Re-start New START

The New START treaty, which commits the US and Russia to halving the numbers of strategic missile launchers, is at risk of expiring unless President-elect Joe Biden takes swift action on entering office. This treaty is one of the few remaining following Trump’s ‘Bonfire of the Treaties’ over the four years of his Presidency. The world cannot afford to lose another treaty.

Talks between the US and Russia appear to have stalled, but recent comments from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs give hope: 

“Russia has repeatedly expressed its support for the unreserved extension of the New START Treaty in the form in which it was signed. It officially made a proposal to the other party to the treaty, the United States, in December 2019 and has reaffirmed it more than once since then. It is abundantly clear that the treaty’s extension would presuppose the preservation of all restrictions stated in New START, both strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear charges.

It is equally important that the treaty’s extension would buy time for comprehensive Russian-US talks on future nuclear missile arms control with due consideration for all factors that have an impact on strategic stability. Russia has presented specific ideas on this score. Now the ball is in Washington’s court.”

When President Putin picks up the phone to President-elect Biden, as he is bound to do before inauguration day, then item number one should be a commitment to speedily agree the extension of New START for a further five years and to accept Russia’s offer of “comprehensive ... talks on future nuclear missile arms control”. Such a move could open a new era of discussion and agreement.

US Missile Intercept

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reported the successful test of a missile interception system in November, 2020. According to various reports, ‘a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballastic missile (ICBM) target in a test. With this milestone, the SM-3 Block IIA becomes only the second US interceptor type to exhibit this capability.’ (Carnegie Endowment website).

Bloomberg reported the events in the following terms: ‘an intercontinental ballistic missile was fired in the general direction of the Hawaiian islands. During its descent a few minutes later, still outside the earth’s atmosphere, it was struck by another missile that destroyed it.’

It may seem perfectly legitimate for any country, including the US, to test and perfect such systems. After all, it is the right of every American not to be murdered by nuclear weapons. However, the announcement of this test has deep and worrying implications for us all.

If such systems were fully developed, what forces or arrangements would prevent the US from actually using its nuclear weapons? If they could be used without fear of nuclear counter-strike, would an American President be more or less likely to use nuclear weapons? Isn’t such a test deeply worrying given the massively increased nuclear tensions, deliberate undermining of the infrastructure of nuclear arms control and general degradation of the ‘global norms’ that have helped prevent nuclear war in the past?

If the perverse concept of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ has been undermined by technological developments, then where does this leave nuclear ‘strategy’?

Now that the US has introduced further asymmetry into nuclear questions, what next?

After Trump: what prospects for peace?

The defeat of President Donald Trump at the hands of the US electorate brings an end to four years of threats, bombast and potentially deadly unpredictability. END Info, The Spokesman and other publications have covered the horrible realities of the Trump regime in detail and there is no need to repeat them again.

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It is important to note that despite his defeat, Trump’s ‘popular vote’ actually increased: he secured more support on the ground in 2020 than in the previous election. The magnificent mobilisation of voters, who lent their support to President-elect Biden, was the decisive factor. We must hope that the aspirations and demands of these voters are fulfilled by the incoming administration. If not, then a return to ‘Trump-style’ rule is not out of the question. Maintaining a broad political mobilisation will be key to ensuring that the hopes of a ‘better America’ are maintained, if not fully realised, over the next four years.

What hope can we identify in the sphere of global affairs - prospects for peace in particular - with respect to the incoming Biden administration? What avenues of hope have opened up?

There are a number of immediate steps that the Biden administration can and must take in order to restore some semblance of regularity and stability to the global arms control and disarmament structures that Trump did so much to damage.

First amongst these must be an immediate agreement to extend New START, not just for a further year but for the full five years allowed under the treaty. There should be no attempts to re-negotiate certain aspects or to vary the treaty before the extension is firmly agreed.

Next, the Biden administration must re-join the JCPOA (Iran Deal) as a matter of urgency. There needs to be a significant lowering of tensions between the US and Iran and so the additional sanctions imposed following Trump’s withdrawal must be lifted. The Iranian people need urgent access to medical supplies and food-stuffs and the Iranian government needs to hear clear messages from the US government that the JCPOA, the inspections regime and further negotiations will be conducted in good faith. This means no more assassinations, no more sanctions and an end to war-like rhetoric from the halls of Washington.

As with New START, there should be no preconditions to resuming US participation in the JCPOA and any attempts to curb Iran’s ballistic missile system should be addressed in separate negotiations and other measures of reassurance.

Of all the dangerous threats made by the Trump administration, the threat to resume explosive nuclear testing was perhaps the most deadly. Thankfully, no such testing was carried out but if the US had decided to go ahead then there is no international agreement to stop them. The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but has, in effect, abided by the international consensus not to engage in such tests. The US should now ratify the CTBT and encourage all other states not yet on board to do likewise.

Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty has pitched Europe into heightened nuclear tensions. Can Biden resurrect the treaty or reach agreement with the Russians to replace it with something similar? Such a course of action will be more difficult than with the other treaties and agreements already mentioned, but it is an important course of action. It will be a test for the incoming Biden administration: can they constructively engage with a ‘strategic competitor’ for the good of humanity, or is such an approach beyond them?

Biden must immediately halt US efforts to undermine the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and seriously engage with the unstoppable processes already underway. Likewise, the US must live up to the rhetoric about the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully uphold its provisions and act on the already agreed action points from successive review conferences.

The President-elect will be fully aware that the European states - including the UK - will be looking to the new administration to ‘take a lead’, particularly with regards to NATO, which Trump threw into some measure of chaos, and with respect to ‘handling’ both Russia and China. What Biden chooses to do, what course of action he decides to embark upon, presents some fundamental challenges for us all. Whereas Biden can fairly straightforwardly choose to resurrect or shore-up aspects of the nuclear treaty framework and positively engage in ‘multilateralism’ with ‘strategic rivals’ on this score, will his other policy choices be as reassuring?

The evidence seems thin on the ground. Take, for example, his Secretary of State appointment. Antony Blinken may be a very different character to Mike Pompeo, but he comes with his own political baggage. Blinken was characterised in the pages of the London Guardian as a ‘born internationalist’, which seems promising enough until you consider what he might understand ‘internationalism’ to be.

For instance he supported the US invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya, has voiced support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen and such like. It should be taken for granted that President-elect Biden is on the same page on these issues.

What is fundamentally at stake here is whether Biden can manage a global shift in power, a shift from US dominance to multipolarity, or whether he and his administration will attempt to stop the unstoppable. Will Biden’s ‘internationalism’ and commitment to ‘multilateralism’ mean positive engagement with the world or building a US-dominated coalition to divide the world between nuclear-armed blocs?

The world is watching.

Nuclear-Free Europe

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General Lee Butler once sat at the centre of the United States’ nuclear capability. He was a member of the ‘nuclear priesthood’ tasked with maintaining and expanding a nuclear infrastructure whilst keeping the political flock on the ‘correct path’. Following retirement, Butler was able to break free from the nuclear doctrine and has devoted himself to the cause of nuclear abolition. His example is not unique but it is rare enough to warrant the highest praise (see Spokesman 129).

So, how to tackle the “powerful, deeply rooted beliefs” in nuclear weapons to which Butler points? If we look at the political landscape in the nuclear-armed states, where the nuclear doctrine is deeply entrenched, then the task seems daunting. In these states, the political establishment is wedded to expanding nuclear capabilities in defiance of Treaty commitments and moral good sense, and the media and institutions of public culture are geared towards legitimising nuclear weaponry and the notion of ‘deterrence’.

What are the actual mechanisms that allow the nuclear doctrine to embed itself and spread? Tom Sauer argues in a recent article in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (‘Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union’) that they differ between the political and public spheres. In the political sphere, the promise of nuclear force modernisation allows politicians to pledge support for arms control treaties and generates consent from the military without fundamentally undermining a commitment to the nuclear doctrine.

Much of this part of the process happens behind closed doors, “without much debate, let alone approval, of the respective parliaments.” These ‘hidden’ processes are part of the nuclear ‘secret cities’ described by Becky Alexis-Martin in her recent work, Disarming Doomsday (see Spokesman 144). Nuclear weapons grew and spread from the ‘secret city’ of Los Alamos, they spread and mutated into ever more dangerous devices: the A-Bomb became the H-Bomb, then the N-Bomb. The ghastly realities of what these bombs might unleash upon humanity are hidden beneath the notion of ‘deterrence’.

If, rather than using the term ‘nuclear deterrence’, politicians and military personnel referred to ‘genocide machines’ – that is, if nuclear weapons were referred to in accurate terms – then they would quickly lose legitimacy. Sauer argues:

“The public legitimation for nuclear weapons is deterrence and in second order prestige. What these mechanisms show is that public legitimation for nuclear weapons is a narrative that does not reveal the complete picture. This may explain the gap between what the general public thinks about nuclear weapons and the objective characteristics of nuclear weapons … Public opinion in the nuclear armed states is reinforced in thinking that nuclear weapons are ‘good because they make the country safe and secure.”

There are considerable hurdles which must be overcome if we are to win widespread public support for and then achieve nuclear disarmament. Hurdles not mentioned so far include the self-interest of the massively convoluted ‘military-industrial complex’ which reaps enormous material rewards from the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons; the military alliances – some bilateral, between the US and UK for example, others networks of alliances such as NATO – which criss-cross the planet and the reflexes of bodies and institutions – ‘think tanks’, some trade unions representing workers involved in nuclear weapon manufacture, political parties or lobby groups – for whom open discussion of this topic is verboten.

This situation points to the fact that purely ‘national’ initiatives for nuclear disarmament are unlikely to succeed without regional or international cooperation. The ‘national barriers’ existent in nuclear-armed states will be more easily overcome through regional and international cooperation. Not only that, but to an increasing degree the most pressing and immediate issues faced by nuclear disarmers – as with the multiple threats and issues with which humanity faces – manifest transnationally. A transnational response is demanded.

Europe in focus

Germany

An opinion poll commissioned by the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the organisation that has spearheaded the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), provides encouragement. In a survey of four European Union states that currently host US nuclear bombs, clear majorities are in favour of their removal: 57% in Belgium, 56% in the Netherlands, 70% in Germany and 65% in Italy. None of these nations are nuclear-armed states in their own right, but as NATO-member states they are ‘committed’ to the ‘delivery’ of US nuclear weapons if required to do so. The fact that 70% of Germans surveyed are in favour of ridding their nation of US nuclear weapons leads us to the first transnational ‘problem’ that demands a transnational answer.

In May 2020, the leader of the German Social Democrats (SPD) in the Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, called for US nuclear weapons to be removed from the country. He told the Tagesspiegel newspaper that: “Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.” The ‘Merkel’ era of German politics is drawing to a close and it is not wholly inconceivable that a future government will be composed of parties which share Mützenich’s view. Although the call for the removal of US nuclear weapons is not SPD policy, it may become a bargaining chip in settling a future coalition government. Such a proposal would be popular, as evidenced not only by the ICAN survey but by the 100,000 Germans who recently called for TPNW ratification.

The removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany would be a major victory for nuclear disarmers, but we cannot escape the question of ‘what then?’ If, as seems possible, the US simply moves the weapons from Germany to neighbouring Poland or another allied state closer to the Russian border then what kind of victory will we have?

France

In February 2020, President Emmanuel Macron raised the prospect of ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear capability. In a speech to military officers, Macron called for further military coordination between EU member states – a process already under way – and proposed that France’s nuclear weapons system should play a central role. Although Macron is not the first French leader to raise such a prospect, the proposals are significant, and significantly troubling, given the context in which they were made.

Macron points to the near-collapse of the global system of nuclear treaties and control measures as one of the motivations for a new approach to ‘deterrence’ and ‘security’. He has previously called NATO “brain dead”. In his speech he correctly referred to a new ‘arms race’ and worries that Europe “must collectively realise that, in the absence of a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional, even nuclear, arms race on their soil.”

France has pledged to extend its ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Germany. The promise is implicit in the Treaty of Aachen signed between France and Germany in January 2019. The Treaty was intended to cement plans for future reforms of the EU, including a French-German defence and security council intended as the decisive political body to guide these reciprocal engagements. The Treaty is particularly significant in that its provisions extend beyond NATO’s Article 5. The new Treaty uses the phrase “by all means” when Article 5 states “such action as it deems necessary”. Through this treaty, France and Germany have already established a nuclear relationship above and beyond the ‘security arrangements’ embedded in NATO membership. How long before serious efforts are made to extend such ‘assurances’ to other EU member states?

Sauer outlines three possible future scenarios: ‘Status-quo’, where the mutual defence clauses of the Lisbon Treaty remain the only EU-wide provisions and where France maintains its existing bilateral agreements (including with the now non-EU United Kingdom); ‘Upgrading’, where French nuclear weapons are ‘Europeanised’; and ‘Downgrading’, where France dispenses with its nuclear weapons and the EU becomes nuclear-weapon-free. In all three scenarios, a transnational nuclear disarmament campaign will surely play a vital role.

Europe: Nuclear battleground?

The formal collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Friday 2 August 2019 opened a dangerous new era for nuclear security in Europe. The United States quickly followed up on its sabotage of the INF Treaty by testing a Treaty-busting, ground-launched, nuclear-capable missile on 19 August.

Does Europe risk becoming a ‘nuclear battleground’ and, if so, what can we do to resist such a risk? It seems clear that the US will look at Europe once more as a staging post for nuclear war and, as such, a potential nuclear battleground. This horrible reality was starkly illustrated in a recent US ‘war gaming’ exercise. On 21 February 2020, ‘Senior Defense Officials’ from the United States Department of Defense convened a ‘Background Briefing on Nuclear Deterrence and Modernization’. The Briefing was extraordinary for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the level of detail on US nuclear operations; secondly, because these details included the revelation of a ‘war gaming’ exercise focused on a scenario in which Europe was the ‘battleground’; thirdly, because the ‘war game’ involved the use of low-yield nuclear warheads; and fourthly, because of the utterly shameless complacency on display. US defence officials clearly exposed the fact that in terms of nuclear strategy, the US considers Europe to be its territory.

With the sabotage of the INF Treaty now an established fact and given the testing of new intermediate-range missiles, it seems likely that the Trump administration or a future US President will seek to station such weapons in Europe or, given technological developments, on ships close to Europe. Any such move requires decisive opposition. A transnational problem requires a transnational solution.

The case for a nuclear-weapons-free zone

The sample of evidence offered above – there are many other issues, not least the UK’s capability – points to the need for a Europe-wide, coordinated, creative peace movement. The transnational problems – from differences in perception to immediate risks – require transnational solutions. As ever more non-nuclear states ratify the TPNW, the overall legitimacy of nuclear weapons is diminished. When the Treaty comes into force, nuclear disarmers in non-ratifying states will have a powerful tool at their disposal. However, there are time sensitive – that is, urgent – issues which require immediate and energetic responses. In terms of Europe, they require a European movement and European solutions. Thus a coalition of peace organisations discussed, drafted and then launched the following appeal, ‘For a nuclear weapons free Europe’:

On the occasion of the 75th commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing, we, the signatories join our voices to those of the survivors and call upon our fellow citizens, politicians and governments to support a European nuclear- weapon-free zone as a matter of urgency.

We call on European governments to:

· end the modernization of all nuclear weapons

· end nuclear sharing

· sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The situation is urgent. Now is the time to respond.

See www.nukefreeeurope.eu for more and to endorse the Appeal.

First published in The Spokesman 146

Trump Must Go

From END Info 20

The world faces two existential threats: climate catastrophe and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. Since the election of Donald Trump as US President, these threats have grown and the prospects for our environment and survival as a species have diminished.

Trump did not invent climate change and his did not invent the bomb. These things existed before him and will continue to exist if, as we must all hope, he is jettisoned from the White House in a timely fashion. However, the policies he has pursued on both counts have made the world a much more dangerous place. Trump must go.

Let’s look specifically at the question of nuclear weapons. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review announced to the world that President Trump intended to use the threat of nuclear force to confront strategic rivals: Russia and China. The Review announced plans for new types of weaponry and new warheads.

Subsequently, Trump’s administration has systematically destroyed the INF Treaty, the JCPOA (Iran Deal), Open Skies Treaty and now New START looks under severe threat.

Threats have been combined with disastrous action. Another four years surely heralds more of the same. There has been much talk of another ‘Cold War’ against both Russia and China.

There is much in Trump’s actions that justifies such talk. However, the situation is much more dangerous than the ‘Cold War’ of the past. Accelerated technology, the breakdown of norms of diplomacy, the sharp contradictions developing in a ‘global economy’ mean, to quote Michael Klare, that “this isn’t your mothers’ Cold War”. Rather, we are experiencing a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move could spell the end of it all.

Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg and other prominent US activists have called for a vote for Democrat candidate, Joe Biden, as the most immediate means to remove Trump from office. Such calls have been criticised by those who point to Biden’s record on a whole number of question. That there are some who cannot cast their vote for Biden for a whole variety of substantial and deeply felt reasons is just one indication of the political mess and the legacies of harm at the centre of US society (characteristics shared by other states). On balance, it looks like Chomsky, Ellsberg and others have it right. Four more years of Trump will be a disaster for humanity. Four years of Biden will not be an easy ride. This is the choice.

New START in peril

From END Info 20

At the end of September, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered his military to assess how quickly it could bring nuclear weapons out of storage and load them onto bombers and submarines. The reason for this instruction and the motive behind publicising it is inextricably linked to Trump’s attempts to sabotage yet another nuclear treaty: New START.

Such a move signals a deliberate increase in already sky-high nuclear tensions. Is the US serious about negotiating an extension to this vital treaty, which aims to limit the number of deployed warheads? Or is it the case that the US’s most recent conduct is part of an overall strategy to tear up the global order of treaties and agreements regulating nuclear weapons?

We hope that the former, rather than the latter, is the case but there is little evidence to support such hopes. Hope comes from a different source: the continued willingness of Russia to remain diplomatically flexible in the face of shifting US demands.

At the time of writing, it has been announced that New START may enjoy a twelve month extension, following further intervention from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 20 Oct, Lavrov issued a statement clarifying Moscow’s offer, saying that Putin envisioned a one-year extension as well as a freezing of nuclear warheads by each side.

“This position of ours may be implemented only and exclusively on the premise that ‘freezing’ of warheads will not be accompanied by any additional demands on the part of the United States,” Lavrov said. “Were this approach to be acceptable for Washington, then the time gained by the extension of the New START Treaty could be used to conduct comprehensive bilateral negotiations on the future nuclear and missile arms control that must address all factors affecting strategic stability.”

We hope that this approach is acceptable and that Trump’s replacement as President of the United States approaches this and related issues in a more measured and constructive fashion.

Meanwhile, whilst agreement to ‘freeze’ the overall number of deployed warheads is welcome, recent developments and the deployment of ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads (sometime referred to as ‘useable’) by the US is a major source of concern.

B-52s over Europe: here to stay?

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Following our coverage in END Info 19 (September 2020) of the presence of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers at RAF Fairford, it has now been confirmed that these planes staged further provocative ‘exercises’ over Europe.

The respected analyst Hans Kristensen tweeted the above picture and the following text on 25 September 2020: “Unique mission of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers today over the Baltic, flying through the Suwalki gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, and doing a pass over Stockholm...”

We ask once more: what is the purpose of such flights other than to increase already sharp tensions between the US/NATO and Russia?

We understand that the B-52s will continue to fly from Fairford on a regular basis. Watch this space for more info and for campaign updates.

Safe on board?

From END Info 20

A submariner from HMS Vigilant, a UK nuclear armed submarine, was found to be drunk when reporting for duty according to various media reports.

The submarine was docked at the Kings Bay Naval base in Georgia, USA, where the UK’s allegedly ‘independent’ nuclear weapons are stored.

This story is alarming for any number of reasons, but the truth of the matter is that the present state of the UK’s nuclear submarine service is so bad that incidents such as this can hardly be surprising.

Naval submariners are tasked with running what they are told is the ‘ultimate deterrence’ and are drilled to understand and accept not only the procedures for deploying these weapons, but the consequences of doing so.

Voyages of these underwater death machines last for months, where crew members endure cramped quarters and, it seems reasonable to assume, acute boredom. No wonder some of them ‘lest loose’ once they reach dry land.

The fact of the matter is that this situation only adds to the risks and dangers of nuclear weaponry. One false move and life on this planet will end.

Russia’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Fundamentals 2020’

From END Info 20

Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) recently highlighted an important statement of Russia’s new “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Policy”. This document was released by Moscow in June 2020 and, as the analysis points out, such publication - including an easily accessible English translation - marks a departure from previous years.

JRL asks: “One immediate question is whether the idea of using nuclear weapons in a regional conflict as part of an ‘escalation for de-escalation’ strategy still exists in Russia’s military planning.” The answer? “Yes, and no: the West and Russia have different interpretations of this central concept ... The West tends to associate the notion with the threat of, say, attacking the Baltic states, but Russia sees it as nuclear-based coercion that prevents NATO from defending these allies ... Meanwhile, there are no credible signs that Russia is planning to attack the Baltics, especially with any hint of nuclear weapons, which would open direct conflict with NATO.”

The open publication of Russia’s nuclear posture should serve to clarify any confusion about Russia’s intentions with regard to this strategy, which was adopted in response to the “Serbian scenario” at the end of the 1990s, when NATO intervened directly in Europe.

The bad news from this document is that Russia has codified its nuclear posture response to the changing nuclear landscape in Europe by issuing a number of “red lines” and a lower threshold for nuclear use. For instance, “the policy says that only ‘reliable’ information ... is needed about the launch of any ballistic missile toward Russia for there to be a potential response. This undermines the future deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and missiles connected with the Aegis offshore missile defence system - all of which Russia officially calls offensive infrastructure.”

This posture is a clear response to Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty and threats to station a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe. ‘Every action has a reaction’ and Trump’s bonfire of treaties and international norms has made the world a much more dangerous place.

Tromsø says ‘Nei’ to US sub base, govn pushes ahead

From END Info 20

Local politicians in Tromsø, Northern Norway, have expressed their opposition to plans to re-open a mothballed base in the area to house US submarines. The base was decommissioned by the Norwegian navy in 2009, but now the US Navy wishes to make a deal to allow use of the Olavsvern base.

US subs have already visited the base, including the USS Seawolf fast attack vessel in August this year. It is thought the both US and NATO subs will sail from the base in the near future.

The position of the Olavsvern base in the Arctic region is strategically important to the US and NATO, which is fixated on ‘responding to’ perceived Russian threats in the region. The opening of a permanent NATO base in the area is likely to do little more than increase already heightened tensions.

In response to opposition from the local council, the Norwegian government responded along the lines that “Tromsø cannot independently leave NATO”! Why not, we ask in return?

The story of the Olavsvern base illustrates the degree to which international relations have deteriorated and the degree to which the western military alliance is once again adopting a ‘Cold War’ mentality.

After the end of the ‘Cold War’, the Norwegian military lost interest in the base. It served no purpose and cost a great deal of money to keep operational. Following logic, they sold it. Strangely enough, the Norwegian version of ebay was used and one lucky buyer picked it up for $5 million. The base later changed hands and the current owners envisaged using it for logistics and repair support for Norway’s enormous oil industry. It looks like these plans are now on hold.

Will the US and NATO allies be stationing nuclear-armed submarines at the base? How often will the base be used? What risks are posed to nearby residents? What risks are posed more widely? Does the US envisage engaging Russian submarines and other naval vessels or is the base just a ‘show of force’ (a dangerous one)?

Tromsø was right to say ‘Nei’ to the plans and we join their call of opposition.