Russia’s 2020 Nuclear Directive

Joachim Wernicke

In June 2020 the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new directive titled Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The document mentions Russia’s allies: members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO) founded in 2002. CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The central concern of the directive is to address the “risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence”, such as: the “build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters.”

One example of this: NATO troops and equipment including nuclear weapon carriers concentrated in countries bordering Russia or Belarus. Not surprisingly, these adversary countries are seen as nuclear targets by Russia.

Expressly mentioned are the “adjacent waters”, meaning the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. Not surprisingly, the Russians are expecting US Navy units to appear in these waters with ships that can launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles. No distinction is made between conventional and nuclear warheads of such weapons. Other concerns include:

“Deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;

- development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space.”

These points obviously refer to Romania and Poland which permit US bases which house missile defence systems. The latter point hints to Germany which is about to home an entirely new “NATO Space Center” at the US air base at Ramstein, one year after the US military established its “Space Force” as a separate military branch.

“Possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;

- uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;

- deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.”

These points evidently refer to the three nuclear weapons states in NATO (USA, Great Britain and France). But also the non-nuclear-weapon states Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey are included, due to their participation in US nuclear sharing: These five states keep special airplanes as nuclear delivery means, prepared and exercising for the dropping of US nuclear bombs. Thus they physically become – even if only temporary – possessors of nuclear weapons, in violation of their obligations from membership in the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1970. This violation can be understood as an illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly these ‘non-nuclear-weapon states’ fulfil the criterion to be Russian nuclear targets, particularly if they should move their nuclear bomber aircraft nearer to the Russian or Belarus border.

“The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation”. Nuclear deterrence comes under the “centralization of governmental control” over nuclear forces. This is a matter of course in all nuclear weapon states. Here it is nevertheless explicitly mentioned as an obvious message to the USA: There is one Russian command structure in and around Moscow – stay away from any attempt of a decapitation strike! This singularity is a specific vulnerability of the traditionally centralized Russian administration. In the more ‘decentralized’ USA the nuclear command structure is geographically distributed, so a decapitation strike against the USA cannot be successful, due to largely different flight times of any missiles fired from outside continental USA.

The conditions under which Russian nuclear weapons can be used include, as can be expected:

- “use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”, meaning a reaction. But then there is a crucial new point: Russian nuclear weapon use can also be triggered by

- “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the

Russian Federation and/or its allies”.

Thus for Russia to now use nuclear weapons evidence of a launch is not required, but rather the “arrival of data on a launch” – implicitly: happened or imminent launch – is sufficient. So for example a scenario: “US naval ships with intermediate-range ballistic missiles are gathering in European seas”. The term “reliable” in connection with “data” implies the possibility of technical or human error – or just the claim that such an error had occurred.

And a further possible trigger of a Russian nuclear weapons employment:

- “attack by an adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.”

In other words, as before: a decapitation strike against the central command structure, regardless of whether it is nuclear or “only” conventional. So, as expected, the decapitation strike is seen as a danger from a Russian point of view, with serious consequences.

In the case of nuclear attack by the USA, this point in the directive only makes sense if Russian nuclear weapon use occurs before the decapitation strike has taken place, i.e. as long as the central command structure still exists, thus as a pre-emptive attack. This fits with the term “arrival of reliable data” and the connected possibility of error, which might be used for justification or excuse of a limited pre-emptive Russian strike, for instance against US installations in Central Europe. Since these main installations are deep underground shelters, they cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs which are too weak – it requires nuclear precision ground explosions.

A successful decapitation strike requires a surprise attack which in turn requires intermediate- range ballistic missiles, since only they have sufficiently short flight times of some minutes, leaving no time for an organized reaction by the victim of the attack. Any concern about the civilian population is outside the concerns of nuclear target planners. Since – different from the Cold War era – hardly any European NATO state today will allow US intermediate-range missiles on its soil, the emphasis has changed towards US missile carrying ships in the European seas, as confirmed in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review which states the advantage of sea-launched missiles, that they “will not require or rely on host nation support”.

And as a further possible trigger for a Russian nuclear weapon deployment:

- “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

This is the reverse of the principle that the USA had claimed in the 1950s in the name of Western Europe: the Soviet Union would be conventionally so superior that a conventional defence against it was not possible – the Soviet Union would win. That is why the USA, as the ‘protective power’ of Western Europe, would immediately repel a Soviet attack by nuclear weapons.

Today, NATO is conventionally many times stronger than Russia, which can be seen from military expenditure alone. This irrational excess obviously is not caused by concerns about European security. Rather defence contracts and military career interests have a major role in propelling this development. For Russia it is not about the claim to protect other countries or about business and careers, but about protecting the existence of her own state system.

The entire Russian directive of 2020 can be read as a loud warning, especially to Central Europe as the prospective battlefield of a US-Russian war. Technically the only way to avoid

an assumedly impending US decapitation strike against Moscow is a pre-emptive attack against regional US command centres and missile ships.

Why was the Russian directive issued just in 2020? The focus on the Covid pandemic from early 2020 fogged up a series of alarming recent events hinting towards the increasing US-Russian nuclear tensions in Central Europe:

- The year before USA sabotaged the INF treaty of 1987 and immediately resumed testing of intermediate-range ballistic missiles which had been banned by this treaty.

- In early 2020 the largest US military maneuver in Europe for 25 years occurred (shortened by the corona pandemic).

- The US government signalled no extension of the NEW Start treaty of 2011 which is due to expire in early 2021.

- The US Navy develops shipborne intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads (which of course can be exchanged by “low-yield” nuclear warheads).

- The command centre for the US Navy Aegis destroyers armed with long-range missiles is located at Ramstein, Germany.

- Since 2019 Russia deploys short-range (500 kilometer) ballistic missiles SS-26 in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia). Thanks to US President Trump’s cancellation of the INF Treaty in 2019 Russia is again permitted to deploy also intermediate-range missiles, reaching from Kaliningrad to the US command and nuclear installations in Central Europe (about 1.000 kilometer).

- The US European command (USEUCOM), after being pushed out from France in 1966, for more than half a century was located in Stuttgart, Germany. By mid-2020 the US government decided to move it to Mons, Belgium, 300 kilometers further west. Is the Central European soil becoming too hot?

Is the USA planning to attack Russia? There is no proof for such an intent, and – besides all moral aspects – it is doubtful that the US Army as an invader of Russia would ever be able to control this country of twice the size of USA. The developing nuclear arms race is strongly driven by the military-industrial complexes, mainly in the USA, but partly in Russia too. However, there is the experience from the last three decades that the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were started by the US military with massive decapitation strikes against these countries, thus removing their leadership and command. None of these states was able to retaliate against the USA. Russia is in a different situation, having the means to damage the USA. But on top of this and given the end of the INF treaty it obtained the option to end an acute crisis to her favour by a prompt and limited nuclear strike against US outposts in Central Europe. The Russian actions probably will be guided by the subjective perception of the potential dangers.

It has to be hoped that a public opinion movement in Europe – perhaps enhanced by the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) valid from early 2021 – will lead to political measures to defuse the acute dangers as described. The most efficient way would be the nuclear-free zone across Europe.

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Why today?

Marc Finaud

Since 1967, five regions of the world have declared themselves as nuclear-weapon-free on the basis of a treaty:

– Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in 1967, entered into force in 2002),

– The South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed in 1985, entered into force in 1986),

– South-East Asia (Bangkok Treaty, signed in 1995, entered into force in 1997),

– Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in 1996, entered into force in 2009),

– Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty, signed in 2006, entered into force in 2009).

In most cases, the nuclear powers have committed themselves in protocols to respect these zones and not to transfer or use their nuclear weapons therein. In addition, Antarctica, outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the seabed are free from the deployment of nuclear weapons under other treaties.1

The idea of such a zone in Europe dates back to the beginning of the Cold War, but never saw the light of day because of the refusal of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to move into this direction. On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and then of the Warsaw Pact, and in view of the imminent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), is it not time to relaunch this initiative and gradually make the whole of Europe, which has been the most nuclearized zone in the world, a region of stability and peace?

I. Historical reminder: Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Europe2

1.In 1956, when the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the only countries possessing nuclear weapons, the latter proposed banning the deployment of any nuclear weapons on European soil. Moscow’s main fear was Germany’s rearmament and its ambition for strategic parity with the United States, which pursued its nuclear-sharing plan with NATO.

2. In 1957, the Rapacki Plan, presented by the Polish Foreign Minister, aimed to ban nuclear weapons in Central Europe (West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland). The United States and NATO, fearing an imbalance of conventional forces in favour of the USSR, opposed it.

3. In the same year, Romania launched the Balkan Initiative for a nuclear-free zone including, on the Socialist side, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia and, on the NATO side, Greece and Turkey. The latter two countries refused to give up the American nuclear umbrella.

4. In 1963 Finland proposed a NWFZ to the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and then the Soviet Union launched its Mediterranean Initiative, excluding all nuclear weapons in most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The United States rejected both initiatives.

5. In 1969, after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Soviet Union extended the Balkan Initiative to the countries bordering the Adriatic. NATO countries rejected it, accusing the USSR of seeking to prevent deterrence against Soviet aggression.

6. In 1982 former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme proposed a new version of the Rapacki Plan for Central Europe, in the form of a corridor from the Baltic to the Balkans, excluding all nuclear weapons with a range of more than 1000 km.

The main reasons for the failure of these initiatives are clear: the policy of the blocs and the nuclear deterrence strategy of the United States and NATO aimed at thwarting the conventional superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. However, the Cold War did not prevent the two superpowers from concluding agreements for the elimination of certain nuclear weapons in Europe, mainly the INF Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty of 1987, which led to the destruction of some 2,700 such missiles.

II. The post-cold war era and progress towards denuclearisation

At the end of the Cold War, the 1991 START I Treaty prohibited the deployment of the strategic offensive nuclear weapons covered by the Treaty outside the territory of the two countries, i.e. also in Europe. In the same year, in the “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives” (PNIs), the United States and Russia undertook to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from their theatres of deployment (in Europe) and to destroy or store them in central locations. The Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 guaranteed the repatriation to Russia of all Soviet nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act excluded any deployment of nuclear weapons in the new NATO member countries.

In 1996, and after two attempts in 1990 and 1995, in response to the accession to NATO of several former Soviet republics or former members of the Warsaw Pact, Belarus launched a new proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the combination of the INF and START I Treaties and the PNIs meant that, in the area proposed by Belarus,3 no nuclear weapons were to be deployed.

III. Why relaunch a NWFZ

in Europe now?

The conditions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War have undergone major changes. The INF Treaty was abrogated on the initiative of the United States, followed by Russia, in 2019. Although the United States has not announced any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles with nuclear capability in Europe and Russia is considering such deployment only in response to an American initiative, there is no longer any legal obligation to exclude such weapons in Europe.

While Russia maintains some 1,870 tactical nuclear weapons,4 most of which are stored centrally on its European territory, the United States deploys some 150 gravity nuclear bombs on the soil of NATO countries (Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey).5 None of these weapons are covered by the 2010 New START Treaty, which relates only to deployed strategic offensive weapons and is due to expire in February 2021.

At the same time, in 2017 the Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted and is due to enter into force on 22 January 2021 after 50 ratifications. In Europe, several states have already signed or ratified the Treaty (Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Holy See), while others have supported its adoption at the UN (Cyprus, Moldova, Sweden, Switzerland). Even if these states were already party to the NPT and therefore prohibited themselves from seeking to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, their obligations under the TPNW will be more extensive and will include, in particular, the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil or non-cooperation with any state in the production of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear powers and their allies dependent on “extended deterrence” or nuclear umbrella, unsurprisingly, opposed the TPNW because it will lead to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. This situation does not seem likely to change in the near future.

However, reviving a NWFZ in Europe would offer several advantages and allow several states to join it subject to the formulation of obligations in a future treaty:

- With the exception of the countries possessing nuclear weapons in Europe (France, United Kingdom, Russia), which would have to renounce them in order to participate in an NWFZ, all the other European states could accept a non-possession and non-stationing commitment apart from the five NATO states where American tactical weapons are currently stationed (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey). In several of the latter, a debate is taking place on the continuation of nuclear sharing,6 and the launch of a NWFZ could influence this debate in favour of the withdrawal of American weapons and hence negotiations with Russia on the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons from European territory. Indeed, keeping these weapons in the arsenals of both countries contributes to lowering the threshold for their use in a nuclear war, the main targets and victims of which would be in Europe.

- Similarly, a NWFZ initiative widely supported in Europe, one of the consequences of which would be the exclusion of the deployment of new nuclear missiles of the type prohibited by the defunct INF Treaty, would be likely to reassure Russia and encourage the negotiation of a new agreement on this subject, independently or in the framework of a successor to the New START Treaty.

- NWFZs are recognised and encouraged by the NPT (Article VII) and by the Plan of Action of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Action 9), which states that “[t]he establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned […] is encouraged.” Reaffirming this legitimacy may help those countries that are still hesitant to accede to the TPNW.

- NATO member states (Baltic States, Poland) and non-NATO member states (Ukraine, Georgia) that fear Russian aggression should find it in their interest to belong to a NWFZ which, like the existing zones, would benefit from legal guarantees of non-attack with nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers (“negative security assurances”).

- Precedents of NWFZs in other regions or other negotiations (anti-personnel mines, TPNW) show the diversity and flexibility of possible frameworks: NGO campaigns, conferences of interested states, negotiation of a treaty.

With a view to sounding out the governments of the states most likely to launch or support an initiative for a NWFZ in Europe (the European states party to the TPNW and those that had launched such initiatives in the past: Belarus, Romania, Finland, and Sweden), concerted action with NGOs in these countries should be launched as soon as the TPNW enters into force (22 January 2021).

Notes

1. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Treaty.

2. H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Jan. 2016 (https://bit.ly/338aZzc). See also: Marc Finaud, “The Experience of Nuclear- Weapon Free Zones”, BASIC, May 2014 (https://bit.ly/3mVdOeT).

3. Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, (Eastern) Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For a more detailed analysis, see: H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, op. cit.

4. Source: Federation of American Scientists (https://bit.ly/33rflB4).

5. Ibid.

6. See: P. Grüll & A. Brzozowski, “SPD Leadership Reignites German Debate on US Nuclear Weapons”, Euractiv, 6 May 2020 (https://bit.ly/2KHDf4S); A. Brzozowski, “Belgium Debates Phase Out of US Nuclear Weapons on Its Soil”, Euractiv, 17 Jan. 2020 (https://bit.ly/39qm0iQ).

Thinking through the TPNW

Tony Simpson

Bertrand Russell applied quite a stern assessment of the efficacy or otherwise of disarmament treaties. ‘I think we may infer that no disarmament agreement will be reliable unless all signatory States are sincerely convinced that it is to their own advantage, and not only to that of potential enemies.’ So he wrote in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, in the context of German rearmament in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany after the First World War. Common Sense was published in 1959, before international agreements on limiting nuclear testing and use of nuclear weapons had been signed.

So what would Russell make of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? What is in it? What is its importance, bearing in mind its scope and limits?

By resolution 71/258, the UN General Assembly decided to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The Assembly encouraged all Member States to participate in the Conference, with the participation and contribution of international organisations and civil society representatives. The Conference duly took place from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017 in New York, when the Treaty text was finally agreed.

The Treaty runs to 20 articles and includes undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It prohibits deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory, and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities.

States parties are obliged to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to individuals affected by the use (specifically mentioning hibakusha – victims of the US nuclear attacks against Hiroshima and then, a few days later, Nagasaki in 1945) or those afflicted by testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take necessary and appropriate measures of environmental remediation in areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty was adopted by the Conference on 7 July 2017, by a vote of 122 States in favour, with one vote against (The Netherlands) and one abstention (Singapore). It was opened for signature by the Secretary-General on 20 September 2017. Following the deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification on 24 October 2020, the Treaty will enter into force on 22 January 2021. That is two days after the new President of the United States is due to be installed.

But what does ‘entry into force’ mean? For the Treaty has divided Member States of the United Nations into two distinct camps. On one side, there are more than 120 States publicly backing the Treaty at the UN. They include more than half the states in Africa, South America and Oceania, all 7 Central American states, one in North America, ten out of 26 Caribbean states, and 21 in Eurasia, somewhat unorthodoxly defined as the land mass extending from Ireland in the West to The Philippines in the East.

Lined up against all these are the nine nuclear-armed States and their supporters. Richard Falk, Princeton Professor of International Law and long-time supporter of Russell Tribunals, puts it this way: ‘… there is a near fatal weakness, or at best, a gaping hole, in this newly cast net of legal prohibition … The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of all nine nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome ... Most of the chief allies of these states that are part of the global security network of states relying directly or indirectly on nuclear weaponry also boycotted the entire process. India, Japan, and China were notably absent, and also opposed the prohibition. This posture of undisguised opposition …includes all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and such important international actors as Germany and Japan.’

In response to the new Treaty, the NATO nuclear triangle of France, United Kingdom and United States issued a Joint Statement of denunciation: ‘We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it,’ they said. ‘Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.’ Remarkably, in October 2018, China and Russia joined these three in a subsequent Joint Statement reaffirming their commitment to a separate and different treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or ‘NPT’, on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. The Permanent 5 said: “The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT ... We will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law …’

There lies the rub – ‘customary international law’. We’ll come back to that.

Sergio Duarte, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, was a young member of Brazil’s UN delegation in the 1960s when the NPT was being drafted. He reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the NPT among many states that do not possess nuclear weapons, although, in his view, ‘the perceived shortcomings of the NPT are not sufficient grounds to justify mass withdrawal’. ‘In all fairness,’ he says, ‘it can be said that the NPT was quite successful in helping to prevent additional states to obtain nuclear weapons. Nothing in it, however, deals with other forms of proliferation, such as the accumulation of nuclear arms, their spread all over the globe in airplanes and submarines, or technological improvements in their range, speed, accuracy and lethal power ... Nuclear-weapon states seem to interpret the provisions of the NPT as legitimizing their arsenals by claiming an exclusive right to rely on nuclear weapons for their security for as long as they see fit while denying this to all others forever.

Duarte sees the new treaty as complementing the NPT. ‘The persistent standstill in multilateral bodies devoted to disarmament, the recent erosion of the arms control architecture, and the revival of the nuclear arms race gave rise to a successful multilateral effort to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. Progress in the process of entry into force of this new instrument (TPNW) should reassure, rather than alarm, the possessors of such weapons. None of its provisions contradicts the NPT. Rather, it expressly reinforces the commitments already accepted by the non-nuclear parties, and provides a path for fulfilling the commitments to nuclear disarmament.’ He points out that ‘recent technological advancements in artificial intelligence make overwhelming retaliation and second strike a certainty’.

Richard Falk sees the Prohibition Treaty as a ‘frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention and development of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity given the way international society is organized. Falk develops his ideas about going beyond what he calls ‘nuclearism’ in a recent collection of his Selected Writings edited by Stefan Andersson and Curt Dahlgren, published in 2019 by Cambridge University Press.

We have seen that the nuclear states are sensitive on ‘customary international law’, repudiating any claim that the TPNW ‘contributes to the development of customary international law’. But Falk bases his argument for the applicability of customary international law on ‘nuclear taboo’. ‘To establish a customary legal norm,’ he writes ‘requires a long established pattern of consistent state practice of which the nuclear taboo (against the use of nuclear weapons) might serve as evidence having existed for a period of more than seven decades … In effect, a consistent pattern of practice must be reinforced by the sense that behaviour was done with an accompanying sense of obligation. It could be argued, for example, that the nuclear taboo incorporates a strong widely shared sense that nuclear weapons should never be used …’

So what new does the Prohibition Treaty bring to the table? In Falk’s view, the Prohibition Treaty should be treated as a ‘historic step forward’. It gives authoritative legal backing to the profound populist stigmatization of nuclear weapons, and as such provides anti-nuclear civil society forces with a powerful instrument to alter the climate of opinion in nuclear weapon states.

ICAN, the International Campaign against Nuclear Weapons, already publishes DON’T BANK ON THE BOMB, a regular report highlighting companies and organisations that profit from the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons, and those, such as the Dutch pension fund, which are choosing to divest. ICAN’s spokeswoman, Beatrice Fihn, aims to ‘deligitimize nuclear weapons and devalue them’, as she explains in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. With an annual budget of a million Swiss francs, rather more than a million US dollars, ICAN does sterling work to advance and spread the reach of the new Prohibition Treaty, from its base in Geneva. Principal funders include the governments of Austria, Ireland and New Zealand, Swiss local councils, plus some private Foundations and individuals.

So what would Bertie say? He would surely applaud the sustained international activism over a decade or more which has brought the Prohibition Treaty to the point where it is endorsed by two-thirds of the Member States of the United Nations, across all inhabited continents, with new signatories, most recently Niger, continuing to join the ranks. He would probably be more sceptical about the prospects of the Treaty in eliminating nuclear weapons. In particular, he emphasized the need for détente to build confidence in verification measures to ensure genuine disarmament. Writing during the Cold War years, Russell’s insight was borne out following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 when actual nuclear disarmament was carried through by Kazakhstan and Ukraine, with international participation. But confidence and trust are again in short supply, particularly between Russia and the United States, as the principal nuclear-armed states, with China now also figuring more prominently in such ‘gaming’, as Alva Myrdal, the Swedish Disarmament Minister and Nobel Peace Laureate, characterized what was then described as ‘superpower’ conduct in relation to disarmament in the late 1970s. The Prohibition Treaty exposes the sharp divergence of interests of the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. It’s an old story, but I think Russell would have been encouraged by the renewed and rising awareness of the threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, which the Prohibition Treaty, and the explicit opposition to it on the part of the nuclear-armed states, sparks. ‘We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest.’

This is the text of Tony Simpson’s talk to the Bertrand Russell Society delivered on 12 December 2020. Tony is the Secretary of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Bertrand Russell Society:

https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/

Re-start New START

The New START treaty, which commits the US and Russia to halving the numbers of strategic missile launchers, is at risk of expiring unless President-elect Joe Biden takes swift action on entering office. This treaty is one of the few remaining following Trump’s ‘Bonfire of the Treaties’ over the four years of his Presidency. The world cannot afford to lose another treaty.

Talks between the US and Russia appear to have stalled, but recent comments from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs give hope: 

“Russia has repeatedly expressed its support for the unreserved extension of the New START Treaty in the form in which it was signed. It officially made a proposal to the other party to the treaty, the United States, in December 2019 and has reaffirmed it more than once since then. It is abundantly clear that the treaty’s extension would presuppose the preservation of all restrictions stated in New START, both strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear charges.

It is equally important that the treaty’s extension would buy time for comprehensive Russian-US talks on future nuclear missile arms control with due consideration for all factors that have an impact on strategic stability. Russia has presented specific ideas on this score. Now the ball is in Washington’s court.”

When President Putin picks up the phone to President-elect Biden, as he is bound to do before inauguration day, then item number one should be a commitment to speedily agree the extension of New START for a further five years and to accept Russia’s offer of “comprehensive ... talks on future nuclear missile arms control”. Such a move could open a new era of discussion and agreement.

US Missile Intercept

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reported the successful test of a missile interception system in November, 2020. According to various reports, ‘a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballastic missile (ICBM) target in a test. With this milestone, the SM-3 Block IIA becomes only the second US interceptor type to exhibit this capability.’ (Carnegie Endowment website).

Bloomberg reported the events in the following terms: ‘an intercontinental ballistic missile was fired in the general direction of the Hawaiian islands. During its descent a few minutes later, still outside the earth’s atmosphere, it was struck by another missile that destroyed it.’

It may seem perfectly legitimate for any country, including the US, to test and perfect such systems. After all, it is the right of every American not to be murdered by nuclear weapons. However, the announcement of this test has deep and worrying implications for us all.

If such systems were fully developed, what forces or arrangements would prevent the US from actually using its nuclear weapons? If they could be used without fear of nuclear counter-strike, would an American President be more or less likely to use nuclear weapons? Isn’t such a test deeply worrying given the massively increased nuclear tensions, deliberate undermining of the infrastructure of nuclear arms control and general degradation of the ‘global norms’ that have helped prevent nuclear war in the past?

If the perverse concept of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ has been undermined by technological developments, then where does this leave nuclear ‘strategy’?

Now that the US has introduced further asymmetry into nuclear questions, what next?

After Trump: what prospects for peace?

The defeat of President Donald Trump at the hands of the US electorate brings an end to four years of threats, bombast and potentially deadly unpredictability. END Info, The Spokesman and other publications have covered the horrible realities of the Trump regime in detail and there is no need to repeat them again.

It is important to note that despite his defeat, Trump’s ‘popular vote’ actually increased: he secured more support on the ground in 2020 than in the previous election. The magnificent mobilisation of voters, who lent their support to President-elect Biden, was the decisive factor. We must hope that the aspirations and demands of these voters are fulfilled by the incoming administration. If not, then a return to ‘Trump-style’ rule is not out of the question. Maintaining a broad political mobilisation will be key to ensuring that the hopes of a ‘better America’ are maintained, if not fully realised, over the next four years.

What hope can we identify in the sphere of global affairs - prospects for peace in particular - with respect to the incoming Biden administration? What avenues of hope have opened up?

There are a number of immediate steps that the Biden administration can and must take in order to restore some semblance of regularity and stability to the global arms control and disarmament structures that Trump did so much to damage.

First amongst these must be an immediate agreement to extend New START, not just for a further year but for the full five years allowed under the treaty. There should be no attempts to re-negotiate certain aspects or to vary the treaty before the extension is firmly agreed.

Next, the Biden administration must re-join the JCPOA (Iran Deal) as a matter of urgency. There needs to be a significant lowering of tensions between the US and Iran and so the additional sanctions imposed following Trump’s withdrawal must be lifted. The Iranian people need urgent access to medical supplies and food-stuffs and the Iranian government needs to hear clear messages from the US government that the JCPOA, the inspections regime and further negotiations will be conducted in good faith. This means no more assassinations, no more sanctions and an end to war-like rhetoric from the halls of Washington.

As with New START, there should be no preconditions to resuming US participation in the JCPOA and any attempts to curb Iran’s ballistic missile system should be addressed in separate negotiations and other measures of reassurance.

Of all the dangerous threats made by the Trump administration, the threat to resume explosive nuclear testing was perhaps the most deadly. Thankfully, no such testing was carried out but if the US had decided to go ahead then there is no international agreement to stop them. The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but has, in effect, abided by the international consensus not to engage in such tests. The US should now ratify the CTBT and encourage all other states not yet on board to do likewise.

Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty has pitched Europe into heightened nuclear tensions. Can Biden resurrect the treaty or reach agreement with the Russians to replace it with something similar? Such a course of action will be more difficult than with the other treaties and agreements already mentioned, but it is an important course of action. It will be a test for the incoming Biden administration: can they constructively engage with a ‘strategic competitor’ for the good of humanity, or is such an approach beyond them?

Biden must immediately halt US efforts to undermine the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and seriously engage with the unstoppable processes already underway. Likewise, the US must live up to the rhetoric about the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully uphold its provisions and act on the already agreed action points from successive review conferences.

The President-elect will be fully aware that the European states - including the UK - will be looking to the new administration to ‘take a lead’, particularly with regards to NATO, which Trump threw into some measure of chaos, and with respect to ‘handling’ both Russia and China. What Biden chooses to do, what course of action he decides to embark upon, presents some fundamental challenges for us all. Whereas Biden can fairly straightforwardly choose to resurrect or shore-up aspects of the nuclear treaty framework and positively engage in ‘multilateralism’ with ‘strategic rivals’ on this score, will his other policy choices be as reassuring?

The evidence seems thin on the ground. Take, for example, his Secretary of State appointment. Antony Blinken may be a very different character to Mike Pompeo, but he comes with his own political baggage. Blinken was characterised in the pages of the London Guardian as a ‘born internationalist’, which seems promising enough until you consider what he might understand ‘internationalism’ to be.

For instance he supported the US invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya, has voiced support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen and such like. It should be taken for granted that President-elect Biden is on the same page on these issues.

What is fundamentally at stake here is whether Biden can manage a global shift in power, a shift from US dominance to multipolarity, or whether he and his administration will attempt to stop the unstoppable. Will Biden’s ‘internationalism’ and commitment to ‘multilateralism’ mean positive engagement with the world or building a US-dominated coalition to divide the world between nuclear-armed blocs?

The world is watching.

Nuclear-Free Europe

From END Info 20

General Lee Butler once sat at the centre of the United States’ nuclear capability. He was a member of the ‘nuclear priesthood’ tasked with maintaining and expanding a nuclear infrastructure whilst keeping the political flock on the ‘correct path’. Following retirement, Butler was able to break free from the nuclear doctrine and has devoted himself to the cause of nuclear abolition. His example is not unique but it is rare enough to warrant the highest praise (see Spokesman 129).

So, how to tackle the “powerful, deeply rooted beliefs” in nuclear weapons to which Butler points? If we look at the political landscape in the nuclear-armed states, where the nuclear doctrine is deeply entrenched, then the task seems daunting. In these states, the political establishment is wedded to expanding nuclear capabilities in defiance of Treaty commitments and moral good sense, and the media and institutions of public culture are geared towards legitimising nuclear weaponry and the notion of ‘deterrence’.

What are the actual mechanisms that allow the nuclear doctrine to embed itself and spread? Tom Sauer argues in a recent article in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (‘Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union’) that they differ between the political and public spheres. In the political sphere, the promise of nuclear force modernisation allows politicians to pledge support for arms control treaties and generates consent from the military without fundamentally undermining a commitment to the nuclear doctrine.

Much of this part of the process happens behind closed doors, “without much debate, let alone approval, of the respective parliaments.” These ‘hidden’ processes are part of the nuclear ‘secret cities’ described by Becky Alexis-Martin in her recent work, Disarming Doomsday (see Spokesman 144). Nuclear weapons grew and spread from the ‘secret city’ of Los Alamos, they spread and mutated into ever more dangerous devices: the A-Bomb became the H-Bomb, then the N-Bomb. The ghastly realities of what these bombs might unleash upon humanity are hidden beneath the notion of ‘deterrence’.

If, rather than using the term ‘nuclear deterrence’, politicians and military personnel referred to ‘genocide machines’ – that is, if nuclear weapons were referred to in accurate terms – then they would quickly lose legitimacy. Sauer argues:

“The public legitimation for nuclear weapons is deterrence and in second order prestige. What these mechanisms show is that public legitimation for nuclear weapons is a narrative that does not reveal the complete picture. This may explain the gap between what the general public thinks about nuclear weapons and the objective characteristics of nuclear weapons … Public opinion in the nuclear armed states is reinforced in thinking that nuclear weapons are ‘good because they make the country safe and secure.”

There are considerable hurdles which must be overcome if we are to win widespread public support for and then achieve nuclear disarmament. Hurdles not mentioned so far include the self-interest of the massively convoluted ‘military-industrial complex’ which reaps enormous material rewards from the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons; the military alliances – some bilateral, between the US and UK for example, others networks of alliances such as NATO – which criss-cross the planet and the reflexes of bodies and institutions – ‘think tanks’, some trade unions representing workers involved in nuclear weapon manufacture, political parties or lobby groups – for whom open discussion of this topic is verboten.

This situation points to the fact that purely ‘national’ initiatives for nuclear disarmament are unlikely to succeed without regional or international cooperation. The ‘national barriers’ existent in nuclear-armed states will be more easily overcome through regional and international cooperation. Not only that, but to an increasing degree the most pressing and immediate issues faced by nuclear disarmers – as with the multiple threats and issues with which humanity faces – manifest transnationally. A transnational response is demanded.

Europe in focus

Germany

An opinion poll commissioned by the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the organisation that has spearheaded the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), provides encouragement. In a survey of four European Union states that currently host US nuclear bombs, clear majorities are in favour of their removal: 57% in Belgium, 56% in the Netherlands, 70% in Germany and 65% in Italy. None of these nations are nuclear-armed states in their own right, but as NATO-member states they are ‘committed’ to the ‘delivery’ of US nuclear weapons if required to do so. The fact that 70% of Germans surveyed are in favour of ridding their nation of US nuclear weapons leads us to the first transnational ‘problem’ that demands a transnational answer.

In May 2020, the leader of the German Social Democrats (SPD) in the Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, called for US nuclear weapons to be removed from the country. He told the Tagesspiegel newspaper that: “Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.” The ‘Merkel’ era of German politics is drawing to a close and it is not wholly inconceivable that a future government will be composed of parties which share Mützenich’s view. Although the call for the removal of US nuclear weapons is not SPD policy, it may become a bargaining chip in settling a future coalition government. Such a proposal would be popular, as evidenced not only by the ICAN survey but by the 100,000 Germans who recently called for TPNW ratification.

The removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany would be a major victory for nuclear disarmers, but we cannot escape the question of ‘what then?’ If, as seems possible, the US simply moves the weapons from Germany to neighbouring Poland or another allied state closer to the Russian border then what kind of victory will we have?

France

In February 2020, President Emmanuel Macron raised the prospect of ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear capability. In a speech to military officers, Macron called for further military coordination between EU member states – a process already under way – and proposed that France’s nuclear weapons system should play a central role. Although Macron is not the first French leader to raise such a prospect, the proposals are significant, and significantly troubling, given the context in which they were made.

Macron points to the near-collapse of the global system of nuclear treaties and control measures as one of the motivations for a new approach to ‘deterrence’ and ‘security’. He has previously called NATO “brain dead”. In his speech he correctly referred to a new ‘arms race’ and worries that Europe “must collectively realise that, in the absence of a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional, even nuclear, arms race on their soil.”

France has pledged to extend its ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Germany. The promise is implicit in the Treaty of Aachen signed between France and Germany in January 2019. The Treaty was intended to cement plans for future reforms of the EU, including a French-German defence and security council intended as the decisive political body to guide these reciprocal engagements. The Treaty is particularly significant in that its provisions extend beyond NATO’s Article 5. The new Treaty uses the phrase “by all means” when Article 5 states “such action as it deems necessary”. Through this treaty, France and Germany have already established a nuclear relationship above and beyond the ‘security arrangements’ embedded in NATO membership. How long before serious efforts are made to extend such ‘assurances’ to other EU member states?

Sauer outlines three possible future scenarios: ‘Status-quo’, where the mutual defence clauses of the Lisbon Treaty remain the only EU-wide provisions and where France maintains its existing bilateral agreements (including with the now non-EU United Kingdom); ‘Upgrading’, where French nuclear weapons are ‘Europeanised’; and ‘Downgrading’, where France dispenses with its nuclear weapons and the EU becomes nuclear-weapon-free. In all three scenarios, a transnational nuclear disarmament campaign will surely play a vital role.

Europe: Nuclear battleground?

The formal collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Friday 2 August 2019 opened a dangerous new era for nuclear security in Europe. The United States quickly followed up on its sabotage of the INF Treaty by testing a Treaty-busting, ground-launched, nuclear-capable missile on 19 August.

Does Europe risk becoming a ‘nuclear battleground’ and, if so, what can we do to resist such a risk? It seems clear that the US will look at Europe once more as a staging post for nuclear war and, as such, a potential nuclear battleground. This horrible reality was starkly illustrated in a recent US ‘war gaming’ exercise. On 21 February 2020, ‘Senior Defense Officials’ from the United States Department of Defense convened a ‘Background Briefing on Nuclear Deterrence and Modernization’. The Briefing was extraordinary for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the level of detail on US nuclear operations; secondly, because these details included the revelation of a ‘war gaming’ exercise focused on a scenario in which Europe was the ‘battleground’; thirdly, because the ‘war game’ involved the use of low-yield nuclear warheads; and fourthly, because of the utterly shameless complacency on display. US defence officials clearly exposed the fact that in terms of nuclear strategy, the US considers Europe to be its territory.

With the sabotage of the INF Treaty now an established fact and given the testing of new intermediate-range missiles, it seems likely that the Trump administration or a future US President will seek to station such weapons in Europe or, given technological developments, on ships close to Europe. Any such move requires decisive opposition. A transnational problem requires a transnational solution.

The case for a nuclear-weapons-free zone

The sample of evidence offered above – there are many other issues, not least the UK’s capability – points to the need for a Europe-wide, coordinated, creative peace movement. The transnational problems – from differences in perception to immediate risks – require transnational solutions. As ever more non-nuclear states ratify the TPNW, the overall legitimacy of nuclear weapons is diminished. When the Treaty comes into force, nuclear disarmers in non-ratifying states will have a powerful tool at their disposal. However, there are time sensitive – that is, urgent – issues which require immediate and energetic responses. In terms of Europe, they require a European movement and European solutions. Thus a coalition of peace organisations discussed, drafted and then launched the following appeal, ‘For a nuclear weapons free Europe’:

On the occasion of the 75th commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing, we, the signatories join our voices to those of the survivors and call upon our fellow citizens, politicians and governments to support a European nuclear- weapon-free zone as a matter of urgency.

We call on European governments to:

· end the modernization of all nuclear weapons

· end nuclear sharing

· sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The situation is urgent. Now is the time to respond.

See www.nukefreeeurope.eu for more and to endorse the Appeal.

First published in The Spokesman 146

Trump Must Go

From END Info 20

The world faces two existential threats: climate catastrophe and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. Since the election of Donald Trump as US President, these threats have grown and the prospects for our environment and survival as a species have diminished.

Trump did not invent climate change and his did not invent the bomb. These things existed before him and will continue to exist if, as we must all hope, he is jettisoned from the White House in a timely fashion. However, the policies he has pursued on both counts have made the world a much more dangerous place. Trump must go.

Let’s look specifically at the question of nuclear weapons. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review announced to the world that President Trump intended to use the threat of nuclear force to confront strategic rivals: Russia and China. The Review announced plans for new types of weaponry and new warheads.

Subsequently, Trump’s administration has systematically destroyed the INF Treaty, the JCPOA (Iran Deal), Open Skies Treaty and now New START looks under severe threat.

Threats have been combined with disastrous action. Another four years surely heralds more of the same. There has been much talk of another ‘Cold War’ against both Russia and China.

There is much in Trump’s actions that justifies such talk. However, the situation is much more dangerous than the ‘Cold War’ of the past. Accelerated technology, the breakdown of norms of diplomacy, the sharp contradictions developing in a ‘global economy’ mean, to quote Michael Klare, that “this isn’t your mothers’ Cold War”. Rather, we are experiencing a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move could spell the end of it all.

Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg and other prominent US activists have called for a vote for Democrat candidate, Joe Biden, as the most immediate means to remove Trump from office. Such calls have been criticised by those who point to Biden’s record on a whole number of question. That there are some who cannot cast their vote for Biden for a whole variety of substantial and deeply felt reasons is just one indication of the political mess and the legacies of harm at the centre of US society (characteristics shared by other states). On balance, it looks like Chomsky, Ellsberg and others have it right. Four more years of Trump will be a disaster for humanity. Four years of Biden will not be an easy ride. This is the choice.

New START in peril

From END Info 20

At the end of September, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered his military to assess how quickly it could bring nuclear weapons out of storage and load them onto bombers and submarines. The reason for this instruction and the motive behind publicising it is inextricably linked to Trump’s attempts to sabotage yet another nuclear treaty: New START.

Such a move signals a deliberate increase in already sky-high nuclear tensions. Is the US serious about negotiating an extension to this vital treaty, which aims to limit the number of deployed warheads? Or is it the case that the US’s most recent conduct is part of an overall strategy to tear up the global order of treaties and agreements regulating nuclear weapons?

We hope that the former, rather than the latter, is the case but there is little evidence to support such hopes. Hope comes from a different source: the continued willingness of Russia to remain diplomatically flexible in the face of shifting US demands.

At the time of writing, it has been announced that New START may enjoy a twelve month extension, following further intervention from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 20 Oct, Lavrov issued a statement clarifying Moscow’s offer, saying that Putin envisioned a one-year extension as well as a freezing of nuclear warheads by each side.

“This position of ours may be implemented only and exclusively on the premise that ‘freezing’ of warheads will not be accompanied by any additional demands on the part of the United States,” Lavrov said. “Were this approach to be acceptable for Washington, then the time gained by the extension of the New START Treaty could be used to conduct comprehensive bilateral negotiations on the future nuclear and missile arms control that must address all factors affecting strategic stability.”

We hope that this approach is acceptable and that Trump’s replacement as President of the United States approaches this and related issues in a more measured and constructive fashion.

Meanwhile, whilst agreement to ‘freeze’ the overall number of deployed warheads is welcome, recent developments and the deployment of ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads (sometime referred to as ‘useable’) by the US is a major source of concern.

B-52s over Europe: here to stay?

From END Info 20

Following our coverage in END Info 19 (September 2020) of the presence of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers at RAF Fairford, it has now been confirmed that these planes staged further provocative ‘exercises’ over Europe.

The respected analyst Hans Kristensen tweeted the above picture and the following text on 25 September 2020: “Unique mission of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers today over the Baltic, flying through the Suwalki gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, and doing a pass over Stockholm...”

We ask once more: what is the purpose of such flights other than to increase already sharp tensions between the US/NATO and Russia?

We understand that the B-52s will continue to fly from Fairford on a regular basis. Watch this space for more info and for campaign updates.

Safe on board?

From END Info 20

A submariner from HMS Vigilant, a UK nuclear armed submarine, was found to be drunk when reporting for duty according to various media reports.

The submarine was docked at the Kings Bay Naval base in Georgia, USA, where the UK’s allegedly ‘independent’ nuclear weapons are stored.

This story is alarming for any number of reasons, but the truth of the matter is that the present state of the UK’s nuclear submarine service is so bad that incidents such as this can hardly be surprising.

Naval submariners are tasked with running what they are told is the ‘ultimate deterrence’ and are drilled to understand and accept not only the procedures for deploying these weapons, but the consequences of doing so.

Voyages of these underwater death machines last for months, where crew members endure cramped quarters and, it seems reasonable to assume, acute boredom. No wonder some of them ‘lest loose’ once they reach dry land.

The fact of the matter is that this situation only adds to the risks and dangers of nuclear weaponry. One false move and life on this planet will end.

Russia’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Fundamentals 2020’

From END Info 20

Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) recently highlighted an important statement of Russia’s new “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Policy”. This document was released by Moscow in June 2020 and, as the analysis points out, such publication - including an easily accessible English translation - marks a departure from previous years.

JRL asks: “One immediate question is whether the idea of using nuclear weapons in a regional conflict as part of an ‘escalation for de-escalation’ strategy still exists in Russia’s military planning.” The answer? “Yes, and no: the West and Russia have different interpretations of this central concept ... The West tends to associate the notion with the threat of, say, attacking the Baltic states, but Russia sees it as nuclear-based coercion that prevents NATO from defending these allies ... Meanwhile, there are no credible signs that Russia is planning to attack the Baltics, especially with any hint of nuclear weapons, which would open direct conflict with NATO.”

The open publication of Russia’s nuclear posture should serve to clarify any confusion about Russia’s intentions with regard to this strategy, which was adopted in response to the “Serbian scenario” at the end of the 1990s, when NATO intervened directly in Europe.

The bad news from this document is that Russia has codified its nuclear posture response to the changing nuclear landscape in Europe by issuing a number of “red lines” and a lower threshold for nuclear use. For instance, “the policy says that only ‘reliable’ information ... is needed about the launch of any ballistic missile toward Russia for there to be a potential response. This undermines the future deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and missiles connected with the Aegis offshore missile defence system - all of which Russia officially calls offensive infrastructure.”

This posture is a clear response to Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty and threats to station a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe. ‘Every action has a reaction’ and Trump’s bonfire of treaties and international norms has made the world a much more dangerous place.

Tromsø says ‘Nei’ to US sub base, govn pushes ahead

From END Info 20

Local politicians in Tromsø, Northern Norway, have expressed their opposition to plans to re-open a mothballed base in the area to house US submarines. The base was decommissioned by the Norwegian navy in 2009, but now the US Navy wishes to make a deal to allow use of the Olavsvern base.

US subs have already visited the base, including the USS Seawolf fast attack vessel in August this year. It is thought the both US and NATO subs will sail from the base in the near future.

The position of the Olavsvern base in the Arctic region is strategically important to the US and NATO, which is fixated on ‘responding to’ perceived Russian threats in the region. The opening of a permanent NATO base in the area is likely to do little more than increase already heightened tensions.

In response to opposition from the local council, the Norwegian government responded along the lines that “Tromsø cannot independently leave NATO”! Why not, we ask in return?

The story of the Olavsvern base illustrates the degree to which international relations have deteriorated and the degree to which the western military alliance is once again adopting a ‘Cold War’ mentality.

After the end of the ‘Cold War’, the Norwegian military lost interest in the base. It served no purpose and cost a great deal of money to keep operational. Following logic, they sold it. Strangely enough, the Norwegian version of ebay was used and one lucky buyer picked it up for $5 million. The base later changed hands and the current owners envisaged using it for logistics and repair support for Norway’s enormous oil industry. It looks like these plans are now on hold.

Will the US and NATO allies be stationing nuclear-armed submarines at the base? How often will the base be used? What risks are posed to nearby residents? What risks are posed more widely? Does the US envisage engaging Russian submarines and other naval vessels or is the base just a ‘show of force’ (a dangerous one)?

Tromsø was right to say ‘Nei’ to the plans and we join their call of opposition.

New US ‘Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile’

From END Info 20

Dr Robert Soofer, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy announced a new generation of “nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles” during a meeting at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in early September. Soofer characterised the announcement as a “response to Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons.”

In fact, such a development is entirely in line with strategy embedded in the US’s last Nuclear Posture Review and fits with the overall posture of aggression adopted against Russia and China.

Such developments will not have escaped the attention of those states characterised as “strategic rivals” or “competitors” in various US policy documents and will surely lead to reciprocal technology developments and deployment.

END Info was alerted to the prospect of a new generation of sea-launched missiles earlier this year by Dr Joachim Wernicke, a Berlin-based analyst and translator of the German edition of Cmdr Rob Greeen’s Security without Nuclear Deterrence. In his analysis of such a development, Dr Wernicke raised the prospect that such systems could be deployed in the seas close to Europe as an alternative to a new generation of land-based nuclear -capable intermediate-range missiles. This prospect now looks all the more likely.

Combined with announcements of the W76-2 tactical nuclear warhead, the overall effect is to lower the ‘nuclear threshold’ once more. What the nuclear-armed states refer to as ‘strategic flexibility’ actually amounts to risk multiplication.

We will remain alert to the prospect of these weapons being deployed outside of US territorial waters.

The Belmarsh Tribunal

The ‘Progressive International’, an organisation of activists, artists, intellectuals and others, has convened The Belmarsh Tribunal to “to put the United States government on trial for its crimes of the twenty first century – from atrocities in Iraq to torture at Guantánamo Bay to the CIA‘s illegal surveillance program – and draw attention to the extradition case of Julian Assange for revealing them.”

Named after the prison in which Julian Assange is being held, this new tribunal invokes the legacy of the International War Crimes Tribunal founded by Bertrand Russell in response to the US’s actions in Vietnam. The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation wrote to Yannis Varoufakis and Srecko Horvat from the Progressive International as follows:

Dear Yannis, Dear Srecko, We were encouraged to hear of your timely initiative in convening the Belmarsh Tribunal. In Russell’s words about the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, it is urgently necessary to ‘prevent the crime of silence’ surrounding Julian Assange and the extradition proceedings to which he is subject. We wish you well in your endeavours, and please let us know if we can assist.

With greetings from England!

Tony Simpson, Tom Unterrainer and Tamara Coates

Don't Extradite Assange

From END Info 20

“[I]t is our responsibility to stand by a true journalist whose sheer courage ought to be inspiration to all of us who still believe that freedom is possible. I salute him.” John Pilger

The WikiLeaks founder, journalist Julian Assange, sits in Belmarsh Prison awaiting his fate. Will he be extradited to the United States, or will he be freed? The campaign that has been waged against Julian is in response to his heroic work in exposing the recent crimes of American imperialism and revealing the intrigue at the heart of power diplomacy. In these efforts, WikiLeaks and Julian were assisted by equally heroic whistle-blowers like Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning: people in the ‘heart of the machine’ who saw the evil at work and decided to expose it to the world. As John Pilger reports (see www.johnpilger.com), there has been a determined effort to ‘get’ Julian Assange. He writes: ‘In 2008, a top secret US State Department report described in detail how the United States would combat this new moral threat. A secretly-directed personal smear campaign against Julian Assange would lead to "exposure [and] criminal prosecution". The aim was to silence and criminalise WikiLeaks and its founder. Page after page revealed a coming war on a single human being and on the very principle of freedom of speech and freedom of thought, and democracy. The imperial shock troops would be those who called themselves journalists: the big hitters of the so-called mainstream, especially the "liberals" who mark and patrol the perimeters of dissent. And that is what happened. I have been a reporter for more than 50 years and I have never known a smear campaign like it: the fabricated character assassination of a man who refused to join the club: who believed journalism was a service to the public, never to those above.’ If the worst happens and Julian Assange is extradited to the USA, then a serious breach of justice will be done. Journalism will have been criminalised and all our freedoms will be undermined.

The Bomb has been banned!

From END Info 20

As END Info 20 goes to press, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has secured fifty ratifications and will come ‘into force’ on 22 January 2021. This historic event is the result of consistent and heroic efforts on the part of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and reflects growing international concern about nuclear tensions.

Meanwhile, the United States is engaged in desperate measures to undermine the TPNW. The Associated Press has obtained a copy of a letter sent by the US to TPNW signatories which claims that the treaty “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous ... Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the ... [TPNW] we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession”.

Responding to the letter, Beatrice Fihn from ICAN characterised such claims as “straightforward lies, to be frank.” The US pitches its objection around the TPNW being a threat to the NPT. This is not only false, given that the NPT explicitly calls for further measures to advance complete nuclear disarmament, but is a bit rich coming from a nuclear armed state that has done little to advance work on the NPT and which has systematically undermined a host of other global nuclear treaties.

This latest action by the US is part of an ongoing effort by the nuclear armed states to undermine the TPNW and to coerce non-nuclear armed states into rejecting the treaty. Perhaps the most significant obstacles have been the actions of the US, UK and NATO allies. The effects of the ‘NATO factor’ can be seen in the fact that the only European states that have ratified the TPNW to date are all non-NATO members. This poses questons about the future direction of the campaign around the TPNW and suggests that a focus on NATO along with consideration of complementary initiatives might be appropriate.

Meanwhile, the TPNW is a reality. The existing, truly inspiring, efforts to achieve ratification will surely continue. In a number of countries there are lively efforts to win further support. Likewise, a planned conference of TPNW ‘ratifiers’ which looks set to take place in Austria, will put additional pressure on those states that have not already ratified the treaty. In addition, such a conference will be an important platform for exposing the dangers of nuclear tensions, nuclear weapons and the nuclear risks we face.

The TPNW will be an essential political tool for campaigners dealing with political parties that present themselves as ‘defenders and promoters of human rights and international law’, but who in contradiction to their professed policies maintain a commitment to weapons of mass murder and attempt to ignore this global treaty.

The TPNW is here. The bomb has been banned. Now it’s up to the peace movements across the world to promote, extend and mobilise to ensure that the TPNW truly comes “into force”. Much work to do in 2021, but the TPNW is a powerful and essential tool in our work for a nuclear free world.

Iran and the nuclear deal

As tensions continue around the Iran nuclear deal, two recent decisions return the spotlight to Iran and the nuclear weapon question in the Middle East.

First, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) blocked attempts by the US to ‘snapback’ all sanctions against Iran that were lifted following agreement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) – or, Iran Deal – in 2015.

The ‘E3′ members of the JCPoA – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – were amongst those who opposed the attempt. They noted in a public statement “that the US ceased to be a participant to the JCPoA following their withdrawal from the deal on 8 May, 2018 … We cannot therefore support this action which is incompatible with our current efforts to support the JCPoA.”

In response, a US envoy accused the UNSC of “standing in the company of terrorists”.

Second, Iran has granted the International Atomic Energy Agency access to two sites which the US and Israeli governments claim are connected to secret nuclear material and activity. Permission to access these sites is a major step forward following events at the start of 2020 and more recent incidents. The assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, January 2020, emphasised that the Trump administration regards Iran as a target and that it is prepared to take reckless actions.

The situation could easily have spiralled out of control if not for a degree of political and military restraint on the part of the Iranian government. Some commentators warned that this event might trigger the start of a ‘nuclear arms race’ in the Middle East.

The Iranian government are fully aware that both Iraq and Libya renounced their nuclear weapons programmes and that following this, both countries faced onslaught from the US military. The twisted ‘logic’ of nuclear deterrence suggests that possession of a nuclear weapons capability ensures against such a prospect. Substantiation for such a risk was provided by the Iranian government itself, when two days after the killing it announced that it would no longer abide by any of the constraints or limitations on nuclear enrichment contained in the JCPoA. The US, which had withdrawn from the JCPoA alleging Iranian breaches despite confirmation from IAEA inspectors that Iran was abiding by the rules, intensified lobbying for a sanctions ‘snapback’ from this point.

Despite US pressure, other parties to the JCPoA continued to work within the framework of the agreement. Following Iran’s statement of intent, the E3 triggered a ‘dispute resolution mechanism’ which, if not for ongoing diplomatic flexibility on the part of the Iranians, could have forced the complete collapse of the JCPoA. Some analysts have suggested that this was the intent of at least one E3 leader, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. However, the JCPoA framework has not collapsed and Iran continues to engage. For serious progress to be made and for the JCPoA to endure, other parties will have to offer Iran serious incentives rather than threats of tightening sanctions or further aggression.

Events such as those at the Natanz nuclear facility in July this year will not have bolstered confidence in a diplomatic solution. It was initially feared that the explosion at the facility resulted from a missile strike, but more recently Iranian officials pinpointed the cause as an act of sabotage. The source and inspiration of the sabotage has not yet been revealed. Whilst we should hope that progress is maintained and support all diplomatic efforts to avert the breakdown of the JCPoA, we should remain alert to the risks of further unilateral action by the United States.

The US ‘envoy’ who ‘undiplomatically’ characterised the United Nations Security Council of standing with terrorists is none other than Elliott Abrams, ‘U.S. special envoy to Iran’. Abrams was characterised in The Nation magazine as having a career “literally built on the defense of mass murder and genocide and his willingness to lie on behalf of those who carried it out and smear the reputations of anyone who sought to try and stop or expose it.” This quote refers directly to Abrams’ dealings in Central America in the 1980s. That’s a deeply concerning résumé for someone tasked with representing US interests anywhere, let alone in Iran, and points to the aggressive posture adopted by the US.

The weeks running up to the US Presidential election will likely see Trump making unpredictable and potentially disastrous decisions in an attempt to distract from the multiple failures of his government and to mobilise opinion behind him. We should not discount the possibility that one such decision could include military action. If it does, then the fact that Iran is already in the cross-hairs should put the peace and anti-war movements on the alert.

First published on the CND website www.cnduk.org

Nuclear disarmament on the agenda!

As the number of states ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) edges ever closer to the ‘magic number’ of 50, it looks certain that a ‘global ban’ of nuclear weapons will come ‘into force’ early in 2021. Once the Treaty passes this threshold, the nuclear-armed states and other states, ‘non-nuclear’ NATO members for instance, will have to decide whether or not to continue ignoring the TPNW or if they’ll take their obligations as ‘law-abiding’ states seriously. If, as looks likely, the nuclear-armed states and allies continue on their destructive path then the international peace movement must vigorously respond, as they undoubtedly will. To their credit, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has worked tirelessly to achieve a situation where we not only have an international treaty with growing support but an international shift in perception where whatever ‘legitimacy’ nuclear weapons still enjoy has received a massive dent. ICAN has coordinated the following ‘open letter’ addressing the current situation and what must now be done.

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Fifty-six former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and defence ministers from 20 NATO member states, as well as Japan and South Korea, have just issued an open letter calling on current leaders to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:

The coronavirus pandemic has starkly demonstrated the urgent need for greater international cooperation to address all major threats to the health and welfare of humankind. Paramount among them is the threat of nuclear war. The risk of a nuclear weapon detonation today — whether by accident, miscalculation or design — appears to be increasing, with the recent deployment of new types of nuclear weapons, the abandonment of longstanding arms control agreements, and the very real danger of cyber-attacks on nuclear infrastructure. Let us heed the warnings of scientists, doctors and other experts. We must not sleepwalk into a crisis of even greater proportions than the one we have experienced this year. It is not difficult to foresee how the bellicose rhetoric and poor judgment of leaders in nuclear-armed nations might result in a calamity affecting all nations and peoples. As past leaders, foreign ministers and defence ministers of Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain and Turkey — all countries that claim protection from an ally’s nuclear weapons — we appeal to current leaders to advance disarmament before it is too late. An obvious starting point for the leaders of our own countries would be to declare without qualification that nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose in light of the catastrophic human and environmental consequences of their use. In other words, our countries should reject any role for nuclear weapons in our defence. By claiming protection from nuclear weapons, we are promoting the dangerous and misguided belief that nuclear weapons enhance security. Rather than enabling progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, we are impeding it and perpetuating nuclear dangers — all for fear of upsetting our allies who cling to these weapons of mass destruction. But friends can and must speak up when friends engage in reckless behaviour that puts their lives and ours in peril. Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way, and a race for disarmament is urgently needed. It is time to bring the era of reliance on nuclear weapons to a permanent end. In 2017, 122 countries took a courageous but long-overdue step in that direction by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons — a landmark global accord that places nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as chemical and biological weapons and establishes a framework to eliminate them verifiably and irreversibly. Soon it will become binding international law. To date, our countries have opted not to join the global majority in supporting this treaty. But our leaders should reconsider their positions. We cannot afford to dither in the face of this existential threat to humanity. We must show courage and boldness — and join the treaty. As states parties, we could remain in alliances with nuclear-armed states, as nothing in the treaty itself nor in our respective defence pacts precludes that. But we would be legally bound never under any circumstances to assist or encourage our allies to use, threaten to use or possess nuclear weapons. Given the very broad popular support in our countries for disarmament, this would be an uncontroversial and much-lauded move. The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a licence to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable. The prohibition treaty adopted in 2017 can help end decades of paralysis in disarmament. It is a beacon of hope in a time of darkness. It enables countries to subscribe to the highest available multilateral norm against nuclear weapons and build international pressure for action. As its preamble recognizes, the effects of nuclear weapons “transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation”. With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. All responsible leaders must act now to ensure that the horrors of 1945 are never repeated. Sooner or later, our luck will run out — unless we act. The nuclear weapon ban treaty provides the foundation for a more secure world, free from this ultimate menace. We must embrace it now and work to bring others on board. There is no cure for a nuclear war. Prevention is our only option.

Signed by:

Lloyd Axworthy, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

Ban Ki-moon, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea

Jean-Jacques Blais, Former Minister of National Defence of Canada

Kjell Magne Bondevik, Former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and 53 others.

See www.icanw.org for more information.