'Eurobomb'? No thanks!

What has prompted recent statements from prominent German political figures and others that call - to one degree or another - for the creation of a ‘Eurobomb’? Such a ‘Eurobomb’ is imagined as an ‘independent’ nuclear weapons system developed, maintained and controlled by a coalition of European states. ‘Independent’ here means ‘independent of the United States’. The idea is not a new one, of course.

NATO’s 1957 ‘strategic concept’ was explicit about the central role of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ [sic] of Europe. The 1957 concept was itself a development of US President Eisenhower’s 1953 ‘New Look’ policy. According to Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neill (Partners in deterrence, p40):

...Einsenhower’s New Look policy ... envisaged maintaining the economic viability of the Western defence effort by substituting (cheap) nuclear for (expensive) conventional forces. The [North Atlantic Council] agreed to the introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to Europe in 1953, and to a general concept of using nuclear weapons for defending allied territory ... in 1954.

From this point onwards, nuclear weapons played a central role in NATO’s concept of ‘defence’ in Europe and became central to the development of relationships within the nuclear-armed alliance. To what extent did the German government, the German public and wider European society debate and discuss the implications of this new development?

In their ‘war-gaming’ of the use of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ of Europe, how many German lives were calculated to be ‘expendable’ for such ‘defence’? How many French lives? How much death and destruction was acceptable? If the 1954 decision was discussed in detail, it was certainly not done in public.

This changed in 1955: between 20 and 28 June of that year, NATO forces conducted a ‘field training exercise’ across Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and a section of France. Named Carte Blanche, the exercise modelled the ‘defence of Europe’ from an attack by Soviet forces. The ‘defence of Europe’ was now, following the 1954 decision, to be conducted with nuclear weapons. The outcome of the exercise indicated the ‘defence of Europe’ by nuclear means would involve the killing of 1,700,000 Germans and the wounding of 3,500,000 others.

The outcome of Carte Blanche became a matter of public discussion and debate in Germany. The population was understandably interested in and alarmed at the cost of ‘defence’ by such means. Have the German and other politicians now floating the idea of a ‘Eurobomb’ encouraged and facilitated similar debate and discussion? What would be the cost of ‘defending Germany’ by such means? Or do they consider other factors to be more important than the prospect of mass-killings?

1956 and the events surrounding Suez add a further dimension to our story. Waning colonial powers, including France and fascist Portugal, were pressuring for NATO to “take a more active interest, and perhaps active policy, outside Europe” (Timothy Sale, Enduring Alliance, p32) at the end of 1955. In this context, Germany argued that: “Wherever one of us loses, all lose”. The key element that united reaction to Carte Blanche and the pressures of late 1955 was a recognition of the obvious from NATO member states: that the ‘defence’ of Europe and the interests of European NATO member-states, including their colonial and post-colonial interests, was now in the hands of the United States. The events of October 1956 demonstrated this most clearly. Not only did the US not come to the aid of Britain, France and Israel in their military action against Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal but they “insisted that the British agree to a cease-fire and present a timetable for withdrawal or Britain would be denied access to the International Monetary Fund” (ibid, p33). That is: the US threatened to bankrupt Britain for ‘stepping out of line’. Why the US is not employing such threats against the genocidal government of Israel today illustrates the levels of sincerity on display in the Security Council and elsewhere. Following Suez, the German foreign minister declared that “NATO is dead for the moment.”

What to make of this declaration? According to a senior official of the German government, who we presume represented the settled view of that government, when the US acted in its own interest to put a stop to the Suez crisis NATO was “dead for the moment”. Contrast this to the outcome of Carte Blanche, where to protect its interests in Europe the US publicly declared its willingness to have millions of Germans killed and wounded. At this point, NATO was not “dead for the moment.” The fact that Germany had no direct interest in the French, British and Israeli colonial escapade in Egypt makes this even more startling.

By this time, Britain was already in possession of atomic weapons and with Prime Minister Eden out of the way, Harold Macmillan was able to quickly repair relations with Eisenhower (who he knew well). Other European NATO member states were not in the same position. Whereas Britain and the US concluded their Mutual Defence Agreement by 1958, cementing the end of anything like a truly independent foreign and military policy for the British, other European states who were not yet atomic powers in their own right had to contend with a changing landscape.

Both Britain and the US considered large deployments of troops in Europe to be overly burdensome. Why, when the ‘defence’ of Europe involved turning Germany into a nuclear battlefield, should so many troops be stationed there? As such, in 1957 NATO’s nuclear posture underwent another significant change to a situation where “sharing of nuclear hardware became a key element of the alliances strategic posture” (Partners in deterrence, p41). ‘Sharing’ did not amount to parity between the US and those states it ‘shared’ nuclear weapons with. For instance, a US Congressional committee visit to West Germany in 1960 observed “fighter aircraft loaded with nuclear bombs sitting on the edge of runways with ... pilots inside the cockpits and starter plugs inserted. The embodiment of control was an American officer somewhere in the vicinity with a revolver.” (ibid). This example and many others emphasised the degree to which European ‘defence’ was wholly reliant on the United States.

Such a reality, combined with US opposition to independent French plans, compelled France to work closely with Israel on the development of nuclear weapons:

Israel signed a secret agreement with then NATO member France, to cooperate in a program of nuclear research that would make Israel the world’s sixth country to possess nuclear weapons. Even here there may have been an indirect, unintended helping hand from the Eisenhower administration. In 1958, the U.S. enraged Charles de Gaulle by opposing French acquisition of nuclear weapons while publicly acknowledging that a special nuclear relationship existed between the United States and Britain.

(Stephen Green, Taking Sides, p157)

The story up to this point demonstrates the degree to which all European members of NATO had convinced themselves, against all moral reasoning and logic, to fully accept nuclear doctrines as a substitute for real security and defence. The story also illustrates the degree to which adherence to such a doctrine implied overwhelming reliance on US capabilities, with little encouragement for independent action. With the entry of France, with the aid of Israel, into the nuclear club there were now prospects for ‘independent’ initiative:

Greater desire for influence over the use of nuclear weapons was also shared by West Germany, which carefully coordinated cooperation with France and Italy to develop sovereign (European) nuclear capabilities while arguing for greater influence over nuclear use decisions in NATO ...

By the 1960s, the proposal for a sea-based [Multilateral Force] of nuclear ballastic missiles became central to transatlantic debates, as the US

... looked to a new NATO force to counter what seemed to be an increasingly close alignment between Paris and Bonn. (Partners in Deterrence)

As we have seen, initiatives towards the development of an ‘independent’ ‘Eurobomb’ first emerged in a period of uncertainty over the actual levels of US commitment to the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and at a time when questions over levels of control emerged. What was true in the 1950s and 1960s seems to correspond to current developments.

A desperate and bloody war rages on the doorstep. NATO is expanding, the US nuclear-bootprint in Europe is expanding and intensifying. Europe is re-arming and re-militarising at an astonishing rate. To all intents and purposes, it would appear that within the questionable confines of what states understand to constitute ‘security’, Europe is meeting the ‘security challenges’ posed by recent events.

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are to receive new, enhanced, US nuclear bombs. The orders for the new, nuclear-capable jets to carry them have been placed and are to be fulfilled. The United Kingdom looks sets to be home to US nuclear bombs once more. These steps surely meet the requirements for maintaining and bolstering the “ultimate guarantor of security”? So what has prompted these calls for a ‘Eurobomb’ and what does this suggest about the near future?

As in 1950s and 1960s, uncertainty around whether or not the US can or will meet its stated obligations as a NATO member in the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and questions around control of nuclear weapons have emerged. The source of this uncertainty and these concerns is threefold. First: the prospect of a second Trump White House, the record of his first administration and recent statements about NATO. Second: the fact that the current President, Joe Biden, and his administration seem unable to secure support in Congress for military aid. Third: the overwhelming signals of political instability emanating from Washington, which are linked to the first two concerns.

“NATO is dead for the moment” worried the German Foreign Minister following the Suez debacle. German, French and other foreign ministers thought the same during the first Trump administration. In a speech on 7 February 2020, French President Macron called NATO “brain dead”. Under Trump, US-NATO relations reached a nadir, with the President demanding huge commitments to military spending (now fulfilled) and a succession of bust-ups at NATO meetings. At one point, European leaders worried about “Westlessness”: how would the world cope without a unified, nuclear-armed military alliance such as NATO?

Johann Wadephul, a senior CDU (Germany) politician who now sits on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s political committee, responded to Macron’s 2020 speculations over ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear weapons with this claim: “We need to consider working with France on nuclear weapons. Germany should be ready to participate in this nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and resources.”

As the US election campaign intensifies, the fragility of ‘European defence’ will become clearer and clearer. Since the late 1950s, European states have told themselves and the world that US nuclear weapons provide the ‘ultimate guarantor’ of ‘security’ [sic]. They have convinced themselves that the nuclear-armed NATO alliance is an essential, indispensable instrument to ensure the ‘security’ of the continent. Yet time and again, these shibboleths have collided with the concerns, priorities and ambitions of individual European states and with reality itself. This is not just a matter of over-reliance on the United States and its nuclear weapons. This is about the entire concept of ‘security’ with nuclear weapons at its core.

Such weapons are not a ‘deterrence’, they are an instrument of ‘compellence’. They compel those who rely on them, like NATO member states, to align themselves with the United States and as such they are subject to the particular interests of that country. They are also subject to the turbulence currently on display in the United States elections and the outcome of this election. Nuclear weapons compel politicians of all stripes to accept the idea that the ability to unleash nuclear genocide is a reasonable foundation for ‘security’. They seek to compel others with the threat of genocide. At a time of sharp nuclear tensions, the myth of ‘nuclear based security’ compels moves towards a proliferation of nuclear capabilities when what Europe and the world needs is more robust non-proliferation and genuine moves towards abolition.

Speculation around a ‘Eurobomb’ exposes the foolishness of ‘nuclear security’.