in fundamental respects it grapples with the same key question: how to avoid annihilation of humankind in a nuclear inferno?

Here we republish Anna Sundström’s foreword to the report. The full version with further analysis is included in the current issue of The Spokesman: Our Common Security.

Looking at the news in the morning we are faced with pictures showing the terrible cruelty of war, extreme weather events leaving people homeless, and reports on rising poverty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The international order, which enables us to prevent wars, stop global warming, fight a pandemic and tackle global challenges, simply does not work well enough. We have to fix it. For our shared future.

In times of acute crisis, there must be those who can look ahead and give a vision of a better future. Forty years ago, the relationship between the superpowers was at rock bottom. The risk of a devastating nuclear war was high. In that situation, an international commission led by Olof Palme presented a report showing that security is something we create together. More and more powerful weapons are not the answer. The concept of common security was established. That way of thinking came to play a role in future negotiations for disarmament and detente.

By taking the concept of Common Security as its starting point, the Common Security 2022 initiative has analysed the world we live in today and some of the great challenges facing humanity. When reading this report, I hope that you will feel an increased optimism about the future. It is possible to make the world better, if we do it together. The idea for this project came from a conversation in February 2020 between myself and Philip Jennings, Co-President of the International Peace Bureau. Common Security 2022 has worked with limited financial and human resources. But because many have shown an enthusiasm and a willingness to contribute their knowledge, we have created this document together. The International Trade Union Confederation, the International Peace Bureau and the Olof Palme International Center are three organisations different in nature, but we all share a vision of a more peaceful world. When starting this journey, little did we know of the situation we would find ourselves in when presenting this report. Some may say it is naïve to even talk about peace, disarmament and common security when the world is on the brink of a new world war. But, on the contrary, now more than ever, we need a stronger discourse for peace.

I would like to extend a deep thank you to all the members of our High-Level Advisory Commission for the time you have spent attending meetings and providing input to the report. The Commission consists of a highly qualified and hugely experienced group of people from all over the world. The collective knowledge within the Commission is what makes this initiative unique. I would also like to thank everyone who participated in the Common Security 2022 webinar series. The webinars provided us with valuable expertise and insights that are reflected here in the report. To my fellow Steering Committee members, thank you for your time, dedication, and engagement. But there are two people I would like to give an extra heartfelt thanks to: Björn Lindh, our coordinator, and Clare Santry, our editor. Without the two of you we would never have pulled this off.

This initiative does not end with the presentation of this report. Rather, it should be seen as the beginning of work that must continue for a long time to come. Our world is in danger, but together we can build our common security.

Anna Sundström

Secretary General,

Olof Palme International Center

* * * * * 

The following recommendations are taken from the Introduction to the report:

To turn the tide, we must:

• Reaffirm the UN Charter based on the rights and obligations of “we the peoples”. International cooperation and respect for international law must be fundamental to all states.

• Revitalise and implement the call by the UN Secretary General for a worldwide ceasefire as the starting point for peace processes in different regions of the world.

• Reinforce respect for International Humanitarian Law as a matter of urgency, given the increasing harm to civilians in recent conflicts.

• Realise that global peace and security are created jointly – that when your counterpart is not secure, you will not be secure either. There must be respect for the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force and the inviolability of borders.7

• Recognise that the threat of nuclear war and climate change are both existential threats to humanity.

• Strengthen trust between states and peoples, so that countries with different systems, cultures, religions and ideologies can work together on global challenges.

• Build a world order based on human needs. There is no development without peace, nor peace without development. And neither is possible without respect for human rights.

• Ensure inclusive governance at all levels in society, to safeguard democratic principles and the inclusion of women, young people and minorities.

Forty years on from the original Palme Commission, the challenges of our interdependent global society demand, more than ever, collaboration and partnership rather than isolation and distrust. Common Security is about human beings, not just nations. Now, in 2022, it is time to consider whether Common Security can help bring us back from the brink.

* * * * * 

From Olof Palme’s introduction to Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival

Our report expresses our deep concern at the worsening international situation, and at the drift towards war that so many perceive today. We are totally agreed that there is no such thing as a nuclear war that can be won. An all-out nuclear war would mean unprecedented destruction, maybe the extinction of the human species. A so-called limited nuclear war would almost inevitably develop into total nuclear conflagration …

On the basis of this strategy of common security, we discussed practical proposals to achieve arms limitation and disarmament. The long-term goal in the promotion of peace must be general and complete disarmament. But the Commission sees its task as being to consider a gradual process in that direction, to curb and reverse the arms race. We do not propose unilateral action by any country. We clearly see the need for balanced and negotiated reduction in arms.

Our aim has been to promote a downward spiral in armaments. We have elaborated a broad programme for reducing the nuclear threat, including major reductions in all types of strategic nuclear system[s]. We propose the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone starting in Central Europe. We also propose a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. Even the process of beginning to negotiate such limitations, we consider, would reduce political tension in Europe …

We also emphasize the importance of regional approaches to security. We propose to strengthen regional security by creating zones of peace, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and by establishing regional conferences on security and cooperation similar to the one set up in Helsinki for Europe. We believe that regional discussions – including negotiations leading to chemical-weapon and battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe – can play an important role in achieving common security in all parts of the world.

NPT RevCon: The fierce urgency of now

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

International Peace and Planet Network

The following text has been released by the International Peace and Planet Network ahead of the upcoming Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in New York in August 2022.

The Ukraine war and competition among the great powers have dangerously increased the dangers of a third, potentially nuclear, world war, and have underscored what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. over half a century ago described as “the fierce urgency of now”.

Like the period leading to the First World War, our era is marked by tensions between rising and declining powers, complex alliance structures, intense nationalism, territorial disputes, arms races with new technologies, economic integration – and competition, and wild card actors. In the best of circumstances, the end of the war in Ukraine will leave humanity confronted with intensified and dangerous geostrategic competitions, deterioration of strategic stability arrangements among the great powers, and intensified nuclear and advanced technological arms races.

The United Nations Charter and the rule of international law are increasingly being violated. With the limited exception of the New START Treaty, no meaningful arms control agreements remain in force. Cooperation among nations that is essential to contain and reverse the climate crisis and to stanch and prevent pandemics has been undermined and is almost entirely absent. With Finland’s pending accession to NATO, hopes that a 2025 Helsinki OSCE conference could have provided the foundation for negotiation of a new European security architecture have been dashed.

Obstacles to the export of grain and fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine leave the Global South facing increased food insecurity and widespread famine. The fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine is also upending global energy markets, with major implications for the global climate agenda. As U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Gutteres has explained, “Countries could become so consumed by the immediate fossil fuel supply gap that they neglect or knee-cap policies to cut fossil fuel use. This is madness. Addiction to fossil fuels is mutually assured destruction.” Food and fuel insecurity will inevitably stoke conflict and violence that could lead to more wars.

The world’s nations are being consolidated into three opposing blocs: With Russia increasingly dependent on China, and with China seeking to offset pressure from the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” and its Indo-Pacific doctrine, these two powers have entered a tacit alliance. European hopes for increasing interdependence and path leading away from U.S. hegemony have been sidelined as European nations find themselves increasingly dependent on the United States and under the thrall of still expanding NATO. And many of the world’s nations are understandably again opting for non-alignment despite pressures from the great powers to ally or collaborate with their blocs. Across the United States, Europe, Russia, China and much of the Global South, these dynamics are re-enforced by rising authoritarianism in which the governments are not accountable to their people.

Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its nuclear threats, expectations for the 10th Nuclear Nonproliferation Review Conference (“NPT RevCon") were low. Now, with a brutal and illegal war raging in Ukraine, and with all the nuclear-armed states committed to spending trillions of dollars in new nuclear and high-tech arms races, there is little expectation that the RevCon will even agree on a final consensus document. Faced with the further weakening of the NPT regime, the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ("TPNW") and winning additional signatories and ratifications for the TPNW are even more important.

In past years, the international Peace and Planet network has mobilized nuclear abolitionists from around the world to press the NPT RevCons to demand progress by the nuclear-armed states in fulfilling their Article VI obligation to engage in good faith negotiations for “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our peace movements must prioritize deepening our collaborations and raising our voices to prevent a catastrophic world war and win the abolition of potentially omnicidal nuclear weapons. The 10th NPT RevCon provides a crucial opportunity for civil society organizations to meet, strategize, and generate maximum pressure on the world’s governments to make peace with each other, and to make a plan to realize the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

In these circumstances, the international Peace and Planet network celebrates courageous actions being taken around the world to end the Ukraine War, to replace great power confrontations with Common Security diplomacy, and to eliminate the existential dangers posed by nuclear weapons and climate chaos.

As we look to the 10th NPT Review Conference, we urgently call for:

# An immediate Ukraine ceasefire, negotiations that ensure the security of a neutral Ukrainian state, withdrawal of Russian and all foreign troops from Ukraine, and improved Russia-Ukrainian relations that can serve as the foundation for a new European security architecture;

# Mobilization of world public opinion to manifest the popular will for peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons;

Nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to halt the threat of use and deployment of nuclear weapons and to adopt a policy of non-use of nuclear weapons;

# Popular mobilizations and actions by governments to support the TPNW with additional signatures and ratifications of the Treaty;

# Renewed respect for the United Nations Charter and the rule of international law.

At the 10th NPT Review Conference itself we call for:

# The nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to commit to implement their NPT disarmament obligations and previous NPT RevCon commitments without further delay;

# The nuclear-armed states and nuclear sharing states to commit to a timeframe of no later than 2030 for the adoption of a framework, package of agreements or comprehensive nuclear weapons convention¹, and no later than 2045 for full implementation, in order to fulfil the NPT Article VI and customary law obligation to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons no later than the 100th anniversary of the first use of nuclear weapons, the 75th anniversary of the NPT and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

# Organization of a hybrid conference on the eve of the NPT RevCon to provide a vehicle for the world’s peace movements to share their understandings of the dynamics of the increasingly dangerous world disorder and to develop common strategies for peace, disarmament and human survival.

As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. starkly pointed out in his last words, “For years now, we have been talking about war and peace. But now, no longer can we just talk about it. It is no longer a choice between violence and nonviolence; it’s nonviolence or nonexistence.”

¹ Modalities and approaches to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world include: negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention or package of agreements; negotiation of a framework agreement which includes the legal commitment to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, identifies the measures and pathways required in general terms, and provides a process for agreeing on details over time; negotiation of protocols to the TPNW or related instruments which nuclear armed and allied states would sign as part of a process for them to join the TPNW and build the nuclear destruction, elimination, verification and compliance process through the TPNW, particularly its Article 4. See WPAbolition2000WG.pdf

TPNW: the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons?

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Tom Unterrainer

1MSP

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came ‘into force’ on Friday 22 January 2021, following the fiftieth ratification, by Honduras, on 24 October 2020. The coming into force of the Treaty marks an important milestone in the ongoing campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons. For the first time since the creation of atomic and nuclear weapons there is now an explicit prohibition – in the form of a United Nations Treaty – on the development, production, possession, use, threat of use or stationing of another country’s nuclear weapons on state party’s territory.

A second important milestone will take place in Vienna, Austria, at the end of June 2022. Here, the First Meeting of State Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW will take place. This meeting will see delegations from ratifying states, observer nations and a plethora of peace activists and researchers come together to discuss the TPNW’s progress and to map out the next steps.

In assessing prospects for the 1MSP and the TPNW itself, it is worth examining which aspects of the Treaty - beyond the ‘symbolism’ of the ‘ban’ - could be linked to concerted strategic efforts by the peace movements ‘on the streets’.

One measure of the impact of the TPNW are the connected facts that the major nuclear-armed states refused to participate in any part of the negotiating process and some of them felt moved to denounce the Treaty once it was agreed. By churlish non-participation, the nuclear powers suggested that their nuclear policies were not only unpopular with the vast majority of UN member states but that they couldn’t bring themselves to mount an honest, public defence of them. The denunciations and energetic attempts to bully signatories to the Treaty into withdrawal also illustrate the degree to which the nuclear powers were rattled at the prospect of the TPNW gaining traction. This fact alone makes ‘The Ban’ and the process that negotiated it of great and lasting value: “a frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity” according to Richard Falk.

TPNW

What of the Treaty itself? What does it say and what does it do? What doesn’t it do?

The TPNW is based in international law and now that it has come ‘into force’, comprises part of the system of international laws, overseen by the United Nations, which are supposed to regulate the conduct of individual states. As is well known, nuclear armed states are perfectly willing to violate, ignore or reinterpret such laws for their own ends. Indeed, the entire system of international laws designed to prohibit or limit the waging of war have been plagued by breaches since such laws were conceived of. The ill-fated ‘Paris Peace Pact’ was, upon agreement in 1928, heralded as “The Signing of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War” and enormous crowds swelled outside the Quai d’Orsay to witness events. Within three years, Japan had invaded China and within seven, Italy invaded Ethiopia. History records the vile dimensions of what happened next. Closer to the issue of nuclear weapons, the development and use of the V2 rocket – the design on which all present-day missile technology is based – by the Nazis during World War II is an illustrative breach of another international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907, which outlawed the bombardment of undefended residential areas. In all such cases, ‘geopolitics’ – or, to put it more bluntly, imperial ambition – trumped international law with devastating effects. Nevertheless, up until the point where international laws are breached they have material effect both in the sense of establishing a series of ‘norms’ by which state parties feel compelled to abide and in the sense that civil society has a standard by which to formulate demands for the actual regulation of the behaviour of states more generally.

Daryl Kimball argues that the TPNW was “designed to fill a ‘legal gap’ in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime” left open by the Non-Proliferation Treaty with its contradictory formulation of urging disarmament whilst giving legal recognition to nuclear-armed states. Further, Kimball argues that the TPNW is a “much-needed wake-up call that has the potential to stimulate further action and take us closer to a world without nuclear weapons.”

European impact

If we examine the impact of the TPNW on European states – a thorny nest of alliances and US-dominated interests – Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Högstra argue that, with:

“its entry into force, the ban on nuclear weapons will be another step towards developing a norm against possessing nuclear weapons. It will positively influence the behaviour of states that are not party to the treaty, including so-called ‘nuclear umbrella states’ … most of whom are on the European continent.”

One aspect of the Treaty which might concentrate the minds of European leaders is the degree to which the “classification of nuclear weapons as ‘controversial weapons’ by finance industry observers and investors” will impact financial markets and individual businesses. Echoing Falk’s characterisation of the TPNW as a “rejection of nuclearism”, Fihn and Högstra argue that The Ban could force greater transparency from European states about the full extent of their participation in and involvement with nuclear weapons. This is particularly clear when it comes to the reality of ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements across Europe, where ‘non-nuclear’ NATO member states are committed to housing and ‘delivering’ (a grim euphemism for dropping) US nuclear weapons. To date, there has been little transparency about the full extent of nuclear weaponry in bases in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Turkey and even less about the commitments to drop weapons of mass murder at the command of the US Commander in Chief. Exposing this reality, a potential outcome of the TPNW process, would be a large stride towards further delegitimising nuclear weapons. A full debate and full transparency on this issue may have some significant legal ramifications in Germany, where the constitution explicitly rules against the participation of German citizens in crimes against humanity. How does the nuclear sharing arrangement and NATO commitments to deploy such weapons square with German constitutional law?

Article 7, points 1 and 6 of the TPNW state that:

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other State Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty …

6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to the affected State Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

The first point addresses the 1MSP. Such a forum for the discussion and promotion of nuclear abolition amongst states that have already made a legal commitment to such ends will provide an important platform for addressing the recalcitrance of the nuclear-armed states and for promoting denuclearisation more widely. This is surely an important step forwards, not only for the states themselves but for everyone involved in anti-nuclear campaigning. How Russia’s war against Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences will impact progress towards further TPNW ratifications is something that requires precise attention. These developments will be considered in the final part of this article.

Point 6 highlights a means by which international cooperation can address severe injustices resulting from the testing and previous detonations of atomic and nuclear weapons. For far too long, the nuclear powers have refused to make amends or have concealed the true extent of their crimes related to nuclear tests. A case in point is the situation in Algeria, which remains severely polluted from nuclear waste produced during French nuclear tests in the 1960s. Senior Algerian officials have seized the opportunity presented by the TPNW to renew demands for France to make urgent amends. The first step in the process would be for France to finally reveal the locations where it buried nuclear waste in the Algerian Sahara. Coordinated pressure from TPNW State Parties will be a massive boost to Algeria’s determined efforts on this score. Is it beyond the realms of possibility that Ireland and Austria – both TPNW ratifying states and both members of the European Union – press the case through the European Parliament and European Commission? The current commitments of both states to the TPNW and EU suggest that this is a possible and urgent course of action. However, it would not be reasonable to assume that either the Austrian or Irish governments will pursue such ends in the absence of a determined and mobilised anti-nuclear movement in both states and across Europe more widely.

So, even with a clear critique of the ways in which nuclear-armed states conduct themselves and the limitations of international law in many cases, it is possible to see the overwhelming positives presented by the TPNW coming into force. However, Falk argues that there remains a “near fatal weakness” at the heart of The Ban. True, signatures, and even more, the formal entry into force of the treaty lends weight to the claim that the international community has, as Falk puts it:

signalled in an obligatory way the repudiation of nuclear weapons for any and all purposes … The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the TPNW process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome.”

Even before events in Ukraine, the existing nuclear powers and their allies were not active and positive participants in the TPNW process. We will now examine why this is a major problem.

Challenges

The initial approach of the nuclear-armed states and their related alliances to the TPNW was to adopt a ‘persistent objector’ status. As Steven Hill points out in his Chatham House report on NATO and the TPNW, if a state or alliance of states persistently raise their objections to a treaty, then they can - in the terms set out in international law - prevent such a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ or binding on states which have not signed up to the treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ in those states which have ratified the treaty, ‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a more general application of the treaty provisions.

As such, any engagement by nuclear-armed states or members of nuclear-alliances in the TPNW process could ‘crack open’ this carefully considered approach to preventing the TPNW from becoming a ‘customary law’. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there were a number of encouraging signs that just such a ‘crack’ could develop. For instance, the coming to power of the SDP/Green/FDP government in Germany was preceded by lively debate about the future of US nuclear bombs stored in that country. The Greens specifically campaigned on a commitment to sign and ratify the TPNW and the SDP and FDP both stated commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament (albeit in an undefined fashion).

The coalition agreement between these parties included a commitment to work toward a Germany and a world free from nuclear weapons. Mention of the TPNW was not included. However, a clear dynamic was developing and it was not unreasonable to hope that the new German government would send observers to the 1MSP. Had they done so, it would have eased the way for other non-nuclear states, formally tied to NATO or not, to send observers also. Such developments would have done some damage to efforts at maintaining a ‘persistent objector’ approach.

What changed? Far from being a ‘limited security operation’, or whatever President Putin characterises it as, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has done nothing to boost security: certainly not for the Ukrainian people; definitely not for Russia which will now see NATO expand closer to its borders; and most definitely not for Europe and rest of the world. Geopolitics is not the be-all-and-end-all of understanding events but it is essential to understand that as a result of Russia’s actions, the geopolitical developments underway prior to the invasion have benefited from a significant boost. From Sweden and Finland applying to join NATO, to the record levels of military spending now promised by European states, to the more confident - and therfore dangerous - military postures adopted by the US and NATO: the world has become a much more dangerous place.

One artefact of the danger is that it will now be more difficult for the TPNW to get a hearing in the corridors of power. Not only has the ‘crack’ in ‘persistent objection’ been filled but the idea that nuclear weapon possession and membership of nuclear alliances ensures ‘security’ has been boosted.

In recognising these challenges, the movements for nuclear abolition need to think about how to overcome them. If one thing is clear, then it is this: without a creative, vibrant, expansive and determined social movement arguing for nuclear abolition, disarmament, de-militarisation and peace then it seems unlikely that swift and decisive governmental, legal and political changes will occur. Our task is to build such a social movement. ­

Finland: “With NATO membership, nuclear disarmament will end”

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Markus Mustajärvi, Finland

Speech by Markus Mustajärvi in ​​Parliament on 16 May 2022. Mustajärvi is a Left Alliance member of the Finnish Parliament for the Lapland constituency and sits on the Defence Committee.

Mr President! During this period, I have received more information on foreign, security and defense policy issues in three committees and two working groups than any other Member of Parliament. During this season alone, I have been sitting in Parliament’s security room for hundreds of hours listening to experts. My opposition to NATO has only strengthened...

The Finnish government and foreign policy leadership have decided to abandon military non-alignment and to rely on armed security as a result of NATO membership. Military non-alignment served us well throughout the post-World War II period, staying out of the conflicts of interest of the great powers during the Cold War ... Back at the end of last year, the leadership of our country, the President and Government of the Republic, reminded us that Finland's policy of staying out of the military alliances is intended primarily for difficult times when our country may face military confrontation. Back in the autumn, it was emphasized that Finland would not allow any third country or foreign armed forces to use the soil of our country, waters or airspace for hostile purposes against another state. Now all this is forgotten.

Mr President! The political leadership does not seem to take into account the fact that the security policy situation in Finland is not improving but deteriorating under NATO policy. Finland's military position may strengthen with NATO membership, but the security situation in Finland as a whole will deteriorate. At the same time, the long common border between Finland and Russia is becoming the border of the Russian-US-led military alliance, the border of confrontation. The enlargement of the military alliance in the vicinity of Russia's most important nuclear bases in a situation where confrontation in the Arctic is escalating will in no way increase security and, as I said in the debate, no one will fall after the nuclear war. Political leadership does not seem to take into account that NATO membership of the two previously non-military Nordic countries will have a negative impact on the delicate balance of the entire northern region and also of the Arctic region. It is known that the United States also wants Finland's and Sweden's support against Russia in the Arctic, and seems to be succeeding in this.

Mr President! Naivism is not an idea. One after another, key players in the government have argued that we need to go to the nuclear bloc so that we can work more effectively for nuclear disarmament. The non-proliferation treaty enshrined in the government's program has not progressed because this government has not wanted to create obstacles to NATO membership. No NATO member state has signed the TPNW and NATO as an organization does not support it. I remind the left and the Greens that Finland is now nuclear-weapon-free. With NATO membership, nuclear disarmament will end, it will be replaced by a so-called nuclear umbrella. Finland is now making the decision to apply for NATO membership without any conditions. The Swedish Social Democrats, on the other hand, are trying to negotiate that NATO should not deploy bases or nuclear weapons in Sweden, at least in peacetime.

As a member of the military alliance, we will be involved in a major war if one breaks out in Europe. As a member of NATO, we are a leading country. With regard to nuclear weapons and the HX project, it is no coincidence that Finland ended up acquiring F-35s, and in particular a US plane. They were the only option capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and our fighter pilots will certainly be trained for that.

* * * * * * 

Markus Mustajärvi made the following intervention on 17 May 2022, setting out alternative proposals to NATO membership.

1. Finland must declare that under no circumstances will it allow nuclear weapons to be deployed in Finland or its land, airspace or sea areas to be used for the transport or transit of nuclear weapons, as this would automatically make Finland a frontrunner in nuclear war.

2. Finland does not intend to train Finnish pilots to transport and use nuclear weapons.

3. The armed forces of no other country, nor the military bases of NATO, should be permanently stationed in the territory of Finland. In this way, Finland avoids and stays outside the risks arising from the escalation of the international situation.

4. Finland does not allow or allow any other state or its armed forces to use the territory or airspace of our country for hostile purposes against other states. - This point is directly from the report adopted in the autumn.

5. A referendum must be held on Finland's membership in NATO.

In the light of the above, I submit the following statement to Parliament for approval:

“Finland is not applying for NATO membership, but will continue to be non-aligned. Only outside the military alliances does Finland have the opportunity to stay out of the war when the Great War broke out. ”

This is the presentation that will be shared with you.

Then, when Norway was mentioned here many times in a recent debate and it was said that Norway has received certain conditions, such as the absence of permanent troops on its territory and the non-acceptance of nuclear weapons on its own territory. Well, permanent forces can be rotated in such a way that they are constantly rotated. The strength remains, but the men change.

And about nuclear weapons then: Who knows which fighters or submarines or battleships have nuclear weapons. No nuclear-weapon state will tell anyone else what armaments it is carrying.

Translated from https://vasemmisto.fi/

All errors the responsibility of END Info

Sweden: Social Democratic women uphold their ‘No to NATO’

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Annika Strandhäll, Sweden

Annika Strandhäll is the Minister for Climate Change and the Environment in the Swedish government. She is the federal board chair of Social Democratic-women, an organisation with a long and proud history of campaigning for peace, disarmament and non-alignment. Social Democratic-women voiced strong opposition to government plans to join NATO. Here Strandhäll upholds this opposition and considers what will come next.

After intense and thorough discussion, the Social Democrats announced their decision on the NATO issue: the party believes that Sweden should join the defense alliance. It was an expected decision, but it was not the outcome we Social Democratic-women fought for. If the application is approved by NATO, unilateral reservations against the deployment of nuclear weapons and permanent bases on Swedish territory must be expressed.

Social Democratic-women have made a long historical struggle for peace, disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons. Our starting point has been that freedom from military alliances has served Sweden well. In the party's internal discussions, we have therefore chosen to stand up for our ‘no to NATO’. At the same time, we have said that we respect the decision made by the party board - such a major security policy issue is, of course, made democratically.

In the situation we are in now, it is important to look ahead. We will continue to work for solutions in an increasingly threatening world. Dialogue and collaboration must always be our main tools for creating stability and security. NATO membership and military rearmament must not be at the expense of our pursuit of peace and disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

It was thanks to the struggle of Social Democratic-women that the Swedish government in the 60s chose to phase out the Swedish atomic bomb program and sign the non-proliferation agreement. That position must be taken further by the government signing the current UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Sweden must clearly remain a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in both peacetime and possible wartime. The possibilities of adopting national legislation against the introduction of nuclear weapons in Sweden should be reviewed. Sweden must also work for NATO to become a military alliance without nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, Sweden's feminist foreign policy must be firmly established and strengthened. A holistic approach must be taken to build secure and functioning states governed by the rule of law, reduce poverty and meet basic requirements such as health, healthcare, schools and education. Equal development assistance is crucial. In order for development assistance to be strengthened, development assistance money must not be used as a reinforcement of the state budget. The money must always go to international efforts, with a clear focus on humanitarian efforts and educational efforts.

Nationally, too, it is important that investments in peace and relaxation go hand in hand with efforts to strengthen welfare, gender equality and the environment. We must ensure that the costs of NATO membership and military rearmament are not borne at the expense of other important policies that are crucial to a sustainable and equal society.

A broad political consensus is needed on these issues. We therefore want to see a cross-party working group working for this in the Riksdag. In troubled times, it is more important than ever that we put peace, freedom and feminism first. This is our common future!

Translated from the Social Democratic-Women website https://s-kvinnor.se/

NATO Expansion

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has, quite plainly, boosted the idea that membership of NATO ensures security. In both Sweden and Finland, opinion polling on NATO membership shifted significantly following Russia’s actions. The proposal that NATO is purely a ‘defensive alliance’ has been heavily promoted by NATO itself, by individual NATO member states and by those who wish to see the nuclear alliance expand further. This idea has been amplified by sections of the media in all NATO member states and would-be-member states - including by some who offer caveats about the need to reform the organisation.

The decision of both Sweden and Norway to apply for NATO membership should be registered and accounted for honestly: it is a major set-back for the idea of peace itself. These two countries maintained policies of non-alignment under significant international pressures over a considerable period of time. More than that, both played an important role in fostering and nurturing disarmament initiatives and wider schemes for alternative, non-militaristic, approaches to security.

Now they intend to join a nuclear-armed, expansionary and militaristic alliance within which the United States plays the dominant role. The governments of these countries will do so whilst telling their peoples and the rest of the world that they want to ensure security.

Whilst there can be no excuse for Russia’s recent actions, there should be no excuse or room for fanciful or magical thinking. The enduring role of NATO and militaristic approaches to ‘security’ all played their part. With an expanded NATO and record-levels of military spending throughout Europe, the situation will be compounded.

For instance, in what way will Finland’s accession to NATO ensure security along the enormous border it shares with Russia? What, do we suppose, will come to characterise that stretch of land? Will it be a slice of peace and harmony or will it degenerate into a flashpoint? How many troops, tanks, missile systems, warplane and drones will be needed to ‘ensure security’ along this border? How many errors, mistakes or unthinking reactions will it take for hostilities to break out there? Regardless of whether Finland or Russia intends to start a war on this border - and it should be assumed neither side wants any such thing - it will become a highly militarised and contentious border because it will represent a faultline between the nuclear-armed NATO and a nuclear-armed Russia.

In the following pages we re-publish a statement from Anna Strandhäll of the Swedish Social Democratic-Women, which makes clear the traditional approach of that country’s ruling political party. We also publish speeches from and proposals by Markus Mustajärvi, which form part of the record of debate and discussion in the Finnish parliament.

Unlike in Sweden, which seems to be pursuing an approach to NATO membership which seeks to exclude nuclear weapons from the territory, Finland has sought no such exclusions so far. As Anna Strandhäll (Sweden) says: “If the application is approved by NATO, unilateral reservations against the deployment of nuclear weapons and permanent bases on Swedish territory must be expressed.” Contrawise, in Finland: “Finland is now making the decision to apply for NATO membership without any conditions. The Swedish Social Democrats, on the other hand, are trying to negotiate that NATO should not deploy bases or nuclear weapons in Sweden, at least in peacetime”, according to Markus Mustajärvi.

The peace movements should be encouraged that opposition to NATO endures within Sweden and Finland. We must find ways to engage with and develop this opposition.

Nuclear MADness

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

By Ludo De Brabander

Ludo De Brabender from the Belgian peace organisation Vrede gave the following speech at CND’s Lakenheath demonstration on 21 May 2022.

Russia’s nuclear threats confirm the weaknesses of the idea of ‘deterrence’. Nevertheless deterrence was and still remains the main argument in the US/NATO doctrine for maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals. According to US documents new US B61-12 nuclear bombs are planned to be deployed at the military base in Lakenheath. Do we have to fear a new nuclear arms race? How to create a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe?

A few days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, President Vladimir Putin announced that he had ordered nuclear weapons to be placed on ‘special alert’ status. Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on the battlefield, against troops or military installations.

Regardless of whether president Putin is playing bluff poker and the risk of nuclear war has actually increased, his multiple nuclear threats are an illustration of how dependent we are on the whims of a small group of rulers, their missteps, miscalculations and emotions in times of crisis. In the summer of 2017, president Trump also threatened to launch a nuclear attack to “completely destroy North Korea”. These threats are confirmation of the weaknesses of the idea of ‘deterrence’ attached to most nuclear doctrines. Deterrence is based on the concept of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’ often referred to by the acronym MAD. But it is not only an acronym. Nuclear arms are MADness. Nevertheless deterrence was and still remains the main argument in the US/NATO doctrine for maintaining and upgrading nuclear arsenals.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, their use is possible. Humanity has escaped nuclear war or accidental deployment of nuclear weapons dozens of times. Before fortune fails us, we must get rid of these planet-threatening weapons of mass destruction!

The various nuclear threats from Moscow are irresponsible and must be condemned. But they also make it clear that the war must not escalate further. They show the importance of diplomacy, of serious negotiations. Europe must not go along with the US military strategy aimed at weakening Russia. A wounded animal can strike unexpectedly.

The war is causing tremendous human suffering. But it is also used by the military industrial complex to militarise Europe to levels unimaginable just a few months ago. Military budgets are skyrocketing. NATO was last year responsible for more than half of world wide military spending, 17 times more than Russia. Soon it will be may be 25 times Russia’s military spending. So, let us have no illusions. The militarisation is not intended to serve our security or to defend us, but to prepare and expand hegemonic combat, with what NATO calls systemic rivals.

The new arms race has also a nuclear component. The deployment of new US nuclear B 61-12 bombs at Lakenheath to make the UK part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, is a manifestation of that. Poland, too, has already made it known that it wants to deploy nuclear weapons if asked so. On the other side, Belarus has already lifted its nuclear-weapon-free zone status and threatened that it may well open its territory to new nuclear weapons from Russia. NATO's expansion to include Finland and Sweden or the deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland could lead to new Russian nuclear weapons being deployed in the Baltic Sea area.

If the UK joins the nuclear sharing countries there will be six of them. The atomic bombs in today's countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey) will be replaced by new ones in the coming years. These new B61-12 bombs are equipped with an electronic tail kit that can guide the bomb to its target. They have also lower yield options. The mixture of both, precision and lower yield options make them very dangerous. They could be seen by war planners as more ‘useable’. The new B61-12 will increase the danger of a war with nuclear weapons eroding the concept of ‘deterrence’ even more. So it is MADness that we’ll have to stop.

In every crisis there is an opportunity. The recent nuclear threats may set people in motion for nuclear disarmament and pressure those in power. When hopefully the war in Ukraine can soon be ended, Europe’s political world needs to reflect on lessons learned. One of these lesson’s should be that we need to get rid of the threat of a nuclear armageddon. That’s why we’ll have to re-establish a constructive political environment in which negotiations towards European nuclear disarmament are possible for all nuclear weapon systems in Europe. This is achievable if we rebuild relations with Russia, based on mutual respect for each other’s security interests and confidence building measures. Common indivisible security and disarmament is the path towards a peaceful and secure future. Europe should become a nuclear weapon free zone as soon as possible!!!

Nuclear Europe Map (updated)

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

Target: Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

During the 1980s and the last great wave of anti-nuclear activity, there existed a real sense of individuals, towns and cities being a ‘target’. The deployment of US nuclear missiles across Europe and similar deployments by the USSR created a sense that the continent could become an actual nuclear battlefield. As Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation wrote at the time: “If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home.” We can see a similar process to one Coates described unfolding forty years later. The deployment of ‘useable’ and ‘steerable’ US nuclear bombs and the advanced fighter-bombers which carry them to the UK and elsewhere in Europe will, no doubt, be matched by similar deployments by Russia. The only conceivable use for such weapons would be in a Europe considered disposable by the ‘great powers’. A Europe where nuclear deployments and expansion render the continent a potential nuclear battlefield.

To illustrate the ways in which individuals and the villages, towns and cities in which they live are still a ‘target’ for such weapons or may become victims of a nuclear accident, we have used Alex Wallerstein’s ‘NUKEMAP’ (see nuclearsecrecy.com) to model the potential effect of a nuclear detonation at Lakenheath.

The model is for the ground detonation of just one B61-7, 340 kiloton, nuclear bomb. This bomb, currently in service, is approximately 23 times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Lakenheath is in a rural area of England and, as such, does not have a large population density. In this particular version of the model, the wind takes radioactive fallout away from major population areas into the North Sea.

The ground detonation of one such bomb would result in the deaths of 7,290 people and injury to more ten thousand more. Most of the immediate deaths would take place within the blast area. This is the closest model to an accident resulting in the detonation of a nuclear bomb similar to those that look set to return to Lakenheath. By way of comparison, if the same weapon was detonated under the same conditions in Nottingham (UK), where END Info is published, the fatalities would total 136,200 and injuries 164,250.

Whatever the model predicts, it seems true to state that Lakenheath will become a nuclear target at the time it becomes a nuclear storage facility and home to nuclear-capable US aircraft. Has anyone asked the people who live in that area what they think about this prospect? It seems doubtful, in the same way that no British parliamentarian, let alone citizen, has been consulted on the matter.

Destination Lakenheath

From END Info 32 | DOWNLOAD

The US Air Force capabilities already deployed at Lakenheath or likely to be deployed there in the coming months include:

Fifth generation F35A Lightening II aircraft

These aircraft were deployed at Lakenheath in December 2021. According to the manufacturers website (f35.com): “The F-35 delivers an unrivaled advantage for our pilots, nation, and global partners. A decisive differentiator in near-peer warfare, the F-35 is the most advanced node in the networked 21st Century Warfare operational vision.” The website of the US Air Forces in Europe (usafe.af.mil) reports that: “The F-35A is an agile, versatile, high-performance, 9g-capable multirole fighter that combines stealth, sensor fusion and unprecedented situational awareness. The aircraft will belong to the 495th Fighter Squadron, which was nicknamed the ‘Valkyries’ during a voting contest in 2020. The new F-35 squadron will consist of 24 aircraft, delivered in a phased approach.” Those familiar with Wagner’s Operas or Norse mythology will know that Oden sent his Valkyries to the battlefields to decide which of the dead were worthy of a place in Valhalla. The “multirole” and “versatile” F35A is nuclear capable. It seems unlikely that this ‘Valkyrie’ will return to the scene of nuclear devastation.

B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

B61 nuclear bombs have been deployed in Europe under US nuclear sharing arrangements for some time. Originally designed as a Cold War weapon in the 1960s, the B61-12 (modification 12) entered production in December 2021 with the aim of extending the lifespan of these nuclear weapons. The latest modification includes ‘steerability’ and ‘dialable yields’, which means that the bombs can be launched some distance from their target (‘standoff capability’ meaning that pilots can reasonably expect not to be impacted by a nuclear blast) and that the explosive power of the bombs can be set as ‘usable’ on the battlefield. The development and deployment of these bombs to Lakenheath (and elsewhere in Europe) represents a significant and dangerous expansion of the US nuclear bootprint and an escalation in tension between nuclear-armed states.

Expanding Nuclear Bootprint

From END Info 32 | Download

Tom Unterrainer, Editorial Comments

The potential return of US nuclear bombs to the UK was announced without fanfare and – more importantly – without any discussion, debate, deliberation or the opportunity for dissent within Britain’s democratic institutions.

There was no official announcement from the British government. No ministerial statement to Parliament. No press conference with representatives from the US Department of Defense. There wasn’t even a distinct press or information release from United States government.

When the government was asked about this development by the Green MP, Caroline Lucas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence James Heappey gave the following non-reply:

“The is unable to comment on US spending decisions and capabilities, which are a matter for the . It remains longstanding and policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

News of this development emerged only after Hans Kristensen, from the Federation of American Scientists, noticed the addition of the UK to the list of nuclear storage sites to be upgraded under NATO’s $384 million infrastructure investment programme. In the 2022 US Department of Defense budget, storage sites in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey were listed. In the 2023 budget, the UK appears on the list.

Let’s untangle this a little. Nuclear developments have almost always operated under a veil of secrecy. For instance, Britain’s atomic programme was done in secret, with not even the then-Cabinet of Her Majesty’s Government being notified. More recently, the current government announced in its Integrated Review that it would “no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers”.

Secrecy – or, at the very least a lack of transparency – extends to the arrangements under which the United States stations nuclear bombs elsewhere in Europe. The US and NATO have never been 100% clear on the numbers of nuclear bombs stationed under nuclear sharing arrangements.

When asked about the possibility of further US nuclear weapons coming to Europe under NATO auspices, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said – in December 2021 – “we have no plans of stationing any nuclear weapons in any other countries than we already have these nuclear weapons as part of our deterrence and that … have been there for many years.”

Stoltenberg’s comments have been interpreted as meaning that although Lakenheath’s nuclear storage facilities are to be updated, NATO has ruled out the stationing of US nukes for the time being. I do not think this makes very much sense. I would interpret Stoltenberg’s comments another way. Throughout, he is speaking as the head of NATO. When he says “we” and “our”, he is talking about the nuclear-armed alliance. In this context it is worth noting that the UK’s nuclear weapons are counted as part of NATO’s ‘nuclear capabilities’ and have been for “many years”. This response from Stoltenberg is typical of the prevalent opacity when it comes to nuclear questions.

RAF Lakenheath was the place where the US Air Force stored nuclear gravity bombs. By the early 2000s, 110 B61 bombs were stored there and US F-15E aircraft were stationed there for the purpose of dropping these bombs on command of the President of the United States.

These bombs were removed – without fanfare – in the later 2000’s and it was only in 2008 that their total removal was confirmed. For the first time since 1954, the United States did not store nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom.

It had already been announced that Lakenheath was to become the first location in Europe for the new US Air Force nuclear-capable F35 fighter-bombers. These arrived in December last year. 24 of them are stationed at the base and the US Air Force is scheduled to commence training for the use of the new generation of guided nuclear bombs, the B61-12’s in the coming year. These bombs will go into production very shortly. According to Hans Kristensen, these bombs look set for shipping to Europe in 2023 where they will replace the B61-3 and 4’s already stationed.

So, it looks almost certain that the US intends to station nuclear bombs in the UK again. This is a major development and one that should be taken very seriously indeed. We are not alone in taking this development seriously: our friends in the European and wider peace, anti-war and anti-nuclear movements are alert to what is happening and they stand with us in our opposition.

Even without the massively increased nuclear tensions that have been developing over the past few years, and which have become even more acute over the past months, our opposition would be sharp.

We know that even in the most stable of times, increasing the US’s nuclear bootprint would create instability. We are not living through particularly stable times.

We know that regardless of other circumstances, a nuclear storage site and an airbase for nuclear capable bombers becomes a target for a nuclear strike. We need to make everyone aware of this risk and link it to all of the other very good reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.

We know that every new nuclear development brings with it new risks, new dangers and new threats in local, regional, national and international contexts.

The Russian Army

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

The Russell Foundation received the following information, together with the introductory text below, in April 2022. We re-publish it here for information. The identity of the authors has been withheld for their personal security.

A huge number of Russian citizens are against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Many express their position through open letters and appeals or simply publications on social media ... More than 1,200,000 people have subscribed under the anti-war petition written by a human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov. More than 330,000 tweets with the hashtag #нетвойне (Russian for ‘no to war’) appeared on Twitter on one of the first days of the war (The Economist, Feb 28). Representatives of many professional communities ... have signed collective open letters. In interviews and social networks a large number of famous Russians ... have published statements against the war, and several print media outlets have come out with special covers ...

The war launched a wave of protests across Russia. Between February 24 and March 20 more than 15,000 people were detained at mass unsanctioned protests or solitary pickets in Russian cities (6,500 in Moscow, 4,100 in Saint Petersburg). 712 people were arrested and 27 were accused of felony on various pretexts. Human rights activists have reported mass violations of protesters’ rights, some protesters have been tortured by police. With the new laws, implemented on March 2, Russians can now go to jail for up to five years in prison for publicly condemning the ‘special operation’ and disseminating ‘deliberately false’ information about it. More than 40 Russian media outlets have been blocked or forced to stop working under the pressure, Facebook and Twitter have been also blocked in Russia. Some people who had signed public appeals against the war were fired from their jobs or received threats (OVD-Info, Mar 10). After the implementation of these laws, protests and anti-war statements became less widespread but did not stop.

Conscripts and contract soldiers in Russian army

In the Russian army there are both conscripts and contract soldiers.

Conscripts are those who were drafted into the army for a year. They are not professional soldiers. A contract soldier is a soldier who has signed a contract with Ministry of Defense and he receives a salary for his service (not less than 2 years).

At the beginning of the military operation, the Russian authorities claimed that only contract servicemen were participating in it.

On March 9 The Ministry of Defense reported that all the conscripts were withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense said it was taking all actions to return the captured conscripts:

‘“Unfortunately, several facts of the presence of conscripts in the units of the Russian Armed Forces participating in a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine have been discovered,” Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said’

Who becomes a contract soldier and how does it happen?

1. Theoretically, people can enter the contract military service after conscript service. But this is not the most common case.

People from depressed regions of the country, where there is no work for them, often enter into a contract, hoping that this will at least be their income.

2. University students can be trained in military centers, military training camps and receive the rank of reserve officer. Some students attend these way not to become a conscript.

Not all university students can and want to study in such military centers and become officers. This means that with the end of their studies, their deferment from conscription ends. They are subject to conscription after graduation. University graduates can sign a contract for military service instead of conscription.

Some men are attracted by the fact that they are promised that they will be able to live at home, and not in the barracks, that they will receive a salary for their service, and in general they are promised a lot.

But in practice, people often find themselves in the position of nearly the same as conscripts, but also for a longer period. (Conscription period is a year and a contract period is not less than 2 years. Then the contract can be renewed).

3. But most often the contract is signed by military conscripts who have already served for several months.

Relatives inform human rights activists about cases when conscripts were forced to sign a contract. Sometimes they were deceived, claiming that the contract would only be valid for two months (so much was left for the conscript until the end of his term of service)

Some reported that their relative was a conscript, he himself did not sign the contract, just like his colleagues. But then it turned out that they were on the lists as contractors. So the documents were falsified.

Personal Documents

Soldiers’ personal documents are a special issue. Very often, relatives of soldiers report that they do not have in their hands any documents that a soldier should have: neither a military ID, nor a passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation

Phones in the army

In accordance with Russian law, a serviceman is prohibited from using smartphones on the territory of a military unit and training ground, and can only use phones without access to the Internet.

The law also provides that the commander of a military unit may set the regime for the use of telephones.

The vast majority of relatives say that the phones were collected from the soldiers. They are not allowed to use their phones. Sometimes the commander allows them to call relatives from his own ( commander’s) phone.

Sometimes soldiers hide the phone and call from it when the commander does not see.

Cases

I want to share a few stories that I learned about from the appeals of relatives.

1. A young man - a contract serviceman served in a military band as a musician.One day he was informed that he was going to the exercises. He was sent to the border with Ukraine. When they arrived, they were lined up and told that these were not exercises, but that they were participating in a military special operation. Now his family is trying to get him back.

2. There were appeals from contract servicemen who are on the border with Ukraine. Realizing that a war is already going on, they filed a report to terminate the contract, because, according to their conscience, they cannot participate in this.

3. The sister of a serviceman who was sent to Ukraine, called me. The sister herself lives in Europe/ Their Mom lives in the North of Russia.

Her brother served in the east of Russia - in Khabarovsk. They were told they were on their way to training.

All of them from the unit were sent west by train. On the train, conscripts were forced to sign a contract. Not conscripts, but contract soldiers arrived on the territory of Ukraine. From Ukraine, her brother called her mother several times from someone else’s phone. He confirmed that he was on the territory of Ukraine. The sister is afraid that their mother will not be able to send the necessary applications and explain to the brother how to act.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that this family has relatives - a cousin lives in Ukraine. At the same time, now his cousin’s family remains at home, and the brother himself is working in Russia (on a rotational basis). That is, in fact, in this war, brothers literally stand on different front lines

4. The soldier got lost from his unit. He didn’t know where to go. A local resident picked him up, gave him food, sheltered him in her house.

This woman called the mother of a soldier from her phone. They talked. This soldier does not have any documents in his hands. What his status is not clear. He wants to return home.

Human Rights Activists’ Advice to relatives

Human rights activists give recommendations to relatives on how to return a serviceman to Russia, as well as how to prevent sending him to participate in a military operation in Ukraine, if he is still in Russia.

The serviceman sends a report to the commander that he asks to terminate the contract with him and dismiss him. The chance of early termination of the contract in terms of legislation is very high, but so far we are not aware of such cases.

If they do not want to terminate the contract in the military unit, then the military personnel can “scare” the commander by the fact that relatives will make such cases public, both in Russian telegram channels and in foreign media service due to the fact that participation in a special operation on the territory of Ukraine is contrary to his convictions of conscience.

The commander will ignore this report

But at the same time, relatives should send appeals to the Ministry of Defense and other authorities that their relative is a soldier and that they know that he said that he could not continue to serve for reasons of conscience. Relatives should ask the Ministry of Defense to terminate the contract with him and fire him.

You need to understand that the command will put pressure on the soldier.

The family should prepare the service member to resist this pressure. Nothing could be worse than sending to war. Unfortunately, few parents and military personnel dare to act on the advice

Why activists working to protect the rights of military personnel are afraid to give interviews to foreign journalists?

In the fall of 2021, the FSB published an order - a list of information that is not itself classified as secret.

But if this information is used by foreign countries or citizens against the interests of Russia, then the person who collected, distributed and transmitted such information will be held criminally liable. This will be considered as treason. Such information includes:

- the state of the moral and psychological state of servicemen in military units

-material support in military units

- the state of health of military personnel

- information about violation of the law

Phones of human rights defenders are tapped by FSB officers. Therefore, human rights activists are afraid to give interviews to foreign journalists.

The information that I describe here was received by me either from relatives of military personnel, or from other human rights activists, whose names I do not name for their safety.

Dark Eagle under the magnifying glass

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Joachim Wernicke, Germany

The following text is a translation of a small section from Joachim Wernicke’s forthcoming book, Germany’s Escape Route from the Dangers of War.

Trump and the new situation

US President Donald Trump made a serious mistake when he terminated the 1987 Treaty on the Prohibition of Land-Based Medium-Range Weapons in 2019 (INF Treaty, range range 500 to 5,500 km). The Treaty banned all such weapons – both US and the Soviet – from Europe, whether nuclear or conventional, including launchers. The result was some perceived security for Europe for 32 years.

It was clear that Trump’s termination of the Treaty could only have one reason: the US wanted to re-establish land-based medium-range weapons in Europe – where else? Against Russia – against whom else? This gave Russia the ‘right’ to station such weapons as well. This created a new situation for Russia, the US and NATO.

Was the 2019 termination of the INF Treaty the spontaneous result of Trump’s policies? Or did his “national security adviser”, John Bolton – more familiar with military intelligence than his boss – whisper this idea to him?: Dark Eagle as the new Super-Pershing, the hypersonic miracle weapon? Technically, there would be something to this view.

Rocket duel

If Trump was thinking of a renewed stationing of medium-range weapons in Europe, who did he want to attack or at least be able to attack? Looking at the European map allows only one answer: Russia. But what the US can do again after the termination of the INF Treaty, Russia can also do, namely to deploy new medium-range weapons. So it would be a rocket duel, as it was in the 1980s: Whoever shoots first has a – perhaps decisive – advantage. An extremely destabilizing situation.

In the sense of a military “balance”, however, neither side has really gained anything. Or maybe it has? There is a fundamental imbalance: even the most advanced Russian medium-range missile cannot be personally dangerous to any politician in Washington. Conversely, from launch points somewhere in Europe, a salvo of Dark Eagle, which can hit Moscow and kill the entire political leadership of Russia, ten minutes after the rocket salvo is launched.

After the turbulent events in the USA around the change in the presidency at the beginning of 2021, Trump’s successor Joe Biden initially had other worries than the overturned INF Treaty. But even after a year in office, Biden had neither given a sign that he had recognized Trump’s mistake, nor had he made any efforts to somehow revive the INF Treaty.

Dark Eagle

Dark Eagle is a very powerful land-based medium-range weapon that the US Army has been preparing since 2019 for operational use from 2023. Dark Eagle is a hypersonic missile system with a range of 2,700 kilometers – “1,500 nautical miles”. According to American information, the new weapons have only conventional, not nuclear warheads.

So we have a new edition of the nuclear NATO retrofit of the 1980s but this time non-nuclear – or so we are told.

Are Dark Eagles really just conventional? Conventional warheads can turn buildings into craters, but they cannot harm deep underground concrete bunkers. This requires nuclear warheads.

Technically, Dark Eagle could also be nuclear armed. But the arrangement of the Dark Eagle fire unit with the missiles in closed canisters for storage and vertical launch does not allow for easy removal of the warhead to store and guard it separately. Only a conventionally armed Dark Eagle is possible for launch from the canister.

The strongest argument for the fact that the Dark Eagle missiles – and also the Tomahawk cruise missiles – are not nuclear, but conventionally equipped is this: Unlike nuclear weapons, these weapons can be used in real life. In its wars of aggression since 1991, the US has fired around 2,000 conventional Tomahawks. The end effect – Dark Eagle or Tomahawk – is comparable to a Luftmine [German ‘parachute mine’, weighing up to 2,200lb] of the Second World War.

What is so special about “land-based”? Can’t ships or submarines also fire medium-range missiles? Both the US and Russia have ships with magazines full of guided missiles. In this case, these are cruise missiles with medium-range range – i.e. US ships with Tomahawk and Russian ships with Kalibr – and short-range missiles. So far, neither side has missiles with medium-range range on surface ships. That’s because these missiles are much larger and heavier and don’t fit into the existing launch magazines on the ships.

Both sides have submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, these missiles are technically unsuitable for the fast shooting over medium-range ranges. Their typical flight duration over a quarter of the Earth’s circumference is half an hour. These intercontinental ballistic missiles are several times larger and heavier than Dark Eagle – and much more expensive.

The U.S. Navy has ordered a variant of Dark Eagle for submarines, called CPS, delivery starting in 2025. Three CPS units fit into the launch tube for a Trident intercontinental. But the valuable missile submarines of both sides operate only on the oceans, where they can hide at great depths if necessary.

The decisive military advantage of land-based medium-range missiles is the possibility of firing a large volley of such missiles simultaneously – within seconds. Ships and submarines can only fire missiles one after the other, with pause intervals between two shots of at least a few seconds. But with the first shot, the ship or submarine betrays its position.

Incidentally, in order to target Moscow with a short flight time, the US Navy would have to shoot from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. There, however, every American warship or submarine will have a Russian escort ship nearby, which would immediately torpedoe and sink the intruder after the first missile launch.

A decapitation strike against the Moscow leadership in a matter of minutes is therefore not possible from the sea. Conversely, this would also apply to the US leadership in Washington. A decapitation strike needs land-based medium-range missiles, and they need to be stationed on the nearby mainland. The USA has Germany in Europe. Russia does not have a single point of support on the American continent.

NATO in self-contradiction

In Europe, medium-range weapons do nothing but threaten, i.e. disrupt the peaceful neighbourhood in the “common home of Europe”. For 32 years, Europe looked safe from such dangers.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized in a press conference in January 2022: “NATO is a defense alliance, an alliance that threatens not a single country, not even Russia.” But what other capabilities does Dark Eagle have than to threaten Russia as its NATO adversary? Should the Russian leadership be personally threatened?

Stoltenberg continues: “We call on and encourage Russia to engage in talks with us, including the reduction of missile systems and nuclear weapons.” Before the reduction, the first thing to do is not to carry out any new deployments of missile systems, i.e. to participate in the moratorium, Russia’s proposal. Why doesn’t NATO want a moratorium?

Here NATO has maneuvered itself into a self-contradiction. Regardless of an anti-Russian turn in German public opinion after the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the German majority would probably reject a new deployment of far-reaching US offensive missiles in the country – if only they knew about it.

But one NATO line has become clear since 2019, namely that the new US missile deployment should not become a public issue. The German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel apparently covered this line: there are no public statements by the government or press reviews about it. Surprisingly, the change of government in 2021 to red-green-yellow brought no change here.

Multi-Domain Task Force

It became known in 2021 that the US Army had begun a revolution in its long-range missile artillery in Europe, with a wide range of firing ranges. For these new “miracle weapons”, the US Army introduced a new troop structure, called MDTF, Multi-Domain Task Force. The combat zone of this type of modern army soldier is no longer the trench, but the computer work station.

In the MDTF of the US Army, three systems of missile artillery are combined under one command:

- The smallest system is HIMARS, an older but modernized self-propelled rocket launcher with a short-range range of up to a few hundred kilometers.

- The second Typhon system is a medium-range weapon, technically not new, but new for the US Army: On trucks are mounted vertical launchers of the type Mark-41 for four missiles each, as they have been in use for decades on US naval ships and since 2016 at the Aegis missile station of the USA in Romania. In the Army, the Mark-41 are to fire two types of ammunition: SM-6 surface-to-surface short-range missiles or Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles. With a range of 1,600 kilometers, Tomahawk is the direct further development of the GLCM cruise missiles, which were stationed in Europe during the NATO retrofit in the 1980s, also in West Germany.

- But the centerpiece of the army’s innovation is the third and largest system: the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile (also known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, LRHW) with a range of 2,700 kilometers.

Official voices from Russia

The Russian leadership needed a few months to clarify the new situation. A statement from Russia, in December 2021, describes the Western focus on the Ukraine conflict as a pretext to distract from the fact that in NATO territory, “attack missile systems are stationed with minimal flight time to central Russia, plus other destabilizing weapons.” From the Russian point of view, the truth is not about Ukraine at all, but about new US long-range missiles in Europe. NATO has reasons to conceal this from the Western public. Subtracting a propaganda component: was this claim simply plucked out of thin air?

“We call on Washington to join Russia’s unilateral moratorium on the deployment of land-based short- and medium-range missiles in Europe.” That is to say, despite the termination of the INF, Russia will for the time being continue to unilaterally refrain from deploying such missiles in Europe. And Russia also includes short-range missiles. Can’t you take them at their word?

Missiles withdrawn from Kaliningrad? The short-range missiles are a surprise, because in 2018 in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, formerly Königsberg/East Prussia, exactly such missiles had appeared (Iskander, firing range 500 kilometers). From Kaliningrad to the US military bases in Germany, it is about 1,000 kilometers, the shortest possible route from Russian territory to these destinations, and thus the shortest flight time.

However, the short-range missile Iskander only comes about as far as Berlin. There are no military targets there that would be worth the use of an expensive missile for Russia. If the Russian moratorium is true, the Iskanders were moved back to the Russian heartland by the end of 2021. Given their important statement, would Moscow risk being caught and paraded as a fraud by NATO?

NATO’s response

In response to the Russian statement, NATO expressed “strong concern” about Russian troop deployment on the border area with Ukraine in a counter-statement in December 2021.

NATO is ready for negotiations with Russia within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council. As for the OSCE: it is “also a relevant platform” but there is no commitment to include it in the process. NATO therefore considers ‘quarrels’ between NATO-Russia to be more expedient. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 reads quite differently: “The OSCE, as the only all-European security organization, has a key role to play for peace and stability in Europe.” In other words, the OSCE is the ideal neutral mediator, especially for NATO-Russia disputes. What can be said against it? Should this no longer apply?

If instead of the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE was to become the independent mediator of the negotiations between the USA/NATO and Russia, this would be the beginning of the end of the two opposing military alliances NATO (USA) and CSTO (Russia). Both sides know this.

Further from the NATO text: “Should Russia take concrete steps to reduce tensions, we are ready to work on confidence-building measures.” In other words, before negotiations begin, Russia must make advances. Strikingly, in the entire NATO declaration, there is not a word about medium-range missiles.

Clarification from Moscow

At the Russian government's annual press conference at the end of 2021, British journalist Diana Magnay (Sky News) asked President Putin whether he could unconditionally guarantee not to invade Ukraine. Putin's answer:

"It is not the negotiations themselves that are important to us, but their results. (...) They demand guarantees from me. It is you who must give us guarantees, and you must do it immediately, now, instead of decades of talking about it and doing what you want."

Another quote from Putin in response to the subject of missiles:

"What would the Americans say if we stationed our missiles on the border between Canada and the United States, or between Mexico and the United States?"

Also at the end of 2021, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov spoke about the Russian missiles banned under the INF Treaty: "At the moment they do not exist. We have a unilateral moratorium. We call on NATO and the US to join this moratorium," but "they simply do not respond to our proposals."

Did Ryabkov tell the truth about the "non-existent" missiles? Until the termination of the INF Treaty in 2019, Russia could not expect to ever be allowed to deploy medium-range weapons again, so it made no sense to build such a thing. But the technology is still there, and has been for decades. In response to the stationing of the Pershing missiles in West Germany from 1984 onwards, the Soviet Union deployed SS-23 short-range nuclear missiles targeting the Pershing positions and other U.S. facilities in West Germany. The successor of the SS-23 was the modern Russian model Iskander. In the 1980s, an SS-23 with a second propulsion stage and steerable warhead was in development, the medium-range missile of the type Volga. It would have brought capabilities such as the American Pershing missile, but development was halted with the INF Treaty.

Deputy Minister Ryabkov became even more precise: There are "indirect signs" that NATO is again stationing medium-range missiles. Rather casually, he mentioned that the 56th Artillery Command of the USA had just been re-established. This unit had operated the Pershing missiles in Germany from 1984 to 1987 – in fact even until 1991.

On the question of what the Russian government might mean by military measures against the US missile deployment, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko became relatively concrete in December 2021: Russia had offered NATO a draft treaty to address the military situation. But if this were not followed by negotiations, "we too would go into the mode of creating counter-threats. But then it will be too late to ask ourselves why we made this and that decision and why we have stationed this and that system in the respective place." "Systems" here apparently means new Russian medium-range missiles and "respective location" probably also or mainly Kaliningrad. Again, Grushko on what it is about from the Russian point of view: "If attack systems that can reach our command centers within minutes are stationed on the territory of NATO countries, we will have to create an appropriate situation for them."...

The official responses of the US and NATO

At the end of January 2022, Russia received written responses to its draft treaties of December 2021. According to statements from Moscow, they did not address the individual Russian points, but rejected them in general form. The focus was on the sovereign right of states to choose their own alliances: "NATO's door is open and remains open," said US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.

But this misses the point: the dispute is not about association membership, but about the presence of foreign troops in the member states. Allowing such presence is not a condition of NATO membership. 22 of the 30 NATO member states do not allow foreign bases, including Germany's neighbours France, Denmark and the Czech Republic. Kosovo is not a NATO member, but has a US base, Camp Bondsteel, with 7,000 troops – larger than Kosovo's own army.

The original texts of the Russian draft treaties were immediately published by the Russian government, and the answers of the USA and NATO remained secret. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged receipt of the responses, complaining: "There is no positive answer to the main question in this document. The main question is our clear position on the inadmissibility of further NATO eastward expansion and the stationing of weapons that could threaten Russian territory."

Accordingly, in the US response, not a word about the stationing of US offensive weapons, i.e. Dark Eagle.

In early February 2022, a few weeks before the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Spanish newspaper El Pais managed to get hold of the texts of the US and NATO responses to Russia and published them as facsimiles. This made it possible to analyse Russian criticism of those responses. Looking at these answers, the question arises as to why the US and NATO are keeping them secret after the Russian papers were immediately published. Which side stands for transparency?

The Russian draft treaty to the US addressed the two main concerns, which – embedded in broad criticism of Russian measures – were answered by the US as follows:

- On stopping NATO's eastward expansion, especially Ukraine's non-admission to NATO: "The United States continues to strongly support NATO's open door policy and believes that the NATO-Russia Council is the appropriate forum for discussing this issue." So not a concrete proposal, but the shifting of the topic to "discussions". Even without Ukraine's NATO membership, the US could have concluded bilateral military agreements with Ukraine in the meantime.

- On the new US medium-range weapons: "The United States is ready to discuss condition-based mutual transparency measures and mutual commitments of both the United States and Russia, to refrain from stationing offensive land-based missile systems and permanent forces with a combat mission on the territory of Ukraine." "The U.S., in close coordination with our allies, is ready to begin discussions within the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) on arms control for ground-based medium-range and short-range missiles and their launchers." Not a concrete proposal, but again the postponement to "discussions". In the meantime, the US may have long since stationed its Dark Eagle missiles in Europe, thus creating a fait accompli.

… In the Russian draft treaty to NATO members, one main Russian concern was in the foreground: the reset of the military situation of the Eastern European NATO members to the state of 1997, before the beginning of NATO's eastward expansion. Overall, the NATO response was in line with the US response, and this point, which – for the sake of competence – was only included in the draft treaty for NATO members, was not addressed in the NATO response.

What can Russia deduce from this overall tenor other than that the US and NATO ignore Russia's security needs and, in particular, keep the Dark Eagle problem under wraps?...

Dark Eagle is the new Pershing

Immediately after the INF was terminated (August 2019), the US began testing new land-based medium-range weapons for the army, using conventional warheads, i.e. non-nuclear. These tests were of target-guided missiles, with accuracy in the meter range – every shot is a direct hit, no matter what the range of fire.

The precision-determining target guidance is done via satellite navigation, in the case of the USA via GPS (Global Positioning System). A second system, called INS (Inertial Navigation System), uses accelerometers and rotary sensors in the missile to allow it to dance wildly around the GPS target trajectory without loss of precision in order to trick out flight and missile defense.

The Dark Eagle has two drive stages and is about 8 meters long, 0.9 meters in diameter, weight class probably around 8 tons. Like Tomahawk, Dark Eagle is transported in erectible canisters on trucks, two of them on a truck. In these canisters, the Dark Eagles are stored in weatherproof conditions, and are fired after they have been erected by hydraulic arms. Dark Eagle is a modernization of the Pershing missile of the "NATO retrofit" of the 1980s, even from the same manufacturer. A Dark Eagle fire battery comprises four rocket trucks, i.e. eight missiles, plus a command vehicle.

Hypersonic means at least five times the speed of sound. In fact, Dark Eagle flies at about twelve times the speed of sound. But the warhead does not necessarily fly in a high ballistic parabolic arc through the vacuum, but can also fly at a lower altitude at the upper edge of the atmosphere. There, the glider can maneuver with rudders. Therefore, enemy missile defenses cannot adjust to a uniform trajectory of its target, that is, the hypersonic warhead penetrates every missile defense…

When and where will Dark Eagle be stationed?

For the triple capabilities of the missile artillery (HIMARS, Typhon, Dark Eagle), the US Army has created a new troop structure, MTDF. Of these, a first unit was set up in 2017, located in the northwest of the USA, in Lewis-McChord in the state of Washington. In 2021, a second MDTF, stationed in Germany, in Mainz-Kastel, close to the European High Command of the US Army in Wiesbaden, followed. There are no further MDTFs so far, and no further one is planned in Europe.

In December 2021, the U.S. Secretary of the Army declared that the Dark Eagle missiles "will probably be deployed in the U.S., rather than in allied countries near China.” A low-content statement: Of the fire positions in the heartland of the USA, Dark Eagle only reaches Canada, Mexico or water surfaces in the Atlantic and Pacific. Asian countries have already thankfully waved off the issue of stationing Dark Eagle against China. Dark Eagle could be deployed on the US island of Guam in the South Pacific, but from there the missile cannot even reach the coast of China, 3,000 kilometers away. So Dark Eagle is useless for the conflict with China.

The minister did not talk about Dark Eagle stationing in Europe. But according to a quasi-official report, the US Army is – unsurprisingly – trying to station Dark Eagle in Europe. Where else in the world? And where in Europe? The command and operational units for Dark Eagle have been set up in Germany since 2021. The operational units in Germany, the missiles elsewhere? What are the operational units without missiles and the missiles without operational units supposed to do? But officially so far not a word about it.

An unbiased look at the map: From where in NATO Europe could Dark Eagle reach Moscow in a short flight time? France and Denmark will certainly say "no, thank you" to new American medium-range weapons on their soil, as will Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium. The Eastern European NATO members are absent, because the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1990 prohibits such important US deployments there.

All other NATO countries are too far away from Moscow, too long a missile flight time. So the remaining option for stationing Dark Eagle is ‘Pershing country’: Germany …

Flight tests with real Dark Eagle missiles should begin in early 2022. When the first missiles are delivered to Germany 'in the fiscal year 2023' (that is, in principle, from October 2022, the beginning of the financial year 2023), then the training in the USA will be completed and the Dark Eagle soldiers will be transferred back to Germany. You can fire immediately, because every move and every calculation is thoroughly practiced. When the missiles are delivered, they are also immediately ready for use.

So the deployment of Dark Eagle (and also the land-based Tomahawk) actually started in 2021, in Germany, in no other European country. And hardly anyone notices it.

Who decides on the stationing?

Who actually decides on the stationing of Dark Eagle in Germany – the US government or the German government? Actually, it is clear in a sovereign country: its government decides. But the decades of experience with the claim to sovereignty or the obedience of the German governments cast doubt on the fact that this will happen …

Why the government, not parliament? Why does the Federal Government and not the Bundestag decide, when the Bundeswehr is a "parliamentary army"? This dispute had first broken out in 1984 over the stationing of the Pershing missiles: The Parliamentary Group of the Greens had complained to the Federal Constitutional Court that the Bundestag had to decide on the missile deployment. The Federal Government, on the other hand, felt that it was sufficient for the Bundestag to discuss it. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the stationing was the decision of the Federal Government. At that time, the whole thing was a purely cosmetic process, for the United States, as the occupying power, had decided to deploy it. There were no Germans as decision-makers. But the stage design, painted as democratic, was maintained...

Main factor German public opinion

... Since reunification in 1990, German public opinion has ultimately been the force that can maintain or change their country's role as a potential NATO battlefield.

German public opinion must be mobilised again if we are to prevent Dark Eagle missiles from being stationed in Europe.

Translated by TU. All errors are the responsibility of the translator.

War in Ukraine: Nuclear Danger

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

The following text is an edited transcript of a speech given to a joint public meeting of Birmingham Stop the War and West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on 29 March 2022.

In March 1961, Bertrand Russell addressed the Second Midlands Conference for Peace in Birmingham. Perhaps some in attendance tonight remember the meeting? Maybe not.

Anyway, I re-read what Russell had to say at this meeting this morning and was struck by its relevance for the issues we face today. It’s almost as if the world hasn’t moved on very much in the last sixty one years! In opening his argument, Russell insisted that:

Our main purpose must be to prevent a war using weapons of mass destruction – and not only to prevent it for a time by makeshift devices, but to establish such institutions in the world as shall make it reasonably certain that a war of extermination will not occur in the foreseeable future.

What were these weapons of mass destruction to which Russell refers? Why was he so concerned that they might lead to a war of extermination?

The weapons were nuclear weapons and he was concerned about the prospect of extermination of human life because once you get beyond the lies that such weapons are a “deterrence”, that they ensure “security” and that they guarantee “defence”, you must understand that nuclear weapon use means extermination. If, as is claimed, ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’ then nuclear war points towards a politics of genocide.

I am afraid that recent events have put the prospect of such a war and such politics back on the global agenda. I will seek to explain why but in doing so, I will argue that such prospects have been very much alive for decades. If we take them seriously now, we must continue to take them seriously in all that we do and in all of our reckonings going forward.

We are gathered here because of President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and the issue of nuclear war is on the agenda because he has quite clearly shattered the nuclear ‘taboo’: that is, whereas the leaders of most nuclear armed states think it impolite to explicitly threaten nuclear use, Mr Putin has broken with this grim charade.

First things first: we must clearly oppose Russia’s actions in Ukraine. They should never have happened in the first place and all Russian military activity should cease immediately. For the sake of humanity, if for nothing else, the killing has to stop. It is quite clear that a military ‘victory’ is unthinkable unless you are prepared to think about tens of thousands of deaths - maybe more - and the utter destruction of scores of villages, towns and cities.

Secondly, we stand squarely with the enormous mobilisation of anti-war opinion within Russia itself. One section of this movement warned that “This war will turn Ukraine into rubble and Russia into a prison.” News from Ukraine and what we’ve seen of the treatment of anti-war protestors in Russia confirms this warning.

It is absolutely right to condemn explicit nuclear threats, wherever they come from. But it is not right, as school history books and some misguided teachers tell us, that nuclear weapons have “only been used twice”: in 1945 when the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The terrible truth is that nuclear weapons have been in daily use from this point onwards. Their possession and the implicit threat of use that comes with such possession have shaped global politics and continue to do so. What do I mean by ‘use’ in this context? Daniel Ellsberg, former nuclear-planner turned peace activist, puts it this way:

A gun is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled.

Nuclear weapons are in daily use and the circumstance of their use is actually much worse than the scenario described by Dan Ellsberg. There is more than one gun. The guns keep getting more powerful. One side has dished out smaller guns to friends, they’ve formed a gang – even gave it a catchy name – and together, they have started edging towards their enemy.

What’s the name of the ‘gang’? NATO. Now, some people insist that in the present circumstances, criticism of NATO is beyond the pale. People in other circles would have you believe that NATO is nothing more than a defensive alliance. Others would kick you out of polite company for opposing this nuclear-armed alliance and for pointing out facts about its function. I’m afraid that such people are at best talking complete and utter rubbish and at worst, they are lying.

This so-called ‘defensive alliance’ was created to, in the words of Lord Ismay who became the first Secretary General of NATO in 1952, “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”, with keeping the Americans in Europe very much a priority. It is worth noting that the North Atlantic Treaty – signed in April 1949 – preceded the creation of the Organisation and an integrated military structure. Amongst the initial members of NATO were the fading colonial powers – Britain and France – and fascist Portugal, a colonial power in its own right. So far, so undemocratic. Yet we’re supposed to believe that NATO has always functioned as a defensive alliance of liberal, democratic states. More than that, we’re supposed to entertain the idea that it is a key plank in what is termed the ‘international rules based order’. More on this later.

Initially, the United States was the only nuclear armed state within the Alliance. It was soon joined by Britain in 1952 – which explains the ascendancy of Lord Ismay – and by France in 1960. By this point, NATO was very much a nuclear armed alliance and so it remains.

With America very firmly in Europe and West Germany integrated into NATO by 1955, Ismay’s characterization of the nuclear alliance needed updating. The prime function of NATO was to maintain US influence in Europe, thereby ‘containing’ the Soviet Union, with member-states under the US dominated ‘nuclear umbrella’.

You simply cannot remove nuclear weapons from your understanding of NATO. Neither can you remove American imperialism from the NATO equation.

Why do these things matter? Because unless you understand these things, the whole history of the last thirty years in Europe is utterly incomprehensible.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact offered the chance for a real security order in Europe. Such an order would have meant disbanding NATO, which – we were told – existed to defend Europe from the Soviets. At the time, people were writing articles with titles such as “Europe without an Enemy” which called for a system of common security based on the entirely rational notion that security is for everyone or it is for none of us. Trade Union leaders in the UK, like Ron Todd of the TGWU, were grappling with the notion of a ‘peace dividend’ – that is, what would happen to arms manufacturing now that huge arsenals were no longer required. Such work revived ideas pioneered during the days of the Lucas Plan and foreshadow much of the work done today on green transition and similar.

The peace and anti-war movements were all calling for similar. But what happened? NATO did not disband, it steadily expanded. The nuclear-armed states did not disarm. The stockpiles remained and US nuclear bombs remain in Europe to this day.

By 1999, the lie that NATO is purely a defensive alliance should have been shattered once and for all. Between March 24 and June 20 1999, NATO unleashed an aerial bombardment on what was then Yugoslavia. NATO called its mission ‘Operation Allied Force’. Thirty-eight thousand sorties were launched, of which almost ten and a half thousand were actual air strikes. ‘Authority’ for this bombardment was assumed by NATO alone. The United Nations was not consulted. The bombardment ratified pure power politics in Europe and removed any pretence to a constitutional international order.

This is important to understand. When we hear appeals for adherence to a ‘rules based order’ from politicians and states people in NATO member states, then know that they are appealing to for the rights of America, Britain, France and the rest to break the supposed norms of this order at will. Geopolitics has three strands: economic, legal and military. They all interact in the course of usual function but properly understood – that is, understood from the viewpoint of historical fact and material reality – the economic and military ultimately usurp the supposed legal leg of the framework. Rules are broken without consequence and, especially in terms of military matters and questions of war, they are broken without sanction, without embarrassment and they are usually broken with a good dose of treachery and deceit mixed in.

We are supposed to believe that the USA – yes, the same USA responsible to war crimes in Vietnam, Guantanamo Bay, the invasion of Iraq and the rest, the same USA over which Donald Trump presided and may well preside again – is the ultimate guarantor of this rules-based order. The world is supposed to believe it. We are supposed to accept the nuclear status of NATO member states and accept their collective efforts to destroy the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons whilst at the same time believing that they are upholding an international rules-based order? Give us a break.

You see, NATO didn’t just expand geographically – in terms of membership – after the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw pact – although this was bad enough. NATO also expanded its field of operations: its perceived sphere of influence. We now have ‘global NATO’, with an ‘area of operations’ that extends to the Asia-Pacific region: a long way from the Atlantic. NATO also inflated its overall posture, and continues to do so. Rather than lay the foundations for security, military means are asserted. Lastly, it has continued to modify its nuclear capabilities which are now to include ‘useable’ nuclear weapons: something President Biden called a ‘bad idea’ during the election but which he signed-off on in the last Pentagon budget (signed into law by Biden two days after Christmas 2021).

There is much else to say, but I will finish on these point: There can be no excuse for Putin’s war against Ukraine. He has chosen a course of action all by himself. Yet the peace and anti-war movement have been warning of the consequences of continuing on the same course with respect to war, NATO and nuclear weapons for decades. We have argued that so-called defence should be replaced with genuine efforts for security. We were ignored.

Our work begins once more and it starts in the most dangerous of moments: when the prospect of nuclear war is on the agenda and when war rages in Ukraine.

We must dedicate ourselves to arguing for the end of this war, towards preventing its spread and to alerting the world to the acute dangers presented by nuclear threats.

If the dull hum of a nuclear warhead ever mutates into a deafening and life-ending roar of a nuclear explosion, humanity will be extinguished. We cannot and will not let this happen.

Ukraine Negotiations: No Fly Zone, Nukes, Neutrality, and Disarmament

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Joseph Gerson, USA

Regardless of whether we agree with him or not, President Biden's statements that Vladimir Putin cannot remain in power and that Putin is a war criminal have compounded already complex negotiations to end Moscow's devastating and nationally self-defeating war of aggression.

Humanity will be sleepwalking to its doom unless the great powers negotiate nuclear disarmament, and to collaborate to stanch the climate chaos that haunts humanity's future.

With Russia's military advances in Ukraine stymied, and with the mounting death tolls, we are receiving contradictory reports about the state of Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy. Ukraine's lead negotiator Mykailo Podolyak reports that the negotiations with Moscow are "absolutely real", but that the Kremlin hasn't pulled back from its most ambitious war aims. Negotiations, he has said, could continue for months. Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, Brig. General Kyrylo Budanov is less optimistic, reporting that the negotiations are "vague and unpredictable". Turkey's President Erdogan, who has met with both the Russian and Ukrainian presidents in his efforts to mediate an end to the war, reports that negotiators have reached "understandings" about Ukraine and NATO, partial Ukrainian disarmament, collective security, and the use of the Russian language, but there have been no agreements on the future status of Crimea or the Donbas. And, contrary to Podolyak, the New York Times claims that Russia is signaling a change in its war goals, announcing that the "first stage of the operation" has been "mainly accomplished." While it "does not exclude continuing attacks on major Ukrainian cities, the Times reports that they are not Moscow's "primary objective". It contends that Russian forces will be concentrated on the "liberation of the Donbas."

Ukrainian and Russian lives will continue to be shattered until either a ceasefire or completion of successful negotiations are announced.

In recent months, I have been privileged to be a set of ears in a confidential series of track II discussions, initially designed to prevent the war and now to help frame diplomatic compromises that could end the bloodletting. Participants include former U.S., Russian and European officials—including military officers, advisors to their respective governments and scholars. A number of the participants communicate with their country's policy makers. A number of these people, despite their differences, have negotiated and otherwise worked together over many years. And even as emotions run high, the discourse is civil and "professional." While there could be unhappy professional consequences for some of the Western participants, one of the senior Russians has commented that "No new initiative comes without the risk of punishment."

This past week, as Ukrainian and Russian negotiators were meeting and other governments weighed in, one of these track II sessions was held to discuss the advocacy and dangers of a possible Western no-fly declaration, as well as what Ukrainian neutrality and disarmament would entail. With the exception of near unanimous opposition to the exceedingly dangerous possibility of a no-fly zone declaration, as described below, a range of possibilities were identified which hopefully will inform the diplomacy needed to end the war.

A No-Fly Zone and NATO "Peacekeepers"

While Russian forces grind away at Ukrainian resistance, there is glee in Washington that Moscow may have trapped itself in an Afghanistan-like quagmire. But one thing that thoughtful U.S. and Russian elites agree upon is that despite the ongoing negotiations, the situation may be as dangerous as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then the Kennedy Administration believed the odds were between a third and a half that the crisis would result in a thermonuclear exchange between the world's two most heavily armed nuclear powers.

Just as the United States has done at least thirty times during international crises and wars, Vladimir Putin has threatened the possible use of nuclear weapons and increased the alert status of his nuclear arsenal. In the words of former U.S. Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Charles Richard, the U.S. has used its strategic nuclear forces to "create the 'manoeuvre space' for us to project conventional military power strategically." This strategy works both ways. It has prevented the U.S. and NATO from establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine to eliminate aerial support for Russian ground forces. As was the case during the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear alerts increase the danger of accidents, insubordinations, or miscalculations triggering the unimaginable. There are also fears that if the Russian military and President Putin find themselves on the defensive, in desperation Putin might fall back on attacking with chemical or low-yield nuclear weapons, risking escalation up the nuclear ladder.

Zelensky has repeatedly appealed for NATO to impose a no-fly zone, an appeal that has found resonance in Congress. Fortunately, thus far NATO leaders have bowed to the reality that enforcing a no-fly zone against Russia would inevitably trigger World War III, in the form of genocidal or omnicidal nuclear exchanges. Enforcing a no-fly zone would require attacking Russian anti-aircraft installations and shooting down Russian planes, to which Russia would respond in kind. Yet, in the track II discussion, a senior American warned that the longer the war continues, and as the Russian military is degraded, the temptation to impose a no-fly zone will grow.

A second reckless proposal, which was fortunately disregarded in Brussels, was made by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Poland's president in the run up to the NATO summit. Standing beside Volodymyr Zelensky, he floated the idea of dispatching NATO "peacekeeping" forces, capable of defending themselves, to operate in Ukraine. His spokesman later elaborated that the operation would involve deploying NATO and other forces in regions of Ukraine that have yet to be occupied by Russia and protecting them "against further Russian activities" .

In the track II session, a senior Russian advisor commented that "If Poland moves to impose a no-fly zone or otherwise intervenes in Ukraine, it will be considered an attack by a NATO member state." Similarly, immediately following the NATO summit, NATO leaders warned that if weapons of mass destruction were used within Ukraine, but their fallout drifted into NATO's territory, it could be interpreted an attack on NATO, necessitating military responses.

Neutrality & Demilitarization

Every war, for better or worse, ends with negotiations. While the details of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations remain tightly held secrets, track II participants assume that Russia's invasion will end with assurances that Ukraine will never join NATO and that it will become a neutral and significantly demilitarized state. Less certain is whether Moscow will insist on regime change in Kyiv in the guise of "denazification" or if Russia's territorial conquests will remain in place.

Russian ambitions in Ukraine, undefined as they continue to be, indicate that negotiating Ukrainian neutrality is at best a complex affair. As one Russian advisor commented, Moscow will insist that there be no possible military threats emanating from Ukraine for many decades to come. Recognizing the fragility of Swedish and Finnish neutrality, with both nations currently debating the possibility of applying for NATO membership, Russian leaders believe that neutrality cannot be rooted in what they perceive to be a hostile political environment. Thus, it is argued that meaningful agreements on Ukrainian neutrality will require progress in U.S-Russian and Russian-NATO negotiations, and they will need to be confirmed by an international treaty or United Nations Security Council resolution.

As if these obstacles are not sufficiently daunting, while Moscow states that regime change is not its goal, believing that neutrality must be rooted in a nation's political system and culture, it will demand some restructuring of the Ukrainian state, perhaps in the guise of its denazification demands. Not as difficult, but no slam dunk, are indications that Russia will demand intrusive inspections to verify Ukrainian neutrality and placing Kyiv's nuclear power plants under a special verification regime or in the future to be run by international operators.

Nonetheless, first steps in the direction of Ukrainian neutrality are being made. Under the pressure of Russia's invasion, President Zelensky has stated that, despite Ukraine's 2019 constitutional commitment to seeking NATO membership, he will not press the issue. He has stated that he is prepared to discuss neutrality as part of a peace deal with Russia but it needs to be guaranteed by third parties and approved in a referendum. It is possible that Zelensky may have wanted to opt for neutrality to prevent Russia's invasion, but political pressure from right-wing Ukrainian nationalist forces—including assassination threats—raised the political (and personal) costs of pursuing that option.

Regardless of how it is designed, Kyiv agreeing to becoming a neutral state will face significant Ukrainian political opposition necessitating strong support, and likely considerable input, from the United States and other NATO states.

There are, in fact, many forms of nation-state neutrality. Swedish, Austrian, Moldavan, Irish, and Swiss neutrality differ from one another. International law would require that Ukrainian neutrality, which prevailed between its 1990 independence until 2015, would require renunciation of Kyiv's ambitions to join NATO, a ban on the presence of foreign military troops and bases, the commitment to treat warring parties equally, and guarantees from a number of countries. Militarily, Ukraine would need the ability to defend its neutrality and territorial integrity. Whether this would include Donetsk, Luhansk, and other regions now controlled by the Russian military appears to be the most divisive issue. Ukraine would also be prohibited from taking part in any international miliary conflict, making its territory available to nations at war (as Cambodia did during the Vietnam War), and providing troops or mercenaries to forces at war.

Determining how Ukraine would defend its neutrality will require intense negotiations. Sweden maintains a professional military, reinforced by conscripts, and its military-industrial complex produces weapons for export as well as for national defense. Switzerland has universal male military service. And at the end of the neutrality spectrum is Ireland which spends little on its military and is widely believed to be unable to defend itself against possible aggression, theoretical though it may be. That said, a neutral Ukraine would require some form of police for domestic security, a border/customs patrol, and a minimal military. Determining where weapons and related training for these forces would come from implies further questions about orientation and influence, and would be another highly contested issue.

Guaranteeing Ukrainian neutrality raises other questions. President Zelensky has said that it would require guarantees from the United States and other NATO nations. Russians respond by asking how this would differ in substance from Ukraine formally joining NATO. There is also the reality that nothing, even constitutions and international treaties that guarantees they will endure. With the people of and governments of Sweden and Finland debating whether to end decades of neutrality and apply for membership in NATO Russian analysts are wondering how Ukrainian neutrality could be guaranteed.

What Then?

Ukrainian civilians and soldiers and Russian soldiers are being killed and maimed every day. Many of Ukraine's cities are being reduced to rubble. And indiscriminate sanctions are wreaking havoc and delivering despair to innocent Russians across that continental empire. These must all end.

International civil society has almost universally condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With our demands for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, a negotiated settlement to the war, and the withdrawal of all foreign military troops, we have helped to frame and apply international pressure to end this unjustified and tragic war. No one should be sacrificed or displaced while political leaders and diplomats debate the fine points of the negotiated settlement of the war. Negotiations can take place amidst a ceasefire. This must be our immediate demand.

Looking to the future, after the guns are silenced we will face the shattered remains of the post-Cold War order, especially the continuing existential nuclear and climate existential threats. Recalling that NATO's expansion to Russia's borders was a contributing cause of the Ukrainian disaster and the long record of devastating U.S. imperial wars, Americans would do well to approach the new era with humility.

Putin has given us new lessons about the catastrophic perils of the arrogance of power. Slow though the restoration of trust and normal diplomatic relations will be, we will face the urgent necessity of Common Security negotiations. The imperatives will be to replace the new ice age of a Cold War with a new Euro-Atlantic order in which no nation seeks to ensure its security at the expense of other nations. This was the promise of initial post-Cold War diplomacy, including the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. And humanity will be sleepwalking to its doom unless the great powers negotiate nuclear disarmament, and to collaborate to stanch the climate chaos that haunts humanity's future.

First published at Common Dreams, 28/03/22

www.commondreams.org

Joseph Gerson is President of the Campaign for Peace, Disarmament and Common Security, Co-founder of the Committee for a SANE U.S. China Policy and Vice President of the International Peace Bureau. His books include Empire and the Bomb, and With Hiroshima Eyes.

Europe is militarising at lightening speed

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Ludo De Brabander, Belgium

What came before

NATO’s relations with Ukraine date back to immediately after independence in 1991. The North Atlantic Alliance included the country in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace program (1994). From 1997, cooperation was deepened with the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). In 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest decided that Ukraine could eventually become a member of the military alliance, without, however, opening the procedure for this (Membership Action Plan, MAP). Russia responded by labeling Ukraine’s membership as a “red line.” In 2009 the Euro-Atlantic military integration of Ukraine was started through an ‘Annual National Programme’.

Ukraine has been actively contributing to NATO military operations ever since. From then on, NATO also conducts annual multinational manoeuvres in Ukraine (under the name ‘Rapid Trident’) and in the Black Sea. The latter regularly take place off the coast of Crimea, which led to a serious incident last year between a British frigate and the Russian army, during which warning shots were fired. Moscow considers such military exercises ‘provocations’. Secret British documents that were unintentionally made public show that scenarios of possible Russian reactions were calculated in advance .

Since the Warsaw summit (2016), NATO support to Ukraine has been provided through a ‘Comprehensive Assistance Package’. In 2019, Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership was constitutionally enshrined by Kiev. In 2020, Ukrainian President Zelensky approved the New National Security Strategy to further develop ties and integration with NATO into full membership.

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbass region (2014), NATO responded with troop deployments, rising military budgets and arms supplies to Ukraine. That same year, at the summit in Wales, NATO heads of government agreed that member states’ military budgets must be at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2024. At that time, only Greece, the United Kingdom and the US reached that standard. Between 2015 and 2021, NATO’s combined budgets grew by $155 billion.

The developments in Ukraine also have major repercussions for the Belgian military-budgetary trajectory. In 2017, the Swedish coalition decided to commit 9.2 billion euros in a program law for investments in weapons systems. The government is thus making an important concession to that other NATO standard of Wales, to set aside 20% of the military budget for military investment. In addition, the Michel government approved a defense growth path that should bring the military budget to 1.3% of GDP by 2030.

Belgium also responded to NATO by supplying around 300 soldiers to be stationed in Estonia and subsequently in Lithuania. They are part of the 4 multinational ‘battlegroups’ that the military alliance in Poland and the Baltic States developed in the context of the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’, a decision of the NATO summit in Warsaw (2016).

In response to Russian military action in and around Ukraine, which eventually culminated in open war, NATO decided to increase its military presence in Eastern Europe. There are now 40,000 troops under NATO command with another four new multinational battlegroups in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Belgium pledged 300 troops to reinforce NATO’s flank in Romania.

Military budgets are rising sharply

From the beginning of this year, European armaments and militarization gained momentum. Immense budget increases - until recently seen as unfeasible - are now becoming reality without significant debate.

In Belgium, at the end of January 2022, the government gave the green light to the STAR plan – ‘Security, Technology, Ambition and Resilience’ – which foresees that defense resources should increase to 1.54% of GDP by 2030. This includes a new investment plan worth more than 10 billion euros. The government approved a preliminary draft law for this at the end of February “for updating the military program law and the defense budget up to and including 2030”. Additional costs have to be added to this for increasing the number of personnel from 26,000 to 29,000 and for the implementation of the POP plan (People-Our-Priority plan), which is intended to improve working conditions and the pay of the troops. Additional expenditure is also made for investments in infrastructure and in research and development of new technologies in collaboration with Belgian industry. The STAR plan reserves 1.8 billion euros for the latter.

Ultimately, the military budget is expected to amount to 6.9 billion euros in 2030, compared to 4.4 billion today. In reality, that could be even higher. In the run-up to the NATO meeting in Brussels at the end of March, the De Croo government has decided to allocate an additional 1 billion over the next three years for arms and ammunition stocks, protective equipment, anti-tank weapons, the vehicle fleet and IT and communication systems. This means that over a five-year period, a total of more than EUR 20 billion in military investments in weapon systems has been committed.

The same pattern can be seen in almost all NATO member states.

Immediately after the invasion, the German government announced that it would invest another 100 billion euros in the army this year. A growth path had already been mapped out for the German defense budget that was budgeted at 53 billion euros in 2022, an increase of 3.2% compared to the previous year. The war in Ukraine means that not since the defeat of the ‘Third Reich’, will so much money be invested in the military apparatus in such a short time. Chancellor Scholtz said his country would immediately increase its military budget to above 2% of GDP, up from 1.53% now.

In the Dutch coalition agreement of December 2021, it was already agreed that a structural additional 3 billion euros would be added for defense, to reach 1.85% of GDP in 2024. According to recent reports, the Rutte government is working on a plan to go to 2% of GDP in order to respond to a parliamentary motion that was passed with a large majority.

On March 16, the Italian parliament voted by a large majority to increase the military budget from 1.41% to 2% of GDP, or from 29.8 billion euros to 41 billion euros.

Although the US already spends astronomically high amounts on the military apparatus - almost 40% of global military expenditure - Washington is also planning another billion-dollar injection. US President Biden proposes increasing the military budget for the next fiscal year (starting this fall) to $813 billion, which would be an increase of $31 billion in one year.

French President Macron, who is in full electoral battle, has announced that the already planned increase in the military budget should be increased, without however giving details. According to the French military programming law (2019-2025), a strong budget increase is already foreseen. In 2025, military resources must be increased to 50 billion euros, compared to 41 billion euros this year. So probably a few billion more.

Spain, Denmark, Poland and Romania are also announcing major budget increases. Poland even wants to go to 3% of GDP next year (compared to 2.2% this year).

NATO member states together accounted for $1,049 billion in military expenditure in 2021. With the announced budget increases, many tens of billions will be added.

Russia’s military budget is about $62 billion, which is 17 times less than NATO’s military resources. Russia is unlikely to follow in the new arms race, as Moscow already spent 4.3% of GDP on military spending last year. With the sanctions on top, it looks like there’s little margin left for further increases. This suggests that the military imbalance of power with NATO will become much greater. The question therefore arises as to why all these extra military resources are needed in the NATO member states? It seems that NATO is preparing for a possible new superpower confrontation. NATO defines not only Russia, but also China as a ‘systemic rival’.

European ‘Peace Facility’ for Ukraine

A few days after the Russian invasion, the Council of the European Union decided to allow EUR 450 million worth of arms supplies to the Ukrainian army through the so-called ‘peace facility’ that came into effect at the end of March 2021. On March 23, 2022, the Council doubled the amount, so that eventually 900 million euros in arms can be supplied.

The Peace Facility was created to finance military missions and support to third countries under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EUR 5 billion planned for the period 2021-2027 will be realized outside the EU budget. After all, according to the EU Treaty, expenditure in support of military operations must be financed with separate contributions from the Member States.

EU Member States have the right to supply weapons under the ‘right of self-defence’ provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The ‘Common Position’, which regulates arms exports from the EU, also allows this in the context of self-defence. In contrast, both the Peace Facility and the Common Position impose restrictions. For example, arms transfers must not prolong or aggravate the conflict (Common Position criterion 3), which is difficult to assess in this existing war. Arms deliveries could greatly enhance the Ukrainian army’s strike capability to bring a swift end to the war. Conversely, arms deliveries can effectively prolong and aggravate the conflict.

Criterion 7 states that the weapons must not fall into the hands of ‘undesirable’ end users. That could be Russian troops in the event that they overpower Ukrainian troops, weapons that are distributed to civilians, or weapons that end up with ‘undesirable’ militias when the fighting becomes ‘unconventional’. In the event of Russian forces being expelled, such militias could target the Russian minority in the country or could be used to further fight the conflict with the insurgent republics (Luhansk and Donetsk).

Finally, criterion 2 states that the weapons may not be delivered if there is a risk that they will be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition to the reporting of Russian war crimes, there have already been reports of members of the Ukrainian army committing war crimes.

Similar provisions are also included in the Q&A of the European External Action Service which regulates arms transfers under the peace facility. However, the Council has not taken a public position on all these possible consequences of arms transfers. A concept note has been leaked that lists the above-mentioned risks, including restrictive measures, such as the provision that the weapons may not end up with entities other than the Ukrainian army. However, President Zelensky has stated at the start of the Russian aggression that Kiev will provide weapons to any civilian willing to fight.

Billions of arms deliveries to Ukraine

A large flow of weapons has been making its way to Ukraine since 2014, with the US as the main supplier. Between 2014 and 2021, the US provided at least $2.5 billion in weapons and military aid. More than $1 billion has been added since the Russian war. The Czech Republic, Poland, France, Turkey and the United Kingdom have also been supplying arms to the Ukrainian armed forces for several years, and it cannot be ruled out that they have been deployed against the insurgent rebel republics in the Donbass region.

Since the Russian invasion, arms deliveries have increased in intensity and volume. Most NATO member states (and some EU member states) have announced the delivery of defensive as well as offensive weapon systems. Belgium has stated that it will deliver 5,000 machine guns and 200 anti-tank weapons to the Ukrainian army.

The United Kingdom is one of the most active arms suppliers in this war, ranging from anti-tank and other missile systems, armored vehicles and artillery to associated ammunition. London is also committed to the delivery of eight naval vessels and a £1.7 billion frigate.

If you go over the list, you will arrive at hundreds of millions of euros in weapons and other military support.

Arms industry

Rising military budgets and massive military aid to Ukraine provide billions in revenue for the military industry. In January, a month before the outbreak of hostilities across Ukraine, US arms giants Raytheon and Lockheed Martin openly stated to their investors that the tensions “will make more business” for the arms companies. Raytheon supplies Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and together with Lockheed Martin the Javelin anti-tank missiles. Both companies are among the top five arms giants to have pumped $60 million into influencing US politics by 2020. In Washington, the arms industry employs 700 lobbyists, which is more than the number of Congressmen. At least 19 of those Congressmen have bought shares of both arms giants, some of them after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Even before the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, the global military industry was predicted to grow by 7% in 2022 (from $453 billion to $483 billion). Western Europe would become the fastest growing market according to these forecasts. The military bidding with rising budgets means that the predicted increase in turnover will turn out to be a serious underestimate. Two weeks after the invasion, arms companies’ shares rose sharply. Shares of Raytheon rose by 8%, General Dynamics by 12%, Lockheed Martin by 18% and Northrop Grumman even by 22%. British BAE Systems saw its shares rise by 14% in the first week after the Russian invasion.

Rising military budgets and arms supplies are a boon to the arms industry, but are having negative repercussions on negotiations and diplomacy. If one side believes in military victory thanks to these deliveries, it could lead to a very bloody prolongation of the war in eastern Ukraine.

End this war

From END Info 31 DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

It is not possible to fully capture the appalling dimensions of a war by listing grim statistics. If such statistics made a difference to those who control the armies and institutions that wage war, then millions slaughtered in wars, large and small, over past decades would not have perished. The disturbing truth is that human life means little to war-makers. A different class of mathematical object matters much more to such people: the calculus of power.

We are the opposite of war-makers. We aim for peace and strive to remove all roadblocks to it. So in reckoning with the calamities produced by President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, we absorb the grim statistics. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that between 4am on the morning of 24 February 2022 and midnight on 12 April 2022, civilian casualties totalled: “485 men, 313 women, 31 girls, and 54 boys, as well as 72 children and 977 adults whose sex is yet unknown”. 1,932 corpses. In addition, many thousands of men, women, boys, girls and children have suffered injuries of which many will be life-changing. The report comments:

Most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, and missile and air strikes.

Added to the civilian deaths are those of the ‘combatants’. According to Ukrainian, Russian and NATO estimates, thousands on each side have died in the fighting. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces include conscript fighters.

To these numbers should be added all those who have died in the eight years of fighting in Eastern Ukraine/Donbass between 2014-2022 and all those yet to be slaughtered. As in all wars, the death toll only ever increases. This war must end.

In a 1964 letter to German social psychologist and humanist philosopher Erich Fromm, Bertrand Russell argued that: “War should be treated as murder is treated. It should be regarded with equal horror and with equal aversion.” War is organised murder. The organisers of murder together with the individual murderers richly deserve our collective horror and aversion.

In the case of the war in Ukraine, international legal procedures have been initiated to catalogue the crimes already committed and to document those that will come if the war continues. Tribunals and hearings are under preparation. The leaders of NATO member states have been very clear in describing the horrors of the war in Ukraine and in identifying a culprit. Yet Mr Biden, Mr Johnson and allies are less forthcoming in their denunciations of the wars, some of them ‘illegal’, waged by US, British and NATO forces. Mr Johnson is vocal on crimes in Ukraine but silent on crimes in Yemen, a horror-show of human suffering imposed on that country by Britain’s ally, Saudi Arabia, and fuelled by arms sales from the UK. Mr Biden sees horror in Ukraine but sees nothing wrong with the wars he supported over decades of ‘public service’.

As bad as this rank hypocrisy is, the stark fact is that the US, UK and allies in the nuclear-armed NATO alliance are already preparing for the next war. Peace, justice and human rights are not actually on their agenda.

The next war

Without doubt, ultimate responsibility for the war in Ukraine rests with Mr Putin. It would, however, be untrue to say that each and every opportunity to de-escalate was taken. END Info and other publications traced the facts of these failures and documented the troubling developments that went with them. We argued for alternative measures: real security and cooperation, denuclearisation and a nuclear-free-zone in Europe. We advocated for diplomacy rather than brinkmanship. In so doing, we echoed the calls of the peace movements throughout the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s, when opportunities for a comprehensive change of course seemed credible afterer the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Rather than taking steps to achieve real security, NATO expanded both geographically and in terms of posture. NATO is now a ‘global’ force with an ever-expanding area of operation.

Despite the growing risks, 2021 seemed like a year of real possibilities compared to today. In 2021 we witnessed widespread discussion in Germany on the future of US nuclear bombs stationed in that country under NATO agreements. We witnessed some NATO member states agreeing to send observers to the First State Parties meeting of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Think-tanks and trade unions were actively engaged in developing a new approach to common security. Everything has shifted in a deadly direction.

It is common knowledge and common sense that all wars and military conflicts end in diplomacy and negotiation. Even where ‘military victory’ at the expense of murder, death and destruction is ‘achieved’ by one side or another, diplomacy and negotiation conclude the matter. It will likely be the case that the horrors in Ukraine will end in a similar fashion. Everyone knows this, yet those in power do not have the good sense to act on this basis. Rather, they are preparing for the next war.

For example, just three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a referendum in neighbouring Belarus approved a new constitution that ditched the country’s non-nuclear-weapon status (27 February 2022). According to reports, 65.2% of those who voted agreed to this change, which makes it possible, for example, for Russia to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus. No doubt, Mr Lukashenko will tell the people of Belarus that such a move ‘enhances our security’. Such a turn of phrase will be familiar to the peoples of Finland and Sweden, two countries which look set to join the NATO nuclear-armed alliance to ‘enhance security’. If it’s true that the Belarus decision has made the world a more dangerous place, then it is also true that Finland and Sweden joining NATO makes the world a more dangerous place.

Military ‘solutions’ are nothing of the sort, they just bring greater risks and a greater possibility of death and destruction. ‘Security’ is not enhanced with nuclear weapons or by joining a nuclear-armed alliance. Rather than achieveing ‘security’, risks are multiplied and the foundations for the next war are established.

Militarisation

Preparations for the next war can be detected not only in the serial failures to pursue peace, the geographic expansion of NATO, the development of new nuclear weapons and the rest. Europe is now entering a period of rapid re-militarisation. If we wind the clock back a year or two, we will recall President Trump’s repeated complaints about the lack of military spending by European states. Trump has departed the political scene and we should hope that he never returns. However, Trumpian levels of military spending are now on the agenda.

As social conditions in Europe spiral ever downwards, as the prospect of widespread poverty intensifies, as living costs skyrocket and as the impacts of Covid and the deficiencies of the economy endure, European countries are pledging billions in increased military spending. Trump would be proud. These things cannot be isolated from the growth of right-wing political forces across the continent: from the Johnson government in Britain, through the streets and voting booths of France, to the government of Hungary. The situation is dangerous. Billions of Euros for machines of murder and destruction whilst the poor get poorer will not ‘guarantee security’. Quite the opposite.

The dimensions of this crisis are not limited to developments in Europe. Note the already-shifting remit of the ‘AUKUS’ alliance between Australia, the UK and US. Within the past month, it has been announced that this alliance will now cover the development and deployment of hypersonic missiles. For what purpose? Who will be the target? Additionally, further efforts have been initiated to include Japan in the alliance. Such a move would massively escalate existing tensions in the region and would mark a significant change in military posture for Japan.

The arc of militarisation extends across the Atlantic, over Europe and far into the southern hemisphere. Existential risks follow this same arc.

End this war ... stop the next one

The peace movements face a monumental challenge as a result of Putin’s war and the militarism of NATO and Europe. There are visible tensions and sharp disagreements. We are, however, united by an understanding that the immediate tasks are to end the war in Ukraine, end the death and destruction that come with it and to resist the drives to escalation. We are also united by the aim of stopping anything like this happening again. To achieve our aims, we must be clear-sighted about the longstanding dynamics and the more recent, dramatic, shifts. We must understand the potential consequences and prepare to resist them.

Nuclear Ukraine

From END Info 30 download

Up until the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine hosted about a third of all Soviet nuclear weapons. Following a 1991 referendum, where an overwhelming proportion voted for independence, the fate of these Soviet weapons was in the hands of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine was a ‘founder’ of the CIS but did not actually join after declining to sign the CIS Charter in 1993.

It was not until 1994 that Ukraine formally agreed to dismantle the ‘left behind’ nuclear weapons system. That same year it signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and renounced nuclear weapons possession for good.

Nuclear weapons possession was firmly and quite rightly renounced in 1994 but nuclear power has been an enduring feature of Ukraine’s infrastructure. The risks and hazards of nuclear power have been well documented, not least in the recent Spokesman Dossier titled Nuclear Power? But the people of Ukraine have no need for book-length summaries of the potentially deadly consequences of nuclear power for in the north of the country, on the Belarus border, sits Chernobyl. Such peace-time risks have now been joined by the acute risks of nuclear power in times of war.

As Jan Vande Putte, co-author of a recent Greenpeace study, points out: “For the first time in history a major war is being waged in a country with multiple nuclear reactors and thousands of tons of highly radioactive spent fuel”.

The Greenpeace study (02/03/22) focuses on severe nuclear hazards at just one of Ukraine’s nuclear power sites: the Zaporizhzhia plant, which with six nuclear reactors is the largest such plant in the whole of Europe. The study sets out the risks:

“In a worst-case scenario, where explosions destroy the reactor containment and cooling systems, the potential release of radioactivity from both the reactor core and spent fuel pool into the atmosphere could create a disaster far worse than [at Fukushima] ... with areas of land hundreds of kilometres from the reactor site potentially becoming inhospitable for decades. Even without direct damage to the plant, the reactors rely on the electric grid for operating cooling systems, on the availability of nuclear technicians and personnel and access to heavy equipment and logistics.”

If Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and his subsequent nuclear threats weren’t bad enough - and they are very bad indeed - then the prospect of nuclear disaster, either deliberate or accidental, compounds an already awful situation.

If those who attempt to maintain some form of safety at the Chernobyl site are prevented from doing so, if supplies are cut off, if shifts cannot change or similar then Putin will have yet more death and destruction to account for. If a single shell or missile ‘accidentally’ hits just one reactor at one of the active plants then the consequences could be immense. If electricity supplies are disrupted and cooling systems fail, then nuclear-meltdown and all that means could unfold. These are risks of waging ‘conventional war’ in places with nuclear power plants. The world knows all of the risks of nuclear power but has failed to act. Will it take another ‘unthinkable’ disaster like Chernobyl to force the issue? We must hope that it doesn’t.

Meanwhile, as energy supplies are impacted as a consequence of Putin’s actions, there will be many who rush towards nuclear power as a means of ‘energy independence’. Such a rush is misjudged on many levels - not least the questions of timescale and interdependence of nuclear fuel supply - but it will be fundamentally misjudged because nuclear power is dirty, dangerous and - as can be seen from events in Ukraine - potentially deadly.