US Missile Intercept

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reported the successful test of a missile interception system in November, 2020. According to various reports, ‘a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballastic missile (ICBM) target in a test. With this milestone, the SM-3 Block IIA becomes only the second US interceptor type to exhibit this capability.’ (Carnegie Endowment website).

Bloomberg reported the events in the following terms: ‘an intercontinental ballistic missile was fired in the general direction of the Hawaiian islands. During its descent a few minutes later, still outside the earth’s atmosphere, it was struck by another missile that destroyed it.’

It may seem perfectly legitimate for any country, including the US, to test and perfect such systems. After all, it is the right of every American not to be murdered by nuclear weapons. However, the announcement of this test has deep and worrying implications for us all.

If such systems were fully developed, what forces or arrangements would prevent the US from actually using its nuclear weapons? If they could be used without fear of nuclear counter-strike, would an American President be more or less likely to use nuclear weapons? Isn’t such a test deeply worrying given the massively increased nuclear tensions, deliberate undermining of the infrastructure of nuclear arms control and general degradation of the ‘global norms’ that have helped prevent nuclear war in the past?

If the perverse concept of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ has been undermined by technological developments, then where does this leave nuclear ‘strategy’?

Now that the US has introduced further asymmetry into nuclear questions, what next?

After Trump: what prospects for peace?

The defeat of President Donald Trump at the hands of the US electorate brings an end to four years of threats, bombast and potentially deadly unpredictability. END Info, The Spokesman and other publications have covered the horrible realities of the Trump regime in detail and there is no need to repeat them again.

It is important to note that despite his defeat, Trump’s ‘popular vote’ actually increased: he secured more support on the ground in 2020 than in the previous election. The magnificent mobilisation of voters, who lent their support to President-elect Biden, was the decisive factor. We must hope that the aspirations and demands of these voters are fulfilled by the incoming administration. If not, then a return to ‘Trump-style’ rule is not out of the question. Maintaining a broad political mobilisation will be key to ensuring that the hopes of a ‘better America’ are maintained, if not fully realised, over the next four years.

What hope can we identify in the sphere of global affairs - prospects for peace in particular - with respect to the incoming Biden administration? What avenues of hope have opened up?

There are a number of immediate steps that the Biden administration can and must take in order to restore some semblance of regularity and stability to the global arms control and disarmament structures that Trump did so much to damage.

First amongst these must be an immediate agreement to extend New START, not just for a further year but for the full five years allowed under the treaty. There should be no attempts to re-negotiate certain aspects or to vary the treaty before the extension is firmly agreed.

Next, the Biden administration must re-join the JCPOA (Iran Deal) as a matter of urgency. There needs to be a significant lowering of tensions between the US and Iran and so the additional sanctions imposed following Trump’s withdrawal must be lifted. The Iranian people need urgent access to medical supplies and food-stuffs and the Iranian government needs to hear clear messages from the US government that the JCPOA, the inspections regime and further negotiations will be conducted in good faith. This means no more assassinations, no more sanctions and an end to war-like rhetoric from the halls of Washington.

As with New START, there should be no preconditions to resuming US participation in the JCPOA and any attempts to curb Iran’s ballistic missile system should be addressed in separate negotiations and other measures of reassurance.

Of all the dangerous threats made by the Trump administration, the threat to resume explosive nuclear testing was perhaps the most deadly. Thankfully, no such testing was carried out but if the US had decided to go ahead then there is no international agreement to stop them. The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but has, in effect, abided by the international consensus not to engage in such tests. The US should now ratify the CTBT and encourage all other states not yet on board to do likewise.

Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty has pitched Europe into heightened nuclear tensions. Can Biden resurrect the treaty or reach agreement with the Russians to replace it with something similar? Such a course of action will be more difficult than with the other treaties and agreements already mentioned, but it is an important course of action. It will be a test for the incoming Biden administration: can they constructively engage with a ‘strategic competitor’ for the good of humanity, or is such an approach beyond them?

Biden must immediately halt US efforts to undermine the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and seriously engage with the unstoppable processes already underway. Likewise, the US must live up to the rhetoric about the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully uphold its provisions and act on the already agreed action points from successive review conferences.

The President-elect will be fully aware that the European states - including the UK - will be looking to the new administration to ‘take a lead’, particularly with regards to NATO, which Trump threw into some measure of chaos, and with respect to ‘handling’ both Russia and China. What Biden chooses to do, what course of action he decides to embark upon, presents some fundamental challenges for us all. Whereas Biden can fairly straightforwardly choose to resurrect or shore-up aspects of the nuclear treaty framework and positively engage in ‘multilateralism’ with ‘strategic rivals’ on this score, will his other policy choices be as reassuring?

The evidence seems thin on the ground. Take, for example, his Secretary of State appointment. Antony Blinken may be a very different character to Mike Pompeo, but he comes with his own political baggage. Blinken was characterised in the pages of the London Guardian as a ‘born internationalist’, which seems promising enough until you consider what he might understand ‘internationalism’ to be.

For instance he supported the US invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya, has voiced support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen and such like. It should be taken for granted that President-elect Biden is on the same page on these issues.

What is fundamentally at stake here is whether Biden can manage a global shift in power, a shift from US dominance to multipolarity, or whether he and his administration will attempt to stop the unstoppable. Will Biden’s ‘internationalism’ and commitment to ‘multilateralism’ mean positive engagement with the world or building a US-dominated coalition to divide the world between nuclear-armed blocs?

The world is watching.

Nuclear-Free Europe

From END Info 20

General Lee Butler once sat at the centre of the United States’ nuclear capability. He was a member of the ‘nuclear priesthood’ tasked with maintaining and expanding a nuclear infrastructure whilst keeping the political flock on the ‘correct path’. Following retirement, Butler was able to break free from the nuclear doctrine and has devoted himself to the cause of nuclear abolition. His example is not unique but it is rare enough to warrant the highest praise (see Spokesman 129).

So, how to tackle the “powerful, deeply rooted beliefs” in nuclear weapons to which Butler points? If we look at the political landscape in the nuclear-armed states, where the nuclear doctrine is deeply entrenched, then the task seems daunting. In these states, the political establishment is wedded to expanding nuclear capabilities in defiance of Treaty commitments and moral good sense, and the media and institutions of public culture are geared towards legitimising nuclear weaponry and the notion of ‘deterrence’.

What are the actual mechanisms that allow the nuclear doctrine to embed itself and spread? Tom Sauer argues in a recent article in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (‘Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union’) that they differ between the political and public spheres. In the political sphere, the promise of nuclear force modernisation allows politicians to pledge support for arms control treaties and generates consent from the military without fundamentally undermining a commitment to the nuclear doctrine.

Much of this part of the process happens behind closed doors, “without much debate, let alone approval, of the respective parliaments.” These ‘hidden’ processes are part of the nuclear ‘secret cities’ described by Becky Alexis-Martin in her recent work, Disarming Doomsday (see Spokesman 144). Nuclear weapons grew and spread from the ‘secret city’ of Los Alamos, they spread and mutated into ever more dangerous devices: the A-Bomb became the H-Bomb, then the N-Bomb. The ghastly realities of what these bombs might unleash upon humanity are hidden beneath the notion of ‘deterrence’.

If, rather than using the term ‘nuclear deterrence’, politicians and military personnel referred to ‘genocide machines’ – that is, if nuclear weapons were referred to in accurate terms – then they would quickly lose legitimacy. Sauer argues:

“The public legitimation for nuclear weapons is deterrence and in second order prestige. What these mechanisms show is that public legitimation for nuclear weapons is a narrative that does not reveal the complete picture. This may explain the gap between what the general public thinks about nuclear weapons and the objective characteristics of nuclear weapons … Public opinion in the nuclear armed states is reinforced in thinking that nuclear weapons are ‘good because they make the country safe and secure.”

There are considerable hurdles which must be overcome if we are to win widespread public support for and then achieve nuclear disarmament. Hurdles not mentioned so far include the self-interest of the massively convoluted ‘military-industrial complex’ which reaps enormous material rewards from the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons; the military alliances – some bilateral, between the US and UK for example, others networks of alliances such as NATO – which criss-cross the planet and the reflexes of bodies and institutions – ‘think tanks’, some trade unions representing workers involved in nuclear weapon manufacture, political parties or lobby groups – for whom open discussion of this topic is verboten.

This situation points to the fact that purely ‘national’ initiatives for nuclear disarmament are unlikely to succeed without regional or international cooperation. The ‘national barriers’ existent in nuclear-armed states will be more easily overcome through regional and international cooperation. Not only that, but to an increasing degree the most pressing and immediate issues faced by nuclear disarmers – as with the multiple threats and issues with which humanity faces – manifest transnationally. A transnational response is demanded.

Europe in focus

Germany

An opinion poll commissioned by the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the organisation that has spearheaded the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), provides encouragement. In a survey of four European Union states that currently host US nuclear bombs, clear majorities are in favour of their removal: 57% in Belgium, 56% in the Netherlands, 70% in Germany and 65% in Italy. None of these nations are nuclear-armed states in their own right, but as NATO-member states they are ‘committed’ to the ‘delivery’ of US nuclear weapons if required to do so. The fact that 70% of Germans surveyed are in favour of ridding their nation of US nuclear weapons leads us to the first transnational ‘problem’ that demands a transnational answer.

In May 2020, the leader of the German Social Democrats (SPD) in the Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, called for US nuclear weapons to be removed from the country. He told the Tagesspiegel newspaper that: “Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.” The ‘Merkel’ era of German politics is drawing to a close and it is not wholly inconceivable that a future government will be composed of parties which share Mützenich’s view. Although the call for the removal of US nuclear weapons is not SPD policy, it may become a bargaining chip in settling a future coalition government. Such a proposal would be popular, as evidenced not only by the ICAN survey but by the 100,000 Germans who recently called for TPNW ratification.

The removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany would be a major victory for nuclear disarmers, but we cannot escape the question of ‘what then?’ If, as seems possible, the US simply moves the weapons from Germany to neighbouring Poland or another allied state closer to the Russian border then what kind of victory will we have?

France

In February 2020, President Emmanuel Macron raised the prospect of ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear capability. In a speech to military officers, Macron called for further military coordination between EU member states – a process already under way – and proposed that France’s nuclear weapons system should play a central role. Although Macron is not the first French leader to raise such a prospect, the proposals are significant, and significantly troubling, given the context in which they were made.

Macron points to the near-collapse of the global system of nuclear treaties and control measures as one of the motivations for a new approach to ‘deterrence’ and ‘security’. He has previously called NATO “brain dead”. In his speech he correctly referred to a new ‘arms race’ and worries that Europe “must collectively realise that, in the absence of a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional, even nuclear, arms race on their soil.”

France has pledged to extend its ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Germany. The promise is implicit in the Treaty of Aachen signed between France and Germany in January 2019. The Treaty was intended to cement plans for future reforms of the EU, including a French-German defence and security council intended as the decisive political body to guide these reciprocal engagements. The Treaty is particularly significant in that its provisions extend beyond NATO’s Article 5. The new Treaty uses the phrase “by all means” when Article 5 states “such action as it deems necessary”. Through this treaty, France and Germany have already established a nuclear relationship above and beyond the ‘security arrangements’ embedded in NATO membership. How long before serious efforts are made to extend such ‘assurances’ to other EU member states?

Sauer outlines three possible future scenarios: ‘Status-quo’, where the mutual defence clauses of the Lisbon Treaty remain the only EU-wide provisions and where France maintains its existing bilateral agreements (including with the now non-EU United Kingdom); ‘Upgrading’, where French nuclear weapons are ‘Europeanised’; and ‘Downgrading’, where France dispenses with its nuclear weapons and the EU becomes nuclear-weapon-free. In all three scenarios, a transnational nuclear disarmament campaign will surely play a vital role.

Europe: Nuclear battleground?

The formal collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Friday 2 August 2019 opened a dangerous new era for nuclear security in Europe. The United States quickly followed up on its sabotage of the INF Treaty by testing a Treaty-busting, ground-launched, nuclear-capable missile on 19 August.

Does Europe risk becoming a ‘nuclear battleground’ and, if so, what can we do to resist such a risk? It seems clear that the US will look at Europe once more as a staging post for nuclear war and, as such, a potential nuclear battleground. This horrible reality was starkly illustrated in a recent US ‘war gaming’ exercise. On 21 February 2020, ‘Senior Defense Officials’ from the United States Department of Defense convened a ‘Background Briefing on Nuclear Deterrence and Modernization’. The Briefing was extraordinary for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the level of detail on US nuclear operations; secondly, because these details included the revelation of a ‘war gaming’ exercise focused on a scenario in which Europe was the ‘battleground’; thirdly, because the ‘war game’ involved the use of low-yield nuclear warheads; and fourthly, because of the utterly shameless complacency on display. US defence officials clearly exposed the fact that in terms of nuclear strategy, the US considers Europe to be its territory.

With the sabotage of the INF Treaty now an established fact and given the testing of new intermediate-range missiles, it seems likely that the Trump administration or a future US President will seek to station such weapons in Europe or, given technological developments, on ships close to Europe. Any such move requires decisive opposition. A transnational problem requires a transnational solution.

The case for a nuclear-weapons-free zone

The sample of evidence offered above – there are many other issues, not least the UK’s capability – points to the need for a Europe-wide, coordinated, creative peace movement. The transnational problems – from differences in perception to immediate risks – require transnational solutions. As ever more non-nuclear states ratify the TPNW, the overall legitimacy of nuclear weapons is diminished. When the Treaty comes into force, nuclear disarmers in non-ratifying states will have a powerful tool at their disposal. However, there are time sensitive – that is, urgent – issues which require immediate and energetic responses. In terms of Europe, they require a European movement and European solutions. Thus a coalition of peace organisations discussed, drafted and then launched the following appeal, ‘For a nuclear weapons free Europe’:

On the occasion of the 75th commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing, we, the signatories join our voices to those of the survivors and call upon our fellow citizens, politicians and governments to support a European nuclear- weapon-free zone as a matter of urgency.

We call on European governments to:

· end the modernization of all nuclear weapons

· end nuclear sharing

· sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The situation is urgent. Now is the time to respond.

See www.nukefreeeurope.eu for more and to endorse the Appeal.

First published in The Spokesman 146

Trump Must Go

From END Info 20

The world faces two existential threats: climate catastrophe and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. Since the election of Donald Trump as US President, these threats have grown and the prospects for our environment and survival as a species have diminished.

Trump did not invent climate change and his did not invent the bomb. These things existed before him and will continue to exist if, as we must all hope, he is jettisoned from the White House in a timely fashion. However, the policies he has pursued on both counts have made the world a much more dangerous place. Trump must go.

Let’s look specifically at the question of nuclear weapons. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review announced to the world that President Trump intended to use the threat of nuclear force to confront strategic rivals: Russia and China. The Review announced plans for new types of weaponry and new warheads.

Subsequently, Trump’s administration has systematically destroyed the INF Treaty, the JCPOA (Iran Deal), Open Skies Treaty and now New START looks under severe threat.

Threats have been combined with disastrous action. Another four years surely heralds more of the same. There has been much talk of another ‘Cold War’ against both Russia and China.

There is much in Trump’s actions that justifies such talk. However, the situation is much more dangerous than the ‘Cold War’ of the past. Accelerated technology, the breakdown of norms of diplomacy, the sharp contradictions developing in a ‘global economy’ mean, to quote Michael Klare, that “this isn’t your mothers’ Cold War”. Rather, we are experiencing a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move could spell the end of it all.

Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg and other prominent US activists have called for a vote for Democrat candidate, Joe Biden, as the most immediate means to remove Trump from office. Such calls have been criticised by those who point to Biden’s record on a whole number of question. That there are some who cannot cast their vote for Biden for a whole variety of substantial and deeply felt reasons is just one indication of the political mess and the legacies of harm at the centre of US society (characteristics shared by other states). On balance, it looks like Chomsky, Ellsberg and others have it right. Four more years of Trump will be a disaster for humanity. Four years of Biden will not be an easy ride. This is the choice.

New START in peril

From END Info 20

At the end of September, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered his military to assess how quickly it could bring nuclear weapons out of storage and load them onto bombers and submarines. The reason for this instruction and the motive behind publicising it is inextricably linked to Trump’s attempts to sabotage yet another nuclear treaty: New START.

Such a move signals a deliberate increase in already sky-high nuclear tensions. Is the US serious about negotiating an extension to this vital treaty, which aims to limit the number of deployed warheads? Or is it the case that the US’s most recent conduct is part of an overall strategy to tear up the global order of treaties and agreements regulating nuclear weapons?

We hope that the former, rather than the latter, is the case but there is little evidence to support such hopes. Hope comes from a different source: the continued willingness of Russia to remain diplomatically flexible in the face of shifting US demands.

At the time of writing, it has been announced that New START may enjoy a twelve month extension, following further intervention from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 20 Oct, Lavrov issued a statement clarifying Moscow’s offer, saying that Putin envisioned a one-year extension as well as a freezing of nuclear warheads by each side.

“This position of ours may be implemented only and exclusively on the premise that ‘freezing’ of warheads will not be accompanied by any additional demands on the part of the United States,” Lavrov said. “Were this approach to be acceptable for Washington, then the time gained by the extension of the New START Treaty could be used to conduct comprehensive bilateral negotiations on the future nuclear and missile arms control that must address all factors affecting strategic stability.”

We hope that this approach is acceptable and that Trump’s replacement as President of the United States approaches this and related issues in a more measured and constructive fashion.

Meanwhile, whilst agreement to ‘freeze’ the overall number of deployed warheads is welcome, recent developments and the deployment of ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads (sometime referred to as ‘useable’) by the US is a major source of concern.

B-52s over Europe: here to stay?

From END Info 20

Following our coverage in END Info 19 (September 2020) of the presence of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers at RAF Fairford, it has now been confirmed that these planes staged further provocative ‘exercises’ over Europe.

The respected analyst Hans Kristensen tweeted the above picture and the following text on 25 September 2020: “Unique mission of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers today over the Baltic, flying through the Suwalki gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, and doing a pass over Stockholm...”

We ask once more: what is the purpose of such flights other than to increase already sharp tensions between the US/NATO and Russia?

We understand that the B-52s will continue to fly from Fairford on a regular basis. Watch this space for more info and for campaign updates.

Safe on board?

From END Info 20

A submariner from HMS Vigilant, a UK nuclear armed submarine, was found to be drunk when reporting for duty according to various media reports.

The submarine was docked at the Kings Bay Naval base in Georgia, USA, where the UK’s allegedly ‘independent’ nuclear weapons are stored.

This story is alarming for any number of reasons, but the truth of the matter is that the present state of the UK’s nuclear submarine service is so bad that incidents such as this can hardly be surprising.

Naval submariners are tasked with running what they are told is the ‘ultimate deterrence’ and are drilled to understand and accept not only the procedures for deploying these weapons, but the consequences of doing so.

Voyages of these underwater death machines last for months, where crew members endure cramped quarters and, it seems reasonable to assume, acute boredom. No wonder some of them ‘lest loose’ once they reach dry land.

The fact of the matter is that this situation only adds to the risks and dangers of nuclear weaponry. One false move and life on this planet will end.

Russia’s ‘Nuclear Deterrence Fundamentals 2020’

From END Info 20

Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) recently highlighted an important statement of Russia’s new “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Policy”. This document was released by Moscow in June 2020 and, as the analysis points out, such publication - including an easily accessible English translation - marks a departure from previous years.

JRL asks: “One immediate question is whether the idea of using nuclear weapons in a regional conflict as part of an ‘escalation for de-escalation’ strategy still exists in Russia’s military planning.” The answer? “Yes, and no: the West and Russia have different interpretations of this central concept ... The West tends to associate the notion with the threat of, say, attacking the Baltic states, but Russia sees it as nuclear-based coercion that prevents NATO from defending these allies ... Meanwhile, there are no credible signs that Russia is planning to attack the Baltics, especially with any hint of nuclear weapons, which would open direct conflict with NATO.”

The open publication of Russia’s nuclear posture should serve to clarify any confusion about Russia’s intentions with regard to this strategy, which was adopted in response to the “Serbian scenario” at the end of the 1990s, when NATO intervened directly in Europe.

The bad news from this document is that Russia has codified its nuclear posture response to the changing nuclear landscape in Europe by issuing a number of “red lines” and a lower threshold for nuclear use. For instance, “the policy says that only ‘reliable’ information ... is needed about the launch of any ballistic missile toward Russia for there to be a potential response. This undermines the future deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe and missiles connected with the Aegis offshore missile defence system - all of which Russia officially calls offensive infrastructure.”

This posture is a clear response to Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty and threats to station a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe. ‘Every action has a reaction’ and Trump’s bonfire of treaties and international norms has made the world a much more dangerous place.

Tromsø says ‘Nei’ to US sub base, govn pushes ahead

From END Info 20

Local politicians in Tromsø, Northern Norway, have expressed their opposition to plans to re-open a mothballed base in the area to house US submarines. The base was decommissioned by the Norwegian navy in 2009, but now the US Navy wishes to make a deal to allow use of the Olavsvern base.

US subs have already visited the base, including the USS Seawolf fast attack vessel in August this year. It is thought the both US and NATO subs will sail from the base in the near future.

The position of the Olavsvern base in the Arctic region is strategically important to the US and NATO, which is fixated on ‘responding to’ perceived Russian threats in the region. The opening of a permanent NATO base in the area is likely to do little more than increase already heightened tensions.

In response to opposition from the local council, the Norwegian government responded along the lines that “Tromsø cannot independently leave NATO”! Why not, we ask in return?

The story of the Olavsvern base illustrates the degree to which international relations have deteriorated and the degree to which the western military alliance is once again adopting a ‘Cold War’ mentality.

After the end of the ‘Cold War’, the Norwegian military lost interest in the base. It served no purpose and cost a great deal of money to keep operational. Following logic, they sold it. Strangely enough, the Norwegian version of ebay was used and one lucky buyer picked it up for $5 million. The base later changed hands and the current owners envisaged using it for logistics and repair support for Norway’s enormous oil industry. It looks like these plans are now on hold.

Will the US and NATO allies be stationing nuclear-armed submarines at the base? How often will the base be used? What risks are posed to nearby residents? What risks are posed more widely? Does the US envisage engaging Russian submarines and other naval vessels or is the base just a ‘show of force’ (a dangerous one)?

Tromsø was right to say ‘Nei’ to the plans and we join their call of opposition.

New US ‘Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile’

From END Info 20

Dr Robert Soofer, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy announced a new generation of “nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles” during a meeting at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in early September. Soofer characterised the announcement as a “response to Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons.”

In fact, such a development is entirely in line with strategy embedded in the US’s last Nuclear Posture Review and fits with the overall posture of aggression adopted against Russia and China.

Such developments will not have escaped the attention of those states characterised as “strategic rivals” or “competitors” in various US policy documents and will surely lead to reciprocal technology developments and deployment.

END Info was alerted to the prospect of a new generation of sea-launched missiles earlier this year by Dr Joachim Wernicke, a Berlin-based analyst and translator of the German edition of Cmdr Rob Greeen’s Security without Nuclear Deterrence. In his analysis of such a development, Dr Wernicke raised the prospect that such systems could be deployed in the seas close to Europe as an alternative to a new generation of land-based nuclear -capable intermediate-range missiles. This prospect now looks all the more likely.

Combined with announcements of the W76-2 tactical nuclear warhead, the overall effect is to lower the ‘nuclear threshold’ once more. What the nuclear-armed states refer to as ‘strategic flexibility’ actually amounts to risk multiplication.

We will remain alert to the prospect of these weapons being deployed outside of US territorial waters.

The Belmarsh Tribunal

The ‘Progressive International’, an organisation of activists, artists, intellectuals and others, has convened The Belmarsh Tribunal to “to put the United States government on trial for its crimes of the twenty first century – from atrocities in Iraq to torture at Guantánamo Bay to the CIA‘s illegal surveillance program – and draw attention to the extradition case of Julian Assange for revealing them.”

Named after the prison in which Julian Assange is being held, this new tribunal invokes the legacy of the International War Crimes Tribunal founded by Bertrand Russell in response to the US’s actions in Vietnam. The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation wrote to Yannis Varoufakis and Srecko Horvat from the Progressive International as follows:

Dear Yannis, Dear Srecko, We were encouraged to hear of your timely initiative in convening the Belmarsh Tribunal. In Russell’s words about the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal, it is urgently necessary to ‘prevent the crime of silence’ surrounding Julian Assange and the extradition proceedings to which he is subject. We wish you well in your endeavours, and please let us know if we can assist.

With greetings from England!

Tony Simpson, Tom Unterrainer and Tamara Coates

Don't Extradite Assange

From END Info 20

“[I]t is our responsibility to stand by a true journalist whose sheer courage ought to be inspiration to all of us who still believe that freedom is possible. I salute him.” John Pilger

The WikiLeaks founder, journalist Julian Assange, sits in Belmarsh Prison awaiting his fate. Will he be extradited to the United States, or will he be freed? The campaign that has been waged against Julian is in response to his heroic work in exposing the recent crimes of American imperialism and revealing the intrigue at the heart of power diplomacy. In these efforts, WikiLeaks and Julian were assisted by equally heroic whistle-blowers like Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning: people in the ‘heart of the machine’ who saw the evil at work and decided to expose it to the world. As John Pilger reports (see www.johnpilger.com), there has been a determined effort to ‘get’ Julian Assange. He writes: ‘In 2008, a top secret US State Department report described in detail how the United States would combat this new moral threat. A secretly-directed personal smear campaign against Julian Assange would lead to "exposure [and] criminal prosecution". The aim was to silence and criminalise WikiLeaks and its founder. Page after page revealed a coming war on a single human being and on the very principle of freedom of speech and freedom of thought, and democracy. The imperial shock troops would be those who called themselves journalists: the big hitters of the so-called mainstream, especially the "liberals" who mark and patrol the perimeters of dissent. And that is what happened. I have been a reporter for more than 50 years and I have never known a smear campaign like it: the fabricated character assassination of a man who refused to join the club: who believed journalism was a service to the public, never to those above.’ If the worst happens and Julian Assange is extradited to the USA, then a serious breach of justice will be done. Journalism will have been criminalised and all our freedoms will be undermined.

The Bomb has been banned!

From END Info 20

As END Info 20 goes to press, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has secured fifty ratifications and will come ‘into force’ on 22 January 2021. This historic event is the result of consistent and heroic efforts on the part of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and reflects growing international concern about nuclear tensions.

Meanwhile, the United States is engaged in desperate measures to undermine the TPNW. The Associated Press has obtained a copy of a letter sent by the US to TPNW signatories which claims that the treaty “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous ... Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the ... [TPNW] we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession”.

Responding to the letter, Beatrice Fihn from ICAN characterised such claims as “straightforward lies, to be frank.” The US pitches its objection around the TPNW being a threat to the NPT. This is not only false, given that the NPT explicitly calls for further measures to advance complete nuclear disarmament, but is a bit rich coming from a nuclear armed state that has done little to advance work on the NPT and which has systematically undermined a host of other global nuclear treaties.

This latest action by the US is part of an ongoing effort by the nuclear armed states to undermine the TPNW and to coerce non-nuclear armed states into rejecting the treaty. Perhaps the most significant obstacles have been the actions of the US, UK and NATO allies. The effects of the ‘NATO factor’ can be seen in the fact that the only European states that have ratified the TPNW to date are all non-NATO members. This poses questons about the future direction of the campaign around the TPNW and suggests that a focus on NATO along with consideration of complementary initiatives might be appropriate.

Meanwhile, the TPNW is a reality. The existing, truly inspiring, efforts to achieve ratification will surely continue. In a number of countries there are lively efforts to win further support. Likewise, a planned conference of TPNW ‘ratifiers’ which looks set to take place in Austria, will put additional pressure on those states that have not already ratified the treaty. In addition, such a conference will be an important platform for exposing the dangers of nuclear tensions, nuclear weapons and the nuclear risks we face.

The TPNW will be an essential political tool for campaigners dealing with political parties that present themselves as ‘defenders and promoters of human rights and international law’, but who in contradiction to their professed policies maintain a commitment to weapons of mass murder and attempt to ignore this global treaty.

The TPNW is here. The bomb has been banned. Now it’s up to the peace movements across the world to promote, extend and mobilise to ensure that the TPNW truly comes “into force”. Much work to do in 2021, but the TPNW is a powerful and essential tool in our work for a nuclear free world.

Iran and the nuclear deal

As tensions continue around the Iran nuclear deal, two recent decisions return the spotlight to Iran and the nuclear weapon question in the Middle East.

First, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) blocked attempts by the US to ‘snapback’ all sanctions against Iran that were lifted following agreement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) – or, Iran Deal – in 2015.

The ‘E3′ members of the JCPoA – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – were amongst those who opposed the attempt. They noted in a public statement “that the US ceased to be a participant to the JCPoA following their withdrawal from the deal on 8 May, 2018 … We cannot therefore support this action which is incompatible with our current efforts to support the JCPoA.”

In response, a US envoy accused the UNSC of “standing in the company of terrorists”.

Second, Iran has granted the International Atomic Energy Agency access to two sites which the US and Israeli governments claim are connected to secret nuclear material and activity. Permission to access these sites is a major step forward following events at the start of 2020 and more recent incidents. The assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, January 2020, emphasised that the Trump administration regards Iran as a target and that it is prepared to take reckless actions.

The situation could easily have spiralled out of control if not for a degree of political and military restraint on the part of the Iranian government. Some commentators warned that this event might trigger the start of a ‘nuclear arms race’ in the Middle East.

The Iranian government are fully aware that both Iraq and Libya renounced their nuclear weapons programmes and that following this, both countries faced onslaught from the US military. The twisted ‘logic’ of nuclear deterrence suggests that possession of a nuclear weapons capability ensures against such a prospect. Substantiation for such a risk was provided by the Iranian government itself, when two days after the killing it announced that it would no longer abide by any of the constraints or limitations on nuclear enrichment contained in the JCPoA. The US, which had withdrawn from the JCPoA alleging Iranian breaches despite confirmation from IAEA inspectors that Iran was abiding by the rules, intensified lobbying for a sanctions ‘snapback’ from this point.

Despite US pressure, other parties to the JCPoA continued to work within the framework of the agreement. Following Iran’s statement of intent, the E3 triggered a ‘dispute resolution mechanism’ which, if not for ongoing diplomatic flexibility on the part of the Iranians, could have forced the complete collapse of the JCPoA. Some analysts have suggested that this was the intent of at least one E3 leader, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. However, the JCPoA framework has not collapsed and Iran continues to engage. For serious progress to be made and for the JCPoA to endure, other parties will have to offer Iran serious incentives rather than threats of tightening sanctions or further aggression.

Events such as those at the Natanz nuclear facility in July this year will not have bolstered confidence in a diplomatic solution. It was initially feared that the explosion at the facility resulted from a missile strike, but more recently Iranian officials pinpointed the cause as an act of sabotage. The source and inspiration of the sabotage has not yet been revealed. Whilst we should hope that progress is maintained and support all diplomatic efforts to avert the breakdown of the JCPoA, we should remain alert to the risks of further unilateral action by the United States.

The US ‘envoy’ who ‘undiplomatically’ characterised the United Nations Security Council of standing with terrorists is none other than Elliott Abrams, ‘U.S. special envoy to Iran’. Abrams was characterised in The Nation magazine as having a career “literally built on the defense of mass murder and genocide and his willingness to lie on behalf of those who carried it out and smear the reputations of anyone who sought to try and stop or expose it.” This quote refers directly to Abrams’ dealings in Central America in the 1980s. That’s a deeply concerning résumé for someone tasked with representing US interests anywhere, let alone in Iran, and points to the aggressive posture adopted by the US.

The weeks running up to the US Presidential election will likely see Trump making unpredictable and potentially disastrous decisions in an attempt to distract from the multiple failures of his government and to mobilise opinion behind him. We should not discount the possibility that one such decision could include military action. If it does, then the fact that Iran is already in the cross-hairs should put the peace and anti-war movements on the alert.

First published on the CND website www.cnduk.org

Nuclear disarmament on the agenda!

As the number of states ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) edges ever closer to the ‘magic number’ of 50, it looks certain that a ‘global ban’ of nuclear weapons will come ‘into force’ early in 2021. Once the Treaty passes this threshold, the nuclear-armed states and other states, ‘non-nuclear’ NATO members for instance, will have to decide whether or not to continue ignoring the TPNW or if they’ll take their obligations as ‘law-abiding’ states seriously. If, as looks likely, the nuclear-armed states and allies continue on their destructive path then the international peace movement must vigorously respond, as they undoubtedly will. To their credit, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has worked tirelessly to achieve a situation where we not only have an international treaty with growing support but an international shift in perception where whatever ‘legitimacy’ nuclear weapons still enjoy has received a massive dent. ICAN has coordinated the following ‘open letter’ addressing the current situation and what must now be done.

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Fifty-six former presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers and defence ministers from 20 NATO member states, as well as Japan and South Korea, have just issued an open letter calling on current leaders to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:

The coronavirus pandemic has starkly demonstrated the urgent need for greater international cooperation to address all major threats to the health and welfare of humankind. Paramount among them is the threat of nuclear war. The risk of a nuclear weapon detonation today — whether by accident, miscalculation or design — appears to be increasing, with the recent deployment of new types of nuclear weapons, the abandonment of longstanding arms control agreements, and the very real danger of cyber-attacks on nuclear infrastructure. Let us heed the warnings of scientists, doctors and other experts. We must not sleepwalk into a crisis of even greater proportions than the one we have experienced this year. It is not difficult to foresee how the bellicose rhetoric and poor judgment of leaders in nuclear-armed nations might result in a calamity affecting all nations and peoples. As past leaders, foreign ministers and defence ministers of Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain and Turkey — all countries that claim protection from an ally’s nuclear weapons — we appeal to current leaders to advance disarmament before it is too late. An obvious starting point for the leaders of our own countries would be to declare without qualification that nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose in light of the catastrophic human and environmental consequences of their use. In other words, our countries should reject any role for nuclear weapons in our defence. By claiming protection from nuclear weapons, we are promoting the dangerous and misguided belief that nuclear weapons enhance security. Rather than enabling progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, we are impeding it and perpetuating nuclear dangers — all for fear of upsetting our allies who cling to these weapons of mass destruction. But friends can and must speak up when friends engage in reckless behaviour that puts their lives and ours in peril. Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way, and a race for disarmament is urgently needed. It is time to bring the era of reliance on nuclear weapons to a permanent end. In 2017, 122 countries took a courageous but long-overdue step in that direction by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons — a landmark global accord that places nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as chemical and biological weapons and establishes a framework to eliminate them verifiably and irreversibly. Soon it will become binding international law. To date, our countries have opted not to join the global majority in supporting this treaty. But our leaders should reconsider their positions. We cannot afford to dither in the face of this existential threat to humanity. We must show courage and boldness — and join the treaty. As states parties, we could remain in alliances with nuclear-armed states, as nothing in the treaty itself nor in our respective defence pacts precludes that. But we would be legally bound never under any circumstances to assist or encourage our allies to use, threaten to use or possess nuclear weapons. Given the very broad popular support in our countries for disarmament, this would be an uncontroversial and much-lauded move. The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s negotiation — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a licence to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable. The prohibition treaty adopted in 2017 can help end decades of paralysis in disarmament. It is a beacon of hope in a time of darkness. It enables countries to subscribe to the highest available multilateral norm against nuclear weapons and build international pressure for action. As its preamble recognizes, the effects of nuclear weapons “transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation”. With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. All responsible leaders must act now to ensure that the horrors of 1945 are never repeated. Sooner or later, our luck will run out — unless we act. The nuclear weapon ban treaty provides the foundation for a more secure world, free from this ultimate menace. We must embrace it now and work to bring others on board. There is no cure for a nuclear war. Prevention is our only option.

Signed by:

Lloyd Axworthy, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

Ban Ki-moon, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea

Jean-Jacques Blais, Former Minister of National Defence of Canada

Kjell Magne Bondevik, Former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and 53 others.

See www.icanw.org for more information.

U.S.S. Britain: B-52s over Europe

“B-52s are back at RAF Fairford, and will be operating across the theater in what will be a very active deployment. Our ability to quickly respond and assure allies and partners rests upon the fact that we are able to deploy our B-52s at a moment’s notice,” announced Gen. Jeff Harrigian, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa commander. He continued: “Their presence here helps build trust with our NATO allies and partner nations and affords us new opportunities to train together through a variety of scenarios.”

Six B-52s landed at Fairford airbase in the UK at the end of August for what has been described as a ‘routine training mission’. General Harrigian and NATO allies might want to paint this mission as merely ‘routine’, reality tells us a different story.

For a start, the announcement that B-52s were “back at Fairford” tells you that they haven’t been there for some time. We know that the B-52s flew missions from this air-base during the invasion of Iraq and in earlier confrontations. After more than fifteen years, why return now?

Second, B-52s are not simple and straightforward aircraft. Hans Kristensen from the Federation of American Scientists identified two of the bombers deployed to Fairford as being nuclear capable. Were these aircraft carrying nuclear weapons when they landed? Were they carrying them when they took off again? What, exactly, was the intention of the US and NATO in deploying such aircraft with such a capability to Europe at the present moment?

Thirdly, the ‘training mission’ in which the B-52s were apparently engaged included flying over each and every NATO member state in Europe. This was not ‘training’, this was a show of force. Worse, the aircraft then went on to fly over Ukraine - not a NATO member-state - and made close approaches to the Russian border (20km away, according to some reports).

Rather than a ‘training mission’, we have seen an effort from the US and NATO to further increase nuclear tensions in Europe. Great Britain was used as a staging-post for this aggressive and ultimately dangerous show of nuclear force. Are we returning to the days when the UK was little more than a United States Ship off the coast of Europe?

Operation “Allied Sky”, as NATO named the stunt, was designed to show ‘adversaries’ - real and imagined - that should it choose to do so, the ‘Alliance’ is more than capable to delivering genocidal death from the skies.

To take such a course of action during ongoing developments in Belarus and ongoing tensions in Ukraine is completely unacceptable. We already know that the US views the whole of Europe as a ‘nuclear battleground’. In return, we say: make Europe a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

THE ATOM BOMBS DROPPED ON HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI WERE NOT THE REASONS WHY JAPAN SURRENDERED IN WWII

Text of a talk to be given by Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) at Deddington Church, 16 August 2020. See www.whytrident.uk for more of Cdr Forsyth’s writings. Also see END Papers 3, The Case Against Trident

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This weekend when we say prayers for peace on the 75th anniversary of the  end of WWII we also remember that two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima  and Nagasaki on the 5th & 9th August. No one really knows how many died but conservative estimates say upwards of 200,000.

The accepted wisdom is that dropping the  bombs brought an abrupt end to the war and so saved possibly thousands of allied forces lives.

When at sea in my Polaris submarine in the 1970s I accepted this version of history. Only recently,  while researching the concept of nuclear deterrence and the effect of its £200Bn cost over 30 years  on our national budget did I find that this accepted wisdom is not correct. Historical facts relate a somewhat different story.

Following the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and moved 1.5 million Soviet troops to the east to launch an attack through  Manchuria.

At a meeting  with the Emperor - a full  six weeks before Hiroshima – the Japanese War Council agreed that they must do a deal with the Americans or suffer invasion and occupation by the Soviets. This would result in the certain ‘elimination’ of the Japanese ruling class and the Emperor’s execution. The death of their Emperor God was not something the Japanese nation could  contemplate under any circumstance.

The US did not want Japan occupied by the Soviets either – the USSR was already seen as a post-war threat to the West -  and, crucially to Japan, the US were prepared to  accept the continuation of the Emperor as Head of State. 

The Japanese War Cabinet minutes barely mention the bombs. When the second one fell on Nagasaki, the minutes merely record that a messenger ran in and said  ‘Sir, we’ve lost Nagasaki, it’s been destroyed by a new ‘special’ bomb’ … and the chairman responded,  ‘thank you’.

A city-destroying weapon wasn’t particularly shocking or new to a country that had already suffered fire bombings of more than 60 cities, including a massive attack on Tokyo in March 1945 that burned to death some 100,000 people  in one night. But, of course, the Japanese Cabinet had no idea that the long term radiation effects of atomic bombs  would at least double the number killed by the initial blast. 

The decision to surrender was actually made on August 10th  because by then  the Soviets had occupied the South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands and were poised to invade mainland Japan.

This - correct - version of events is supported by a number of contemporary statements: 

·        In his History of WWII Churchill wrote “It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell”

·        Admiral Leahy Chief of Staff to President Truman said: “The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender”.

·        And Professor Galbraith, the official US investigator in Japan said: “The bombs fell after the decision had been taken by the Japanese government to surrender.”

So… why did the US drop the bombs?

Two reasons – firstly, General MacArthur was determined to test them for real and he had absolutely no moral compunction in doing so. Secondly, as US Secretary of War Henry Stimson admitted - the bombs were used  “to gain political advantage over the Soviet Union in the post-war situation”.

It then became convenient for the West  to allow the myth to linger through the Cold War when we were led to believe the Soviets might  attack the West with nuclear weapons. However, Sir Roderic Braithwaite, our Ambassador to the USSR in the early 1990s, has written  “…There is no evidence that the Russians ever hoped to incorporate Western Europe by military means”. So was this yet another myth?

In  the early 1980s, when the General Synod debated ‘The Church and the Bomb’, Christopher Hall challenged the logic of  nuclear deterrence and advocated disarmament. Two years ago the present Archbishop of York did so in an eloquent  and powerful address to the Synod. He made the point that while the UK committed to nuclear disarmament in 1968,  here we were, 50 years later, building new and more powerful submarines and missiles. By a large majority the Synod called on the Government to sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons an action the Government refuses to do. 

Discovering the truth behind the myth that the two atom bombs caused the Japanese to surrender was one of a number of discoveries that has now caused me too to challenge the concept of nuclear deterrence and to agree with Christopher Hall, the Archbishop and many others that we should give up our nuclear weapons. You also may find food for such  thoughts in the Archbishop’s address.

Alva Myrdal's Blueprint from European Nuclear Disarmament

From END Info 18 | August 2020. Download here

In her keynote contribution to Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament (Spokesman Books), Alva Myrdal, the former Disarmament Minister in Sweden, argues for a ‘stepwise’ process of nuclear disarmament in Europe, through what she describes as “self propelled initiatives”, and calls for early unilateral a bilateral measures and guarantees. The following text was published in END Bulletin 7, Winter 1981/82, and is published here as a reminder of the wide-ranging and creative thinking taking place at the time.

Let us try out in a purely imaginative way, what pattern a European nuclear weapon free zone might take – or, more realistically, how the circle of agreements for nuclear disarmed countries, covered by guarantees of non-attack with nuclear weapons, grow in a rather self-generated manner.

Led on by the already thorough public discussion, well prepared proposals and perceptions, embodied in the Rapacki, Undén and Kekkonen plans, I have come to deal fairly extensively with prospective projects in a rank order from those which seem most feasible to the more difficult ones. Thus first the core neutral nations: Sweden and Finland, Yugoslavia, Austria and Switzerland; next the rather cohesive Nordic flank nations: Denmark and Norway in addition to the aforementioned Sweden and Finland; and finally the crucial Central European states which might offer themselves as “balanceable”: the two Germanies and Poland, perhaps taking in also Czechoslovakia or some other East European nation.

Extensions

As the interest in obtaining such added security as an acknowledged status of nuclear disarmament is probably shared by most, if not all, countries in Europe, one might dare to suggest some further extensions. For instance, Holland and Belgium might be early joiners, to judge from their own lively public debate on the issue. On the southern side, Roumania might perhaps be expected to follow up earlier initiatives to help establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Balkans. If balancing is necessary, either Greece or Turkey or both, might then have to be won for a matching agreement. But perhaps Roumania might go it alone, considering its many initiatives to loosen the constraints of the military blocs, whilst preserving their political systems unaltered.

The two minor nuclear powers in Europe, France and Great Britain, have another context. Their quid pro quo problem is very different and much more directly concerns the superpowers’ major interests.

In this essay advocating European nuclear disarmament, I have restricted the attention to those tactical and Eurostrategic weapons which, although some may be important for an overall superpower context, are deployed by them – or intended – for use against European territories. They are definitely against our most vital interests.

Two remarks must be explicitly stressed. One is to remind us – and the superpowers – of the great positive value for the European countries attainable by buttressing security with their promised pledges not to attack us with nuclear weapons when we keep our own territories free from such weapons.

The second is that I have been moved to write as I do in the conviction that at bottom, not just a few, but all, people do realise the compelling need to begin now to lift the fear of doomsday which we sense in appreciating that the all-to-mighty nations in their spiralling mutual hostility use our peoples in Europe as hostages, at a time when we ourselves have become so free from aggressive impulses.

My own proposal definitely favours a stepwise approach but one to be incessantly pursued at the unilateral, as well as the bilateral levels.

Starting now

Europe is now given a chance to negotiate – if we are prepared to take it. The two superpowers have been brought, at last, to agree that negotiations about medium range nuclear missiles for Europe should start, before the end of this year.

This is good. But it is not enough, neither in terms of timetable nor of participants. The negotiations cannot proceed above the heads of the parties mainly concerned, namely the European countries themselves. Nor can these countries passively wait until next year to discover which directions the negotiations might take.

We should make up our own minds and act, both on a schedule of more tightly planned, speedier negotiations and on building up an agenda which could produce desirable results.

How can we hasten the many faceted pattern of negotiations? Probably we should be tentative to begin with, allowing different nations to “feel out” the possibilities of cooperation with other nations. Likeminded states like the free, nonaligned nations would be in order to open talks right away, and so would such others as the smaller and “next to nuclear free” states like those of Benelux. Members of the military alliances must begin by opening dialogues with their superpower leaders to gain insight as to how they can go forward in winning freedom from the nuclear weapon option; thus Norway and Denmark can explore how safely they can become free from being drawn into NATO’s planning for using nuclear weapons in wartime.

We, the European countries – must prepare a variety of inputs for what as yet are only prospectively bilateral negotiations between the two superpowers. They should not be left alone to decide on what Germans call “Nach-Rüstung” – making some additions of new nuclear-weapon systems on European soil seem inevitable, a foregone conclusion.

Our chance to influence the decisions is the greater the sooner we start and the more decisively we act in presenting plans.

'Consistent and staunch support for the CTBT'

From END Info 18 | August 2020. Download here

Following President Trump’s threats to resume nuclear testing, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated a letter to all State Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (see END Info 17). The letter was also sent to other agencies and individuals with a stake in the CTBT. We received the following reply from the European External Action Service.

Brussels, 15 July 2020

Distinguished Colleagues,

Thank you for your letter on ‘Nuclear Testing Alert’ dated 29 June 2020.

Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious threat to international peace and security and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. The European Union has been a consistent and staunch supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of its Organisation. Since its opening for signature in 1996, the CTBT has helped stop nuclear testing while also serving as a strong confidence- and security building measure. Support for the CTBT within the EU is strong and universal; all EU Member States have signed and ratified the Treaty. We promote actively its entry into force and universalization in line with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Let me assure you that the entry into force of the CTBT remains our political imperative.We use every opportunity to encourage new CTBT ratifications using our political, diplomatic and financial tools. We raise the issue of CTBT ratification in our political dialogues and through diplomatic outreach to the remaining Annex II and non-Annex II countries alike. We decided to become a supporter of promoting the entry into force of the CTBT action in the UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament. We contribute to the CTBT Article XIV process and count ourselves among the ‘Friends of the CTBT’.

In parallel with our political demarches, we continue investing significant amounts to underpin the CTBTO efforts in promoting capacity building and the Treaty's entry into force. Regular contributions from EU Member States to the CTBTO comprise roughly 40% of the Organization’s total annual budget. The EU is one of the largest providers of voluntary funds to the CTBTO. Since 2006, the Council of the European Union has adopted eight Decisions in support of the CTBTO: 3 Joint Actions in 2006, 2007 and 2008 and 5 Council Decisions in 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018 and 2020 committing EUR 29.5 million. The EU provides financial support to the CTBTO for training and education work aimed at building up and maintaining the necessary capacity in the technical, scientific, legal and policy aspects of the Treaty and its verification regime.

The CTBT is the result of the dedicated efforts of policy makers, colleague diplomats and civil society. With strong support from the UN General Assembly, what we have today is an incredibly strong instrument, fully verifiable, signed by 184 States and ratified by 168 States. The EU believes that every single signature and ratification matters. Every single country can lead by example and help universalise the Treaty. Through the CTBT, countries with differing perspectives have demonstrated their ability to think strategically and responsibly. This is the spirit we have to nurture and the EU is your friend in this endeavour.

Yours sincerely,

Joanneke BALFOORT