Den Nuklearismus herausfordern: Das Atomwaffenverbot

Richard Falk

(Übersetzt von Joachim Wernicke, Berlin)

First published in English in The Spokesman 148: Challenging Nuclearism edited by Tony Simpson and Tom Unterrainer. See link for more information.

Am 7. Juli 2017 stimmten 122 UN-Länder dafür, den Text eines vorgeschlagenen internatio-nalen Vertrags mit dem Titel „Entwurf eines Vertrags über das Verbot von Atomnwaffen“ (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW) zu genehmigen. Der Vertrag konnte ab September offiziell unterzeichnet werden, wird jedoch erst zu einem verbindlichen Rechtsinstrument, und zwar gemäß seinen eigenen Bestimmungen am 21. Januar 2021, 90 Tage, nachdem das 50. Land beim UN-Generalsekretär seine Bestätigung hinterlegt hat, dass es den Vertrag gemäß seinen verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen ratifiziert hat.

Dies ist eine große Errungenschaft, nicht zuletzt, weil sich alle kleineren Atomwaffenstaaten weigerten, am Verhandlungsprozess teilzunehmen, und die Vereinigten Staaten, Frankreich und das Vereinigte Königreich eine formelle Erklärung abgaben, in der sie den Vertrag anprangerten und sich weigerten, bei der Durchführung ihrer Außenpolitik ihre Abhängigkeit von Atomwaffen abzuändern.

In einem wichtigen Sinne ist es unglaublich, dass es nach den Angriffen auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki 76 Jahre gedauert hat, bis dieses bedingungslose Verbot jeglicher Verwendung von oder Drohung mit Atomwaffen erlassen wurde [Artikel 1 Buchstabe e], im Rahmen eines multilateralen Vertrags, der unter der Schirmherrschaft der Vereinten Nationen ausgehandelt wurde. Die Kernverpflichtung von Staaten, die sich dafür entscheiden, Vertragspartei zu werden, ist sehr weitreichend. Der Vertrag verbietet jegliche Verbindung mit Atomwaffen, sei es durch Besitz, Einsatz, Prüfung, Weitergabe, Lagerung oder Herstellung [Artikel 1 Buchstabe a].

Der TPNW ist über das reine Verbot hinaus von Bedeutung. Er kann und sollte interpretiert werden als frontale Ablehnung des geopolitischen Ansatzes zum Nuklearismus und der Behauptung, die Beibehaltung und Entwicklung von Atomwaffen sei eine nachgewiesene Notwendigkeit für die globale Sicherheit, angesichts der Art und Weise, wie die internatio-nale Gesellschaft organisiert ist.

Es ist eine gesunde Entwicklung, dass der TPNW Ungeduld und Misstrauen gegenüber den ausgefeilten geopolitischen Rationalisierungen des nuklearen Status quo zeigt. Sie haben die grundlegenden Einwände vieler Regierungen gegen den Nuklearismus und die anti-nuklearen Ansichten ignoriert, die die öffentliche Meinung der Welt seit langem beherrschen, und sie haben Aktivisten der Zivilgesellschaft animiert. Die alten Zusicherungen der Atom-waffenstaaten, sich zur nuklearen Abrüstung zu verpflichten, sobald ein günstiger Moment eintrifft, verlieren zunehmend an Glaubwürdigkeit, da die Atomwaffenstaaten, mit den Vereinigten Staaten vorneweg, weiterhin enorme Investitionen in die Modernisierung und Weiterentwicklung ihrer Atomarsenale tätigen. Die USA schlagen sogar vor, Atomwaffen im Weltraum zu stationieren, trotz der Risiken und Kosten.

Trotz dieses berechtigten Erfolgserlebnisses muss zugegeben werden, dass es eine fast fatale Schwäche gibt, oder bestenfalls ein klaffendes Loch in diesem neu gegossenen Netz der gesetzlichen Verbote, das durch den TPNW-Prozess geschaffen wurde. Es stimmt, 122 Unterschriften und noch mehr das formelle Inkrafttreten des Vertrags untermauern die Behauptung, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft mit einer so bedeutenden Haltung die Ablehnung von Atomwaffen für alle Zwecke verbindlich signalisiert hat, und dies formalisierte das Verbot gegenteiliger Handlungen. Der enorme Wermutstropfen in diesem Heilmittel ergibt sich aus der Weigerung jeder der neun Atomwaffenstaaten, sich dem TPNW-Prozess auch nur in dem legitimierenden Umfang anzuschließen, an der Verhandlungskonferenz teilzunehmen mit der Möglichkeit, ihre Einwände zu äußern und das Ergebnis zu beeinflussen. Auch die meisten der wichtigsten Verbündeten dieser Staaten, die Teil des globalen Sicherheitsnetzwerks von Staaten sind, die sich direkt und indirekt auf Atomwaffen verlassen, boykottierten den gesamten Prozess. Es ist auch entmutigend anzuerkennen, dass mehrere Länder, die sich in der Vergangenheit mit großer Leidenschaft gegen Atomwaffen eingesetzt hatten, wie Indien, Japan und China, auffällig abwesend waren und ebenfalls das Verbot ablehnten. Diese Haltung der unverstellten Opposition gegen dieses von den Vereinten Nationen geförderte Unternehmen zur Delegitimierung des Nuklearismus, das gleichzeitig die Ansichten einer Minderheit von Regierungen widerspiegelt, muss äußerst ernst genommen werden. Es umfasst alle fünf ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheits-rats, die über eigene ausgeklügelte Atomwaffenprogramme verfügen, und so wichtige internationale Akteure wie Deutschland und Japan, die seit langem unter dem Atomschirm der USA Zuflucht suchen.

Das NATO-Dreieck aus Frankreich, Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten, drei der fünf Vetomächte im Sicherheitsrat, verärgert über dessen Unfähigkeit, das gesamte TPNW-Projekt zu verhindern, ging 2017 so weit, eine gemeinsame Denunziationserklärung abzugeben, deren Ton ihren trotzigen Anspruch offenbarte, der jeden Zweifel an der dauerhaften Absicht einer nuklearisierten Weltordnung beseitigte: „Wir beabsichtigen nicht, ihn [den TPNW] zu unterzeichnen, zu ratifizieren oder ihm jemals beizutreten. Daher wird sich an den rechtlichen Verpflichtungen unserer Länder in Bezug auf Atomwaffen nichts ändern.“

Der Hauptteil der Erklärung behauptete, dass die globale Sicherheit von der Aufrechter-haltung des nuklearen Status quo abhänge, der durch den Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (NVV) von 1968 gestärkt werde und durch die Behauptung, dass es „die Politik der nuklearen Abschreckung“ gewesen sei, die „wesentlich war für die Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens in Europa und Nordasien über 70 Jahre lang.“ Es ist wichtig, die geografischen Grenzen zu beachten, die mit den behaupteten friedenserhaltenden Vorteilen von Atomwaffen verbunden sind, die die hässliche Realität ignorieren, dass während dieser Zeit verheerende Kriegsführung außerhalb der befürchteten gegenseitigen Zerstörung der Kernländer der geopolitischer Rivalen, einer zentralen gemeinsamen Verdrängung der beiden nuklearen Supermächte während des gesamten Kalten Krieges. Während dieser Jahrzehnte der Rivalität wurden die gewalttätigen Dimensionen der geopolitischen Rivalität effektiv in die nicht-westlichen Regionen der Welt ausgelagert, was für viele gefährdete Völker im gesamten globalen Süden massives Leid und weit verbreitete Verwüstung verursachte. Eine solche Schlussfolgerung legt nahe, dass selbst wenn wir den Anspruch auf Atomwaffen als lobenswert für die Vermeidung eines großen Krieges akzeptieren würden, insbesondere eines nuklearen Dritten Weltkriegs, diese „Errungenschaft“ auf Kosten des Lebens von Millionen, wahrscheinlich zig Millionen Zivilisten in nicht-westlichen Gesellschaften erreicht wurde. Darüber hinaus war die Leistung ein kolossal verantwortungsloses Spiel mit der menschlichen Zukunft, erreicht ebenso durch Glück als auch der Rationalität, die Theorie und Praxis der Abschreckung zugeschrieben werden.

Der TPNW selbst stellt den westfälischen Rahmen des Staatszentrismus nicht selbst in Frage, indem er einen Rahmen globaler Rechtmäßigkeit vorgibt, der unter der Autorität der „internationalen Gemeinschaft“ oder der UNO als maßgeblicher Vertreterin der Völker der Welt erlassen wird. Seine Bestimmungen sind sorgfältig formuliert, indem sie Verpflichtun-gen nur in Bezug auf „Staaten“ auferlegen, d.h. Regierungen, die die vorgeschriebene Ratifikation hinterlegt haben und damit formell dem Vertrag beigetreten sind. Selbst Artikel 4, der hypothetisch darlegt, wie Atomwaffenstaaten sich von allen Verbindungen mit den Waffen trennen sollten, beschränkt seine Ansprüche auf Vertragsstaaten und bietet keinerlei Anleitung im Falle einer vermuteten oder behaupteten Nichteinhaltung. In Artikel 5 wird auf die Verpflichtung zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung durch die Verfahren der „nationalen Umsetzung“ verwiesen.

Der Vertrag strebt zwar eine schließliche Universalität an, durch den Beitritt aller Staaten im Laufe der Zeit, aber zwischenzeitlich sind die auferlegten Verpflichtungen von minimaler materieller Relevanz über die Übereinstimmung der nichtnuklearen Parteien hinaus, nicht die Stationierung oder andere Verbindungen mit den Waffen zu akzeptieren. Es ist für eine andere Gelegenheit, aber ich glaube, dass nach dem gegenwärtigen Völkergewohnheits-recht, dem neu entstehenden Weltrecht und dem immerwährenden Prinzip des Naturrechts ein starkes Argument vorgebracht werden kann, dass die Verbote im TPNW universell bindend sind, unabhängig davon, ob ein Staat beschließt oder nicht, Vertragspartei zu werden.

Als unnötiger weiterer Schritt zur Bekräftigung des Etatismus und insbesondere der „nationalen Souveränität“ als Grundlage der Weltordnung gibt Artikel 17 den Parteien des TPNW ein Rücktrittsrecht. Alles, was Vertragsstaaten dazu tun müssen, ist die Kündigung mit einer Erklärung über „außergewöhnliche Umstände“, die „die höchsten Interessen ihres Landes gefährdet“ haben. Der Austritt wird zwölf Monate nach Übermittlung der Mitteilung und Erklärung wirksam. Der Vertrag enthält kein Verfahren, mit dem die Behauptung „außergewöhnlicher Umstände“ als unangemessen oder bösgläubig angefochten werden kann. Es ist eine Anerkennung, dass selbst für diese nicht-nuklearen Staaten, die sich an den Vertrag halten, nichts an Recht, Moral oder menschliches Wohlergehen Vorrang hat vor der Ausübung souveräner Rechte.

Artikel 17 wird in absehbarer Zeit wahrscheinlich nicht in Anspruch genommen werden. Diese Bestimmung erinnert uns an die starke Restabneigung selbst von Anti-Atom-Regierungen, globalen und menschlichen Interessen Vorrang vor nationalen Interessen zu geben. Die Rückzugsoption ist auch deshalb wichtig, weil sie bestätigt, dass die nationale Sicherheit weiterhin Vorrang vor dem Völkerrecht hat, sogar in Bezug auf völkermörderische Massenvernichtungswaffen. Als solche sind die von den Parteien des TPNW eingegange-nen Verpflichtungen auf eine Weise umkehrbar, die in den multilateralen Übereinkommen nicht enthalten ist, die Völkermord, Apartheid und Folter verbieten, oder in jus-cogens-Bereichen.

Ist es angesichts dieser Unzulänglichkeiten dennoch vernünftig, dass Atomwaffen-Abolitionisten durch die Vorlage eines solchen Vertrags einen großen Sieg für sich beanspruchen? Bedenkt man, dass die Atomwaffenstaaten und ihre Verbündeten den Prozess allesamt abgelehnt haben und auch diejenigen im Kreis des beabsichtigten gesetzlichen Verbots sich ein Rücktrittsrecht vorbehalten, dürfte der TPNW von Zynikern als reines Wunschdenken und sogar von einigen Engagierten abgetan werden Anti-Atomkraft-Anhänger eher als Anlass für den Schierlingsbecher als für das Glas Champagner.

Die Kluft zwischen den Atomwaffenstaaten und dem Rest der Welt war noch nie so stark, und es gibt keine Anzeichen auf beiden Seiten der Kluft, die geringste Anstrengung zu unternehmen, um eine gemeinsame Basis zu finden, und vielleicht gibt es keine. Ab sofort ist es eine Distanz zwischen zwei Formen der Asymmetrie. Die Atomstaaten genießen ein Übergewicht an Hard Power, während die Anti-Atomstaaten die Oberhand haben, wenn es um Soft Power geht, einschließlich solider Wurzeln in "materieller Demokratie", "Weltrecht", "Naturrecht" und "Globaler Ethik". '.

Die Hard-Power-Lösung für den Nuklearismus war im Wesentlichen reflexiv, das heißt, sie stützte sich auf den Nuklearismus, wie er von den führenden Atomwaffenstaaten geprägt wurde. In der Praxis bedeutete dies eine gewisse Zurückhaltung auf dem Schlachtfeld und in Krisensituationen (es gibt zweifelsohne ein existenzielles Atomtabu, obwohl es niemals ernsthaft erprobt wurde) und vor allem eine delegitimierende einseitige Umsetzung des Regimes des Nichtverbreitungsvertrags [NVV]. Diese Einseitigkeit manifestiert sich in zweierlei Hinsicht:

(1) diskriminierende Verwaltung der zugrunde liegenden Nichtver-breitungsnorm, am vorbehaltlosesten im Fall Israels; ebenso die exzessive Durchsetzung der Nichtverbrei-tungsnorm über die Grenzen des NVV selbst oder der UN-Charta hinaus, wie im Irak (2003), und derzeit durch Androhung von militärischen Angriffen gegen Nordkorea und den Iran. Jede solche Anwendung militärischer Gewalt wäre nicht defensiv und rechtswidrig, sofern sie nicht durch eine Resolution des Sicherheitsrats genehmigt wird, die von allen fünf ständigen Mitgliedern und mindestens vier anderen Staaten unterstützt wird, was glück-licherweise unwahrscheinlich bleibt [UN-Charta, Artikel 27(3)]. Wahrscheinlicher ist der Rückgriff auf einseitigen Zwang, der von den Ländern geführt wird, die die berüchtigte gemeinsame Erklärung zur Abwertung des TPNW abgegeben haben, wie dies für die USA und Großbritannien in Bezug auf den Krieg gegen den Irak der Fall war, prinzipiell rationa-lisiert als Anti-Proliferations-Unternehmen, was sich als ziemlich grober Vorwand für einen Angriffskrieg mit anderen Zielen herausstellte, wobei er  „Schock- und Ehrfurcht“-Taktiken zur Schau stellte.

(2) Das Versagen, die den Atomwaffenstaaten auferlegten Verpflichtungen zu respektieren, nach Treu und Glauben eine Vereinbarung auszuhandeln, diese Waffen mit verifizierten und umsichtigen Mitteln zu beseitigen und darüber hinaus eine allgemeine und vollständige Abrüstung anzustreben. Fast 50 Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des NVV im Jahr 1970 hätte offensichtlich sein müssen, dass Atomwaffenstaaten ihre materiellen Verpflichtungen aus dem Vertrag verletzt haben, was 1996 durch ein Gutachten des Internationalen Gerichtshofs (IGH) bestätigt wurde, die eine einstimmige Aufforderung zur Umsetzung dieser rechtlichen Verpflichtungen gemäß Artikel VI einschlossen. Diese Schlussfolgerung aus Taten und Worten ziehend, ist für alle, die Augen haben um zu sehen, klar, dass sich die Atomwaffenstaaten als eine Gruppe für Abschreckung plus Gegen-Weitererbreitung entschieden haben, als ihr permanentes Sicherheitsregime.

Ein Beitrag des TPNW besteht darin, der Welt das entscheidende Bewusstsein dieser 122 Länder zu vermitteln, das durch die weltweite öffentliche Meinung verstärkt wird, dass der Abschreckungs-/NVV-Ansatz für globalen Frieden und Sicherheit weder umsichtig noch legitim noch ein glaubwürdiger Weg ist, der im Laufe der Zeit zum Ende des Nuklearismus führt.

An seiner Stelle bietet der TPNW einen eigenen zweistufigen Ansatz – erstens eine bedingungslose Stigmatisierung des Einsatzes oder der Androhung von Atomwaffen, gefolgt von einem Verhandlungsprozeß, der die nukleare Abrüstung sucht. Obwohl sich der TPNW über die Entmilitarisierung der Geopolitik und die konventionelle Abrüstung schweigt, wird weithin angenommen, dass spätere Phasen der Denuklearisierung nicht umgesetzt würden, es sei denn, sie beinhalteten eine ehrgeizige Verkleinerung des Kriegssystems. Der TPNW schweigt auch über die Relevanz von Fähigkeiten zur Atomenergie, die mit der Zeit zwangsläufig eine Waffenoption mit sich bringen, angesichts des weit verbreiteten aktuellen technologischen Know-hows. Auch die Relevanz der Kernenergietechnik müsste in einem gewissen Stadium der nuklearen Abrüstung angesprochen werden.

Sollten wir, nachdem wir diese großen Mängel der Vertragsabdeckung und -ausrichtung aufgezeigt haben, diese Einschränkungen beiseite legen und an den Feierlichkeiten und erneuerten Hoffnungen der Aktivisten der Zivilgesellschaft teilhaben, die Welt von Atomwaffen zu befreien? Mein geschätzter Freund und Kollege David Krieger, der sein Leben der Aufrechterhaltung des Brennens der Flamme der Unzufriedenheit über Atomwaffen gewidmet hat und der der langjährige und Gründungspräsident der Nuclear Age Peace Foundation ist, schließt seine fundierte Kritik an den Gemeinsamen Erklärungen der NATO-Führer mit diesem ermutigenden Gedanken:

„Trotz des Widerstands der USA, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs markiert der Atomteststoppvertrag den Anfang vom Ende des Atomzeitalters.“ [Krieger, „U.S., UK and France Denounce the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty“]. Ich bin mir da überhaupt nicht sicher, obwohl Kriegers Aussage die eindringliche Ungewissheit offen lässt, wie lange es dauern könnte, von diesem „Anfang“ zum gewünschten „Ende“ zu gelangen. Ist es, wie einige selbsternannte „nukleare Realisten“ gerne betonen, nicht mehr als ein Endziel, was eine höfliche Codierung für die völlige Ablehnung der nuklearen Abrüstungsoption ist, als „utopisch“ oder „unerreichbar“?

Wir sollten uns bewusst sein, dass es seit 1945 viele frühere „Anfänge vom Ende“ gab, die uns dem Ziel der Beseitigung der Geißel des Nuklearismus vom Angesicht der Erde nicht näher gebracht haben. Es ist eine lange und etwas willkürliche Liste, einschließlich der unmittelbaren entsetzten Reaktionen der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Welt auf die Atombombenangriffe am Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, und was diese Angriffe über die Zukunft der Kriegsführung aussagten, die massiven Kampagnen des zivilen Ungehorsams gegen Atomwaffen, dies erregte in einigen Atomwaffenstaaten kurzzeitig die Aufmerksamkeit der Massen; vorgelegte Abrüstungsvorschläge der Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion in den 1960er Jahren; die Resolution 1653 (XVI) der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, die 1961 die Drohung oder den Einsatz von Atomwaffen nach der UN-Charta für bedingungslos rechtswidrig erklärte und jeden Täter als eines Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit schuldig ansah; die Kubakrise von 1962, die viele bei der plötzlichen Erkenntnis erschreckte, dass eine Koexistenz mit Atomwaffen nicht tolerierbar war; das mehrheitliche Beratende Gutachten des Internationalen Gerichtshofs von 1996 als Reaktion auf die förmliche Anfrage der Generalversammlung zur Legalität von Atomwaffen, das die Möglichkeit der Legalität des Einsatzes auf den eng begrenzten Umstand der Reaktion auf unmittelbare Bedrohungen des Überlebens eines souveränen Staates beschränkt; die scheinbare Nähe zu historischen Abrüstungsvereinbarungen, die Ronald Reagan und Michail Gorbatschow 1986 bei einem Gipfeltreffen in Reykjavik, Island, vereinbart hatten; die außergewöhnliche Öffnung durch das Ende des Kalten Krieges und den Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion, die den Weltführern den bestmöglichen „Anfang vom Ende“ bot, und doch geschah nichts; und schließlich die Prager Rede von Barack Obama im Jahr 2009 (die von Jimmy Carter 1977 Gefühle widerspiegeln, ebenfalls zu Beginn seiner Präsidentschaft weniger dramatisch ausgedrückt), in der er mit großem Beifall engagierte Bemühungen befürwortete, die Abschaffung von Atomwaffen wenn nicht zu seinen Lebzeiten, so doch zumindest so schnell wie möglich voranzutreiben; es war ein Anfang, gut genug für einen Friedensnobelpreis, aber dann ein weiteres Scheitern, vermutlich entmutigt durch den Gegendruck des gewaltigen Nuklearwaffen-Establishments.

Jede dieser Gelegenheiten weckte kurz die Hoffnungen der Menschheit auf eine Zukunft, die von der Bedrohung durch einen Atomkrieg und der damit verbundenen Katastrophe befreit war, und doch gab es, wenn überhaupt, nur wenige Anzeichen für einen Fortschritt von jedem dieser Anfänge, die so hoffnungsvoll in Richtung des Zieles begrüßt wurden. Bald überwältigten Desillusionierung, Verleugnung und Ablenkung die Hoffnungen, die durch diese früheren Initiativen geweckt waren, und die Atmosphäre der Hoffnung wurde in jedem Fall ersetzt durch eine Aura atomarer Selbstgefälligkeit, geprägt von Gleichgültigkeit, Ignoranz und Verleugnung. Es ist wichtig anzuerkennen, dass die nationalen bürokratischen und ideologischen Strukturen, die den Nuklearismus unterstützen, äußerst widerstandsfähig sind und sich als geschickt erwiesen haben, die flüchtige Politik periodischer Aufregungen des Anti-Atom-Aktivismus auszusitzen und zu überlisten.

Und nach etlichen Jahren wird nun wieder ein Neuanfang ausgerufen. Wir müssen mehr Energie aufbringen und aufrechterhalten als in der Vergangenheit, wenn wir das Schicksal früherer Neuanfänge in Bezug auf das TPNW vermeiden wollen, das ohne zivilgesellschaft-liche Militanz und Beharrlichkeit in jeder Phase nicht vorangekommen wäre. Die Heraus-forderung besteht jetzt darin, die nächsten Schritte zu erkennen und dann zu gehen und nicht den Präzedenzfällen der Vergangenheit zu folgen, die auf die Feier eines scheinbar vielversprechenden Anfangs folgten, mit einem falschen Vertrauen auf die Mächtigen, die die Situation zu bewältigen und entsprechend zu handeln. In der Vergangenheit wurden die früheren Anfänge bald begraben, akute Bedenken tauchten schließlich wieder auf und ein weiterer Neuanfang wurde mit Fanfaren angekündigt, während die früheren gescheiterten Anfänge aus dem kollektiven Gedächtnis gelöscht wurden.

Hier können wir zumindest der Gemeinsamen Erklärung führender NATO-Verbündeter dafür danken, dass sie ein klares Signal an die Zivilgesellschaft gesendet haben, und den 122 Regierungen, die dem TPNW-Text zugestimmt haben, dass sie es wirklich ernst meinen mit der Beendigung des Nuklearismus, sie müssen den politischen Kampf weiterführen, weiteren Schwung gewinnen und versuchen, Kipp-Punkte zu erreichen, an denen diese Anfänge vom Ende beginnen, genug Zugkraft zu gewinnen, um ein echtes politisches Projekt zu werden, und nicht nur ein weiterer harmloser Tagtraum von gut gemeinten, bald vergessenen leeren Gesten.

Ab sofort ist der TPNW ein Vertragstext, der höflich das Ende des Nuklearismus vorschreibt, aber um diesen Text in ein wirksames Kontrollregime umzuwandeln, werden tiefgreifende Verpflichtungen, Opfer und Beharrlichkeit erforderlich sein, die schließlich das Unmögliche erreichen und an die Bewegungen erinnern, die so tief verwurzelte Übel beendeten wie Sklaverei, Apartheid und Kolonialismus, aber erst nach langen Kämpfen.

Can Nuclear-Free Zones be Enforceable?

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

The following text is taken from Think Globally, Act Locally: The United Nations and the Peace Movements (Spokesman, 1988).

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina alleged in July 1982 that the United Kingdom was in breach of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. This Treaty had been agreed in 1967, at Tlatelolco in Mexico, and was the first Treaty to establish a nuclear-free zone in a widely populated area. Previously, areas which had been declared to be free of nuclear weapons had included the Antarctic, Outer Space, and the Seabed. But Latin America was the first populated continent to forbid nuclear weapons anywhere in its region. A recent report by the United Nations summarises the provisions of this agreement:

“The basic obligation of the parties to the Treaty, defined in article 1, is to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the very presence of nuclear weapons for any purpose and under any circumstances.

Parties to the Treaty also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorising, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon”.1

The Treaty of Tlatelolco has given rise to an Enforcement Committee, charged with the task of considering any violations or alleged violations.

“OPANAL was set up in June 1969. Its control system includes safeguards to be negotiated with IAEA with respect to all the nuclear activities of the parties”.2

When Argentina appeared before this Committee, it was seconded by Panama.

The status of Argentina in relation to the Treaty is itself a little ambiguous. The Argentines had signed the Treaty in 1967, but they had not actually ratified it subsequently, which would have been necessary if it were to be fully applied. However, the Treaty covers to whole area of Latin America, together with extensive areas in the surrounding oceans. Article 4 defines its scope:

“Article 4. Zone of application

1. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force.

2. Upon fulfilment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35° north latitude. 75° west longitude: from this point directly southward to a point at 30° north latitude. 75° west longitude: from there, directly eastward to a point at 30° north latitude. 50° west longitude: from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5° north latitude. 20° west longitude: from there, directly southward to a point at 60° south latitude. 20° west longitude: from there, directly westward to a point at 60° south latitude. 115° west longitude: from there, directly northward to a point at 0 latitude. 115° west longitude: from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35° north latitude. 150° west longitude: from there, directly eastward to a point at 35° north latitude. 75° west longitude”.3

Britain had long previously endorsed the Treaty, by signing, in December 1967, the two protocols which were open to nuclear powers outside the region. These were “deposited” with the Government of Mexico two years later, thus activating all the procedures of the Treaty. One of the protocols involved states holding colonial territories in the area, and the other, nuclear states. They were devised in order to permit both colonial and nuclear powers to underwrite the non-nuclear status of the whole continent. But the British Government filed declarations reserving its position on certain matters within the province of the Treaty, which placed limits on its compliance.

“When signing and ratifying Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II, the United Kingdom made the following declarations of understanding:

In connection with Article 3 of the Treaty, defining the term ‘territory’ as including the territorial sea, airspace and any other space over which the state exercises sovereignty in accordance with ‘its own legislation’, the UK does not regard its signing or ratification of the Additional Protocols as implying recognition of any legislation which does not, in its view, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

The Treaty does not permit the parties to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in technology have made possible the development of devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used for weapon purposes.

The signing and ratification by the UK could not be regarded as affecting in any way the legal status of any territory for the international relations of which the UK is responsible, lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by the Treaty.

Should a party to the Treaty carry out any act of aggression with the support of a nuclear weapon state, the UK would be free to reconsider the extent to which it could be regarded as committed by the provisions of Additional Protocol II.

In addition, the UK declared that its undertaking under Article 3 of Additional Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty extends also to territories in respect of which the undertaking under Article 1 of Additional Protocol I becomes effective”.4

The Argentine complaint of 1982 concerned the despatch of nuclear-powered submarines to the Falkland waters. It was, of course, a nuclear-powered submarine, the Conqueror, which sank the Argentine cruiser Belgrano, an event which marked off the irreversible deterioration of this conflict into all-out war. It is a nice question whether the arrival of nuclear submarines in South American waters was in fact a breach of the Treaty. As we have seen, Article One insists that nuclear material and installations in the region are solely employed for peaceful purposes. It is arguable that a nuclear submarine engaged · in·- military action is not employing nuclear energy peacefully, even if it is not actually carrying nuclear explosives. Nonetheless, a “nuclear-weapon” in the meaning of the Treaty, is a device which can release nuclear energy “in an uncontrolled manner”. Article Five lays down this criterion. It explicitly exempts propulsion mechanisms from the definition of “weaponry”. No doubt because the Treaty is so specific, the Enforcement organisation did not feel able to take effective action on the original complaint. However, the Committee might have felt differently, had it been able to verify a report which appeared in the New Statesman two years later. This claimed to have hard evidence that a Polaris submarine had been sent to the South Atlantic.

“One well-placed political source has already revealed to Tam Dalyell that a Polaris submarine was sent to the South Atlantic. Dalyell was informed that the submarine went as far south as Ascension; the likely target for a threatened or demonstration nuclear attack was said to be Cordoba, northern Argentina. The nuclear threat might have been used if any of the task force’s capital ships - one of the carriers, or the troop ship Canberra - had been destroyed in a missile attack. The Polaris deployment was said to have been ordered in the wake of the sinking of HMS Sheffield, after ministers had to confront the possibility that Argentine air superiority and Exocet missiles could mean the military defeat of the British task force, and the rapid political extinction of the Thatcher government.

The New Statesman has been able to confirm that a Polaris submarine was indeed deployed to this position. Details of the deployment are given in a series of highly classified telegrams sent to the British Embassy in Washington”.5

Polaris, of course, is armed with what are undeniably nuclear weapons. If the New Statesman were able to authenticate their claim, then their evidence should certainly have been of interest to OPANAL, because, however distant Polaris remained from the Falkland zone, once it was redeployed in connection with the British task force, its weapons must have been trained against targets in the Treaty area.

Such claims may be difficult to substantiate. But they are not the only issues which should be considered by Tlatelolco’s enforcement committee. Other ships than submarines steamed South during the Falklands/Malvinas war. It remains a crucial question to determine how many of these were nuclear armed. One important witness was Lieut. David Tinker, who died during the conflict. His moving letters to his family were published in 1982, and this is what they said:

“One of our jobs out here is to transfer stores around between ships and yesterday I walked into the hangar and found a nuclear bomb there. I suppose if the USA and USSR have got 7,000 each, the chance of walking into one must be increased, but nevertheless I was rather surprised, and wondered if it was worth sheltering in the hangar any more. Of course, it turned out to be a drill round, full of concrete, that Fort Austin, now eventually going home, was taking back to England. I don’t really know why we brought any down here. Loosing one off really would evaporate support for us by the EEC and Third World. Anyway, at least this lump of concrete is going back.” 6

Tinker is not at all alone in offering this testimony. It is apparently standard practice to issue such drill rounds to ships which may be called upon to deploy real ones. But how widely distributed were real sea-born nuclear armaments, particularly depth charges, and were any of them sent southwards? There were various press reports that British ships routinely deploy nuclear depth charges while they are on patrol. The Times, on 3rd November 1982, made a categorical statement that some of these were taken South.

“Frigates had nuclear weapons

Some British ships in the South Atlantic during the Falklands campaign were carrying nuclear anti-submarine weapons (our

Defence Correspondent writes):

Whitehall sources said that some of the frigates which went to the Falklands had been involved in exercises in the Mediterranean, and would have been routinely carrying anti-submarine nuclear bombs. Because they were diverted directly to the South Atlantic there would have been no opportunity to offload the weapons.

There would certainly have been no intention to use them in the South Atlantic, and ships which sailed from Britain would not have taken any nuclear weapons with them.

These bombs or depth charges are designed to be dropped from helicopters against deep lying submarines, and they explode beneath the sea’s surface.

The fact that anti-submarine vessels carry nuclear depth charges has been an open secret for some time. It was being said yesterday that until the weapons were “armed” they were safe, and that the arming or fusing mechanisms were stored in separate parts of the ships from the bombs themselves.

It is likely that the Prime Minister will be closely questioned on this issue. Mrs Margaret Thatcher will also be questioned about the fact that the 16,000-ton supply ship, Fort Austin, was diverted to the South Atlantic, sailing from Gibraltar on March 29”.

Other sources have assumed that the redirection of British naval forces towards the South left them with no opportunity to divest themselves of nuclear depth charges before they went off to fight the Argentinians.

HMS Sheffield, which was sunk, took down, it was claimed, an entire cargo of such nuclear depth charges. A preliminary account of this appeared in the Latin America Weekly Report, on 12th November 1982:

“Another diplomatic storm is blowing up from the South Atlantic following claims that the British task force was carrying nuclear weapons during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, in violation of the Tlatelolco treaty. The British government is refusing to respond to these accusations, claiming that any disclosures about its deployment of nuclear arms would run counter to national security interest.

According to defence experts in London, many of the British frigates and destroyers diverted to the area at the beginning of April would have been carrying tactical nuclear weapons designed for anti-submarine warfare. Nuclear depth charges are routinely carried by British warships on operations patrol in such areas as the North Atlantic, they say, and a large part of the fleet had no opportunity to offload any lethal weaponry before sailing for the South Atlantic.

A former naval secretary in the Thatcher government, Keith Speed, has cast doubt on the theory that the task force would have discharged its nuclear weapons at Ascension Island. Interviewed by BBC television this week, he said that he would have been surprised had the British force not carried nuclear arms to the Falklands.

Other defence sources say that the first effort was made to take the weapons out of the area after the sinking of the General Belgrano and the beginning of the ‘shooting war’. This task was undertaken by an auxiliary support vessel, the Fort Austin which was close to HMS Sheffield when the destroyer was crippled by an Exocet missile.

It has been claimed that the Sheffield still had nuclear depth charges on board when it was hit, and that the British force spent the next three days attempting to remove them. The ship went down with a number still on board. These had to be recovered by naval divers.

The Fort Austin, meanwhile, is at the centre of another mystery surrounding the conflict. It has been established that the supply vessel sailed for the South Atlantic on 28 March, several days before the British Prime Minister claims she had any knowledge of the impending Argentine invasion of the islands”.

Further allegations of the same kind have been made by Tam Dalyell:

“ ... on March 29, ships and RFA vessels on Exercise Springtrain were ordered south ... a number of those vessels carried nuclear weapons.

... some of the ships left Portsmouth in early April carrying nuclear weapons. ... there was a row of gargantuan proportions about this in parts of Whitehall, as a result of which some, though not all, of the nuclear weapons were offloaded from the ships when they were at sea, before they got to the western approaches ... the Stenor Inspector and the Stenor Seasearch have been trying to retrieve nuclear devices from the tombs of HMS Sheffield and HMS Coventry.

... there is also the problem of lost nuclear depth charges from two lost Sea King mark 4 and two lost Sea King mark 5 helicopters

... the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr Speed), the former Navy Minister, who lost his post, opined on News Night that he would be most surprised if the fleet were not carrying nuclear weapons”.7

This account was also supported by an extensive account in the New Statesman which said:

“The Navy has its own, relatively small stock of nuclear depth bombs. For some time after the Falklands War, they were not allowed to take them to sea. Ministers had belatedly discovered that the admirals had sent three quarters of the total British naval nuclear stockpile towards the South Atlantic battle zone.

In peacetime, nuclear depth bombs are only allowed on board attack carriers (like HMS Hennes and HMS Invincible) and certain anti-submarine frigates. As all of the available ships in these classes set off for the Falklands in 1982, the ‘War Cabinet’ - the Oversea and Defence committee (South Atlantic) - were warned that most of the Navy’s nuclear weapons would soon cross the equator”.8

This was not the only claim in the Statesman piece, to which we shall return shortly.

At this point in the argument, what can be said about the case of the Sheffield? The HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile on May 4th. “She caught fire, and the crew abandoned ship”, reported The Times next morning.

“A massive pall of smoke appeared on the horizon as Sea King helicopters ferried casualties back to the flagship carrier HMS Hennes. The Sheffield, about 15 miles away, was completely blotted out by the smoke which formed a solid column from the sea to the clouds.

As fire raged in the Sheffield a call was put out for hoses and pumping equipment to be dropped by helicopter. A frigate went alongside to help tackle the fires but three hours later it was decided to give the order to abandon ship because of the danger of a possible explosion of the Sheffields own Sea Dart missiles ... The Sheffield was still drifting and on fire last night. She is thought to be the first British warship to be lost in battle since the Second World War (Henry Stanhope writes)”.

In fact, at the time Sheffield sank, she was not “drifting” but under tow, as Mr Frank Allaun elicited from Mr Blaker in a parliamentary question on 23rd July 1982:

“Mr Frank Allaun asked the Secretary of State for Defence how HMS Sheffield was sunk; and if he will make a statement.

Mr Blaker: HMS Sheffield sank under tow in heavy weather because sea water entered the hole in her side caused by the

Argentine missile which struck her. To clarify any possible misunderstanding, I can state that there has never been any incident involving a British nuclear weapon leading to its loss or to the dispersal of radioactive contamination”.

Was Mr Blaker admitting that the ship carried nuclear weapons which were not “lost” during the dying agony while the wreck was under tow? And why was the ship under tow after the order had been given to “abandon ship” for fear of exploding missiles? What, furthermore, of Mr Dalyell’s charge that some of the weapons which sank with their ship were nuclear ones, for which the Stenor ships were later chartered to fish? These were the subject of another parliamentary question from Mr Frank Allaun, on 18th October 1982.

“Mr Frank Allaun asked the Secretary of State for Defence why two oil-fired underwater recovery vessels have been chartered to deal with HMS Sheffield.

Mr Blaker: No underwater recovery vessels have been chartered to deal with HMS Sheffield.

Mr Frank Allaun asked the Secretary of State for Defence, further to his reply to the hon. Member for Salford, East on 23 July, Official Report, c.340, if HMS Sheffield carried nuclear weapons.

Mr Blaker: It would not be in the interests of national security to depart from the long-standing practice, observed by successive Governments, neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in particular locations at given times”.

Here we may see one of the great principles of Government equivocation at work: never lie if you can help it, but don’t hasten to tell the truth. The Stenor ships were not “underwater recovery vessels”, although at least one of them, the Seaspread, did carry a diving bell, as we were to learn on 1st September 1983 when Petty Officer Michael Harrison received the Queen’s Gallantry Medal, as The Times told us, for “possibly the most dangerous task ever undertaken by a Royal Navy diving team”.

“The medal was won while divers were recovering classified documents and equipment from ships sunk during the Falklands campaign last year. The nature of the material recovered has not been specified but it is thought to have included top secret code books and cryptographic equipment.

The citation says that ‘though working in extremely unpleasant, hazardous and dark conditions, and despite becoming entangled on two separate occasions with hanging debris, Harrison persevered with the task, putting himself at grave personal risk’.

The action was in depths of more than 300 feet, and was carried out by a team of 27 naval divers.

The operation was conducted from a chartered vessel, the 7,000 ton Stena Seaspread. It involved using a diving bell to carry the divers down.

The divers left the diving bell but remained connected to it, while searching for the documents and equipment in the sunken ships.

It is believed that much of the activity centred on Coventry which sank north of the Falklands.

The recovery of the material has been regarded as a sensitive matter by the Royal Navy, not only because it was highly classified, but also because ships lost off the Falklands have been designated war graves”.

Subsequently some doubt has been expressed about the role of the Stenor ships. Basing himself, no doubt, on this report, Duncan Campbell claimed in the New Statesman report to which we have already referred that they were in fact sent to retrieve cryptographic equipment and code books, not nuclear weapons.

“There were thus no tactical nuclear weapons on board the surface ships sent south to the Falklands. The deep-diving vessel sent to recover ‘equipment’ from the sunken wreck of HMS Coventry -widely suspected at the time to have been an attempt to recover lost nuclear weapons - was in fact attempting to retrieve top secret cryptographic equipment and codebooks which the destroyer’s captain had not had time to destroy. Type 42 destroyers, like Coventry, do not carry nuclear weapons in peacetime”.9

Perhaps this may be true of the diving recovery work on the wreck of the Coventry: but are we expected to believe this of the Sheffield, which was under tow when it went down?

If they were not incinerated, why could the code books and machines not have been retrieved during these operations?

As Mr Dalyell asked at the time, it would be interesting to establish

“whether our security services let our American allies know in advance that we British were taking nuclear weapons into their hemisphere against protocol 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco of which ~both Britain and the Americans are signatories. The related question is, what do we now say as British people to the non-aligned nations which, meeting in Delhi, asked us to remove nuclear weapons from land and sea areas around the Falklands? It is all very well to say that we would never have used nuclear weapons. That seems to be the received wisdom. However, can we be quite sure? Let us suppose, heaven help us, that Invincible, Hennes or Canberra, hit by a torpedo which actually exploded, had gone down with a loss of life comparable to the sinking of the Belgrano. There might have been an irresistable demand, in a losing situation, to go ahead - as was, indeed, discussed in certain quarters - to bomb granaries and airports in Argentina. Those who have nuclear weapons in desperate situations may be tempted not to be too choosy about how they use them. The whole operation was a hideous gamble, with no long-term prize for this country”.10

On June 3rd 1983, I wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on some of these questions:11

Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General, United Nations New York, USA

Dear Secretary General,

For some time now British public opinion has been disturbed by questions about the conduct of the Falklands War, and in particular by a serious controversy about the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser Belgrano.

The charges against Mrs Thatcher have been tersely summarised in an ‘information sheet’ (number 11) published by Ecoropa under the title Falklands War: The Disturbing Truth. There are two main counts in this indictment:

1. The cruiser Belgrano was sunk ‘so as to make peace impossible’ even while an agreement for Argentine withdrawal from the islands was reaching its final stages.

2. That nuclear weapons were taken to the South Atlantic.

These matters are very grave and they surely merit a special enquiry in Britain. I shall certainly give all support to the demand for this enquiry if I am elected to the House of Commons on June 9th.

But these matters do not only affect the people of the United Kingdom. Both raise profound international questions.

The first charge, of sabotaging peace talks by sinking the Belgrano, amounts to an accusation that Mrs Thatcher or her agents breached the Nuremburg Principles of 1946, which provide the most authoritative summary of the decisions of the post-war War Crimes Tribunal. This Tribunal received unanimous endorsement for its findings at the General Assembly of the United Nations (see Resolution 95-i). The precise infraction alleged against Mrs Thatcher or her agents is covered in Principle VI as a ‘crime against peace’, qualified in Article a(i) as ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war ... in violation of international ... agreements or assurances’. It will be remembered that UN Resolution 502 demanded ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ and withdrawal of Argentine forces, and called for a ‘diplomatic solution’ respecting the UN Charter.

The second charge of sending nuclear weapons into the war zone, alleges a direct breach of the terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which Britain recognises the status of Latin America as a nuclear-free zone.

Can you advise us about how these issues could be properly investigated? We are particularly concerned about the enforcement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, since we have been active in encouraging the proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in Europe. Clearly, the possible breach of the Latin American nuclear-free zone raises major questions. Disregard of nuclear-free zone arrangements would, if it were to go unopposed, totally negate the intentions of the UN Special Session on Disarmament, which commended such zones as an important confidence building measure.

At the same time, the legal implications of the sinking of the Belgrano are also deeply serious. There would be no ‘crime against peace’ if there had been no UN Resolution 502, and if diplomatic approaches had been spurned on all or either sides. The armed forces on both sides were in no position to know about the extent of diplomatic progress. It is unlikely that the diplomats could expect to have detailed knowledge about military dispositions. Only at the point where decisions could be taken, weighing together both diplomatic and military issues, is there any possibility of a ‘crime against peace’. For this reason, it seems to me that the United Nations is the only relevant body to investigate this issue.

With great respect,

Yours sincerely,

Ken Coates

On 26th August 1983, I received a reply from Mr Richard Wathen:

Dear Mr Coates,

I should like to refer to your letter of 3 June 1983, addressed to the Secretary General concerning matters pertaining to the conduct of the Falklands War.

We have carefully analysed the two issues you have raised in your letter which are of undoubted importance. The alleged introduction of nuclear weapons into the South Atlantic Zone has been the object of a resolution by the General Conference of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (we are attaching a copy in Spanish, the only language available at this time). This Organisation might in fact be competent also to initiate an investigation on this matter.

As far as the United Nations is concerned, any investigation would have to follow the adoption of a resolution by one of the two political organs of the Organisation already seized of the question of the Falklands (Malvinas), namely the General Assembly or the Security Council. Such resolution would have to be sponsored by one or more member states.

Yours sincerely,

Richard W. Wathen, Principal Officer,

Department of Political Affairs,

Trusteeship and Decolonisation.

ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN LATIN AMERICA

GENERAL CONFERENCE

Eighth (Ordinary) Period of Sessions

Item 18 on the Agenda

KINGSTON, JAMAICA: 16-19 May 1983

CG/RES.170 (VIII) 18 May 1983

Resolution l 70(VIII) - Reports of the introduction of nuclear arms by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the zone and areas of the Islas Malvinas, Georgias Del Sur and Sandwich Del Sur.

The General Conference,

Considering that the governments signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have categorically expressed their determination that

nuclear energy be used in Latin America exclusively for peaceful purposes and, to this end, reaffirmed their sovereign decision to establish a military de-nuclearised zone in order to keep their territories free, forever, of nuclear armaments:

Considering that the Argentinian Republic has denounced at various international gatherings the presence of nuclear weaponry aboard vessels of the British naval forces which operated in areas within the geographical zone designated by Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in connection with the conflict in the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) and the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, pointing out in the light of this event the significance of countries in possession of nuclear weapons engaging in operations in which nuclear energy is put to non-peaceful uses:

Considering that spokesmen for the government of the United Kingdom have on several occasions declared that it would be inconvenient, for reasons of national security, to abandon the established practice, observed by successive governments, of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at a specific place and a given time;

Considering that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has made the declaration which appears in the document S/Inf. 261 of 11 May 1983;

Having regard to the fact that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL) has a duty to supervise compliance with the obligations laid down by the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

Reaffaming the need for a balance of responsibilities and obligations affecting states which possess nuclear arms and those which do not possess them;

Resolves:

1. To note with concern the complaint formulated by the Argentinian Republic concerning the introduction of nuclear arms, by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, into areas included in the geographical zone designated in Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

2 To take note of the declaration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the fourth Considering paragraph of this Resolution refers, and which states in its leading paragraphs: “The Government of the United Kingdom has scrupulously complied with its obligations under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas for which, de jure or de facto, it is internationally responsible and which are located within the limits of the geographical zone established in the said Treaty. Moreover, the Government has scrupulously complied with its obligations under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty and has not deployed nuclear weapons in areas where the Treaty is in force”.

3. To take note of the important presentations and declarations formulated by the Delegations of Argentina and the United Kingdom at this General Conference.

4. To express its concern at the fact that in areas within the geographical zone designated by Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty, submarines powered by nuclear energy should have been employed in warlike actions.

5. To exhort all States in respect of which the Treaty and its Additional Protocols are not in force, to take the necessary steps in accordance with Article 28 to complete the process of military de-nuclearisation in the relevant zone defined by Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty itself.

6. To reaffirm the commitment of all States linked by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Additional Protocols, to refrain from carrying out all actions which might endanger the status of military denuclearisation of Latin America and to recommend that the Council of the Organisation closely supervise its strict enforcement.

7. To communicate to the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 38th Period of Sessions, and to the Disarmament Committee, the text of the present Resolution, together with the declarations made on the subject in the course of this Conference.

(Approved in the Forty-ninth Session, held on 19 May 1983).

Translated from the Spanish by Mike Mullan.

In order to understand the significance of the British Government’s statement summarised in the second point of this Resolution, we need to remind ourselves of the two distinct commitments which arise, not only under Protocol I, to which Tam Dalyell referred in his complaint, but also under Protocol II of the Treaty. Protocol I implies the exclusi

Common Security 2022

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

In the face of climate change, unbalanced globalisation, crumbling disarmament treaties, the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the decline of democracy – no single country can address the challenges of the modern world.

A new high-level global commission has been formed to tackle the risks to the contemporary world using the framework of Common Security.

The concept of Common Security emerged from the conclusion of a commission in 1982 led by the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. After 40 years, the time has come to reframe security and reimagine our world again. No single country can address the challenges of the modern world. The only true security is Common Security.

The new commission will present a far-reaching report for Common Security 2022 that will form a blueprint for survival in the face of extreme challenges: climate change, unbalanced globalisation, crumbling disarmament treaties, the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the decline of democracy.

In the next year, a number of flagship events will gather knowledge and perspectives with the aim of the commission publishing its report in April 2022.

The project is coordinated by the Olof Palme International Center, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the International Peace Bureau.

Learn more about the New Global Commission at https://commonsecurity.org/

* * * *

“International Security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction.”

These words, from 40 years ago, serve as a stark reminder that the survival of humanity is not a forgone conclusion. The continuation of human existence in the twenty-first century, on a planet of nearly eight billion people, is a colossal global mission. It is an endeavour that relies on a commitment to cooperation not annihilation.

In 1982, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, led by the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, published the report, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. At this time, Cold War tensions and the frightening prospect of nuclear war dominated the international agenda. The report laid bare the horrendous consequences of nuclear conflict, and exposed the fallacy that nuclear deterrence provides security. A nuclear war cannot be won, but would be disastrous for all parties involved. The Commission developed the concept of common security: the idea that cooperation can provide the security that humans crave, where military competition and nuclear deterrence have failed. That ultimately, nations and populations can only feel safe when their counterparts feel safe.

When Olof Palme convened his commission, the world knew that it stood on the brink of catastrophic nuclear war. It is less well-known that scientists have now set the Doomsday Clock at 100 seconds to midnight for humanity. The world faces the existential threats of nuclear war and climate change. This is on top of a toxic mix of inequality, populism, extremism, nationalism, gender and racial violence, and a shrinking democratic space. The cost of militarism stands in stark contrast to the shortage of money to tackle other challenges. Now is the time to reconsider whether common security can help bring us back from the brink once again.

The challenges of our interdependent global society demand collaboration and partnership, not isolation and distrust. But the path to cooperation and peace needs to be updated for the twenty-first century, particularly in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. By identifying the new challenges facing humanity, a contemporary blueprint for survival can be established.

In the introduction to the 1982 report, Palme expressed doubt that disarmament would happen if it must wait for governments to act:

“It will only come about as the expression of the political will of people in many parts of the world. Its precondition is simply a constructive interplay between the people and those directly responsible for taking the momentous decisions about armaments and for conducting the complicated negotiations that must precede disarmament.”

The need for people to be the catalyst for change is more relevant than ever. Popular will and public action have spearheaded movements for change in the twenty-first century. Now is the time to draw on people power to bring about disarmament and peace.

The Common Security 2022 project will host nine flagship panel discussions over the coming year. Each conversation will focus on a different theme related to global peace and security. These online public debates will provide the basis for a new far-reaching report, to be published in 2022.

Peace and the new geopolitical realities

In the twenty-first century the threat of nuclear war remains undiminished. Massive investments in faster, more lethal nuclear weapons, coupled with significant nuclear tensions between nations, create a dangerous cocktail for conflict. But the global campaign for nuclear disarmament has lost its profile and public fear of nuclear war appears muted. Urgent issues for discussion include the failure of disarmament talks, frustrations over the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, test bans, and nuclear free zones.

Although significant geopolitical realignments have occurred since 1982, strategic competition and power struggles between nations continue unabated. Borders shift, superpowers fluctuate, and alliances wax and wane; but conflict and violence remain a constant. According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, the number of full-scale wars increased from 15 to 21 between 2019 and 2020.

The Palme Commission focused on Europe as the battleground for any conflict, with minimal attention paid to other regions. But the Global Peace Index 2020 identified Europe as the most peaceful region in the world, with the Middle East and North Africa at the other end of the spectrum. In an increasingly multipolar world, an urgent reassessment of global politics and conflicts is needed. As regional conflicts and emergencies spill over into the global arena, populations and nations cannot expect to isolate themselves from the rest of the world in order to live securely. Key to discussions should be the situation in Central Africa, West Asia (Iran and its neighbours), Israel and Palestine, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula.

The Palme Commission sought to empower the UN for the purposes of peace. Today, the UN’s role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is one of the most visible examples of international cooperation. But we need to explore what other forms of multilateralism should be encouraged or developed.

Emerging threats and opportunities

Technological advancement over the past 40 years has resulted in a plethora of new threats and challenges for modern society. Computerised warfare, cyber security, drones, the use of artificial intelligence, and the dangerous development of chemical and biological weapons are some of the emerging issues. The Palme Commission cautioned against the militarisation of space, as a dangerous expansion of martial competition. This prediction appears prescient, with space becoming an increasingly contested environment. Clarification of international laws and a renewed emphasis on disarmament are issues that should be considered.

The interplay between peace and the climate emergency is crucial to future security. Climate-related risks have far-reaching implications for the health and existence of humanity and the planet. Although climate migration is fuelling tension, the activism and determination of the climate change movement has united populations and nations. The momentum for climate cooperation offers a unique opportunity for rallying collective action in the pursuit of global peace.

Economic and social inequality

The Palme Commission warned that economic inequality, poverty and deprivation were major threats to security, and that “peace and prosperity are two sides of the same coin.”40 years later, rising income inequality has been blamed for increasingly polarised politics, and the ascendance of populism and nationalism. With political conflict often spiralling into violence and war, a conversation is needed about whether greater equality could be a recipe for peace.

Gender equality in the quest for peace and security was a relatively unexplored topic by the Palme Commission. However statistics show that when women are at the negotiating table, peace agreements are more likely to last 15 years or longer. But conversely, only 22% of peace agreements in 2019 contained gender equality provisions. The role of women in peace and security needs further scrutiny, and practical proposals developed.

The economic and social burden of military spending was a central focus of the Palme Commission. The fear that military expenditure diverts funds from social and environmental investment continues to be a concern. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, world military spending in 2020 rose to almost $2 trillion, a 2.6% increase in real terms from 2019. As the world struggles with the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, questions around military spending are highly pertinent. Recovery from the pandemic could be assisted by investment in peace and development, rather than war and deterrence.

The way forward

“We see the need for a new beginning in the peaceful struggle against war and destruction.”

The Palme Commission’s desire to replace the idea of nuclear deterrence with a positive approach to security still stands. A means to making people and governments feel safe without the threat of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear deterrence, military force, and violence. Common security as an alternative path to nuclear competition.

The threat of war and its consequences have not diminished over the years. But political will, people power, and responsible policies can lead to change. There is still time to be innovative and ambitious in reframing security and reimagining our world. Common Security 2022 is an opportunity to assess the contemporary global security landscape, identify current challenges and hazards, stimulate a public policy debate, and ultimately establish new paths to sustainable peace.

Too Late to Shake NATO Awake?

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Sean Howard

t’s Stockholm, 14 December, 1992, and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev has begun to address over 50 of his counterparts at a summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an institution widely considered instrumental in helping end the Cold War. Just two years after the November 1990 CSCE ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’ had boldly declared that the continent was “liberating itself from the legacy of the past,” Kozyrev is worried the chance to build a ‘Common European Home’ is being lost, a ‘peace dividend’ squandered by American-led NATO triumphalism. So, in diplomatic desperation, he decides: no time like the present, to pay a visit from the future…

“Great Russia,” Kozyrev growls, is back, determined to protect its own western flank, defending its Slavic brethren (and suddenly vulnerable Russian minorities) from a NATO wave threatening to wash through the former Warsaw Pact to the shore of the Baltics, or even Ukraine. Given the Alliance’s pursuit of “essentially unchanged” goals – military supremacy and strategic dominance – a counter-Alliance is once again needed; and so, as a “state capable of looking after itself and its friends…using all available means, including military,” Russia will require all “the former Soviet Republics” to “immediately join a new federation or confederation”.

As Trudy Rubin wrote in The Baltimore Sun, what the Foreign Minister “didn’t say, but what every diplomat was all too well aware of, was that Russia still possesses 11,000-plus nuclear weapons.” No wonder, when he “left the room,” most “diplomats stood stunned,” while US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger “rushed after him, demanding, ‘What is going on?’” A long hour later, he found out, when Kozyrev returned the podium to declare: Neither President Yeltsin nor I will ever agree to what I read out in my previous speech. I did it so that you should all be aware of the real threats on our road to a post-Communist Europe.

Widely dismissed as a joke or hoax, it was instead, veteran New York Times columnist William Safire insisted “a historic performance” by “the young man,” a “slap in the face…to say, ‘Wake up! Stop being so damnably complacent! To avert a return to a divided world, help us now’” – a rude awakening, admittedly, but one to which “the West’s diplomats should reply: ‘Thanks, we needed that.’”

The ‘sleep’, alas, was not broken. As the nightmarish ‘Back to the Future’ decade of the 1990s unfolded, NATO’s war-wagons rolled east, against the urgent, bipartisan advice of many senior retired US politicians, diplomats and officials. As a 1997 Open Letter to President Clinton, signed by 40 national security establishment luminaries, argued, while Moscow “does not now pose a threat to its western neighbors,” expanding the Alliance – a move “opposed across the entire political spectrum” in Russia – would be certain only to “undercut those who favor reform and cooperation with the West,” and “bring the Russians to question the entire post-Cold War settlement.”

On 1 January 1995, two years after Kosyrev’s performative prophecy, the CSCE became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a change ostensibly intended to institutionalize and advance the pan-European agenda, embracing what the Budapest Declaration of December 1994 called ‘Genuine Partnership in a New Era.’ The day the declaration was signed, however, President Yeltsin foresaw the dawn of a ‘Cold Peace’ unless Washington changed its ‘victory march’ tune, abandoning the “dangerous delusion” that “the destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital.” While “we hear explanations,” Yeltsin scoffed, that NATO expansion “is allegedly the expansion of stability, just in case there are undesirable developments in Russia,” the real “objective is to bring NATO up to Russia’s borders,” in breach of multiple, unequivocal ‘security assurances’ offered to the Soviet Union in 1990-91 that the Alliance would expand “not an inch eastward”.

Writing in the American journal Foreign Policy in 1995, the year before he was replaced in a sharp hardline shift, Kozyrev justified his Stockholm ‘stunt,’ arguing that “although the ideas I presented were far from the most extreme held by Yeltsin’s opponents, they threw my Western counterparts into virtual panic: for a few moments they had a realistic glimpse of the kind of Russia they would have to deal with” if “Western politicians, again Americans in particular” continued to “substitute a strategy of rapid expansion of NATO” for “its fundamental transformation” into a defensive, denuclearized alliance seeking “partnership” with, not absorption of, “Eastern Europe, including Russia.”

On the sidelines of the 1994 Budapest Summit, Russia, the US, the UK, and Ukraine demonstrated the potential of disarmament diplomacy to positively shape the post-Cold War world, signing the ‘Budapest Memorandum’ confirming Ukraine’s relinquishment of Soviet nuclear weapons left on its territory, in return for security guarantees of non-interference in its internal affairs. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a gross violation of these commitments, but also a graphic illustration of “the kind of Russia” the West had by then to deal with, an ultranationalist autocracy embittered by a near-doubling of NATO from 16 states to 28, a surge swallowing most of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The total is now 30, with Bosnia and Herzegovina next in line and the former Soviet Republics of Georgia and Ukraine ‘aspiring’ to join, the latter with political encouragement and practical support (e.g. weapons and training) from Washington. The prospect of Ukrainian accession was at the root of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, designed in part to prevent the absorption of Sebastopol, for centuries the home port of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, into a ‘Western’ Alliance not only enjoying conventional superiority but still claiming its Cold War ‘right’ (outnumbered by the Red Army) to strike first with nuclear weapons. Moscow, too, has claimed that same ‘right’ since the mid-1990s, when Yeltsin renounced the doctrine of ‘No First-Use’ inherited from the last Soviet leader – and champion of a nuclear-weapon-free world – Mikhail Gorbachev.

And not only would both sides strike first to prevent or deter nuclear use; both would ‘go nuclear’ to deter or defeat non-nuclear attacks – conventional, chemical, biological, even cyber. As Admiral Charles Richard, head of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), stated bluntly during a recent event at the Brookings Institution: “Nuclear is not separate from conventional”; hence the ‘need’, according to Air Force Magazine’s summary of his remarks, for a “new nuclear and conventional integration policy” – new not just for the US, but NATO.

On June 14, NATO leaders will meet at the Alliance’s new, $1.45 billion (!) HQ in Brussels to discuss what Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg all-knowingly defines as “the challenges of today and tomorrow,” a self-serving short list – “Russia’s aggressive actions, the threat of terrorism, cyber attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security impact of climate change, and the rise of China” – inexcusably excluding the danger of nuclear war, or indeed the detrimental impact of astronomical military spending (almost $2 trillion in 2020, the Year of COVID!) on, for example, pandemic preparedness…

Leaders will also be charged with reviewing a report, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, published in November 2020 by a ‘Reflection Group’ appointed by Stoltenberg in the turbulent wake of President Trump’s description of NATO as “obsolete,” and French President Macron’s diagnosis of strategic “brain death.”The Reflection Group, however (10 pro-NATO “independent experts”) was tasked not to reason ‘why’ – to finally answer the basic questions posed by Kozyrev in 1995: “What is the raison d’être of NATO today?” and “Who is its real enemy?” – but rather explore ‘how’ Alliance “unity, solidarity, and cohesion,” given and taken as a self-evident good, can be increased. For what is too good for a “strategic anchor in uncertain times,” drawing on its “success in the Cold War” to keep at bay not only the Russian ‘Bear’ but now the Chinese ‘Dragon’ (added to the list of NATO adversaries in 2019 at the xenophobic behest of the Trump Administration)?

And to combat, maybe literally, both Russia and China will certainly require – as the report takes pains to stress – a hellish amount of firepower (conventional and nuclear), correspondingly massive ‘investments, and the pursuit of “dominance” in every “arena” opened by emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), e.g., “big data, Artificial Intelligence, autonomous capabilities, space, cloud technologies, hypersonic and new missile technologies, quantum technologies and biotechnologies, and human augmentation/enhancement.”

A “strategic surge” in all these areas is necessary, we are told, to maintain NATO’s “edge” and “ability to win on the battlefield.” But the jewel in the Alliance’s crown remains its spectrum of nuclear capabilities: the long-range, thermonuclear weapons of the US, UK, and France (thousands of warheads, each capable of killing millions) and around a hundred American short-range, ‘dial-a-yield’ bombs (each capable of killing many thousands), ‘hosted’ at air bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. In recent years, and particularly since Coronavirus lockdowns literally brought home the importance of ‘human’ rather than ‘national’ security, the popularity in NATO states of nuclear weapons in general, and ‘nuclear sharing’ in particular, has steeply declined, a fall also explained by the ‘new light’ cast on the issue by a fast-rising star, the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the ‘Ban Treaty’ NATO continues to regard with a cool, porcelain disdain at odds with public sentiment.

In Canada, for example, 74% of 1,007 respondents to a Nanos poll conducted in late March ‘supported’ (55%) or ‘somewhat supported’ (19%) Canada signing and ratifying the Ban. (Quebec – 82% – and Atlantic Canada – 74% –were the most enthusiastic regions, the Prairies – 65% – the least.) Almost the same number, 73%, agreed or somewhat agreed that Canada should join “even if, as a member of NATO, it might come under pressure from the United States not to do so.” And in a striking indication of the Treaty’s stigmatizing impact, 71% declared they “would withdraw money from any investment or financial institution…investing funds in anything related to the development, manufacturing or deployment of nuclear weapons.”

The NATO 2030 Report dutifully rides to the rescue of the status quo, insisting not only that “nuclear-sharing arrangements” are a “critical element” of NATO’s “security guarantees,” but that the “political value of this commitment is as important as the military value it brings”. But what does this mean, except that ‘nukes’ – acting as a kind of atomic adhesive, or Superweapon superglue – are needed as much to prevent internal division as deter external threat? Isn’t that rather a high price to pay, absurd risk to run, for “unity?”

Counting the many blessing of the Bomb is essential, the Report argues, to “counter hostile efforts to undermine” the Alliance’s “vital policy” of nuclear dependence. The ‘hostility’ presumably emanates from the Nobel Peace-Prize winning International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and other Ban Treaty supporters, an ‘emerging and disruptive’ threat – first the Bear, then the Dragon, now the Dove! – NATO needs to counter by insisting the TPNW “will never contribute to practical disarmament, nor will it affect international law.” In January this year, however, with its 50th ratification, the Treaty became international law, fully-binding on its growing membership. And if that membership, to date, includes none of the nuclear-armed nine (China, France, Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, UK, US) or their 32 pro-Bomb allies, its contribution to disarmament may yet prove decisive if it can generate new perspectives, inspire deep debates – and inform new policies – within NATO and beyond.

The Canadian Government recently insisted that the Ban Treaty’s “provisions are inconsistent with Canada’s collective defensive obligations as a member of NATO.” This is a favourite means of ‘cementing’ the Alliance’s pro-Bomb façade: but is it true? The famous ‘collective defense’ provision (Article V) of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty states only that an attack against one is an attack against all, not how such aggression should be deterred or responded to. As Canadian activist Ray Acheson details in her superb contribution to Peace Research Perspectives on NATO 2030, “a look at how NATO came to identify as a nuclear weapon alliance indicates, rather than ‘compromise’ achieved through ‘statecraft’, the process was more like obedience reached through intimidation.”

To keep hopes of disarmament alive, saner NATO states like Denmark and Canada insisted that the Alliance’s first Strategic Concept (1950) did not embrace or endorse collective nuclear defense. After years of Anglo-American bullying and arm-twisting, the second Strategic Concept (1957) did – a fateful surrender greatly increasing, as Canada complained, the chances “of the atomic sword being unsheathed.”

False narratives – and histories – can generate false consciousness, constraining or eliminating options for change; and such fabrication, as peace researcher Michael Brzoska writes in ‘Bending History, Risking the Future,’ is the dangerous hallmark of the new ‘study’:

Foremost among the events the report does not mention are Russian opposition to the extension of NATO to the East, the illegality of the Western wars in Kosovo and Iraq, and Western contributions to the dismemberments of arms control arrangements.

As a result, Brzoska worries, the report “bodes ill for the future,” strengthening “the view, already accepted in many NATO countries, of a Western world, with NATO as its ‘strategic anchor,’ that has been innocently drawn into the quagmires created by evil others.”

As an exercise in ‘reflection,’ in fact, NATO 2030 rather resembles the narcissistic architecture of the new Headquarters, a 250,000 square-meter complex (comparable in size to UN HQ!) of “shiny glass and steel interlocking buildings,” housing 4,000 staff, with “glazing equivalent to 10 football pitches, sleek, airport terminal-like halls” and an “amphitheatre-like…decision-making chamber”: a high-tech temple with a “central IT brain” – and 60,000 sensors – which I heard a former disarmament diplomat describe as a “glass mausoleum.”

Sixty thousand sensors – and no clue about peace.

What a joke!

First published on the ‘Cape Breton Observer’ website.

NATO meets, peace movements respond

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Recently, in reporting on the diversion of the Belorussian aircraft, an ITV News (UK) commentator said that NATO was ‘seen as the world’s policeman’. So let us unpick that phrase. Firstly, ‘the world’s’ and therefore global.

From the time at the end of the Cold War when NATO began to expand its membership to include the former Soviet states up to the Russian border, to in more recent years making agreements with countries around the Pacific and even venturing into Latin America, NATO has been expanding. And any shred of the concept of the North Atlantic area has been lost. But it isn’t really global in the sense it doesn’t include Russia or China. Those two countries are now considered ‘enemies’. And one might as well translate ‘global’ as US, as it has always dominated NATO’s policies.

Then there is the word, ‘policeman’. There are in the world some vicious police forces working on behalf of oppressive governments, but I don’t know of one which is nuclear armed, with a policy of using those weapons first. NATO is a military alliance not a police force, armed with nuclear weapons, including the so-called UK (in reality, the USA’s) nuclear armed Trident submarines which are ‘integrated’ into NATO.

In the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, which the UK signed, nuclear armed states were committed to reducing their nuclear arsenal, in ‘good faith’. In defiance of the treaty and international law, Boris Johnson has stated that his government would raise the cap on the warheads on the missiles on the Trident submarines, to increase from 180 to 260. In effect re-arming not disarming and thus it is with NATO.

You don’t need to be an apologist for the regimes in Russia or China to see how provocative NATO’s actions are. As recently as 1st June, the French Mouvement de la Paix, reported seeing four US B-52 bombers flying over Paris escorted by two French Dassault Rafale aircraft, as part of a NATO show of force.

Defender 21 is one of the largest NATO led military exercises in Europe in decades across 30 training areas. In response Russia deployed troops to its western border. Also, this year will see a reinforcement of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in Portugal, Romania, Steadfast Defender 21 Bulgaria and Hungary.

Stopp NATO, from Norway, warns of increased tensions in the high north and nuclear threats in the Arctic. Coming to the UK in September will be Dynamic Marine 21 which will test NATO’s Response Force Maritime component and Joint Warrior 21, preparing participants to operate as a joint task force. And these are only a few of the military exercises taking place this year.

But Stop NATO 2021 declared that there is no place for NATO in the world of peace and social justice we want to build and invited us all to discuss the alternatives at a counter summit.

A series of virtual meetings took place starting on Sunday 13th June. These meetings covered a wide array of issues and attracted participants from across the world. In addition to the virtual aspect of the conference, there were gatherings and demonstrations on the streets of Brussels itself, maintaining a tradition of protest at these events. See https://www.no-to-nato.org/

Steps towards nuclear disarmament

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

The German Federal Foreign Office released the following statement on 5 July 2021:

Today, Foreign Minister Maas is meeting the Swedish and Spanish Foreign Ministers in Madrid in order to call for joint steps towards nuclear disarmament prior to the Review Conference of the Non‑Proliferation Treaty.

Today’s meeting in Madrid is the fourth meeting of the foreign ministers of the Stockholm Initiative. Already in February 2020, representatives of 16 countries convened in Berlin to agree concrete proposals on nuclear disarmament.

Using positive momentum

In January this year, another meeting took place in Amman. Since then, after several setbacks in previous years, such as the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, there have been some recent positive developments.

At the beginning of the year, the United States and Russia were able to agree on an extension of the New START Treaty, which limits the strategic launchers and warheads of both countries. A meeting between US President Biden and Russia’s President Putin in Geneva on 16 June confirmed the intention of both sides to conduct further talks on arms control.

In light of new technological developments, the revival of disarmament diplomacy is urgently needed in order to pre-empt the potential risk of a new arms race. Before the meeting, Foreign Minister Maas, together with his Spanish colleague Arancha González Laya and his Swedish colleague Ann Linde, issued the following statement on this topic:

More than ever, we need to see progress. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements have been continually eroded in recent years. New tensions and distrust between the global powers have thwarted further reductions in nuclear weaponry.“

Proposals for the nuclear-weapon states

The Stockholm Initiative makes proposals so that the nuclear-weapon states can take further steps towards disarmament, as set down in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 16 states of the Stockholm Initiative, all of them non-nuclear-weapon states from all continents, submitted 22 specific proposals in advance of the Review Conference. In this way, the Non‑Proliferation Treaty could be strengthened not least through the following stepping stones:

Continue to reduce nuclear arsenals.

Ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in strategies and doctrines.

Minimise the risk of conflict and accidental use of nuclear weapons.

Develop credible and robust nuclear disarmament verification capacities.

Unblock negotiations on a treaty prohibiting fissile material production for military purposes.

Among the 22 specific proposals not listed in the German Foreign Office press release are:

Nuclear-Weapon States, collectively or individually, to tighten Negative Security Assurances, including in the context of Treaties establishing Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones.

And:

All States to support the establishment of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in all regions of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, including the establishment of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in relation to which we feel encouraged by the first session of the conference held in 2019 and continuous efforts in this regard.

Further, the three Foreign Ministers released the following statement, published in the German newspaper, Rheinische Post:

The Stockholm Initiative: A renewed

commitment to Nuclear Disarmament

“A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” On 16 June, President Biden and President Putin re-affirmed this fundamental truth, famously coined by their pre­decessors, Reagan and Gorbachev, at the last peak of the cold war. Back then, this sentence marked the beginning of a US-Soviet arms-control engagement beneficial to all humankind. Today, it instils new hope that the world can get back on the path of nuclear disarmament.

We need progress more than ever. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements have crumbled in recent years. Renewed tensions and mistrust between global powers have undercut further reduction of nuclear arsenals in the past years. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, one of the basic instruments for arms control, was terminated in 2019. Technological advance increases complexity, creates new risks and may even fuel a new arms race. And regional proliferation challenges, such as Iran and North Korea, continue to demand our full engagement.

Against this background, the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, composed of 16 states from all continents, aims to revitalize diplomacy, strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and make progress on the path of disarmament. In the interest of humanity, we must ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again.

In a series of Ministerial meetings in Stockholm, Berlin, Amman, and now Madrid, we have developed more than 20 actionable proposals to reinforce the NPT and the implementation of its disarmament goals ahead of its upcoming Review Conference. The extension of the New START earlier this year, the prospect of new talks between Russia and the US on the future of arms control and risk reduction measures, and a new commitment to restraint at the highest political level, as expressed last month in Geneva by the US and Russian presidents, are good news. These ideas figured among the “stepping stones” that our initiative had proposed.

As much as we welcome these positive developments, we encourage nuclear-weapon States to take further decisive steps towards disarmament. These may include reducing the role of nuclear weapons in policies and doctrines, minimising the risk of conflict and of accidental nuclear weapon use, further reducing stockpiles, and contributing to next-generation arms control arrange­ments. We must, once and for all, put an end to nuclear testing by bringing into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, unblock negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for military purposes, and develop robust and credible nuclear disarmament verification capacities. In other words: we should learn from history and thereby build for the future. As part of this, we will strengthen our interaction with affected communities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and our engagement with the younger generation. We will also strive for the full and equal participation of women in decision-making processes in the field of nuclear disarmament, as well as for the full integration of gender perspectives.

That is why we, the countries of the Stockholm Initiative, will meet today in Madrid to reaffirm our resolute commitment to advancing nuclear disarmament and take next steps to that effect.

At our last meeting in Amman, the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, told us: “Individually, you represent different regions. Together, you represent a collective commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons”. We call on other States to join us in this endeavour.

Signed by: Heiko Maas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Arancha González Laya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Ann Linde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

The work of the Stockholm Initiative indicates a renewed mood to reinvigorate the debates around nuclear weapons and to take concrete steps towards disarmament. These indications at the governmental level find some resonance at the level of political activism and of the ‘person on the street’. The Trump administration did a great deal of work to reveal the acute dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. Credit where credit is due. It is now time for the nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states to throw off the Trump legacy in a deep and meaningful way. Yes, this will mean mapping out credible steps towards nuclear disarmament but it will also mean taking a stand that might prove unpopular.

So whilst Foreign Minister Maas should be congratulated for his work, we should remind him that Germany is home to US nuclear weapons under NATO sharing agreements. Is he happy with this arrangement? It is important that the NPT Review Conference is used as a staging post to take the argument to those who wilfully ignore the provisions of the Treaty, but why no mention of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which is supported by the overwhelming majority of humanity and the governments that seek to represent them?

Any steps towards nuclear disarmament are welcome, but the shuffling steps of a toddler must develop into an adult stride.

No new ‘land-based’ nuclear weapons in Europe Now get rid of the other nukes

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

‘Defense News’ (defensenews.com), reported in early June that “NATO allies are poised to formally oppose the alliance deploying ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe, following U.S. President Joe Biden’s meeting with fellow heads of state”. Confirmation of this stance is contained in paragraph 26 of the Brussels Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021, which reads:

26. We reaffirm our commitment to respond in a measured, balanced, coordinated, and timely way to Russia’s growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, which is increasing in scale and complexity and which poses significant risks from all strategic directions to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area. We will continue to implement a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures to achieve Alliance objectives, including strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; intelligence; and exercises. We have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.

Such a declaration is to be welcomed, for all the obvious reasons. It had been feared that one consequence of Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty would be stationing of such weapons on the European landmass once again. Such a prospect has now been ruled out.

This commitment, welcome as it is, is not the end of the matter. For instance, in a linguistic sense having “no intention” to do something is not at all the same as a declaration that you “will never” do such a thing. When it comes to questions of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the context of a continuing sharpening of tensions, precision of language or a lack thereof has consequences.

Take the US Aegis Ashore missile system which is currently stationed in Romania and is due for deployment in Poland from 2022. According to a paper submitted to the Defence Committee of the British House of Commons on ‘Consequences for UK Defence of INF Withdrawal’ (Katarzyna Kubiak, see also The Spokesman 142: European Nuclear Disarmament), the missiles used in the Aegis system can be fairly straightforwardly adapted, by a change of fuel tank and payload, into an intermediate-range nuclear missile. If leaders have “no intention” of deploying such weapons in Europe, then perhaps there should be a clear commitment that the Aegis-based missiles will never be adapted.

What of sea-based nuclear missiles in European waters? As Joachim Wernicke has pointed out in these pages on previous occasions, a new generation of US sea-based, nuclear-capable missiles are in development. Will US ships be permitted to carry such weapons in the territorial waters of European states? Will US ships armed with such weapons be permitted to dock in European ports? If so, then what does having “no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe” amount to?

What of the US nuclear weapons already in Europe? (see page 4 for a map of their locations) Do these weapons relate to a commitment to “keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective”? The presence of US nuclear weapons, along with the French and UK arsenals, makes Europe a more dangerous and not a safer place to live. Real security will depend on their removal and a nuclear-weapons-free Europe.

(Re) Imagine Our World: voices for peace

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Tom Unterrainer

This is an expanded version of a talk given to US peace activists on 12 June 2021.

The movements for peace, social and racial justice in the United States have set an example for the world. This is as true of the movements of the past as it is today. European activists and their organisations continue to be inspired by activism in the US, just as we carefully follow and analyse the political direction of the US government.

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and our founder have a long association with the US. The British government imprisoned Russell for his active opposition to the First World War. He was fired by Trinity College, Cambridge, as a result and found that post-war England offered a less-than-hospitable environment for him. Meanwhile, appreciation for his efforts and opportunities for work arrived from the US. Although opposition to his work eventually manifested itself, Russell’s time in America was an important episode in his life. He continued to follow political developments – including the movements against the American war against the Vietnamese people – and worked closely with American activists until the end of his long life.

So it is a privilege to be with you today and to be speaking to a largely American audience.

You will no doubt have seen images of the beauty and splendour of the Cornish coastline, in the South West of England, over recent days. The images will have shown sun-drenched beaches, blue sea and skies. The place looks prosperous and idyllic. Much of the Cornish coast is all of these things. However, if you travel just a few minutes inland a different Cornwall is revealed. A place of widespread insecurity, joblessness, low wages and poverty. As of 2011, Cornwall’s measure of wealth was just 64% of the European per capita average making it not only one of the poorest regions of England but of Europe as a whole. This measure will not have improved following a decade or more of austerity measures in the British economy.

The arrival of the G7 leaders to this remote corner of the British Isles will not have done much to ameliorate these conditions. The contrast between the presence of leaders of the seven most powerful nations on the surface of this planet and the gross deficiencies in social justice evident a few miles inland is instructive.

What were the G7 leaders doing in Cornwall? Were they discussing a global ‘levelling up’ to lift the poorest and most insecure of us out of poverty? Or were they discussing something else?

With a new US President and multiple challenges facing the US dominated political order, this G7 summit can be understood as an effort to begin redrawing the map of Western influence and power. The aim is to ensure that the political footprint, economic fingerprints and military boot prints of the west continue to leave their mark.

The challenges to ensuring such a prospect range from the impact of Covid, the fractures in the economies of the G7 states and the reality that the political order is shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar configuration. One example of how the US President and UK Prime Minister plan to respond to such challenges can be found in the new version of the ‘Atlantic Charter’ signed by Biden and Johnson immediately before the G7 met.

The original Charter was agreed and signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 1941. The Charter set out joint US/UK goals for the world after World War II. Even though the US had not yet entered the war, these two leaders saw fit to make plans for the post-war landscape. The agreement was made in the context of the US as the rising global power and Britain as an imperial power – with substantial colonies around the world.

The New Atlantic Charter has been signed in quite different circumstances where a global power other than the US in on the rise and where the UK is a politically isolated, nuclear-armed island which retains a significant financial centre and which has lumbered itself with an unpredictable and thoroughly unpleasant Prime Minister.

The New Atlantic Charter is made up of eight brief points, the first of which resolves “to defend the principles, values, and institutions of democracy and open societies, which drive our national strength and our alliances.” The fifth point affirms “our shared responsibility for maintaining our collective security and international stability and resilience against the full spectrum of modern threats”.

It is well known that there have been tensions between Biden and Johnson on both the personal and political level. It is clear that between the two, Biden is the more rational and ‘mainstream’ character. Whatever the tensions, they have been put to one side because the issues at stake for both Biden and Johnson transcend personalities: they concern the imperatives of global politics.

The new US administration has yet to put its strategy with respect to defence, security and nuclear weaponry ‘on paper’, but comments from Biden himself and his Secretary of State indicate that Russia and China will be offered no respite. Conversely, Prime Minister Johnson has put his name to an ‘Integrated Review’ [see END Info 23 & 24 for extensive coverage]. Johnson’s ‘Integrated Review’ is clear that Russia and China are considered ‘strategic competitors’ to UK/Western interests and proposes containment. Not only that, but the nuclear doctrine contained within the ‘Integrated Review’ includes a reversal on warhead numbers and raises a significant question mark over the circumstances under which the UK would consider a nuclear strike.

What is Biden’s assessment of the ‘Integrated Review’? Does he support the breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty announced in its pages? The agreement of the New Atlantic Charter would suggest that nothing within the ‘Integrated Review’ troubles him or his administration to a great extent. Donald Trump has gone, but ‘British Trump’ endures.

Under Trump, many of us spoke and wrote about the dangers of a ‘Global Tinderbox’: a configuration of risks, tensions and capabilities – both military and technological – that put the world in great danger. It seems that the ‘Global Tinderbox’ is still with us where one mistake, misstep or misunderstanding could boil over into a situation of existential risk. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and their Doomsday Clock, global risks from climate change to nuclear war are as sharply posed as they were under Trump. This is a world where tensions between the ‘West’, China and Russia continue to sharpen; where every nuclear armed state on the planet is not only renewing nuclear arsenals but developing new nuclear weapons; where the US and allies are still asserting themselves in an effort to maintain global influence and where ‘new technologies’ and the application of existing technologies to the battlefield accelerate the pace at which disaster could unfold.

If we are to find ways to de-escalate the risks, to move away from the ‘Global Tinderbox’, then we must not only talk of peace. We must identify the roadblocks to peace a develop a strategy to remove them. One example of this is the launch of the Nuke Free Europe network and their plans for a month of action (see pages 3-6). The network is calling for an end to nuclear sharing in Europe, a halt to the arms race and for European states to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Where the global powers have the G7, NATO and the rest the global peace movement have solidarity, internationalism and transnational cooperation. The Nuke Free Europe network is one example of many similar initiatives. All such initiatives will be coming together for the International Peace Bureau’s ‘World Congress’ in October this year. I hope to see many of you there in person, or online, to plan for a global, peaceful alternative.

* * * *

The Second World Peace Congress will bring together a wide variety of experts and advocates from all around the world. Speakers will come from all kinds of disciplines and backgrounds, including both high level representatives and grassroots level voices. It will equally involve diverse fields: peace organizations, feminist and civil rights groups, labor unions, environmentalists, educators, religious and spiritual leaders , development workers, human rights advocates, and more.

See the full programme at:

www.ipb2021.barcelona

The campaign to make Europe a nuclear-weapon-free zone

From END Info 25 | July/August 2021 | download pdf

Editorial Comments

This September will see peace activists and organisations from across Europe engage in a month of co-ordinated action to demand a ‘nuke free Europe’.

Protests will be staged in England, Scotland, France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy to call for the end of nuclear sharing, a halt to the modernization of nuclear weapons and for European states to sign up to and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

From the perspective of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, this month of action is the product of not just several years of recent work but of efforts over four decades. When Donald Trump announced his intention to sabotage the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia which banned intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the Russell Foundation produced and circulated a new ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’ statement, calling “on everyone concerned with peace and security to join in raising the alarm over the likely consequences of scrapping the INF Treaty and to work towards the creation of more Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones, including Europe.”

The INF Treaty, signed in 1987, should be properly understood not simply as an agreement between the then-Soviet Union and the USA but as a product of sustained mobilising, thinking and doing within the European peace movements of the 1980s as well as a mark of profound changes underway in European and Soviet society.

The first ‘European Nuclear Disarmament’ Appeal was drafted by Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation, the historian E. P. Thompson and others in response to the original risks posed by intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The contact address for the original appeal were the offices of the Russell Foundation in Nottingham, England, where this bulletin is written and produced.

We are very proud of our history and of the things we have achieved. Unfortunately, there is much work for a small peace foundation and the very many disarmament, peace and related campaigns to do.

Trump has gone but the increasing tensions, risks, new technologies and the weapons of mass murder that sit at the centre of US, European and other militarisms endure.

Join us in September. Organise your own action. Distribute this bulletin. Get informed through our other publications. Get involved in your closest activist group and make links with the Nuke Free Europe network.

Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Ken Coates

This text was first published as a chapter in Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim - The Case of Mordechai Vanunu (Spokesman Books, 1988). The book includes an introduction and concluding chapter by Vanunu, along with material from The Sunday Times investigation into the case and further analysis. The book was published to aid the work of the International Campaign for Mordechai Vanunu, of which the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation was a supporting organisation.

On the 6th July 1987, thirty-six British Members of Parliament wrote to the Norwegian Nobel Committee to nominate Mr. Mordechai Vanunu of Israel for the Nobel Peace Prize. Since Mr. Vanunu was currently held in prison in Jerusalem, this was an unusual nomination. What were the reasons for it?

“On the 5th October 1986” reports the proposal, “Mr. Vanunu published in the Sunday Times a detailed story about the Israeli Government’s nuclear bomb factory near Dimona in Southern Israel. In addition to a detailed description, Mr. Vanunu furnished the newspaper with photographs and diagrams, and his account of the plan was found to be ‘entirely authentic’ by a number of international experts who subsequently examined it.

The threat of nuclear proliferation into various hot spots around the world is one of the major perils confronting the international community. It takes prodigious courage for a private citizen to confront his own government on such a sensitive issue. Mr. Vanunu has paid a very heavy penalty. For revealing his knowledge, he was kidnapped in Rome, and secretly taken to Israel, where he has been locked in solitary confinement. Even his family have now been denied the right to visit him. Although be faces a death sentence, his trial is being conducted in secrecy.”

As the parliamentarians point out, there is reason for deep concern about the Israeli Government’s preparation of nuclear weapons. The decision is a provocation: if it were not challenged, on what basis could any impartial person reproach the Arab States if they were to follow suit? The nuclearization of conflict or potential conflict in one of the world’s hottest of “hot spots” can only be a terribly dangerous precedent.

But we should observe from the very outset of this discussion that Mr. Vanunu’s kidnap is itself an illegal act, which has no conceivable justification in international conventions. We cannot doubt that the Italian Government would have refused to extradite Mr. Vanunu for trial, on any of the evidence which is available. Vanunu’s revelations serve to defend the nonproliferation regime throughout the world, and are clearly a matter of conscience. Such disclosures have aroused disquiet in Italy and England, and any judge in either country would find them quite ineligible for criminal reprisals.

There can be no doubt that Vanunu is a courageous and deeply conscientious person, who has suffered from the most outrageous treatment by the Israeli authorities. We shall return to this question later.

Paranoia

First, however, we must concern ourselves with the substantive issues in this case. What caused the paranoid responses of the Israeli State in this matter? After all, it is not common for States to range across the territories of friendly countries, in order to bring about the abduction of political dissidents. Vanunu was spirited from London to Rome, where he was forcibly drugged, and chained-up for transportation to Tel Aviv. There does not appear to be any doubt that his departure from Italy was procured by illegal means, in violation of Italian laws and exit formalities. Such extreme measures put the normal conduct of inter-governmental relations under severe challenge. However we examine this affair, there can be no doubt of the culpability of the Israeli authorities. In order to understand this sequence of events, it is necessary to refer back to a succession of lsraeli policy statements on the issue which is really at stake: that of nuclear proliferation.

There is, of course, a long history of public statements by various Israeli spokesmen, on all the issues of nuclear non-proliferation policy. But for the purposes of this argument we have no need to retrace our steps further than the 7th June 1981, when the Osirak nuclear reactor was bombed by Israeli aeroplanes. In a statement purporting to justify this action, the Government of Israel pledged its continuing support for the principle of nonproliferation, for multilateral arms control agreements, and for UN decisions against nuclear proliferation. The statement, The Iraqi Threat - Why Israel had to Act, rehearsed a catalogue of diplomatic initiatives by Israel, in this sense:

“Israel ratified the partial Test Ban Treaty on 15th January 1964, and the Outer Space Treaty on 18th February 1977. On 10th June 1%8, Israel voted in favour of United Nations Resolution 2373 adopting the text of the NPT. It did so in the belief that this would enhance practical and satisfactory solutions for the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. In subsequent years, Israel has studied the NPT’s various aspects in reference to the conditions prevailing in the Middle East, and has concluded that the turbulent and constantly shifting conditions still prevailing in the region prevent the Treaty’s implementation in good faith on the part of many of the States in it.

A central assumption of the NPT is the existence of conditions of peace which do not exist today in the area. With the exception of Egypt, the Arab States do not recognize Israel’s right to exist, are continuously preparing themselves to destroy it, and are mostly specialist, were deeply shocked by photographs of a component machined in lithium deuteride. Both authorities believed that the devices shown in this and other photographs provided did not show “a simple atom bomb but a thermo-nuclear bomb”. As the Sunday Times itself concluded: “The verdict of ten senior and expert scientists approached by the Sunday Times is that Vanunu’s testimony cannot be faulted”.

If we accept this evidence, it is evident at once that Mr. Shamir’s statement at the United Nations General Assembly must have been quite untrue, even at the time he made it. If lsrael had already become “the first country in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons into the region”, the promise to refrain from this action in future can only be understood as a deliberate and particularly damaging dishonesty. There are many ways to mislead the General Assembly without telling actual lies: but on the 1st October 1981 it is quite evident that Mr. Shamir went far beyond any license which might conceivably be given to diplomatic evasion. His statement was absolute and categorical: he now owes the United Nations an explanation.

Calculated to undermine

Perhaps the Israeli spokesman is not the only diplomat to have offended in this way, grave though it is to do so. There is, however, a more serious question. On this and a large number of other occasions, as the Israeli Government statement points out, Israel has advocated the conclusion of a Treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone throughout the Middle East. To assure the United Nations that Israel “will not be the first” to introduce nuclear weapons, and to demand the creation of a nuclear-free zone, whilst all the time producing and storing a full-scale nuclear arsenal, is to present a package calculated to undermine not only the United Nations but also the very idea of nuclear-free zones. That such misleading declarations have been uttered “annually” hardly mitigates the offence. The Israeli Government itself continuously insists that it wishes to see the establishment of adequate guarantees in this field. As it argues in the text we have already cited: “Restraints of a technical or institutional nature alone can hardly protect the area from nuclear proliferation.” To appeal for the creation of a nuclear free-zone, whilst at the same time secretly building a major stockpile of nuclear weapons, is to furnish an unusually compelling kind of proof for this statement!

It remains true that of all the panoply of partial disarmament measures considered in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, one is preeminent. The agreement to create and enforce nuclear-free zones is among the more achievable objectives for States, and for their peoples, in many parts of the world. Not only in Latin America, but also in other zones such as the South Pacific, or the continent of Africa, the idea of constituting a nuclear-free zone has captured widespread popular support, and mobilized the support of many of the Governments in the areas concerned. In this connection, the experience of the campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament is that millions of Europeans have come to share the view that a nuclear-free zone in all Europe is both possible and desirable. Already there are intense practical negotiations in smaller sub-regions of the European continent, to begin to put in place some parts of what many hope will be a larger jigsaw, sanitising larger and larger areas. The particular merit of such proposals if that they provide a practical linkage between the activities of popular movements and the relevant governments, and they make a space in which a global public opinion can grow. Such an international public mobilisation is crucial to the maintenance of peace through a period of unprecedented crisis, both economic and political. As the popular pressure has begun to develop, the United Nations system has taken on a more material reality for millions of people, so that the vast demonstration which accompanied the opening of the Second Special Session could convince many of the real existence of a new potential in the world.

But the Vanunu case poses a most dire challenge to all this positive thinking. The creation of the Israeli bomb, and its analogue in South Africa, confronts us with a quite new, and very major problem of enforcement of non-nuclear commitments in the military field.

The first lesson of the Vanunu story is clear: that considerable agnosticism is required when evaluating the successive claims of governments which are poised upon the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In retrospect, we now see the French involvement in Israeli nuclear programmes, and in the initial provision of the Dimona reactor in a very clear and sinister light. It is not at all surprising that Israeli leaders can mislead the United Nations, when we remember how they responded to the enquiries of the United States Government about what was going on at Dimona in the early 1960s. “We are building a textile factory”, replied the Israelis. Now it is possible to see the meaning of various other key events in Israel’s military evolution: the French embargo on arms supplies; the pressures of the American administration for ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the later hiatus over the supply of Pershing missiles. There has evidently been some serious complicity in this act of nuclear provocation, and there are embarrassing questions to be answered in more than one of the world’s chancellories.

The first serious effort to find answers to these questions has been extensively reported in the Christian Science Monitor. The newspaper gives an account of a study by Gary Milhollin, which makes precise allegations of a violation of undertakings given to the Norwegian Government, when a quantity of heavy water was supplied in 1959.

Mordechai Vanunu has recorded that 88 pounds of plutonium are produced each year at Dimona, which quantity can be used to make something between eight and ten bombs annually. Heavy water is necessary to this process, and the Norwegian delivery amounted to 20 tons. It was obtained against firm pledges that it would only be used for peaceful purposes. It was agreed that the Norwegian authorities could maintain rights of control and inspection over the uses to which the water was put. But Milhollin has established that, up to the moment of Vanunu’s revelations, no attempt was made from Oslo to monitor the observance of these pledges.

Heavy water

After the Sunday Times publication of the real situation at Dimona, the Norwegian Government requested Israel to allow an appropriate inspection of the uses of the heavy water. It proposed that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be invited to investigate and report. In September, the Israelis refused any such inspection. At the talks in question, the Israelis conceded that the heavy water was being used at Dimona, and that Plutonium was being produced with it. Per Paust, the spokesman of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has been reported as saying that the Israeli’s maintain that any IAEA report would be biased, and continue to insist that they have breached none of their obligations to Norway.

It seems that the rights of the Norwegian authorities, under international law, are comprehensive. Whether or not it can be proved that the heavy water from Norway was abused for military work, the Norwegians are entitled to the inspection for which they have asked. If tests establish that plutonium has been produced, then the Norwegians have the right to see the product, and if weapons have been manufactured they have the right to insist upon them being dismantled. Mr. Paust also believes that the water could be recalled, although no-one is quite sure how much other heavy water, from other sources, may have been supplied to Israel. What is known is that the Americans have furnished Israel with 3.9 tons, and that additional supplies have come from France. “French” heavy water originates either from the USA or Norway, and is theoretically subject to the same controls agreed between Norway and Israel. Therefore the French had no right to re-export it to Israel without permission, and any “French” heavy water used for military purposes could be recalled, not only by the French Government, but also by the American or Norwegian Governments.

Milhollin’s estimate is that Dimona uses 36 tons of heavy water. The American water has been under control since it was moved from Dimona, and the IAEA has inspected it. But it has not been tested to elucidate whether, while it was at Dimona, it was employed in Plutonium refinement. American experts did visit Dimona annually from 1963 to 1969, but they conducted none of the relevant tests, either.

If the Norwegian authorities persist in their enquiries, as they undoubtedly should, then it is evident that similar enquiries should be initiated by the French and American Governments. The IAEA should also be pressed to be more curious than it hitherto has been. All these questions are absolutely urgent, if the non-proliferation regime is to retain any credibility whatever.

But it is equally imperative to re-examine a whole history of nuclear co-operation between Israel and South Africa, with the same open-mindedness.

The nuclear test which took place in the South Atlantic on 22nd September 1979 was monitored by a United States satellite. The explosion, which gave off a characteristic double flash, took place at a height of eight kilometres, which is commensurate with the performance of the GS Howitzer, which has been manufactured in South Africa since the United States supplied Pretoria with a range of modern artillery delivery systems. The Americans have also supplied the South Africans with 300,000 shell casings, adequate to deliver a two to three kiloton nuclear device.

It has been confirmed that forces of the South African fleet were present in the South Atlantic in the area of the explosion at the time that it took place. And further, it is credibly alleged that the 1979 explosion was a joint Israeli-South African achievement, as necessary to the Israelis for verifying their technology as it was to the South Africans for threatening their neighbours. That the United Nations were persuaded to record a verdict of “not proven” about this explosion tells us a good deal about the respect of some of its experts for the rules of evidence.

Israel-South Africa

However, new evidence continually appears, and it would be instructive to reopen this enquiry in order to evaluate it. Since we now know that the allegations of Fuad Jabber, or the judgements, from a different perspective, of Robert E. Harkavy, were founded on realistic assumptions, it becomes necessary to evaluate the contemporary analyses of Israeli-South African cooperation, all over again.

Valuable evidence for such a new investigation has been presented by Jane Hunter in her most disturbing work on Israeli Foreign Policy.

“In 1965, after South Africa brought its Safari safeguarded reactor on line, Israeli scientists began advising South Africa on their Safari 2 research reactor. In 1968, Professor Ernst Bergmann, the ‘father’ of Israel’s nuclear program, went to South Africa and spoke strongly in favour of bilateral co-operation on the development of nuclear technology.

According to the authors of a novelized treatment of Israel’s nuclear program - barred from publication by the Israeli censor - as early as 1966, South Africa had invited Israel to use its land or ocean space for a nuclear weapons test. Led at that time by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Israel declined the invitation. However, according to the Israeli authors, whose sources included Shimon Peres, an enthusiastic intimate of the Israeli nuclear program, and Knesset Member Eliyah Speizer, during his April 1976 visit to Israel Premier Vorster again extended the invitation to Israel to conduct a nuclear test.

It is commonly held that Israel wanted a test venue far from the Middle East in order to uphold its longtime position that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. This ‘position’, hinging on some arcane reading of the word ‘introduce’, is as meaningless as the endlessly heard term ‘peace process’.

The following year, a Soviet satellite picked up unmistakable signs of preparation for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert. Fearing that such a test ‘might trigger an ominous escalation of the nuclear arms race,’ the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany joined the USSR in pressuring South Africa to abort the test. As to the bomb that was to be tested, “‘I know some intelligence people who are convinced with damn near certainty that it was an Israeli nuclear device’, said a high-ranking Washington official.“

At three o’clock in the morning on September 22, 1979, Israel and South Africa conducted a nuclear weapons test where the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans merge. A newly recalibrated U.S. Vela intelligence satellite recorded the characteristic double flash of light. It was a small blast, designed to leave very little evidence. The CIA told the National Security Council that a two or three kiloton bomb had been exploded in ‘a joint South African-Israeli test’. A Navy official revealed that U.S. spy planes over the test area had been waved away by South African Navy ships and forced to land secretly in Australia. The CIA knew (and later told Congress) that South African ships were conducting secret maneuvers at the exact site of the test. The South African military attaché in Washington made the first ever request to the U.S. National Technical Information Service for a computer search on detection of nuclear explosions and orbits of the Vela satellite.

Almost immediately the Carter Administration convened a special panel to conduct an investigation of the incident. The panel heard reports from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the CIA; and representatives of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department of Energy and the State Department presented evidence to the panel supporting the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. Their findings were summarily dismissed by the Carter White House, which after a delay of seven months declared:

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this (Vela) signal was of nuclear origin, the panel considers it more likely that the signal was one of the zoo events (reception of signals of unknown origin under anomalous circumstances), possibly a consequence of the impact of a small meteor on the satellite.

Moreover, as new information became available, it was simply ignored. In one critical instance, evidence of radiation observed in the thyroid glands of Australian sheep was discounted. The initial lack of this “smoking gun,” traces of radiation, suggested to a Los Alamos scientist that the low-yield weapon tested had been a neutron bomb. However, the Carter panel had used the absence of radiation as a prime excuse in its cover-up.

Many who had been involved with the investigation were aghast and wondered by the Carter White House was ‘equivocating’. Some within the government said that the Carter Administration was hiding behind the ‘zoo’ theory to avoid dealing with the political headaches that would accompany acknowledgement of the test. An affirmative report might have affected the ongoing negotiations over the creation of Zimbabwe in which South African co-operation was needed and upset the just negotiated Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt. Carter also had reasons to fear ‘complications in gathering Jewish votes during the upcoming Democratic Party primary campaign against Sen. Edward Kennedy.’

But beyond that, as a State Department official explained, coming clean on the test ‘would be a major turning point in our relations with South Africa and Israel if we determined conclusively that either had tested a nuclear bomb. It makes me terribly nervous just to think about it.’ Of course by deciding to ignore reality the Carter administration - and following in its footsteps, the Reagan administration,which went on record May 21, 1985 as upholding the Carter ‘verdict’ - destroyed the already tattered credibility of the nonproliferation posture of the U.S. There was no challenge forthcoming from Congress. Quite the contrary: in 1981 Representatives Stephen Solarz and Jonathan Bingham withdrew legislation they had introduced calling for a cutoff of U.S. aid to nations manufacturing nuclear weapons after they learned from the State Department “that such a requirement might well trigger a finding by the Administration that Israel has manufactured a bomb.” The U.S. government turned its back on the potential victims of Israeli and South African nuclear aggression and stuck its head in the sand like an ostrich.

Cover-up

Five years later, the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund in cooperation with Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation and the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa issued a report on the 1979 nuclear weapons test. Based on documents obtained from the government under the Freedom of Information Act, the report detailed scientific evidence not taken into account by the Carter panel. It demonstrated conclusively that a cover-up had been perpetrated by the Carter Administration. Written by Howard University Professor Ronald Walters, the report warned that the cover-up, ‘coupled with the Reagan Administration’s subsequent allowance of an increase in nuclear aid to South Africa has serious implications for international peace and security.’

The sponsors of the report urged that the investigation be reopened under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineers, and also called for a Congressional investigation and ‘the release to the public of all pertinent information.

Of course whether enquiries are reopened in the USA, or the United Nations, or not, many African States are deeply uneasy about these events. Unsurprisingly, the conclusions which they have drawn reflect considerable alarm. A number of African countries have quite reasonably concluded that they are prospective candidates for nuclear bombardment by South Africa. No Government in the front-line states can possibly ignore this threat. Persistent cross-border military activity by the apartheid regime is a permanent fact of political life in the southern part of the African continent.

But it is not only in the front-line states that alarm bells have been ringing. As Oye Ogunbadejo informs us:

“Nigeria, for example, sees itself as ... a potential target. Lagos has consistently argued that any improvements in South Africa’s military power and nuclear capability, with the assistance of the west, pose direct military threats to Nigeria, and make it an open target of long-range nuclear attack. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, as President, continued to emphasise the need for his country to catch up with South Africa in the nuclear field. For the time being, however, Nigeria’s efforts are geared, essentially, towards energy purposes.”

Yet, Ogunbadejo cites other prominent African spokesmen who are very impatient with the restrictions of nuclear capacity to the civilian sector. Thus, Ali Mazrui is reported as a strong critic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty:

“From a third world point of view, I don’t believe the Treaty is worth the paper it is written on. And if I were to become President of a third world country, I would not hesitate to withdraw from it. Imperialism in the nuclear age is the monopoly stage of nuclear technology.”

Mazrui foresees an alliance of black South Africa with Nigeria and Zaire, which would develop its own African ‘deterrent’.

“Africa under its triumvirate of diplomatic leaders partly endowed with nuclear credentials, will have begun to enter the main stream of global affairs. And the world as a whole, once it discovers the lunacy of its nuclear ways, will have learned an old lesson in a new context: the lesson that wild mushrooms are dangerous.”

Of course, the attitude of the Government of Free South Africa cannot yet be determined. Fortunately, for many years, progressive people throughout the African continent have given their support to the goal of a nuclear-free zone in the whole region. Kwame Nkrumah froze all French assets because of the tests in the Sahara desert during 1961. At the same time, Nigeria severed its diplomatic contact with France. The advent of the Non-proliferation Treaty was perhaps more keenly welcomed in Africa than in any other sector of the globe. Ogunbadejo believes that only a major initiative towards nuclear disarmament by the great powers can maintain this kind of wider global commitment.

“In the maintenance of future world order, the close co-operation and understanding between the superpowers and the other states with nuclear weapons is an essential precondition.”

In small things and big

The advent of the Gorbachev-Reagan summits, and the conclusion of a Treaty to dismantle intermediate nuclear forces, welcome though it is, nonetheless arrives after the eleventh hour, when we consider the savage implications of the problems of proliferation. Conventional theories of deterrence are deeply flawed, and nowhere more than in their standard presumption of a bipolar model of nuclear confrontation. In a crude way, several thousand warheads may, when confronted by several thousand other warheads, determine a certain kind of behaviour. No such determination may be presumed, however, once proliferation has extended to the ‘pariah’ states. In the hot spots which include and surround these states, there is sufficient turbulence to encourage the insane idea that nuclear weapons can be useful as means of actual warfare. What elsewhere would be normal restraints of public opinion are here conspicuously absent.

We have more than a little evidence that neither domestic nor international law controls the potential responses of such governments.

In small things, the Israeli Government kidnaps its opponents, and visits exemplary repression upon them. In large things, it misleads the United Nations and extends the threat of nuclear destruction to two of the most dangerous areas in the contemporary world.

It is hardly surprising that good people who are facing such threats may flinch in their commitment to oppose all or any reliance on nuclear weapons. Thus, Ogunbadejo tells us:

“Edem Kodjo, the last substantive Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, caused quite a stir at the 19th summit during June 1983 in Addis Ababa, when he militantly urged African Governments to match ‘South Africa’s nuclear mights’: ‘it is the duty of member states which are able to resolutely embark on the nuclear path to do so. “‘

Nuclear proliferation is the tragic reductio ad absurdem of deterrence theory. That old cynic, Harold Macmillan, cogently expressed the problem:

“If all this capacity for destruction is spread around the world in the hands of all kinds of different characters dictators, reactionaries, revolutionaries, madmen - then sooner or later, and certainly, I think by the end of the century, either by error or insanity, the great crime will be committed.”

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the idea of nuclear-free zones, can neither of them continue unaffected by the nuclearization of the military forces of Israel and South Africa. If there is still time to maintain the civilized commitment of Africa and the Arab world to non-nuclear defence policies, it must be evident that that time is rapidly speeding away. Mordechai Vanunu has removed the last veil which had been concealing this ugly situation.

Now, in order to survive, the Non-Proliferation regime must discover how to disarm Israel and South Africa of their nuclear bludgeons. A failure to confront this intransigent issue may not at once create the field full of dragon’s teeth which will eventually grow. Problems of resources and technology will ensure an uneven development of nuclear military potential. But here, we are talking about something more fundamental than budget allocations: at stake is the whole question of the political will for peace and disarmament, as well as the deep-rooted problem of social justice. If the rest of the world abandons the front-line states to South African intimidation, including nuclear intimidation all Africa will conclude that Ali Mazrui is right. If everyone outside the Middle East remains deaf to the process which is now reopening behind locked doors in Jerusalem, then the call for an Arab bomb will become irresistible. We are members of one another, and it is at critical moments like the present that it becomes necessary to demonstrate this fact.

So widespread is the international movement for peace, that the Third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament will see continued healthy pressures for the destruction of nuclear weapons, and the extension of ever wider nuclear-free territorial agreements. Yet, it seems to me, that all these events provide us with a powerful argument that disarmament can no longer be left to governments.

There are widespread debates about the need for reform of the United Nations system, and many new proposals are emerging from the different peace movements, as they experience the weaknesses and limitations of the inherited UN system. Even within the old system, however, many voices have been raised for the creation of a new information order, as a pre-condition for an enlightened and active world public opinion.

The confrontation between Israel and its neighbours, the plight of the Palestinian people, and the abscess of apartheid are both major parts of a global crisis of militarism. This is worsening as a result of economic crisis, contraction and collapse. If the Stock Exchange crash leads through trade wars to the explosion of the world’s debt bomb, then the present proliferation of nuclear weapons is a perfect formula for Armageddon. No-one can tell where conflict will spill over, once any of these sinister devices are detonated.

So urgent is this problem that nothing less than a worldwide popular movement is needed to meet it. It cannot be left to the immediate victims of these new nuclear threats, to protest and appeal in isolation. “Send ye not”, said our English poet John Donne, “to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee”.

* * *

In warning us of these perils, Mordechai Vanunu has earned our support and help. Writing from his confinement, he sent me this inspiring message:

“I hope you received my last letters to you. Last week I received the autobiography of Bertrand Russell. Thank you very much. In this very interesting book I find I share some things in common with the life of Russell. I am also governed by unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind.

I believe many people would like to do more for those who suffer without reason, like all the refugees in the world. I tried to help them when I was a student. This activity guides me to my next action.

Even now in these inhumane prison conditions, I feel good, because I believe I did my duty and followed my conscience.

I am happy to know that many people support and understand what I did, and my hope is that more people will do more things to stop nuclear proliferation throughout the world.

We are now in a great moment when the US and the USSR are signing an agreement to reduce nuclear weaponry in Europe. This is a good step in the right direction: to destroy all the nuclear weapons in the world.

I want to thank you for your action for peace, and for spreading news of my case to more people.”

I do not think that humanity will ignore or forget the plight of this good man. In organizing solidarity with him, we shall continually remind the world of the menace against which he warned.

Double standard policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

“I swear I believe Armageddon is near.”1

So wrote US President Ronald Reagan in his diary on the evening on June 7, 1981. What prompted this private proclamation of doom? Earlier that day, fourteen US-built F-16 aircraft flew from their base in the Negev dessert. These Israeli military jets made their way at low level across Jordanian and Saudi Arabian airspace, before reaching their target: the Osirak nuclear reactor, located just 10 kilometres southwest of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The jets dropped bombs which destroyed Iraq’s fledgling nuclear energy programme.

In conformity with diplomatic protocol, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin informed the US President through his Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis. Some accounts hold that Lewis was stunned at the news, which was conveyed to Reagan via the text of this rather bland cable:

‘At 1940 local (1740 ZULU) Prime Minister Begin contacted me and asked me to convey the following message to you as quickly as possible. Commence text. Today our air force carried out a raid on the atomic reactor near Baghdad. According to the reports of our pilots the target was completely destroyed. All our planes returned safely. End text.’2

At the time of the attack, Iraq – unlike Israel – was a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear materials at the Osirak reactor were under the supervision and safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency and, with the exception of a short period following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, had been regularly inspected.3 The volume and status of the materials at the site were such that the prospect of Iraq developing nuclear weapons from them in the short-term was close to zero. Why, then, did Israel attack the Osirak reactor at this point? Why attack when Iraq was fully signed up to international arms control and monitoring arrangements? Why attack when there was little or no prospect of Iraq developing weapons from the small quantity of nuclear materials at the site?

Israeli elections were due to take place on June 30, 1981. Begin’s Likud party and government coalition partners were thought to have only a narrow lead in the run-up to the polls. Likud and company had been behind in the polls prior to the outbreak of tensions around the placing of Syrian missiles in Southern Lebanon – itself a response to building Israeli aggression. Israel had planned to attack these missile installations, first in April and then May but was thwarted by poor weather conditions and other factors. “Was the timing of the raid on Iraq an election-month substitute for the destruction of the Syrian missiles?”, asked Anthony Fainstein in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

“It is difficult for me to avoid this conclusion; the same thoughts have occurred to the Israeli opposition. The raid did provide psychological points against Iraq, but did little else for Israel beyond helping Begin’s re-election bid.” 4

Neither did the raid prevent Israel from unleashing an attack on PLO and other targets in Lebanon just ten days later, on June 17.

What prompted President Reagan’s stark reaction? Was the attack a surprise? Not according to archival record which contains multiple warnings from Ambassador Lewis.5 Was the US opposed – in principle – to an Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor? Almost certainly not. The reaction from the White House was about something else, as was the chorus of opposition that culminated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 487, which condemned:

“the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations … [and] strongly condemns the attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”6

The main factor at play in the response was not outright opposition to Israel’s action but a concern about timing. Begin worked according to his own timetable – determined by the upcoming elections – and imperatives (more on which later), but the rest of the world – and the new US President in particular – feared a slide into widespread regional conflict that would jeopardise a clear settlement of power and influence in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war, which commenced in September 1980, was in part an attempt by the Iraqi regime to replace Iran as the preeminent regional power following the Iranian revolution. It was not until 1982 that the US officially ‘normalised’ relations with Iraq and – together with Saudi Arabia and others – started to pump money and arms into the country. The point here is that regional power and influence, beyond the role played by Israel in US regional concerns, was a key factor in the initial response to the Osirak bombing. Israel’s actions had potentially jeopardized the power settlement but in the event, the much-feared chain of events that could have led to full-scale regional conflict failed to materialise.

If timing was a factor for both Begin and Reagan in this instance, it was a marginal one in the overall dynamic. As far as Israel is concerned, its external priorities in relation to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is wholly determined by the fact that Israel is itself a nuclear power. As such, the attitudes of neighbouring states towards the acquisition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is conditioned by a nuclear-armed Israel. This is one leg of the ‘double standard policy’ that operates in the Middle East, whereby whilst Israel insists on maintaining and developing its own nuclear arsenal to ensure the ‘ultimate deterrence’, it cannot countenance any other regional power taking the same course. Official Israeli nuclear policy – insofar as it can be determined from under the veil of deliberate opacity – seems blind to the fact that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot but induce other regional states to develop their own nuclear programmes alongside the development of other weapons of mass destruction.

This point was comprehensively made by Matti Peled, onetime military commander of Gaza and Major General in the Israeli Defence Forces, turned peace activist and Knesset member. On 25 November 1987, during a speech on behalf of the Progressive List for Peace on a vote of no confidence in the Israeli Parliament, Peled stated:

“The Israel government deludes itself that being the leading Middle East state in the field of nuclear power bestows upon Israel immunity from weapons of mass destruction. This is one of the most dangerous illusions in the sphere of strategic thinking. There may be found some people, however, sticking to the argument that Israel is mainly concerned to prevent any Arab state from developing nuclear weapons … The Israeli government’s assumption that it can succeed in preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Arab states by a series of bombardments of nuclear reactors, is thoroughly unrealistic. This is another dangerous illusion distorting the strategic thinking of Israel.”7

Peled’s point being that the mere existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal is no protection and, moreover, itself presents a threat to Israel’s security. Nonetheless, this approach to regional actors endures with hostility towards Iran the starkest illustration.

Another leg in the ‘double standard policy’ relates to what Commander Robert Green refers to as a “distinct version of the concept of existential nuclear deterrence”8 whereby:

“a deliberately opaque and contradictory posture of refusal to acknowledge possession, let alone deployment, of a nuclear arsenal. Understanding the evolution of this particular, perverse notion is essential because it poses a grave danger to Israel, the Middle East and the United States.”

Green continues, quoting from the 1993 edition of Seymour Hersh’s work on Israeli nuclear doctrine, The Samson Option:

“For more than three decades, successive American administrations of both parties, the bureaucracy, and the diplomatic service have ignored the existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal … The current official position of the United States and its allies is, astonishingly, that there is no evidence that Israel is, in fact, in possession of nuclear arms.”9

Israel’s “distinct” formulation of nuclear deterrence and the continuing American disinclination to publicly recognising it, is all the more peculiar given the widespread acknowledgement and understanding that such a nuclear arsenal exists. Hersch is not the only writer to cover the story of Israel’s nuclear programme and policies. Anver Cohen’s important work, Israel and the Bomb,10 traces the development of Israeli nuclear strategy through stages of secrecy, denial, opacity and its current phase: ambiguity, whereby deliberate obfuscation and concealment are deployed.

In the last two of these phases, Israel has had a willing accomplice and enabler: the United States. Even when the US government has been presented with undeniable evidence, such as proof of joint nuclear tests between Israel and Apartheid South Africa or the materials presented by Mordechai Vanunu, no acknowledgement was forthcoming. Ken Coates presented an explanation for this state of affairs:

“Conventional theories of deterrence are deeply flawed, and nowhere more than in their standard presumption of a bipolar model of nuclear confrontation. In a crude way, several thousand warheads may, when confronted by several thousand other warheads, determine a certain kind of behaviour. No such determination may be presumed, however, once proliferation has extended to the ‘pariah’ states. In the hotspots which include and surround these states, there is sufficient turbulence to encourage the insane idea that nuclear weapons can be useful as a means of actual warfare. What elsewhere would be normal restraints of public opinion are here conspicuously absent. We have more than a little evidence that neither domestic nor international law controls the potential responses of such governments.

In small things, the Israeli government kidnaps its opponents, and visits exemplary repression on them. In large things, it misleads the United Nations and extends the threat of nuclear destruction to two of the most dangerous areas in the contemporary world.”11

Ken Coates did not have a crystal ball and could not have foreseen the coming of the Trump Administration in the US and its cooperation with the Netanyahu government in Israel. He could not have anticipated the degree to which the “normal restraints of public opinion” have degraded. However, he and other analysts were supremely alert to the trajectories of US policy in the Middle East and the terms by which the ‘double standard policy’ operated.

Notes

1. Reagan, Ronald (2007) The Reagan Diaries, Harper Collins

2. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre,

3. Fainberg, Anthony (1981) ‘Osirak and international security’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1981

4. Ibid

5. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre

6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 487,

7. Peled, Matti (1988) ‘Denuclearising the Middle East’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

8. Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

9. Hersh, Seymour (1993) The Samson Option, quoted from Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence pp 123

10. Cohen, Anver (1998) Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York

11. Coates, Ken (1988) ‘Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

A nuclear-armed state versus the Palestinian people

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

Dateline: 16 May 2021. Al Wahda Street, central Gaza City.

Israel intensifies air-strikes on Gaza in a continuation of its latest assault on the Palestinian people. Official Israeli channels insist that such actions are “precision targeted” against individual “terrorists” and related organisations.

Al Wahda Street – in the bustling heart of Gaza – was home to many before the missiles struck. Amongst them were the family of Dr Ayman Abu al-Auf who served as head of Internal Medicine at Gaza’s Shifa hospital. By the end of the day, Dr al-Auf was dead. So were his 13 year old daughter Tala and his 17 year old son. All three killed by Israeli “precision” bombing.

According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “Rula Mohammad al-Kawlak, 5, Yara, 9, and Hala, 12 – all sisters - together with their cousin Hana, 14, and several other of their relatives, as well as sisters Dima and Mira Rami al-Ifranji, 15 and 11, and neighbour Dana Riad Hasan Ishkantna, 9” were killed in the same “precision” attacks.

The NRC reported that by the 18 May, of the 60 children killed in Israeli attacks, 11 had been receiving treatment for pre-existing trauma at one of its facilities. Tala Abu al-Auf was one of their patients.

Tala’s life was dominated by trauma, suffering, uncertainty and violence. Anywhere else in the world, the teenage daughter of a doctor might have expected a relatively care-free and comfortable life. A life loaded with opportunity, hope and joy. Such opportunities are denied to the children of Gaza, be they the children of doctors or the children of the countless jobless in that stretch of land.

Tala is no longer traumatised. Death at the hands of “precision” bombing put an end to her too-short life.

* * * 

The most recent Israeli assault on the Palestinian people looks like an all-too-familiar and all-too-tragic event. Every few years the gross ‘normality’ of the protracted oppression of the Palestinian people is punctured by an intense assault at the hands of the Israeli military. Every few years the State of Israel pushes at the boundaries of what has previously been accepted by the international community and demands more. It deploys a highly organised, heavily equipped military and demands one bit more: more Palestinian territory, more Palestinian lives, more traumatised children, more concessions from world opinion.

Rather than maintain a balance between coercion and consent as is the norm in many states – ‘liberal’ or otherwise – Israel employs brutal coercive measures and demands consent from the world. The death, trauma and suffering of the Palestinian people are secondary to the drive for one more cluster of houses, one more stretch of land. The wishes of the Palestinian people or the calculable reaction of an oppressed people are not accounted for. All-too-often the death, trauma and suffering are not recorded on the balance sheet of world opinion.

When the reaction comes in the form of children throwing stones at soldiers in bullet-proof vests with machine guns slung over their shoulders, or in the firing of scores of missiles in the expectation that some of them will penetrate Israel’s sophisticated missile defence system, we are expected to draw an equals sign. We are expected to kneel at the altar of ‘reasonableness’ and condemn an occupied and oppressed people who refuse to kneel in the face of occupation and oppression. We might be tempted to draw an equal’s sign in the name of peace, in the name of opposition to violence whatever its source.

However, we cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we can identify and understand the roadblocks to peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we are clear that powerful forces are ranged against the conquest of peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace in Palestine or the Middle East more widely without a clear recognition that in Palestine we are talking about a nuclear-armed state against a people denied a state of their own.

We cannot talk sensibly about peace in this region unless we are clear that the ‘double-standard’ policy employed by the US and allies with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons is mirrored in the double-standards deployed in the treatment of Palestinians on the streets of Gaza, the West Bank and within the Palestinian community in Israel itself.

When Israel is allowed to maintain obscurity around its nuclear weapons arsenal when other states face threats of attack, sanctions and international opprobrium for seeking the bomb, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but threatens NPT member states with attack for developing a nuclear programme, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to constructively engage in efforts towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East and finds encouragement for doing so, a double-standard policy is at work.

Where is the room for an equal’s sign? To draw such a sign would not only be a crime against mathematics but a crime against reality, a crime against morals and a crime against reason.

When a people stand up against decades of dispossession, occupation, trauma and oppression the peace movement must stand with them. When a nuclear-armed state, armed to the teeth with ‘conventional’ weapons with the help of foreign aid from the US, UK and elsewhere wages war then the peace movements are clear where we stand.

When we learn the name Tala Abu al-Auf, learn of her fate and know that she is one of legions who have suffered then we know where we stand. When we understand that a thick strand connects her killing to the lived experience of millions of Palestinians, to the fate of the Middle East and all the way to the murderous hum of Israel’s nuclear warhead stockpile, we know where we stand.

Stand with Palestine.

A version of this article first appeared on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament website, www.cnduk.org

The UK’s First Use policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

Text of a contribution made on 29th April to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of peace groups.

I am a former British Royal Navy nuclear submarine commanding officer. In the 1970s I served in a UK Polaris submarine with responsibility for the ‘permission to fire key’ which would have launched 48 300kt warheads . I did so on the understanding that we would only be ordered to do so as a counter-attack – 2nd strike - against an incoming nuclear weapon attack by the Soviets. I would have withheld permission if I had any reason to think we were being ordered to launch a first strike. I was not prepared, under any circumstance, to start a nuclear war based on an intelligence assessment that the Soviets might be on the point of launching a nuclear attack. Intelligence can be fatally flawed, or wide open to misinterpretation or be straightforward prejudiced manipulation - as the 2003 US-UK invasion of Iraq showed all too clearly. Fortunately, UK Secretary of State for Defence’s pre-war assertion that nuclear weapons might be used to counter Saddam Hussein launching a chemical or biological weapon attack was not acted upon.

In the run-up to the 2016 UK’s Trident submarine replacement debate in the UK Parliament, I questioned the cost and utility of Trident missiles in this post-Cold War world. I was also concerned that this ignored the UK’s commitment to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT’s entry into force in 1970 - two years before I went on my first Polaris patrol - had encouraged me to think that the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction was indeed so mad that, within my lifetime, nuclear weapons would become the dinosaurs they deserved to be. How wrong I was.

So it was quite a shock for me to discover five years ago that First Use had, secretly, always been part of UK planning but had not been declared either to us at sea or to the nation. We were all under the false impression that Polaris was solely a counter-strike weapon. And still today, hiding in plain sight - but camouflaged behind the comfort blanket phrase ‘weapons of last resort’ - is the fact that the UK’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – as it is now called - could still include a First Strike as a ‘last resort’ if our conventional forces are in danger of being over-run.

This ambiguity places current UK Trident submarine Commanding Officers in an impossible position. If nothing is ruled out, then everything, including First Use, can be ruled in. However, submerged on patrol, they will have no way of knowing why they are being ordered to fire, what the target is, or the consequences on civil populations of doing so. They therefore cannot make the legal and moral judgements that the Nuremberg Principles require them to do. They will not know if they are carrying out a superior’s order to commit a war crime. They must completely trust in their Prime Minister who, uniquely among nuclear weapon States, has the sole authority for a decision to fire with no military or third party approval required.

Interestingly, another former Royal Navy submarine captain recently stated ‘I would not press the button for Boris’ – why? Because he said he did not trust Prime Minister Johnson’s judgment. Similar reservations were expressed by senior US military during President Trump’s time in office.

So I fully support this initiative to examine whether now is the time to press for a global No-First-Use policy. Much as I applaud and support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force recently, the reality is that an instant outright ban is not likely to be observed by the nuclear weapon states. But it may well apply such pressure on them that they feel the need to concede some relaxation of threat posture - such as No-First-Use - if only to show some compliance with NPT Article 6.

However, a big obstacle to overcome is that the nuclear weapon States justify possession of their weapons and the lawfulness of First Use by referring to the International Court of Justice 1996 Advisory Opinion which, by a casting vote, could not conclude whether or nor the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful if the very existence of a State was threatened; although it did decide that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would ‘generally’ be unlawful.

Similarly, the 1977 conference chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross that negotiated Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions acceded to the nuclear weapon States’ insistence that the Protocol should not ‘name and shame’ any specific weapons. This enabled the UK to include in its Military Law handbook that the use of nuclear weapons was not prohibited by the Protocol: a factually correct conclusion but speciously achieved.

I therefore wonder if the UN General Assembly could be prevailed upon to frame a more specific request for the ICJ, and also perhaps for the ICRC, for an Advisory Opinion on whether there are any circumstances in which First Use - or even the threat of First Use - of nuclear weapons would be lawful? The danger of course is that, if First Use is deemed unlawful, it may seem to justify their use (or threat of this) for a counter strike. But this may be a temporary price worth paying.

In parallel, let us also consistently remind those States not signed up to the NPT that nuclear ‘comfort blankets’ provide no comfort at all. For every £ put towards funding a nuclear armoury that is already more than big enough to end the world, they are a £ further away from being equipped to defend against far more immediate modern day threats.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://www.gcsp.ch/events/nuclear-risk-reduction-and-disarmament-it-time-no-first-use-policies-usa-and-globally

No First Use: US/UK connections

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

Text of a contribution made on 15th May to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of US peace groups.

On 25th September 1945, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote to US President Truman in the following fashion:

“… I have so far heard no suggestions of any possible means of defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor. In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war [World War II, that is] it was [argued] that the only answer to the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to be correct. This obvious fact did not prevent bombing but resulted in the destruction of many great centres of civilisation. Similarly if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation…”

Why commence a short contribution on the question of a ‘No First Use’ policy with a quote from a letter written seventy six years ago? ‘Changing the political relationships of States’ is key.

At the time of writing, Britain was not yet a possessor of atomic weapons. It was, however, experiencing the collapse of its empire. One month before this letter was written, Truman had given the order for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after this letter was written, Attlee issued secret orders – kept secret from the majority of his administration, parliament and the people – for British scientists and engineers to begin work on what is still quaintly referred to as an ‘independent deterrent’.

Many of us gathered here will know that the ‘independence’ of Britain’s atomic weapons was short-lived, that following the successful test of a British hydrogen bomb the US waived the strictures of the McMahon Act and that the nuclear arsenal now maintained on these islands is entirely dependent on US technologies and assistance. We know that there is a ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’ between the US and UK, first signed on 3 July 1958 and which has been renewed nine times since. The next renewal date is 31 December 2024.

The extent of the UK’s reliance on the US in these matters extends from missile targeting – UK nuclear missiles are at several days’ notice to fire – to nuclear fuel for propulsion reactors. The UK’s nuclear weapon arsenal is, in fact, counted as simply a component part of the US arsenal.

So it is of some interest to trace the thoughts of two western leaders at the opening of the nuclear age. All the more so given Attlee’s warning that “if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation …”. All the more given the recent nuclear posture announced in the ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age. This document says much about a certain interpretation of how the relationship between states has changed, but says nothing about how they should and could be positively changed to avert mutual annihilation.

The headline measure in the review was the announcement that Britain would abandon the upper threshold for the number of nuclear warheads it possesses and rather than maintain a commitment to reduce the overall numbers over time, it would increase the upper threshold by over 40%, a total of 260 warheads. This increase galvanised a wave of opposition in the UK and left many commentators baffled about the reasoning behind it. Others suggest that the announced increase simply reflects the fact that rather than actually reducing the numbers of warheads as promised, the UK failed to do so and has found a means to account for the failure. The review announced that in future, the British government will not be as forthcoming about the number of warheads in its possession.

Less notice has been taken of the outline offered on the UK’s nuclear warfighting posture, which begins:

“we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons.”

The review claims that:

“This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.”

It then goes on to explain that the UK “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”

However, the British government then announces that all such policies are under review and that:

“the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact” This mean that it ‘reserves the right’ to reconsider and respond with nuclear weapons. It is not explicit by what means the reconsideration will take place, the time scale or the parameters that might guide the reconsideration.

The integrated review itself makes clear that ‘emerging technologies’ include drones, AI and cyber-attack type technologies. So here, the British government is warning of a drastic reduction in the threshold for nuclear use from a scenario where such weapons might be used to prevent a possible aggressor from using them to one where they might be used in response to the use or threat of use of a cyber attack, for example.

This posture announcement demonstrates a number of things: A complete failure of diplomacy and foreign policy in the face of a disrupted and still-changing global order; the relative incapacity of conventional British military capabilities to respond to perceived threats and a stick-not-carrot approach to engaging with the realities of the world as it is.

­­All of which has lowered the threshold at which the UK – and, we might presume – other nuclear armed states in the NATO alliance would actually use nuclear weapons.

Rather than assuring any sense or form of security, such a posture drastically increases the insecurity of life on this planet. Such a posture acts as a block on the road to changed political relationships between states. How will the other nuclear armed states – some of which are described as ‘strategic competitors’ – respond?

Such a posture makes the case for examining the feasibility of adoption of an explicit No First Use posture and a thinking-through of how such a policy might be achieved all the more pressing.

What, for instance, does the new US administration think of Britain’s nuclear posture? Will the shift in the UK’s posture be reflected in the future US Nuclear Posture Review or will it be repudiated?

What does the UK’s posture mean for mainland Europe, which is once again being thought of as a potential nuclear battleground? The Russian Foreign Ministry was outspoken in opposition. The German Foreign ministry spokesperson raised concerns about the numbers of warheads, but not much has been said about the threatened reduction in threshold for use.

The peace movements in Europe are certainly alert to these changes and have voiced their concerns, as has the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK itself.

Joining the opposition to the British governments’ posture are a growing number of voices from former Naval-personnel, who warn of the risks associated and the parlous state of the British Navy and other conventional forces.

For the first time a several years, the US has an administration that might – just might – be more thoughtful, rational and open-minded on such questions than the British government. Whilst Prime Minister Johnson dreams of a ‘Global Britain’ and ‘Empire 2.0’, President Biden seems open to a different approach. Adoption of a No First Use policy by the US – the aim of efforts underway – would be an important contribution to our work in the UK and Europe more widely.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://masspeaceaction.org/event/prohibiting-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Note on Nuclear Weapon Announcements in the UK Integrated Review

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Peter Jenkins, British Pugwash

Summary

The United Kingdom government recently announced, in the context of an integrated policy review, that it will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 (from a previous target of no more than 180) and that it will extend its longstanding policy of deliberate ambiguity by no longer making public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warheads and deployed missiles.

These decisions are best seen as symptomatic of a belief that the United Kingdom’s and NATO’s security environment has been deteriorating and that now Russia in particular poses a grave threat to the Kingdom and its NATO allies. Pugwash has an opportunity to react constructively to the decisions by exploring the reasons for the heightening of NATO/Russian tensions in recent years.

Additionally, use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear aggressors in certain circumstances

is envisaged ( extension to the policy of deliberate ambiguity may be connected to this) and the right to review the UK’s negative security assurance to Non-Nuclear Weapon States is reserved. But nuclear weapon use in response to cyber-attacks and against non-state actors is ruled out, and the UK’s nuclear weapon submarines will remain at several days’ notice to fire.

Detail

The context of these changes in the UK’s nuclear weapons policy is a strategic review of “security, defence, development and foreign policy”. Being the first review of UK strategy since the 2016 decision to withdraw from the European Union, and inviting comparison with strategic reviews done in 2010 and 2015, the 2021 review suggests a wish to convince readers that EU withdrawal has enhanced the UK’s potential to be an important actor on the global stage. In particular, the 2021 review dwells on economic and political interests in the Indo/Pacific region and it sets out the capabilities, actual and aspirational, that the Kingdom can bring to bear on the pursuit of those interests. Nonetheless, it recognises that the North Atlantic area remains the primary concern of UK defence policies.

Increase in the Overall

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

“In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile

ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads”

Integrated Review of Security,

Defence, Development and

Foreign Policy (IR), 15 March 2021

The most specific and most logical explanation for this decision came in a TV interview that the Secretary of State for Defence gave on 21 March. He referred to improvements in Russian missile defences and implied that these meant the UK’s nuclear deterrent must grow in size to remain credible. UK governments have long taken a capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on Moscow as a yardstick for the credibility of the UK deterrent. Russia is thought to have been strengthening Moscow’s anti-ballistic missile defences in the context of a major upgrade of its anti-access and area-denial capabilities, lessons having been drawn from the first and second Iraq wars and NATO’s 1999 aerial assault on Serbia.

However, the Integrated Review itself contains no reference to Russian missile defences.

Instead, it refers to a wider, more amorphous range of threats, which has been described as “a deteriorating security environment.”

“We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states, and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals. They are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new ‘warfighting’ nuclear systems which they are integrating into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others. The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and proliferation of potentially disruptive technologies all pose a threat to strategic stability….We will continue to keep our nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.” (IR)

This explanation seems to lack logic. It is far from obvious that increases and improvements in another state’s nuclear forces require increases in a retaliatory nuclear force judged to be assured (because invulnerable to a first strike) and credible (because capable of causing a potential aggressor unacceptable damage). Nonetheless, this is the explanation to which the

Integrated Review gives pride of place.

British Pugwash has heard it said that these risk concerns centre on Russia, China, North Korea (DPRK) and Iran. Here, too, an element of illogicality enters in. China has stated publicly that it does not intend to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of a confrontation with an adversary, and it is hard to imagine the UK intending to be the initiator of a nuclear exchange with China. The North Korean government is preoccupied with what it sees as an existential threat from the United States of America. Iran is not thought to have resumed the research into nuclear weapon design and manufacture that it abandoned in 2003; its Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the possession and use of nuclear weapons; in agreeing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran pledged to remain a Non-Nuclear Weapon State; Iran does not possess a missile capable of reaching Western Europe; and Iran

has offered to refrain from developing missiles with ranges in excess of 2000 km.

It is probable, therefore, that these risk concerns centre essentially on the weapon systems and military doctrines of Russia, and that they are felt as much from a NATO perspective as from a national UK perspective. A country assessment of Russia in the review includes this passage:

“The UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia. However, until relations with its government improve, we will actively deter and defend against the full spectrum of threats emanating from Russia. Through NATO, we will ensure a united Western response, combining our military, diplomatic and intelligence assets in support of collective security ... We will also support others in the Eastern European neighbourhood and beyond to build their resilience to state threats.”

This is not the place to explore why the British government has formed a view that the United Kingdom and NATO now face a grave “spectrum of threats” from Russia. Several possible reasons will occur to anyone who has been taking an interest in the evolving character of Russia’s relations with NATO members since 2012. Suffice it to say that this grim assessment contrasts with the 2010 strategic review (which set the stockpile target at no more than 180):

“No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us under grave threat.”

The 2021 assessment also goes some way beyond the assessment in the 2015 strategic review. The latter confines its Russian threat perception to the following sentence:

“Though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it [Russia] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.”

Belief in a re-born Russian threat thus seems to be the leading explanation for the decision to increase the overall weapons stockpile. Two other possible factors mention merit, however, before turning to the decision to expand a longstanding policy of ambiguity to embrace actual stockpile and deployed nuclear weapon numbers.

One is a possible fear that in time improvements in offensive underwater technologies will affect the invulnerability of the UK’s strategic missile submarines. Behind the stockpile increase could lie an intention to maintain more than one such submarine on patrol on a routine basis.

However, an IISS commentary on the Integrated Review casts doubt on the feasibility of a two-vessel routine, at least until a new generation of submarines enters service during the 2030s:

“There are, however, potential constraints to that scenario. Among them are the well publicised problems with the refits and serviceability of the current Vanguard class, which have recently made it challenging to maintain the minimum Continuous At Sea Deterrence requirement of one submarine on patrol.”

(The UK and nuclear warheads – stretching credibility?, 26 March 2021)

Second, it could be that officials have come to the view that the 2010 decision to cut the stockpile to 180 by 2025, re-confirmed in 2015, and to deploy no more than 40 warheads on routine patrol, was ill-judged and that the stockpile needs to grow, irrespective of changes in the strategic environment and threat perceptions, to achieve credibility. This possibility has been hinted at in British Pugwash’s hearing but there is no hard evidence for it.

Withholding of Missile and Warhead Numbers

“We will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technological environment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.” (IR)

Two additional explanations for this prizing of ambiguity come to mind.

The first is that the UK government intends to deploy nuclear weapon systems to deter substrategic nuclear and non-nuclear threats to NATO on its North East front, but does not wish to reveal the number of systems designated for this purpose that will be on routine patrol at any one time. A Q & A paper issued some weeks after the Integrated Review suggests that this explanation is unlikely. In it the Ministry of Defence affirms that none of the UK’s nuclear weapons are “designed for tactical use during conflict”; instead, they exist to “deter the most extreme threats to national security”.

However, this formulation seems to leave open the possibility that ‘low-yield’ strategic systems will be deployed routinely in case a need for their use in sub-strategic/tactical contexts arises. That possibility is also left open by statements in the review that the UK’s nuclear weapons are committed to the defence of both the Kingdom and NATO allies, and that “their fundamental purpose” is, inter alia, to deter “aggression”, the qualifier “nuclear” being omitted.

The second possibility is that the UK government has come to view a greater lack of

transparency as a necessary adjunct to maintaining the option of using nuclear weapons in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks and to cope with threats which emerging technologies may pose:

“We reserve the right to review this [Negative Security] assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.” (IR)

The impression sought is perhaps that the United Kingdom will have sufficient systems deployed at any one time to be able to respond to non-nuclear WMD and emerging technology threats without impairing the credibility of its strategic deterrent.

To end on some positive notes. The Integrated Review indicates that when on patrol the UK’s strategic submarines will continue to be at several days’ notice to fire. The review states that

“since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state.” It seems, from what British Pugwash has heard, that the option of using nuclear weapons against non-state actors has been excluded. The MOD’s Q & A paper rules out their use in response to cyber-attacks. And the UK government comes down firmly on the deterrence side of the deterrence/warfighting distinction:

“We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies ... We remain committed to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction…The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.” (IR)

Conclusion

These changes in the UK’s nuclear policy are regrettable. They amount to a step backwards and away from the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. They call into question the sincerity of the UK’s advocacy of “step-by-step” movement in the direction of that vision. They raise doubt about the strength of the UK’s commitment to full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They demonstrate that the United Kingdom is still wed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

However, it would seem best for the Pugwash movement to channel concern over these decisions into a constructive initiative. One option would be for Pugwash to explore in some detail why the UK government (probably in the company of other NATO governments) has come to believe that Russia now poses a much graver threat to NATO than UK governments believed in 2010 and 2015. Such work would open up the possibility of Pugwash trying to contribute to a reduction in NATO/Russian tensions and would complement work to prevent a resumption of the nuclear arms race (see Pugwash Note on Arms Control and Disarmament, January 2021).

It is probably fanciful to imagine that the mutual confidence which characterised relations between Russia and NATO in the years that followed German re-unification can be re-built. But there is room for each side, NATO governments and the Russian government, to clarify the motives behind recent forms of behaviour that the other side has found objectionable, and to draw up mutually acceptable rules of the road for future co-existence.

The current climate of mutual incomprehension, suspicion and fear, of which the UK’s latest strategic review appears to be a product, is pregnant with nuclear risk on both sides of the NATO/Russian border.

Peter Jenkins

Chair, British Pugwash,

9 May 2021

Roadmap to end nuclear sharing

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Report on the Nuke Free Europe webinar

Compiled by Angelika Claussen, IPPNW Deutschland

The first webinar on the “Roadmap to end nuclear sharing” on March 29, 2021, was a real success, with 87 people from all over Europe, and some from other continents, taking part. Our aim was to develop interactive connections and a common strategy for European peace and disarmament activists to approach governments.

Tom Sauer, Professor in International Politics, Universiteit Antwerpen stated at the beginning of his overview that nuclear weapons are illegal under international law since January 22nd. We peace activists now expect the nuclear weapons states to pledge to take nuclear arms elimination under Art. VI NPT seriously. Europe is over-armed with nuclear weapons, there are not only three nuclear weapons states (F, UK and RUS), but it also hosts US nuclear weapons in five countries (B, D, I, NL, Turkey) and 20 European countries are NATO members. As Tom Sauer pointed out, NATO and its dogma of nuclear deterrence policy is the key obstacle for NATO countries in Europe preventing them from signing the TPNW.How can peace activists in NATO countries proceed? Tom Sauer proposes: Tackle NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and increase pressure on the nuclear sharing countries Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. We can do this by arguing that there are five NATO countries that already refuse to allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory: Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Spain. Policies can be changed since the majority of people is opposed to any kind of nuclear deterrence. We can put forward concrete steps to join the TNPW. If all four nuclear sharing countries act together, other countries, like Poland, whose governments currently declare that they want nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, will have difficulty justifying this stance to their population. This will be the beginning of a change in deterrence policy, initiated by civil society.Tom Sauer proposed a mixed policy approach: lobbying, protesting at US military bases and systematic media work. In particular, international protests at military bases in the four nuclear host countries could address either modernisation policies or ask to withdraw the bombs and send them back to the US.

The strategies and action levels presently used in the four nuclear host countries are good, but not enough, when one compares it with the fact that 70–80 % of the public want their governments to sign the TPNW. This message has not yet been delivered to our governments. Joining the TPNW and shifting the NATO paradigm of nuclear deterrence will be the focus of our work.

What are constructive steps that could be taken in the short term? A. Stop the dismissive tone used towards TPNW advocates and make that clear at the upcoming NPT review conference. B. Do not vote against the TPNW in the UN General Assembly in future. C. Take part in the first state meeting of TPNW as an observer next year in Vienna.

The following peace groups work on TPNW in Belgium: Vrede, Pax Christi Flanders and CNAPD in the French speaking part of Belgium. Protests will be held on the September 26th at the US military airbase in Kleine Brogel. Although 77 % of the Belgian public is in favour of joining the TPNW, the Belgian government does not care – yet. However, the Belgian government coalition agreement does not dismiss the TPNW out of hand, rather seeks to find ways to engage with TPNW parties. Only the Greens and Dutch speaking Socialists agree with joining the TPNW.

Peter Buijs, chair NVMP/IPPNW Netherlands, pointed out how medical and humanitarian arguments helped to revitalise the nuclear weapons debate in Dutch politics, brought forward by allies and ourselves separately and united by the civil society coalition “Balieberaad for a nuclear weapon free world”, initiated in 2016 by the NVMP. This meanwhile includes the Dutch Council of Churches, Red Cross, Mayors for Peace, Dutch Humanists, Pugwash, Greenpeace, PAX, IALANA and the NVMP. In 2017 our common pressure resulted in a premiere: after the elections: for the first time a coalition agreement mentioned nuclear weapons: “This government actively pursues a nuclear weapon-free world”, completed by the right wing liberal party VVD (from PM Rutte) by the ‘disclosure’: “... , within the framework of alliance obligations,...”, meaning of course NATO. This regards a centre-right wing government (Rutte-III).

In order to improve this paragraph after the next elections (17-3-2021), NVMP invited the Balieberaad-partners early last summer to draft six urgent recommendations for the election programmes of the political parties. Together we finally issued a statement in July 2020, that said The Netherlands should:

1. further intensify its active pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world;

2. intensify its role as an initiator and bridge-builder in and outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with emphasis on the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states (Art. VI);

3. end nuclear sharing: phase out the remaining Dutch nuclear task, i.e. the (approx. 20) US nuclear B61 bombs at the Dutch airbase Volkel;

4. start discussion within NATO about alternatives to nuclear deterrence;

5. sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW;

6. advance a paradigm shift from spending on weapons to diplomacy and combatting root causes of war like hunger, inequality and climate change

From the 27 political parties running for parliament, nine - mostly on the centre-left side – did incorporate (partly) these recommendations in their political programmes, especially about joining the TPNW and ending nuclear sharing. Two young NVMP-board members developed a Nuclear Weapon Election Compass for the Balieberaad, used intensively on social media.

All these nine parties were elected to parliament, but none have a majority (see Susi Snyder’s: https://nonukes.nl/march-2021-dutch-election-outcomes-and-nuclear-weapons/ ). Again, there were heavy losses on the left, just as in 2017, and the biggest party, the ruling right-wing liberal VVD from PM Rutte, won again. Fortunately, the second strongest party – the winning D66 (centre-left liberal democrats) has for decades a quite positive paragraph on nuclear weapons, including signing the TPNW, and making sure that the new Dutch fighter jets are not capable of dropping nuclear weapons, in their election programme. Together with the Social Democrats, D66 is also the party behind the resolution that got the former Dutch government (Rutte-II) to participate in TPNW negotiations in 2017. But Mark Rutte, the expected new Prime Minister, is in favour of nuclear sharing.

On 13-4-2021, the Balieberaad will convene online to decide how to influence the making of a new government, resulting in a new coalition agreement, that will go beyond the one from 2017, and also beyond the recent Belgium one from 30-9-2020, which will explore “... how the TPNW can stimulate multilateral nuclear disarmament”. Peter’s conclusion: civil society should start a European Appeal to NATO to end its policy of ‘credible nuclear deterrence’, e.g. by gathering signatures from well-known European writers, physicians, scientists, religious leaders, and others, stating that we Europeans don’t want to be defended any longer by weapons that any moment can mean our own destruction and that of the rest of the world.

Lisa Clark, Co-President of IPB and Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, Italy. Lisa agrees with Peter’s idea of creating some sort of a European Russell-Einstein Appeal to put an end to the NATO dogma of nuclear deterrence. No Italian government, either centre-left or centre-right, has ever wanted US nuclear weapons to be removed from Italian soil, although in some cases they paid lip service to “a world without nuclear weapons”. The civil society campaign in favour of removing them started a long time ago, but lobbying gained momentum in 2016, when Italy voted against the convening a conference in 2017 to discuss a ban treaty. Italy has a long tradition of supporting disarmament agreements, but not in this case. The campaign concentrated on education/information on the TPNW, on the ethical and legal issues. Up to now more than 200 cities have approved council resolutions demanding that Italy sign the ban treaty. In many cases, approval was unanimous, proving that the stigma is already having effect – no one dares to speak in favour of nuclear weapons in public. Opinion polls on nuclear weapons in 2019 showed that 70% were in favour of joining the TPNW, in 2020 it was 87 %, showing that the campaign has reached a lot of people.

The coalition has grown: the Bishops of the 7 Catholic dioceses near the USAF base at Aviano endorsed activities celebrating the entry into force of the TPNW on January 22nd. In the province of Brescia, where the Ghedi nuclear base is located, 165 grassroot NGOs also endorsed celebrations for entry into force, alongside 56 local government authorities. Throughout Italy many more cities printed the campaign’s poster, informing their citizens of the entry into force of the TPNW: it was displayed in city hall’s public spaces.

A resolution was passed in parliament in 2017 requiring the government to commission research into the legal consequences of Italy joining the ban treaty. Though this resolution was passed, nothing has ever been done. This year the campaign is pressing for another resolution on this issue, which will also ask for Italy to be present at the first TPNW States Parties meeting in Vienna in January 2022.

Johannes Oehler, ICAN Germany. Johannes Oehler gave an overview of the history of nuclear sharing in Germany since 1958. At that time, the Social Democrats said that nuclear sharing should not be connected to NATO membership.

Büchel airbase today: the current CDU/SPD government decided to renew the airbase and construction is taking place right now in preparation for the new B61-12 nuclear weapons. This is in opposition to the will of the population to end nuclear sharing. We activists should continue to remind that nuclear deterrence is useless.

German groups launched the campaign: “Atombomber, nein danke” (nuclear bomber, no thanks), responding to the fact that the updated B61-12 will need new aircraft to transport these bombs. The campaign contacted many parliamentarians and thus put pressure on government policy. The Social Democrats decided that the decision to buy a new aircraft from the US for nuclear sharing should be postponed until after the German general election in September 2021.

On the future of nuclear sharing in Germany: A study of the scientific board of the German parliament stated that joining the TPNW does not conflict with either NATO or with NPT membership.

On the election on September 26th in Germany: The Social Democrats support participating as an observer at TPNW conference in 2021 or 2022 and urge the nuclear weapons states, US and Russia, to start talks on nuclear disarmament.

The Greens will support signing TPNW but without giving any timeline. In the current draft of their election programme, there is no mention of refusing to buy nuclear aircraft or opposition to the deployment of the updated B61-12 nuclear weapons.

The Left Party is in favour of signing, ratifying the TPNW, and ending nuclear sharing.

Johannes invites everyone to join IPPNW and ICAN’s action days in July 2021 at the Büchell airbase: https://buechel.nuclearban.de/

Susi Snyder, Pax Netherlands. We need support for concrete steps to implementation, for instance the member states of TPNW are obliged under the treaty to call on others to join- this is something they can do in many multilateral forums.

Last year, a letter signed by more than 50 former ministers from our countries called on our governments to join the treaty - https://www.icanw.org/56_former_leaders. A similar type of action could take place again, and if so, it should be brief and focused.

There’s been great success engaging Mayors and municipalities, including with Mayors for Peace. There is an opportunity to go back to these cities, and raise the profile of the motions or resolutions that were passed earlier. Now that the TPNW is in force, we can raise the stakes, for example by going back and asking them to make sure that the city doesn’t do business with nuclear weapon producing companies, that the city pension funds are not invested in companies that are complicit in keeping nuclear weapons around. There’s a city guide for divestment tool kit which might be useful: https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/city-guide/

Prohibited behaviour will be stigmatised since nuclear weapons are illegal. Be loud and proud. It’s not our job to equivocate about the fact that all WMD are prohibited -its those who refuse to make the worse weapons illegal that should be forced to explain the differences.

There is an opportunity with B61-12 modernisation: the old bombs will be sent back to the US to allow the new Boeing tail-kits and other parts to be added, and this is a moment to make sure that the new nuclear bombs cannot return to Europe.

We can also use the annual exercises with nuclear weapons for stigmatisation, for instance the “Snowcat” or “Steadfast Noon” exercises. (17 countries involved). The timing is usually September/ October, which gives us enough time to get former military people from several SNOWCAT countries to publish a joint op-ed in multiple outlets that stigmatise nuclear weapons.

We should continuously use our arguments on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. There is no way that nuclear weapons can be used without causing a humanitarian catastrophe. There is no help if they are used. The Red Cross will not show up, there will be no soup, no blankets, just destruction, suffering which for some will last for decades. There is no arguing this, but still, lots of people don’t know. By keeping focused to this message in our outreach last year, and giving HOPE that the ban treaty offers, we were able to increase support for the Dutch joining the TPNW by more than 15%, to now being over 75%. Here’s a link on the surveys across Europe: https://www.icanw.org/nato_poll_2021.

Removing the roadblocks to peace

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

“The world stands at a crossroads” declares the ‘Call for Action’ for a Nuclear Weapons free Europe. The organisers of the call, the Nuke Free Europe network in which the Russell Foundation participates, have initiated a month of action (see below) focussed on demanding an end to nuclear modernisation and nuclear sharing and for European states to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. These demands are a starting point towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons once and for good.

The demands address three key ‘roadblocks to peace’ in the European context. Each and every nuclear armed state has begun a process of not just updating existing weapons, but are developing a whole new range of nuclear warheads. Billions of Euros are going towards ‘more usable’ nuclear weapons, new machines of death and destruction, at a time when we should all be focussed on remaking society in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic. A new arms race must be stopped.

The fact that US nuclear weapons have a home in Europe under nuclear sharing agreements is another roadblock. The presence of such weapons in Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands makes each country a potential target. The presence of such weapons indicates that the US views Europe as a potential nuclear battleground. They must be removed.

The refusal of the vast majority of European states to engage with the TPNW and the hostile posture assumed by some states indicates another major roadblock: a refusal to take stated commitments (through the NPT, for example) to nuclear disarmament seriously. The peace movements in Europe must organise to put the question near to the top of the political agenda.

The UK’s announcements on nuclear warheads and nuclear use indicate some of the challenges we face, but also indicate that such decisions can be challenged. The UK is in breach of the NPT and must be held to account.

The final roadblock addressed in this issue of END Info relates to the plight of the Palestinian people. The status of Israel as a nuclear-armed state and the double-standards in relation to this status indicates two things: that the Palestinian people face an occupier with military capacities beyond any other state in the region and that the failure of the international community to bring Israel into the NPT or effectively challenge serial breaches of international law in other respects means that a drastic shift in approach is required.

To give context to Israel’s bomb, we reprint Ken Coates’ detailed account of how it was developed and its impact on the region.

Hold UK to account on nuclear warheads

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

In response to the UK Government’s ‘Integrated Review’, Lord McDonald of Salford – former chief civil servant in the Foreign Office – commented as follows:

“raising the cap on our stockpile of nuclear warheads looks odd. I understand that a continuous at-sea deterrent needs us to be able to deploy two boats from time to time. The new ceiling allows both boats to be fully armed. But that does not increase deterrence. It is expensive and incompatible with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In 1968, the non-nuclear weapon states accepted that as their permanent status in exchange for two things: the sharing of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, and that nuclear weapon states would work towards nuclear disarmament. The Government assert that the objective is untouched, but the announcement is a step away from its achievement.”

For a former senior civil servant in the Foreign Office to so bluntly question the decisions contained in the Integrated Review is quite something. If such a person considers the announcements to be “incompatible” with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then everyone concerned should stop and think. It is likely the case that similar concerns were raised by those still serving in the highest positions but, of course, their advice remains largely hidden from public view. Voices of restraint and concern seem to have been ignored. As Machiavelli noted: “A prince who is not wise cannot be well advised.” Such a ‘prince’ sits in Number 10 Downing Street.

The peace movements do not need to infer breach of the NPT from the comments of an English Lord or by use of their own good sense. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done a significant service to the movement by securing a legal opinion on the matter. The opinion, titled Legality Under International Law of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Policy as set out in the 2021 Integrated Review, is clear that the British government is in breach of the NPT: it has broken international law.

The detailed opinion was drafted by Professor Christine Chinkin and Dr Louise Arimatsu, both international lawyers based at the London School of Economics. The full opinion can be read on CND’s website (www.cnduk.org) but it is worth quoting the conclusions of the report fully:

In our opinion, for the reasons set out above:

(i) The announcement by the UK government of the increase in nuclear warheads and its modernisation of its weapons system constitutes a breach of the NPT article VI;

(ii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state party to the NPT solely on the basis of a material breach of the latter’s non-proliferation obligations;

(iii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in self-defence solely on the grounds that the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities or emerging technologies, could have comparable impact to nuclear weapons.

The conclusion is clear. What next? Is there a court anywhere on the planet that might take up the case and hold the UK to account? It looks unlikely and even if such a court existed, would the British government take any notice?

As with many questions of international legality or illegality, the fundamental issues are in essence political issues. As such, political responses are required. The fact that the British government is in breach of international law should spark a widespread response, including from the overwhelming majority of states which are party to the NPT. As a priority, the peace movements and organisations in Europe should report the UK to the United Nations for being in breach of the NPT. Individuals can and should do the same. Efforts can be made to get parliamentarians either individually or collectively to report the breach. Importantly, the ongoing work of CND in this respect should be followed carefully and supported fully.

What of the NPT itself? What does the UK’s action and the legal opinion imply? The next NPT Review Conference will take place “no later than August 2021”, according to the UN’s website. This conference presents an opportunity for state parties alarmed by the UK’s announcements to make a clear intervention. If such interventions are not forthcoming, then the peace movements can use the opportunity to raise the issues on their own account.

According to UN Secretary-General António Guterres:

“The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally-binding obligations on disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime...”

If this is the case, then now seems to be the time to re-assert the “essential” character of the NPT and to finally begin the political work that has not been forthcoming in the previous 53 years of the NPT’s history. As a first step, this means working towards nuclear disarmament in line with the TPNW and halting all nuclear modernisation.

TPNW deflates nuclear sharing

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 23 available here

“Umbrella” vs. “Sharing”

NATO was founded in 1949 with the claim that a US ‘nuclear umbrella’ would protect non-nuclear member states. In 2018, the British government affirmed that its nuclear Trident SSBN missiles are part of “the defense of our NATO allies”1. The French government, meanwhile, never made such explicit claims about using its nuclear ‘Force de Frappe’ for non-French interests.

Besides this ‘umbrella’ situation, five out of the 27 non-nuclear NATO member states (Turkey, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) have taken part in US nuclear sharing2, since the 1960s: US nuclear free-fall bombs are stored in these countries. In the event of war, fighter-bomber planes and aircrews from these countries are supposed to drop US nuclear bombs on selected targets. As the NATO commander-in-chief is always a US general, European aircrews in the nuclear sharing system function as de facto foreign legionnaires of the USA.

The operational radii of the fighter-bomber aircraft are about 1,000 km, thus (except Turkey) the ‘sharing’ targets are necessarily in European region. Given NATO’s overall posture in Europe, Russia is presumably the main target.

In this precision guided missile era the dropping free-fall nuclear bombs from decades-old manned aircraft is dangerous for the air crew. In order to drop the bomb the aircraft has to take a flight path over its target. What chance does a German nuclear fighter-bomber Tornado – a 50 year old ‘veteran’ – have to penetrate modern air defence systems?

Differing risks for NATO members

Nuclear sharing illustrates different levels of risk among the NATO states: 22 non-nuclear NATO member states are allegedly “protected” passively by the US “nuclear umbrella”. For the 5 “sharing” states this “umbrella” has holes, as they – and only they – are commanded to become accomplice to actions which otherwise would legally burden the USA alone, who are the owner state of the nuclear weapons. The US nuclear airbases in the “sharing” states obviously present high-ranking targets for any US adversary. In none of the five NATO states was nuclear sharing ever put to a public vote3. France, Czech Republic, Denmark and Iceland do not allow US bases in their territory. Iceland doesn’t even have a military. Thus even neighbouring NATO states carry widely differing risks.

“Sharing” dependent on personal decision

The functionality of nuclear sharing has a peculiarity: It doesn’t depend on government or military decisions. Instead it is up to the will of individuals, in this case air force personnel being citizens of the ‘sharing’ states. In the decision of such air force personnel to obey or refuse a nuclear command the following should be considered:

(a) the consequences of personal insubordination,

(b) the consequences of being accused as a war criminal at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (Netherlands) and

(c) personal, moral and related aspects.

Insubordination

If air force personnel refuse the command to deploy nuclear bombs, they might have a setback in their professional career, but nothing more. European ‘sharing’ states no longer shoot ‘disobedient soldiers’, as historic predecessors regularly did. This liberalization removed an ancient principle of the military: The soldier follows blindly the commands from the political leadership, they are not to ask questions. The ‘sharing’ air force personnel are citizens of democracies. They will have experienced the fact that democratic governments can fail and even lie to the public regarding the ‘justifications’ for war. The most prominent example was the 2003 US/UK Iraq invasion, as has been shown by the 2016 Chilcot Report to the British government.

Each member of a ‘sharing’ fighter-bomber crew has the personal obligation to respect the international law of warfare. To refuse a command which, according to the available information, appears illegal is no insubordination contrary to discipline but a citizen’s obligation. If the air force personnel happens to be a German citizen, they are expressly obliged to obey international law by the constitutional ‘Basic Law’.

Air force personnel as professional soldiers are trained and familiar with the international law of warfare, including awareness of its rapid development concerning nuclear weapons in the recent decades. This culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has been in force since January 2021 for the – till present – 54 states which ratified it. It is backed by the consent of 122 of the 193 UN member states. Major European states which have ratified the TPNW are Austria and Ireland. The Treaty has finally internationally stigmatised nuclear weapons in line with chemical and biological weapons. Thus the question “Is a threat or use of a nuclear weapon legal?” is no longer pending, as nuclear weapon states and their entourage kept claiming over decades, but it is answered for good by a general and unconditional “No”.

So theoretically, each crew member has to make a personal decision as to whether a given command to drop a nuclear bomb on a specific target is legal. For the details of this see the work of Robert Forsyth, former Commanding Officer of a British Polaris nuclear ballistic missile submarine, who points out1: the legal situation demands for the soldier (a) to know the identity of the target (which the Polaris crew didn’t) and (b) to assess the damage to be expected at this target from the bomb drop under the given conditions, particularly with regard to civilian collateral damage. For targets in inhabited areas the result is clear: such attacks are illegal.

Concerning nuclear weapons, a German Bundeswehr airman or airwoman is in a legally clear situation: According to the MoD service instructions of 2006, it is forbidden for her or him to use anti-personnel mines, nuclear weapons, bacteriological weapons and chemical weapons5. So he or she doesn’t have the choice but the obligation to refuse a command to drop a nuclear weapon, regardless what the government does.

Accusation of war crime

The Rome statute of 1998, the basis of the International Criminal Court, contains a clear definition of which actions are treated by the court as war crimes. It refers explicitly or implicitly to long existing international law like:

- the Hague Convention of 1907 (prohibiting firing into dwelling quarters),

- the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 (declaring that a command doesn’t free the soldier from his or her obligation to check if this command may be illegal, if he or she had the personal choice to refuse an illegal command),

- the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 with their Protocol Additional I of 1977 (prohibiting attacks which cannot discriminate between combatants and civilians) and

- the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 1996 (declaring both the threat and the use of any nuclear weapon to be illegal).

The US law professor Richard Falk4 adds that the unwritten nuclear taboo (never to use nuclear weapons) has been in effect for more than seven decades and therefore is evidence that it is a customary legal norm.

Since 2002 the ICC searches, prosecutes, judges and punishes war criminals. Following the Rome statute and seeing the effects of nuclear weapons, the use of a nuclear weapon in an inhabited area is unavoidably a war crime, regardless of weapon yield and air or ground burst. In other words: No scenario is known where use of a nuclear explosion in an inhabited area could be legal.

The ‘sharing’ air force personnel who pressed the nuclear button and survived the mission flight despite air defence finally will stand alone in front of the ICC. Except for the US and Turkey, all NATO states are members of the Rome statute. Thus the US denies the responsibility of the ICC for actions of their military personnel which might be assessed as war crimes according to the Rome statute definition. This may be formally right, but is it acceptable for NATO’s supreme command? In the case of nuclear sharing the US will – perhaps rightfully – argue that the ‘sharing’ air force personnel were not their citizens so the US are not involved. NATO will – perhaps rightfully too – refuse any responsibility for nuclear sharing and will point to the national government of the personnel concerned. However, this government will not be able to protect its personnel from the ICC procedures. In case of a ‘sharing’ nuclear explosion the responsible government officials (MPs, MoD and air force command chain) will to be accused at the ICC too, comparable to the Nazi offenders at the Nuremberg tribunal from 1945.

Before the TPNW came into force the ‘sharing’ air force personnel could claim for her or his defence that they trusted, in good faith, the legality of the actions and commands of their government to which they may have sworn an oath of loyality. With the TPNW in force it is no longer a debatable political opinion but an undisputable fact, regardless of whether a particular government has signed the treaty or not: The military strategies of the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are based on the preparedness to commit monstrous war crimes.

Personal aspects

If the air force personnel has family she or he might think about their children at home who will ask one day what they had done in the war. Shall they tell them: “I pressed the button and killed some ten or even hundred thousand people. For a similar number of surviving people I made their future life hell. These people had never harmed our country. I made their country uninhabitable for generations. This crime carries my name. I could have refused the command but I obeyed”?

The airman or airwomen knows that ‘the system’ or ‘the politicians’ do not press the nuclear button, but they themselves according to their free will. They also might think about how for the rest of their life they will be chased in their dreams by the nightmare scenes on the target ground, either learnt from media reports or from their own imagination. They wouldn’t only ruin the lives of the victims. They would ruin their own and their family’s lives too.

And even if they somehow escaped punishment by the ICC: their name as a crew member responsible for the nuclear bombing will be in the history files. Therefore they might expect personal revenge by a secret service of the victim state or even privately by survivors who will trace and find them. Similar has happened: In 2002 a midair collision of two airliners occurred over Southern Germany, killing 71 people including 49 children. In 2010 the father of a victims family met the responsible ground based air traffic controller who had ‘mis-performed’ and stabbed him to death.

Nuclear sharing in retreat

NATO claims that the TPNW is irrelevant because the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are not members. This is formally correct. But since the TPNW, according to the will of the majority of the UN states, stigmatises nuclear weapons like chemical and biological weapons, there is no longer space for claims that there are conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons might be legal.

A side problem for NATO is that non-NATO countries consider the US nuclear sharing a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and an illegal nuclear proliferation: After take-off the non-US national air crew has the power of disposal over a nuclear weapon. Exactly this is prohibited by the NPT. For instance the crew could decide to desert and emergency-land with the nuclear weapon on enemy ground.

To further illustrate the problem, one may think about a fictional nuclear sharing, legally a copy of NATO’s action: Saudi-Arabian or Iranian aircraft carry nuclear bombs shared by Pakistan as the owner state.

NATO member state governments keep claiming that the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ is ambiguous for the extreme case that nuclear weapon use is the “Last Resort” to save the very existence of a state, and therefore it could be legal (on this question the ICJ judges voted 7:7 undecided). Whatever this could mean for a nuclear weapon state, such a “Last Resort” scenario can only be valid for the nuclear weapon state itself, not for any third parties like its allies, thus not for the five European states involved in nuclear sharing.

Will there be at any time any Turkish, Italian, German, Belgian or Dutch air force personnel of clear mind and morality prepared to obey a command to drop a nuclear bomb on any target in Europe? How will the air forces of the five European nuclear sharing states under the TPNW – regardless if signed by them – recruit their nuclear bomber crews? What will be the result of an open public discussion on this question? It looks like the TPNW indeed has deflated US nuclear sharing.

Steadfast Noon

An open question will probably remain as to whether the participation of air force personnel of the “sharing” states in the yearly NATO maneuver ‘Steadfast Noon’ is legal. With or without nuclear bomb mockups, nuclear missions are practiced in this maneuver. Is it a threat against Russia and her ‘allies’? According to the ICJ 1996 Advisory Opinion it is. The ‘sharing’ governments may claim it isn’t. By principle a valid statement could be obtained from the ICC following an accusation from a state which might see itself as threatened, as a member of the Russian-led “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO): Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. But these states are not members of the Rome statute, with the exception of Tajikistan. This country, however, is located more than 2,000 km from the nearest NATO area (eastern Turkey), so technically it is out of range of US ‘nuclear sharing’.

Notes:

1 Robert Forsyth, Why Trident?, Nottingham 2020: Spokesman, ISBN 978-0-8512-4890-5.

2 Nuclear Sharing: the facts, END Info Issue 22, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/ENDINFO22.pdf

3 Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Hogsta, Changing Europe’s Calculations - Treaty on the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, The Spokesman No. 147, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, ISBN 978-0-8512-4895-0.

4 Richard Falk, Challenging Nuclearism, The Spokesman No. 147, see above.

5 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung R II 3, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03 Humanitäres

Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, August 2006, DSK SF009320187,

www.bits.de/public/documents/taschenkarte03-2006.pdf

Remembering and shaping the future: for a policy of common security

by Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

From END Info 23 available here

More and more people have the feeling that we are living in a time of escalating confrontation and even the possibility of a great war again presents itself. Uncertainty shapes our daily life more and more. The statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that their ‘Doomsday Clock’ remains at ‘100 seconds to Midnight’, is a concise expression of these dangers threatening us all, especially - in the long term - the climate disaster, and directly the 14,000 nuclear weapons on earth.

Is there an alternative that a social and political majority - nationally and internationally – will support? An alternative that helps to ensure survival and ensure a better life? A strategy that combines historical experiences with answers to current challenges? As Willy Brandt, among others, put it: “Peace is not everything, but everything is nothing without peace”!

The political alternative is a policy of “common security” – a policy that is conservative and revolutionary at the same time. Conservative because it does not aim to change the social systems and political orders of the individual countries; it accepts socialism and capitalism, or whatever the rulers characterize their system. It recognizes the variants of an authoritarian, liberal and welfare state-regulated capitalism as well as a democratic or authoritarian constitution of non-capitalist states as systems that exist and which can only be legitimately changed only from within. In this way, it creates the prerequisites for peaceful competition between these systems in the first place.

It is revolutionary because it excludes war as the continuation of ‘politics by other means’, because it no longer allows this murderous method of ‘conflict resolution’, which has cost hundreds of millions of deaths over millennia and has raised the question of the very existence of humanity for more than 60 years. In other words, it raises humanity and the planet to a new level of coexistence based on elementary humanism.

The policy of common security can bring us closer to one of the great aims of humanity: a world without war!

Almost 40 years ago, common security was formulated as a concept in Olaf Palme’s report Common Security a Blueprint for Survival, written by an international group of experts. Next year it is to be updated with the participation of the International Peace Bureau and International TUC.

What are the basic principles of this still current concept?

- In the atomic age, security cannot be created by an individual state or in opposition to other states, but only together and in partnership

- War is no longer a political tool in the atomic age; all conflicts and controversies must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation. Violent changes of borders, the appropriation of territory are excluded and state sovereignty and supranational unions remain untouched.

- Cooperation is the basis for peaceful coexistence, this must develop in steps and includes the development of trust. Cooperation encompasses all levels: economy, ecology, science, culture, sport. Consultations at all levels and joint crisis responses are part of this.

- Human rights are respected and their realization is repeatedly urged in negotiations and discussions - from all sides and in relation to all human rights: civic and social. However, human rights are not a fighting instrument in interstate disputes in order to label the other as “bad guys”.

- Armaments limitation and disarmament are indispensable. This always includes small first steps to demilitarization, equalization of troops and other confidence-building measures such as contacts between the military. Openness and verifiability of measures are essential. In the long term, exclusive military alliances like NATO should either be demilitarized into existing inclusive networks and completely redesigned (like the OSCE in Europe) or dissolved.

If the policy of common security was originally a Euro-Atlantic concept, it is now a global one and precisely for this reason it must be regionalized more intensively.

Very specific concepts are necessary for common security strategies for different regions of the world, not only for Europe.

The détente policy of the 21st century is unthinkable - this is also a further development compared to approaches from the 70s and 80s of the last century - without the peace movement as one of the large, cross-border social movements and without an international civil society. They are the engine for a new policy of détente, drive these developments forward and secure them against crises through comprehensive diplomacy from below.

The basic idea of the Palme Report is very simple: My safety is only guaranteed if the safety of my counterpart is also guaranteed. There is only security if it is reciprocal.

Disarmament - also a lesson from the 1970s and 1980s - is the indispensable “materialization” of détente policy. That is why disarmament is absolutely crucial. It could be decisively advanced through unilateral calculated steps, especially by those in the stronger position. In the northern hemisphere, that's NATO.