Remembering and shaping the future: for a policy of common security

by Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

From END Info 23 available here

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More and more people have the feeling that we are living in a time of escalating confrontation and even the possibility of a great war again presents itself. Uncertainty shapes our daily life more and more. The statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that their ‘Doomsday Clock’ remains at ‘100 seconds to Midnight’, is a concise expression of these dangers threatening us all, especially - in the long term - the climate disaster, and directly the 14,000 nuclear weapons on earth.

Is there an alternative that a social and political majority - nationally and internationally – will support? An alternative that helps to ensure survival and ensure a better life? A strategy that combines historical experiences with answers to current challenges? As Willy Brandt, among others, put it: “Peace is not everything, but everything is nothing without peace”!

The political alternative is a policy of “common security” – a policy that is conservative and revolutionary at the same time. Conservative because it does not aim to change the social systems and political orders of the individual countries; it accepts socialism and capitalism, or whatever the rulers characterize their system. It recognizes the variants of an authoritarian, liberal and welfare state-regulated capitalism as well as a democratic or authoritarian constitution of non-capitalist states as systems that exist and which can only be legitimately changed only from within. In this way, it creates the prerequisites for peaceful competition between these systems in the first place.

It is revolutionary because it excludes war as the continuation of ‘politics by other means’, because it no longer allows this murderous method of ‘conflict resolution’, which has cost hundreds of millions of deaths over millennia and has raised the question of the very existence of humanity for more than 60 years. In other words, it raises humanity and the planet to a new level of coexistence based on elementary humanism.

The policy of common security can bring us closer to one of the great aims of humanity: a world without war!

Almost 40 years ago, common security was formulated as a concept in Olaf Palme’s report Common Security a Blueprint for Survival, written by an international group of experts. Next year it is to be updated with the participation of the International Peace Bureau and International TUC.

What are the basic principles of this still current concept?

- In the atomic age, security cannot be created by an individual state or in opposition to other states, but only together and in partnership

- War is no longer a political tool in the atomic age; all conflicts and controversies must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation. Violent changes of borders, the appropriation of territory are excluded and state sovereignty and supranational unions remain untouched.

- Cooperation is the basis for peaceful coexistence, this must develop in steps and includes the development of trust. Cooperation encompasses all levels: economy, ecology, science, culture, sport. Consultations at all levels and joint crisis responses are part of this.

- Human rights are respected and their realization is repeatedly urged in negotiations and discussions - from all sides and in relation to all human rights: civic and social. However, human rights are not a fighting instrument in interstate disputes in order to label the other as “bad guys”.

- Armaments limitation and disarmament are indispensable. This always includes small first steps to demilitarization, equalization of troops and other confidence-building measures such as contacts between the military. Openness and verifiability of measures are essential. In the long term, exclusive military alliances like NATO should either be demilitarized into existing inclusive networks and completely redesigned (like the OSCE in Europe) or dissolved.

If the policy of common security was originally a Euro-Atlantic concept, it is now a global one and precisely for this reason it must be regionalized more intensively.

Very specific concepts are necessary for common security strategies for different regions of the world, not only for Europe.

The détente policy of the 21st century is unthinkable - this is also a further development compared to approaches from the 70s and 80s of the last century - without the peace movement as one of the large, cross-border social movements and without an international civil society. They are the engine for a new policy of détente, drive these developments forward and secure them against crises through comprehensive diplomacy from below.

The basic idea of the Palme Report is very simple: My safety is only guaranteed if the safety of my counterpart is also guaranteed. There is only security if it is reciprocal.

Disarmament - also a lesson from the 1970s and 1980s - is the indispensable “materialization” of détente policy. That is why disarmament is absolutely crucial. It could be decisively advanced through unilateral calculated steps, especially by those in the stronger position. In the northern hemisphere, that's NATO.

From an economy of war to an economy of peace

by Olof Palme

From END Info 23 available here

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Speaking to the Socialist International in Helsinki in 1978, Olof Palme made a passionate speech for disarmament which was re-published in European Nuclear Disarmament, Bulletin of Work in Progress, No 1, 1980. Decades on, Palme’s speech is worth considered attention as both a historical record and as a message from the past for future generations.

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At our Geneva Conference in 1976 we stressed that “the chief object of international socialism is to substitute cooperation amongst peoples for confrontation between states.” The Socialist International recognized “the purpose of detente has been achieved and maintained through the effective participation of two super-powers” but that we “nevertheless refuse to acknowledge partition of the world between two immovable and opposing blocs that produce tension and run the risk of dangerous confrontation as a permanent fact of international relations. In the existing situation, lasting security for the world cannot be achieved merely through equilibrium between the power-blocs on the basis of shared spheres of influence. Nor can it be brought about by a balance negotiated between the super-powers alone.”

We considered that “the extension of detente must lead to greater co-operation between the nations, thus progressively reducing the sources of conflict and grounds for intervention in the great powers in fields that encroach upon the sovereignty and independence of States.”

Two trends in world politics are gradually eroding our prospects for a future of peace and justice. If unchecked, they could have disastrous consequences for [humankind] already within the next decades. One is the widening gap between rich and poor nations. The other is the arms race and the climate of confrontation and apprehension it engenders.

That rich nations grow richer while poor nations become poorer is intolerable from the point of view of solidarity and justice. But it is also intolerable because of the dangers inherent in such a situation of conflicts between the poor and rich, between north and south. The widening gap between rich and poor nations will inevitably lead to increased tensions between states and ultimately become a threat to world peace.

The arms race has now reached such levels that it is getting out of control. Intellectually one can perhaps afford the argument that there is no direct evidence of the relationship between armaments and the risks of war. In the nuclear age, complacency based on such a hypothesis becomes too risky a proposition. If the nuclear arms race continues unabated it might well become what Herbert York has called a “race to oblivion".

At the root of this gigantic arms race is the mutual distrust which has prevailed for quite a long time and which prevails between both superpowers and the nations committed to each. The policy of detente has partly dispelled this suspiciousness. When in this respect we speak of detente, it important to keep in mind that we are talking about relations between nations with vastly different social systems. Distrust among these nations can be further decreased or dispelled mainly in one way: through a dialogue, by broadening contacts, by cooperation in all possible areas. The greatest possible reciprocal openness is the only means we have at our disposal.

The conference for security and cooperation in Europe has laid an important foundation for continued efforts in this respect. Today there is a well-oiled apparatus for conferences and consultations. This should provide an incentive for all the parties of the International to go on working in this field. One of the parties of the Socialist International - the SPD - has, through its foreign policy, laid some of the most important cornerstones for a policy of detente. This entails an obligation, not only for the SPD, but for all of us who are affected by European security.

If we have a strength in this regard, it is in our ideas. We feel this strength. Only those who are weak and uncertain are reluctant to engage in discussion with those who have different views and ideas. A multitude of contacts among the various nations and peoples of Europe should be the next stage in the policy of detente. The dialogue should be elaborated into a many-facetted chorus. In this way, information and opinions can be exchanged and ideas tested against one another. This could lead to a further lessening of distrust. In the wake of this phasing out of distrust there is going to flow mutual confidence that national security can be created and maintained in ways far less financially detrimental and eternally deadly than the methods which prevail today in the military systems of all countries. We have to widen the concept of national security. A broad offensive to inject new life into all the elements of the policy of detente is thus the first point I would like to designate as basic to the disarmament efforts of the future.

My second point concerns the question of whether the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race and the related strategic weapons systems in general, are relevant, if the objective is to safe-guard national security. Alva Myrdal has maintained the theory, in her comprehensive work on disarmament, that the arms race is really just a consequence of a gigantic miscalculation. Developments in recent years have obviously confirmed this theory. The military expenditures in the world were estimated in 1977 to have amounted to close to 400 billion dollars. This means more than a billion dollars each day. These enormous expenditures stand in no kind of proportion to the increased security which they are intended to buy. In point of fact, they increase the threat to people’s security in all countries. The arms race is also intolerable because it represents a tremendous waste of human, material and technological resources for destructive instead of constructive purposes ...

But even if today we are facing a quantitative arms race of tremendous proportions, perhaps the qualitative arming is even more perilous. It seems there is no limit at all to what military research and development can cost. New weapons see the light of day, not because they are needed in any sense of the word, but because it is possible to develop and produce them. And if there is no strategy for their employment, then such a strategy is invented ...

Nuclear disarmament remains the most important objective. It is obvious that the two major nuclear weapons states, the Soviet Union and the United States, will have to take the lead in this disarmament process. That the powers have been able to achieve agreement on limitations of their nuclear arsenals must be regarded as an important victory for statesmanship and rationality. On the other hand, they have not been able to agree on any genuine measures of disarmament, and they have not been able to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty, long overdue. They have given solemn pledges to the world community to reach real results in their talks in nuclear disarmament. Impatience in the world community is growing, not least in view of the fact that other nations have been queuing up to acquire nuclear weapons and the chimerical status and security that go with these weapons.

As my third point, I would like to take up a special aspect of the nuclear arms race. The vast nuclear weapons arsenals on the European Continent pose a threat not only to their possessors and the countries allied with them. They pose a threat, as well, to all the peoples of Europe. All the ideas and every initiative which can remove or decrease these threats are to be welcomed. A former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén, once presented the thought to the United Nations of a nuclear-free club some 15 years ago. This thought has continually been revised in various forms ever since, in international discussions.

In Europe there are no immediate or acute threats of conflicts of a military nature. But the disagreements between the great power blocs still cast their shadows across Europe. No tangible progress in the disarmament talks has been achieved during recent years. This is disturbing.

Thus Europe is no special zone where peace can be taken for granted. In actual fact, it is the centre of the arms race. Granted, the general assumption seems to be that any potential military conflict between the superpowers is going to start someplace other than in Europe. But even if that were to be the case, we would have to count on one or the other party - in an effort to gain supremacy - trying to open a front in our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal has recently pointed out, a war can simply be transported here, even though actual causes for war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre of war. Here there have been great military forces for a long time. Here there are programmed weapons all ready for action …

Today more than ever there is, in my opinion, every reason to go on working for a nuclear-free zone. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be a nuclear-free Europe. The geographical area closest at hand would naturally be Northern and Central Europe. If these areas could be freed from the nuclear weapons stationed there today, the risk of total annihilation in case of a military conflict would be reduced.

This would make it possible to fully exploit the international agencies to prevent, postpone and ameliorate the effects of a conflict. It would improve the possibility to prevent a nuclear war being started by mistake.

Here I would like, as a fourth point, to remind you of the negotiations which have been going on since 1973 in the Austrian capital on arms limitations in Europe. The risk that a conflict will be transmitted to our continent would be reduced if the weapons arsenals of Europe could be radically reduced. During the five years that these talks have been going in Vienna, however, no positive results have been achieved, so far. Instead, the negotiations seem to have more nearly been paralyzed. There has been no lack of concrete proposals but the paralysis is of political nature ...

This brings me to my fifth point. I firmly believe that it is imperative to start a process of disarmament for development, a process of redeploying the resources spent on armaments to civilian purposes. Two trends which threaten peace - the arms race and the growing disparities between rich and poor in the world - could be transformed into one process that would enhance the possibilities of peace.

The human, material, technological and financial resources spent on armaments constitute on immense potential reserve for development purposes, for a new international economic order.

The changes in the flow of resources which we are working to achieve - away from military expenditures over to constructive appropriations for development - present a challenge to our common sense and an incentive for radical initiatives in all countries. It is essential to talk over the various kinds of adjustment problems which can arise in the industrialized countries as well, when resources for research and development and for production are switched over from military to civilian ends. The structure of the arms industry should be investigated and an alternative use of military-industrial technology for civilian purposes promoted, in an effort to contribute toward a continued economic development which can be used to satisfy social needs. Studies of the economic and other consequences of such a changeover can facilitate disarmament talks …

Both at the international and national level we have to make the general public aware of the magnitude of the resources that are now devoted to armaments and the tremendous potential for development these resources represent.

Trade unions can play an important role in a process of disarmament. One of the greatest obstacles is the widespread misconception that disarmament. will lead to unemployment and a lower standard of living. I would like to stress here that the labour unions have a decisive role in working out plans for change in the employment structure and to make such a change acceptable to their members.

My emphasis on the need to inform and mobilize public opinion derives from my faith in the principles of democracy and in the sound judgment and reason of ordinary people. I believe that the vital issues of our time can be grasped by anybody who is in the possession of the basic facts. People need not be defenceless victims of technological progress. And I believe in particular that public opinion will react very strongly once it has been made aware of the contrast between the needs of the poor and the waste of resources represented by the arms race.

A strong and informed public opinion is also necessary in order to turn the tide. It is essential to underpin and strengthen political will in the effort to initiate the process of disarmament and development. It is now time to switch over from a world economy based on the threat of war to one dedicated to peaceful social construction and social needs, - in a word, from an economy of war to an economy of peace.

To establish peace in today's world is first and foremost a question of creating a just social order for all the world’s people. The responsibility for failing to economize the world’s resources lie with the rich countries who spend colossal resources on military weapons. It is these countries who must create an economy of peace. The change has to begin there. The change has to begin now.

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The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has an extensive archive of materials from the END initiatives of the 1980s. Get in touch to find out more.

Persistent objectors

by Tom Unterrainer

From END Info 23 available here

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END Info 22 (Feb 2021) reported on a recent report from Chatham House, ‘NATO and the TPNW’ (page 5). This report is, available online, is worth closer examination in one particular regard: the matter of ‘persistent objectors’. The report states as follows:

While it is a general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states, it is also an accepted principle that a rule set forth in a treaty could, under certain conditions, become binding on a third state as a customary rule ... However, this is not an automatic process. Two distinct concepts are relevant here: the concept of so-called ‘specially affected states’, and that of ‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ has explained, a lack of consent from specially affected states may have the effect of preventing the required general state practice from emerging, preventing the rule from coming into being in the first place. There is a strong argument that states with nuclear weapons and those in a nuclear alliance would be specially affected by a proposed ban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence - so-called persistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

What does all this mean and what does it explain? It seems that the hope that the TPNW will create a decisive ‘normative shift’ in international law with respect to nuclear weapons is in question. What Steven Hill1 points out in his Chatham House report is that if a state or alliance of states persistently raise their objections to a treaty, then they can - in the terms set out in international law - prevent such a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ or binding on states which have not signed up to the treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ in those states which have ratified the treaty, ‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a more general application of the treaty provisions.2

How to address this potential barrier? How to react to the ongoing insistence of the nuclear-powers that their possession of instruments of mass murder is in any way legitimate?

An important step is to understand that the TPNW will not steadily accrue widespread legal status through the ongoing workings and mechanisms of international law. The ‘persistent objections’ of the US, UK, NATO and whoever else must be met with organisation and mobilisation of great legions of persistent objectors on the streets, in the conference rooms, inside political parties and social movement organisations. We must continue to find creative and imaginative means to apply the concrete lessons of the TPNW, to mount sharp arguments against ‘nuclearism’, to sound the alarm about the manifold dangers presented by such weapons and the geopolitical strategies of their possessors.

There is much work to do.

Notes:

1 Hill, Steven (2021) ‘Nato and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Chatham House, London accessed at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

2 See Falk, Richard (2021) ‘Challenging Nuclearism’ in The Spokesman 147: Challenging Nuclearism, Spokesman, Nottingham for an extended discussion on this a related point

Call for action: For a nuclear weapon free Europe

The world stands at a crossroads. It is time for Europe to make strategic choices in facing existential threats. For two consecutive years, the Bulletin for Atomic Scientist have placed the Doomsday Clock at 100 seconds to midnight. Never has this symbolic clock been closer to a possible nuclear and climate nightmare. Nuclear weapon states are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. The US wants to deploy new B61-12 nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

From END Info 23 available here

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The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that we must work together to overcome the two existential threats of the 21st century: nuclear war and global warming. Increased military expenditure reduces investment in social infrastructure, while extensive military exercises and operations create major carbon emissions, driving us closer to extinction in more ways than one.

For years the people of Europe have expressed their desire to be nuclear-weapon-free by calling for the removal of US nuclear weapons. Now they are pushing for their governments to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). According to recent online surveys in 6 countries, between 77% and 89% of the population want their countries to join the TPNW.

We must work together in the light of an understanding that all lives on the planet are interwoven, rethink what we mean by protection, redefine ideas of defence and develop towards a ‘common security’. A nuclear weapon free Europe would be the most important step in the transition to a civil and shared security, abandoning the road of continuous militarisation.

We call on all citizens to organize against our possible extinction and to fight for a just, green and peaceful Europe, free of nuclear weapons, with security for all provided through other means. The situation is urgent. As the risks of nuclear confrontation spread from Europe, through Russia, the Middle East, China and the Korean peninsula, Europe must take a stand.

We appeal to everyone in Europe to act and to take part in a European month of action - September 2021. We ask social organisations, trade unions, environmental, youth and woman’s movements, north-south and political organizations, people of all faiths and persuasions to join, endorse, promote and support the appeal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.

We call on European governments to:

- stop spending valuable resources on new nuclear weapons and their deployment

- end nuclear sharing

- sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

10 reasons why increasing the number of warheads is wrong

by Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

From END Info 23 available here

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1. The UK is one of three official Depositaries for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to administrative duties, UK is required to set high standards of conformity. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development & Foreign Policy appears to be in breach of the letter of the NPT and definitely in breach of the spirit.

2. One 100kt Trident warhead is sufficient to physically destroy hundreds of thousands of people along with the infrastructure of a small State. It would also inflict generations of radiation effects on all its neighbours. The previous limit of 180 warheads was sufficient to kill millions of people and cause such devastation as would lead to a nuclear winter and extinction of multiple lifeforms. An additional 80 achieves no more than doubling up on this and ensuring any surviving life forms are extinguished

3. It may be that the Government envisages using low yield (5 - 10kt) warheads against chemical and biological threats - even from NPT signatories. While these may be slightly less than Hiroshima’s blast and radiation effects – still being experienced 75 years later – their use could well trigger a nuclear exchange between third parties whose effects would be totally disproportionate to the reason for using them and replicate delivery of several 100kt warheads.

4. The threat of use of nuclear weapons in the past has not prevented non-nuclear warfare e.g. Korea and Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that it would deter cyber or chemical/biological attacks or any other form of non-nuclear warfare.

5. The increase in warheads undermines the UK commitment to Article VI of the NPT and so significantly weakens the Treaty, i.e. ‘The haves can have more with impunity but not you’ is not a good message.

6. The implication that UK may use nuclear weapons to counter non-nuclear attacks may encourage non-nuclear weapon States to provide themselves with nuclear weapons to have similar enhanced protection.

7. The ‘Global Reach’ military ambitions of the recent Integrated Review exceeds the capability available, even after implementing its recommendations, because of the extreme cost of nuclear weapons.

8. Nuclear weapons are a very blunt Cold War era instrument entirely inappropriate for nuanced reaction to say Russian incursions in the Baltic or China in the Pacific. Neither country would seriously consider that UK would actually launch a nuclear attack against them and so would proceed knowing we lacked the conventional force to oppose.

9. UK professes to be a ‘rules based’ society. The targets at which a nuclear warhead could be lawfully fired and arguably be compliant with current international laws are limited to mid ocean or uninhabited desert - provided there is no prevailing wind.

10. The US Biden administration is contemplating reducing nuclear weapons and to be used on a ‘sole use’ and not first use basis i.e. only to deter/retaliate to a nuclear weapon attack. The UK policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ which, by denying nothing, embraces all, will conflict with the US. The risk is that technical/political support for UK Trident might be withdrawn. The US is so deeply embedded in UK Trident, from supply of missiles, warheads, targeting procedures and the launch system, that it has the means to render UK Trident inoperable if it so wishes.

Letter of protest

The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs sent the following letter to UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, in response to the warhead announcement.

From END Info 23 available here

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In its integrated review of the national defense and foreign policy for the next 10 years published on March 16, the U.K. government announced that it would increase the cap of its nuclear warheads from the current 180 to 260.

With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on January 22, to develop, test, produce, possess, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons have all become illegal. The recent decision of your government runs counter to this global trend. On behalf of the only A-bombed nation, we strongly protest against, and urge you to retract the decision.

The 10th NPT Review Conference will be convened on August 2. What is required to do in the current world is to cooperate in tackling such imminent problems facing the humanity as COVID-19, climate change, wealth gap and poverty, human rights suppression and genderrelated issues. To that end, the implementation of the previously agreed commitments is called for, including “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (2000) and “to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (2010). The five nuclear weapon states, including the U.K., should be held most accountable for their implementation.

According to an opinion poll in the U.K., almost 60% of the public supports the government signing up to the TPNW. You must respond to the voice of the majority of your people in good faith.

Warhead Alert!

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated the following letter in response to the UK government’s warhead announcement. The letter was sent to Josep Borrel, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European Union External Action Service; Marjolijn Van Deelen, Head of Disarmament Policy at EEAS; David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament and to other politicians engaged in EU foreign policy. We will publish any responses in future.

From END Info 23 available here

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18/03/2021

Dear ....,

If 180 warheads are sufficient to cause a world-ending nuclear winter and achieve the worst nightmare that any environmentalist could ever imagine, why would the UK need 260? The answer is to persuade the US not to delay or postpone the joint W93 warhead programme on which the UK’s ‘independent’ Trident missile submarines are totally dependent. The artificial justification is a thinly veiled suggestion that China - whose policy for nuclear weapons is significantly less aggressive than UK’s - might pose a nuclear threat. The UK’s expanding nuclear warhead programme undermines the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a time when the European Union and others are urging renewed compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. We repudiate this regressive move by the UK and urge proper compliance with the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Yours sincerely,

Signatories:

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) 2nd in Command Polaris submarine, commanded two other submarines and the Commanding Officer’s Qualifying Course

Commander Rob Green Former nuclear-armed aircraft bombardier-navigator

Denis Halliday Former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ireland

Julie Ward MEP 2014-2020, UK

Marian Pallister Chair, Pax Christi Scotland

Jeremy Lester Clerk (Chair) Quaker Council for European Affairs & Chair, Saferworld Europe

Ludo De Brabander Vrede vzw, Belgium

Reiner Braun Executive Director, International Peace Bureau, Germany

Colin Archer Secretary-General, International Peace Bureau (retired)

Professor Stuart Holland University of Coimbra, Portugal

Professor Steven Rose Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience, Open University, UK

Professor Andreas Bieler School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Axel Ruppert Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Brussels Office

Carol Turner Co-Chair Labour CND

Earl Turcotte Chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Canada

Tony Simpson & Tom Unterrainer Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Rae Street & Pat Sanchez Rochdale and Littleborough Peace Group, UK

TJ Milburn Chair, Exeter CND, UK

Christine Bousfield UK

Christopher Butler UK

Ulla Grant UK

Ian Hewitt UK

Till Geiger UK

Brian Winters USA

UK warhead announcement: Immoral, Illogical, Illegal

“We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons” claims the British Government in their ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’: Global Britain in a competitive age. It is unclear quite how this sentiment fits with a renewed commitment to Britain’s nuclear weapon system and the announcement that the overall ceiling on nuclear warheads is to be increased: “the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

From END Info 23 available here

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If the empty pledge on disarmament and the alleged imperative of Britain retaining a nuclear capability came as no surprise, the announcement that the long-established intent to reduce the overall number of warheads was to be dispensed with sent a shockwave across the planet. A further shocking element of the report comes in the following passage: “we reserve the right to review this assurance [that the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT state parties] if the future threat of ... emerging technologies ... makes it necessary.”

Immoral

The British public, like the vast majority of the world’s population, opposes nuclear weapons. Repeated polling has not registered majority support for UK nuclear weapons, and a recent survey found that 77% of the population agreed that all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

The British government is massively out-of-step with the population on this question, yet unknown billions of pounds have been pledged to manufacture instruments of mass-murder just days after nurses were subjected to what, in effect, amounts to a pay cut.

The current British government is a serial rule-breaker and the scrapping of intent to reduce the overall number of warheads fits into this pattern of conduct. Far from providing increased ‘security’ the British decision to not only retain nuclear weapons but to increase the number of warheads can only increase tensions and generate greater risks.

Illogical

At the time of the announcement, the British government made no effort to justify its decision beyond general statements about “adversaries”, “threats to stability” and the “evolving security environment”. In subsequent interviews the Secretary of Defence, Ben Wallace, claimed that an increased number of warheads was a response to alleged changes to Russian missile defence. When questioned, Mr Wallace could not explain how 260 rather than a smaller number of warheads would make a difference.

As the Russian government has pointed out, the British decision comes weeks after agreement was reached between the US and Russia to extend New START for a further five years: an agreement that will reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. How does the British decision fit with the global trends? What does the US, on which Britain is dependent for the vast majority of its nuclear capability, make of the announcement?

Could the failure to adequately explain the need for more warheads be linked to the fact that there is no good reason? Or could it be that the real story behind this decision is being deliberately withheld? How does Britain’s lobbying of the US Congress over the W-93 warhead fit into the picture? Might Britain be planning to increase the number of Trident submarines on ‘Continuous At Sea’ patrol, which might make it necessary to have more warheads?

Does the shift in nuclear posture embodied in “reserve the right to review” and in the direction of travel detailed in the wider report suggest a potential ‘war fighting’ nuclear posture, rather than an alleged ‘deterrence’ posture? Might Britain need more warheads if such warheads are to be ‘useable’?

The basic lack of transparency on nuclear questions and the illogical stance offered by the government generates large numbers of questions, all of which demand closer examination.

Illegal

Britain is not only a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands ‘effective measures’ to end the ‘arms race’ (Article VI) but it is one of three ‘Official Depositories’ of the NPT. This status demands exemplary conduct and action from such states.

The decision to increase the number of warheads appears to be in breach of Article VI and Britain’s status and could, therefore, be illegal under international law. It will be left to international lawyers and the other parties to the NPT to decide whether or not this is technically the case, and it should be noted that several NPT signatories are already in breach. Whatever the material legal status, Britain’s decision will clearly act against the interests of non-proliferation and will surely induce other states - both nuclear armed and non-nuclear - to assess their own positions.

The TPNW and the V2 Rocket

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came into force 90 days after the 50th of 193 UN member states had ratified it. As part of international humanitarian martial law, the treaty prohibits its participating states from any activity related to nuclear weapons. Following a request from the US government, the German government stayed away from the negotiations on the treaty and has so far refused to sign it.

There is a fundamental historic connection between the TPNW projecting the end of the nuclear weapons age, and – hardly noted – its roots at the Baltic seaside village of Peenemünde (Germany), the ‘birth place’ of the V2 ballistic rocket of World War II. There, in 1937, a new Army Research Institute had been established with the task of creating a long-range artillery rocket named A4. This was a new development, namely the official repeal of international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907 – with the German Reich as a member state – which forbade the bombardment of undefended residential areas. When German warplanes bombed southern England in World War I from 1917, the victorious Allied powers then rightly demanded that those who carried them out be extradited as war criminals. With its firing range of 300 km, the A4 rocket was an innovation as an artillery weapon. But due to its kilometer-wide hit spread, it was obviously militarily useless and could only be used for terrorizing the civilian population, i.e. for war crimes, not criminal misconduct by individuals, but for the first time as an official state program. This fact led to the later propagandistic renaming of A4 as V2, ‘V’ standing for Vergeltungswaffe meaning retaliation weapon. The V2 rocket (as with its twin, the V1 cruise missile) was only used against residential areas, mainly in England.

In World War II, the bombing of cities was perfected, initially by Germany, but then increased by Great Britain and the USA. A new aspect was the total destruction of cities by the large- area fire storm, with thousands of dead and injured, initially achieved with incendiary and high-explosive bombs, then in 1945 for the first time with nuclear bombs. ‘Humanitarian law’ seemed to have been forgotten.

Initially, the US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. An immense arms industry had grown up there during the war. After 1945 it continued unabated, with the nuclear sector as an additional business area. Military budgets increased year-on-year. The air force, the navy and – in the end – the army competed for the allocation of funds. The Soviet Union under Stalin, which had been a war ally shortly before, served as a new enemy because the old enemy Hitler had been defeated. In 1947 the US Air Force first planned nuclear attacks against Moscow and other Soviet cities. War crimes had become the core of military strategy.

Stalin countered this with his own development of nuclear weapons. With the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the USA lost its monopoly. A nuclear arms race began. The Soviet military, without air bases on American soil, relied on the replication and further development of the V2 missile as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons, with the aim of a nuclear ICBM. At the same time, the US strengthened its air force and its global airbases. It was not until years later that they too succeeded with the ICBM, also a further development of the V2.

The nuclear explosive yields were increased on both sides in the 1950s. From the range of thousands of tons of conventional explosives (TNT) – as in the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – they rose to millions of tons. Such a bomb would have been able to completely destroy a metropolis like Moscow or New York, with death tolls in the millions. More and more nuclear-armed rockets and missiles replaced the manned nuclear bombers.

Generations since then grew up with the basic uncertainty that a nuclear war could wipe out all higher life forms on earth. Governments, democratic or not, advocated the belief that victory in nuclear war is impossible, so it would never happen. At the end of the 1970s, the number of nuclear warheads had reached an irrational peak of over 40,000, with over 95% in the arsenals of the USA and the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the humanitarian international law of war spoke up again in 1977, in the form of an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949: Indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that cannot distinguish between civilians and the military, became prohibited. This is especially true for nuclear weapons. But their owner states refused to recognize this, and their entourage followed.

By 1980, advances in electronics had drastically reduced the hit spread of long-range weapons, down to several meters, regardless of the firing range. This was a sensational innovation: every shot was a direct hit. It made it possible for the first time to reliably hit and destroy deep underground command bunkers with nuclear bombs. Unlike in the vast United States, the Soviet command structure was (and the Russian one now is) locally concentrated in the greater Moscow area. A surprise attack, known as a decapitation strike, by a salvo of a few dozen rockets from Western Europe seemed technically possible. It was about a so-called medium range of about 2,000 km firing range, with ballistic flight times of about 10 minutes. For the attacked victim, this would be too short for a reliable assessment of the situation, let alone for commanding the type and scope of a counter-strike. So victory in nuclear war seemed possible.

The corresponding new US Pershing-2 missiles were deployed in West Germany – and nowhere else – from 1983. Open and unprotected in mobile forest positions in the Federal Republic of Germany, the missiles, being the most important targets, in the event of a Soviet attack would have been destroyed within minutes. Obviously they were only good for a surprising first strike: “Use them or lose them”.

The Soviet side countered this US deployment in Central Europe with new short-range SS- 23 nuclear missiles in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with a flight time of only 5 minutes. A nuclear duel was armed, with the full risk of destruction of Central Europe. Electronic warning systems watched each other. A computer failure could have started a ‘limited nuclear war’. In 1987 the US-Soviet treaty to ban land-based medium-range missiles (INF treaty) eliminated this danger. In 1991 the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia as the legal successor and the heir to Soviet nuclear weapons.

The majority of states in the world were less and less willing to accept the threat to their existence from the nine nuclear-weapon states, including the USA in the lead, followed by Russia. In 1996 the UN Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the threat and use of nuclear weapons to be contrary to international law. The nuclear weapon states did not care. But in 2017 122 of the 193 states in the UN finally voted for a treaty (TPNW) that outlawed all activities related to nuclear weapons, including possession. As mentioned, this treaty has now entered into force, but only for those states that have ratified it. At that time there were 51 states, including Austria and Ireland. All nuclear weapon states and their entourage – including Germany – had stayed away from the UN negotiations. So far, the German government has refused to, against the will of the majority of its citizens. US nuclear weapons are still stored on German soil. With a German signature on the TPNW contract, that would be over.

The US military-industrial complex costs ten times more than the Russian one every year. Nevertheless, Russia is keeping up with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, at the same absurd level of over 5,000 warheads, with the corresponding costs. That is difficult to understand, because the new US competitor, China, is declaredly not participating in the nuclear arms race. China considers its 20 times smaller number of warheads – around 300 – to be sufficient against the USA. Why doesn’t Russia do the same?

The nuclear duel of the 1980s is now returning to Central Europe. Since 1999 NATO has been advancing to Russia’s borders. In 2019, US President Trump quit the 1987 INF treaty banning land-based medium-range weapons. Since then, the US military has been procuring precisely such new long-range missiles in non-defensible hypersonic technology on a large scale, with ranges of at least 2,000 km, i.e. from Germany deep into Russia. The focus is on the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon of the US Army and the Conventional Prompt Strike missile of the US Navy. The US nuclear weapons laboratory Sandia is developing the model of a precise hypersonic warhead common to the Army and Navy. So how credible is the claim that the warhead will only be equipped with non-nuclear weapons? Is a decapitation strike against Moscow being considered again? The new US missiles should be ready for use from 2023.

From then on, the nuclear duel will probably be armed again.

In 2018 the American government published a new Nuclear Posture Review, with an emphasis on “low yield” (less than 20 kilotons, comparable to the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). The US Defender Europe maneuver, the largest in 25 years, began in early 2020. It moved through Germany and Poland towards the Russian border. The corona pandemic stopped this marching earlier than planned. In another maneuver in August 2020, American B- 52 nuclear bombers flew over the non-NATO member Ukraine. A US naval base has been in operation in Ukraine on the Black Sea since 2017 (Ochakiv). All of this may be viewed as protecting Western Europe or as a preparation by the United States for war in Europe.

Russia reacted promptly to President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 by deploying SS-26 (Iskander-M) nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave. This area around the former German city of Königsberg in East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II. The small area is now sandwiched between the NATO states Poland and Lithuania. Why are the missiles not in the safety of the Russian heartland? Obviously because of the shorter flight time. A look at the map reveals what the rockets in Kaliningrad should be aiming at: The concentration of US military bases in West Germany around 1,000 km away, with a focus on Ramstein, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Bitburg, ballistic flight time from Kaliningrad around 7 minutes. The neighboring NATO states France, Denmark and the Czech Republic do not allow US military bases, as of course the neutral states Austria and Switzerland.

In order to destroy the deep underground US command bunkers, nuclear ground explosions at least “low yield” are required, because even the largest conventional bombs are too weak for this. In 2020, the Russian government published a new directive for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be read as a warning to Germany. In the German public, these facts have received little attention.

The SS-26 missile weighs 4.6 tons, with a 0.7 ton conventional warhead. The associated range is given as 500 km. A nuclear “low yield” explosive device weighs only a few tens of kilograms. A firing range of 1,000 km should therefore be possible from Kaliningrad – with the SS-26 or another type of missile from the Russian arsenal.

Will the American anti-missile system SM-3, which will be deployed near Slupsk (Poland) in the near future, be able to intercept rockets on the way from Kaliningrad to West Germany? No, this is not technically feasible, especially if the rockets maneuver only slightly during the flight.

At this point, Peenemünde comes into view as a symbolic place: Kaliningrad is located at the end of the former Baltic Sea test range for V2 rockets from Peenemünde to the east. It seems like an irony of history that over seven decades later Germany is threatened from there by nuclear missiles of a basically similar design to the V2, and not because of the German military, but on someone else’s account: namely because of the US Forces bases in the western part of the country.

The German signature under the TPNW, following the example of neighboring Austria, would end this threat. Not only will the 20 or so US nuclear airdrop bombs then have to be withdrawn from the Büchel airfield (Eifel): the US Armed Forces do not differentiate between conventional and nuclear components. With the German signature under the TPNW, the presence or transit of such conventional-nuclear forces on or over German territory would be prohibited in the future. This applies equally to the French and British military, because these two NATO states also maintain nuclear weapons. Incidentally, by the 2-plus-4 treaty of 1990 the area of the former (East-) German Democratic Republic has been declared a nuclear weapons free zone.

In the “heyday” of Peenemünde in the 1930s and early 1940s, there was still a general mood throughout Europe that a large state could not do without military defense. Today hardly anyone will deny that the densely populated Germany can no longer be defended militarily, not only in view of the state of the art of weapon technology, but especially in view of the highly centralized public supplies and, effective as “bomb amplifiers”, nuclear power stations and large chemical plants as well as the lack of any civil defense. Across all political forces in Germany today there has to be assumed accordance on one point: Under no circumstances any war weapon effects in Germany – by whomever, hostile or allied. Without the protection of the TPNW, however, this would not be achievable in Germany’s geographic location.

Peenemünde, located in what is now a holiday area, is home of a well visited technical-historical museum. The missile trail that once moved towards and which today might emanate from Kaliningrad presents meritorious occasion to make the restoration of humanitarian international law by the TPNW a public exhibition topic, precisely at the place where in 1937, as a worldwide precedent, the state organized dismantling of international martial law had begun.

Federal elections will take place in Germany in autumn 2021. The Green Party, which emerged in 1980 as a result of the wide public resistance against nuclear armament, is considered to be the likely coalition partner of the next German government. Will signing the TPNW be a non-negotiable coalition condition? Or will the temptation of ministerial posts be stronger than any principle?

Nuclear sharing: the facts

NATO isn’t particularly shy about stating the basic facts about its role with regards to nuclear weapons.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

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The ‘NATO Nuclear Deterrence’ fact sheet, available on NATOs website, states the following:

Three NATO members - the United States, France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear weapons.

The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.

NATO’s nuclear deterrence also relies on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies. A number of European NATO members have dual-capable aircraft dedicated to the delivery of these US nuclear weapons. The United States maintains full custody of these weapons at all times. These “nuclear-sharing arrangements” predate and are fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [emphasis added]

From characterising the combined nuclear forces of the US, UK and France as ‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence’ to confirming that supposedly non-nuclear armed states can ‘deliver’ - in the euphemism favoured by advocated of nuclear weapons - NATO is proud to confirm the basic extent of its ability to wipe life from the surface of the planet.

What NATO is less keen to reveal are the locations and extent of the US nuclear weapons in Europe. So where are they, how many of them are there, why are they there and what risks to they present to local populations and to Europe as a whole?

Where and how many?

The location of these US weapons has been an ‘open secret’ for some time. More recently, NATO itself revealed the locations after accidentally posting a report on its website. Here’s a run-down:

Netherlands: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in The Netherlands at the Volkel airbase.

Belgium: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in Belgium at the Kleine Brogel airbase. Belgium is also home to NATOs HQ.

Germany: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored at the Buchel airbase in Germany. Germany is also home to a large number of US armed forces.

Italy: Around 70 nuclear bombs are stored at the Aviano and Ghedi-Torre airbases in Italy. Some of these bombs were previously stored at RAF Lakenheath in the UK prior to their withdrawal in 2008.

Turkey: It is estimated that 50 nuclear bombs are stored at the Incirlick airbase in Turkey.

Total: up to 180.

Why are they here?

Dates and extent of deployment varies, but the presence of these weapons in Europe can be thought of in two ways: first, as a ‘hangover’ from the ‘Cold War’ and second, as a demonstration of the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons to NATO’s overall strategy for Europe and neighbouring regions.

In the case of Germany, it has been suggested that ‘nuclear sharing’ was initiated after threats from the German government to pursue their own nuclear weapon developments. The location of US nuclear bombs in Turkey is a clear consequence of the strategic importance placed on the region to the south of that country.

The presence of US nuclear bombs in Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy is clear demonstration that these states are closely tied into the US/NATO military alliance.

What are the risks?

Many people feel that the presence of such weapons creates a ‘target’ of potential aggressors. Moreover, nuclear material - in whatever form - is never ‘risk free’. The dangers of malfunction in an atomic weapons are all the more pronounced. This is why a growing number of people demand an end to ‘nuclear sharing’ and the removal of these bombs.

Such a move would be an important first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone across the whole of Europe.